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 Abstract  
Decreasing water availability per capita in more and more countries is the result of bad 
management over the past centuries.  The ‘world water crisis’, however, is not inevitable.  
The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been promoted over 
the last ten years as a possible way of reversing such a trend. One of its most fervent 
promoters is the Global Water Partnership, according to which “IWRM is a process which 
promotes the co-ordinated development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000: 22). 
A number of authors are critical of an appropriation of the IWRM concept by the Global 
Water Partnership devoid of its historical evolution over more than 70 years (Biswas, 2005; 
Mollard and Vargas, 2005a). As a result of this omission, these authors question the 
applicability and usefulness of the concept and call for assessing the effectiveness of IWRM 
implementation. The difficulties of practical IWRM implementation are manifold and 
include issues of scale, as well as institutional, political, and social constraints to sectoral and 
environmental integration (Tortajada, 2005; Duda and El-Ashry, 2000; Mitchell, 1990), that 
can be more or less specific to developing countries (Thioubou, 2002).  
The 1992 Mexican Water Law, amended in 2004, explicitly refers to IWRM as a national 
objective. As a result, there has been fairly extensive research on the implementation of 
IWRM in Mexico at the national level. This study assesses the implementation of IWRM 
efforts in the municipality of El Grullo (Jalisco), to identify the local and necessary 
conditions to enhance these.  
We first recall the innovative aspects of the IWRM concept, as compared to more traditional 
water management. Ambitious, integrated water resources management is a holistic 
approach that includes both the natural system (water and its diverse components –surface 
water/groundwater, quantity/quality- but also all other environmental resources such as 
land, forests and biodiversity in general) and the human system, including all the different 
uses (domestic, agricultural, industrial, etc.) (Mitchell, 1990). Integrated water management 
is an indicator of what Gleick (2000) qualifies as a change in paradigm between the 20th 
century –where infrastructure development enabled to better exploit resources, perceived as 
unlimited- and the 21st century, where finite resources are to be managed in order to 
 maintain ecological integrity. Integrated water resources management is necessary to realise 
this ‘blue revolution’ (Calder, 2005). It requires, on the one hand, a participative and 
negotiation-oriented institutional framework and, on the other hand, water pricing tools, so 
as to balance demand and supply (Meublat, 2001). 
At the level of a municipality, implementing IWRM efforts translates, on the one hand, in 
ensuring good quality municipal water and sanitation services without impacting 
surrounding ecosystems and, on the other hand, participating –with other municipalities 
and institutions- in coordination activities at the level of the basin or sub-basin (Smits and 
Butterworth, 2006).  
Seven months of fieldwork over a three-year period enabled to realise a number of 
interviews, both with households in the El Grullo municipality (in four urban 
neighbourhoods and three villages) and with key informants (the local authorities of El 
Grullo and five neighbour municipalities, members of the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed 
Commission and researchers from the partner institution IMECBIO). These interviews were 
complemented by direct observation as well as secondary sources of information.  
Our results show that in spite of being well endowed in water resources, the municipality of 
El Grullo does not manage to provide good quality potable water services. Water 
distribution is irregular and forces households to resort to appropriate social practices (e.g. 
use of various storage methods and alternative water sources). The inequity of the variable 
water service quality is reinforced by a fixed water fee system, in the absence of meters. 
Further, the lack of any wastewater treatment station impacts riparian villages and aquatic 
ecosystems located downstream from the wastewater discharge. Efforts are currently 
underway to address these issues: the municipality wishes to have water meters installed, 
and is also negotiating a concession with a private company for a constructed wetland to 
treat municipal wastewaters.  
At the regional level, the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission, which was established 
in 1998, is criticised for the poor effective participation it generates and its lack of means and 
concrete results. Created in reaction to finance local priorities, the Inter-municipal initiative 
of the lower Ayuquila watershed, a negotiation platform that convenes ten municipalities, is 
in comparison relatively successful. Developed through a ten year trust-building process by 
the researchers from the University of Guadalajara and the directorship of the Sierra de 
Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, it has enabled the Ayuquila River to regain its original state, 
as well as set up a series of measures to protect the environment (e.g. the establishment of 
 fire brigades and solid waste separation and recycling programmes). The Ayuquila-Armería 
Watershed Commission wishes, in turn, to replicate this model throughout the whole 
watershed. Although the management plan is still to be designed at the basin scale, these 
inter-municipal initiatives are indeed judged more flexible and better adapted to IWRM 
implementation. 
These results show that in order for the El Grullo municipality to enhance its efforts in terms 
of IWRM, important changes must take place. More specifically, decentralisation must be 
reinforced, at the level of both the municipal water board and the Ayuquila-Armería 
Watershed Commission. First, the potable water tariffs should be set independently by the 
municipal water board, on the basis of its operating costs –and not on that of political 
calculations, as is actually the case by the Jalisco State Congress. This would contribute to 
put an end to the vicious circle entailed by the municipal board’s insufficient financial 
capacity (i.e. lack of staff, limited infrastructure maintenance, heterogeneous water services, 
lack of meters, non-payment of fees, etc.), along with other factors at stake (like encouraging 
a culture of payment). The Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission should also benefit 
from more freedom and means, in order to increase its credibility among the municipalities 
its territorial borders encompass. The effective transcription of the 2004 reform of the Water 
Law, which seems to point in that direction, is awaited by all those interested in this issue.  
This thesis thus confirms previous analyses of problems surrounding IWRM 
implementation in Mexico (Mollard and Vargas, 2005b; Tortajada, 2005; García, 2004; Centro 
del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003; Martínez et al., 2002b). It also highlights 
the importance of finding country-specific ways for ensuring effective IWRM 
implementation. In particular, this may mean considering other scales than that of river 
basins. 
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 Résumé 
L’insuffisante quantité d’eau douce disponible par habitant qui menace un nombre croissant 
de pays résulte de mauvaises habitudes de gestion de la ressource, acquises au cours des 
siècles passés. La ‘crise mondiale de l’eau’ n’est cependant pas une fatalité. 
Le concept de Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (GIRE) est promu depuis une dizaine 
d’années comme un moyen possible de renverser la vapeur. L’un de ses plus fervents 
défenseurs est le Partenariat Mondial sur l’Eau, pour lequel “la GIRE est un processus qui 
promeut un développement et une gestion coordonnés de l’eau, du sol et des ressources qui 
y sont liées, de manière à maximiser équitablement le bien-être économique et social qui en 
résulte, sans compromettre la durabilité des écosystèmes vitaux” (traduit de GWP, 2000 : 
22). 
Un certain nombre d’auteurs critiquent l’appropriation qui est faite du concept de GIRE par 
le Partenariat Mondial de l’Eau sans en reconnaître la conformation historique pendant plus 
de 70 ans (Biswas, 2005; Mollard et Vargas, 2005a). Ils mettent de ce fait en question 
l’applicabilité et l’utilité du concept, appelant de leurs vœux à une évaluation de sa mise en 
œuvre et des difficultés rencontrées à ce propos. Celles-ci sont nombreuses, que ce soit en 
termes d’échelle ou de contraintes institutionnelles, politiques ou sociales s’opposant à une 
intégration sectorielle et environnementale (Tortajada, 2005 ; Duda et El-Ashry, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1990), qui peuvent en outre être spécifiques aux pays en développement 
(Thioubou, 2002).  
La loi sur l’eau mexicaine de 1992, réformée en 2004, fait explicitement état de la GIRE 
comme base de la politique nationale de l’eau. De ce fait, sa mise en œuvre au Mexique a 
déjà fait l’objet d’un certain nombre de recherches. Cette étude se concentre sur les efforts 
de gestion intégrée de l’eau dans la municipalité de El Grullo (Jalisco), afin d’identifier les 
conditions locales requises pour en améliorer les résultats.  
Dans un premier temps nous rappellons l’aspect innovant de la gestion intégrée de l’eau par 
rapport à une gestion plus traditionnelle. Ambitieuse, la gestion intégrée de l’eau est une 
approche holistique qui inclut à la fois le système naturel (les divers composants de l’eau –
eau de surface/eau souterraine, quantité/qualité- ainsi que ses interactions avec 
l’environnement naturel plus large comme le sol, les forêts et la biodiversité en général) 
mais aussi les divers usages humains de l’eau pris dans leur ensemble (usages domestiques, 
agricoles, industriels, etc.) (Mitchell, 1990). Elle est un indicateur de ce que Gleick (2000) 
 signale comme un changement de paradigme entre le 20ième siècle –où le dévelppement 
d’infrastructures permettait de mieux exploiter la ressource, perçue comme illimitée- et le 
21ième siècle, où il s’agit plutôt de gérer une ressource limitée tout en préservant les cycles 
écologiques. La gestion intégrée de l’eau est nécessaire pour mener à bien cette ‘révolution 
bleue’ (Calder, 2005). Elle requiert, d’une part, un cadre institutionnel participatif et orienté 
vers la négociation, et d’autre part, des outils permettant de calculer le prix de l’eau, afin 
d’équilibrer l’offre et la demande (Meublat, 2001). 
Au niveau municipal, mettre en œuvre des efforts de gestion intégrée de l’eau signifie tout 
d’abord assurer un service municipal d’eau potable et d’assainissement de qualité, sans 
affecter les écosystèmes environnants, et ensuite participer –avec d’autres municipalités et 
institutions- à des activités de coordination au niveau du bassin (ou sous-bassin) versant 
(Smits et Butterworth, 2006).  
Sept mois de travail de terrain sur plus de trois années ont permis de réaliser de nombreux 
entretiens qualitatifs avec les habitants de la municipalité (dans quatre quartiers urbains et 
trois villages) ainsi que des informateurs-clé (autorités locales d’El Grullo et de quatre 
municipalités avoisinantes, membres de la Commission du Bassin Versant de l’Ayuquila-
Armería, chercheurs de l’institut de recherche partenaire IMECBIO). Ces entretiens ont été 
complétés par de l’observation directe ainsi que des sources d’information secondaire.  
Nos résultats montrent que malgré sa riche dotation en eau, la municipalité n’arrive pas à 
assurer un service municipal en eau de qualité. Celui-ci est très inégal suivant les quartiers 
et les villages, obligeant les habitants à faire face à travers des pratiques sociales adaptées 
(divers modes de stockage de l’eau et recours à des sources alternatives). L’inéquité qui 
résulte de la variabilité du service est encore renforcée par le système tarifaire fixe, en 
l’absence de compteurs. Par ailleurs, l’inexistence d’une station d’épuration des eaux usées, 
liée à l’insuffisante capacité financière d’El Grullo, défavorise les villages riverains et 
écosystème aquatiques situés en aval. Des efforts sont en train d’être mis sur pied afin de 
remédier à ces difficultés : la municipalité souhaite mettre en place des compteurs, et est par 
ailleurs en pourparlers avec une entreprise privée pour un projet de concession d’une 
lagune de décantation des eaux usées.  
Au niveau régional, la Commission du bassin versant de l’Ayuquila-Armería est assez 
critiquée, après huit années d’existence, que ce soit pour la faible participation effective 
qu’elle convoque ou son manque de moyens et de résultats concrets. Au contraire, 
l’initiative inter-municipale de la partie médiane du bassin versant, plate-forme de 
 négociation entre dix municipalités crée en réaction afin de financer les priorités locales, est 
un franc succès. Construite sur la base d’une confiance développée depuis une dizaine 
d’années par les chercheurs de l’Université de Guadalajara et la direction de la Réserve de la 
Biosphère Sierra de Manantlán, elle a permis à la rivière Ayuquila de retrouver son état 
originel et de mettre en place toute une série de mesures de protection de l’environnement 
(lutte contre les feux de forêt, tri et recyclage des déchets ménagers). A tel point que la 
Commission du bassin versant souhaite répliquer ce modèle afin d’en couvrir l’ensemble du 
bassin. Même si le plan de gestion restera fixé au niveau du bassin, de telles initiatives sont 
en effet jugées plus flexibles et plus adaptées pour mettre en œuvre une gestion intégrée de 
l’eau. 
L’analyse de ces résultats montre que d’importants changements doivent avoir lieu afin que 
la municipalité d’El Grullo puisse améliorer ses efforts en termes de gestion intégrée de 
l’eau. La décentralisation en place doit notamment être renforcée, à la fois au niveau du 
service municipal de l’eau mais aussi de la Commission du bassin versant. D’une part, le 
tarif de l’eau potable doit pouvoir être fixé de manière indépendante par la municipalité, sur 
la base du coût de ses opérations –et non plus sur des principes politiques électoraux, 
comme c’est actuellement le cas au niveau du Congrès Etatique de Jalisco. Cela contribuera 
à mettre fin au cercle vicieux crée par une insuffisante capacité financière (personnel 
insuffisant, infrastructures mal entretenues, couverture du service très hétérogène, absence 
de compteurs, arriérés de paiements, etc.), en accompagnement d’autres mesures (comme 
l’encouragement à payer les factures). D’autre part, la Commission du bassin versant de 
l’Ayuquila-Armería doit pouvoir, elle aussi, bénéficier de plus de liberté et de moyens, afin  
d’accroître sa crédibilité auprès des municipalités incluses dans son champ d’action. La 
transcription effective de la réforme de la loi sur l’eau de 2004, qui va dans ce sens, est 
attendue au tournant par tous ceux qui s’intéressent à cette question.    
Cette thèse permet donc de confirmer les analyses d’experts travaillant sur les problèmes de 
la gestion intégrée de l’eau au Mexique (Mollard et Vargas, 2005b; Tortajada, 2005 ; García, 
2004 ; Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003; Martínez et al., 2002b). Elle 
souligne aussi l’importance, pour chaque pays s’engageant dans la mise en œuvre de la 
GIRE, de trouver la manière la plus adéquate de le faire, qui ne passe pas forcément par 
l’échelle du bassin versant. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, we first present a snapshot of the global context of water, very often 
presented as one of crisis. In a second section, we introduce our research design: the 
institutional framework in which it took place, our research objectives and questions. The 
last section outlines the structure of the thesis.  
 
1. A ‘global water crisis’: what kind of a crisis are we talking about? 
a. Facts and figures 
Hereafter, we introduce the data which point out to a global water crisis: the reduction of 
freshwater availability per person –mainly due to rising demand and contamination of the 
resource- as well as the consequent environmental impacts. 
 
Decreasing freshwater availability per person 
Water resources (estimated to reach 1380 million km3) make up 70% of the planet’s surface. 
But less than 3% of this is freshwater, the rest being saline. Moreover, 70% of the total 
freshwater is not available, as it constitutes the polar ices of Antarctic and Greenland. The 
30% of freshwater actually available (12.3 million km3) is essentially groundwater (29%) and 
surface water (1%), which is the only easily accessible portion. 
  Figure 1: Available freshwater on Earth 
 
  Source: WBCSD, 2006: 1 
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Although water is a renewable resource that simply changes form and location –without 
creation or destruction- through the hydrologic cycle (see figure 2 below), two main factors 
are affecting its availability1. 
Figure 2: The hydrologic cycle 
 
Source: Cech (2005: 24) 
The first factor is population growth. Competition over the same amount of freshwater has 
rather intensified during the last century, as global population more than tripled –from 1.6 
million to 6.1 million (reaching 6.5 million today). But global freshwater consumption 
increased even more than twice the rate of the population growth, rising six-fold between 
1900 and 1995. 
This is because population growth incurs an increase in water demand for agriculture, 
domestic use, hydropower, industry, etc. While agriculture has always maintained a 
prominent position (reaching 70% of total water use worldwide), during the last century 
industrial and municipal uses have at least tripled, reaching respectively 24% and 9% today 
(UNDP, 2006). These proportions nonetheless vary according to the countries (apart from 
that of domestic uses, similar to the world average): agriculture reaches more than 80% in 
                                                 
1 This is without mentioning the effects of climate change on the hydrologic cycle, difficult to quantify (Dupont, 
2006). Indeed although it could increase annual precipitation in some instances, rising temperatures can also 
increase the rate of evaporation and lead to loss of freshwater trapped in glaciers (WBCSD, 2006). In any case, all 
countries –and especially the poorest people in poor countries- “will feel the impact of changing rainfall patterns, 
extreme weather events and rising sea levels” (UNDP, 2006: 134). 
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low and middle-income countries2 and drops to 30% in high-income ones, while industrial 
uses fluctuate between 10% to 60% respectively (UN-WWAP, 2006b).  
Map 1: Freshwater uses by sector 
 
Source: UNEP, 2002 
 
Further, various changes in lifestyle (expectation to find all crops all year round, thus 
requiring more irrigation, or increased consumption of meat, as well as impacts of tourism 
on local resources) combined with urbanisation (water supply of big cities is often realised 
through over-exploitation of aquifers3 or massive water transfers) also put more pressure on 
the resource (UN-WWAP, 2003a). Increasing affluence in countries like India and China for 
instance also entails increased water consumption, be it for basic water and sanitation needs 
or other lifestyle-induced changes (gardens, car-washes, swimming-pools, etc.) (WBCSD, 
2006).  
Water reserves are also decreasing because the natural components of the hydrological cycle 
(precipitation, infiltration, runoff, evaporation and transpiration) are being disturbed by 
human activities –such as deforestation, sedimentation, urbanisation- that prevent the cycle 
from pursuing its normal pathway4 (UN-WWAP, 2006b).  
                                                 
2 This is the result, among other things, of development policies in the 1950s-1970s that had the primary objective 
of increasing crop yields through the extension of irrigation (Meublat, 2001). 
3 Although underground water constitutes an important reserve, extraction rates often exceed the rhythm at 
which it is renewed.   
4 Evapotranspiration, which occurs at the level of plants and the soil, is reduced by deforestation or urbanisation. 
Sedimentation, for its part, impacts the water quality.  
 4
As a result, the availability of freshwater per person has decreased by 40% since 1970, and 
will continue to do so, by 30% until 2025 (UN-WWAP, 2003a). Reserves have plummeted 
from 16,800 m3 per year per person in 1950, down to 7300 m3 in 2000 and are expected to 
reach 4800 m3 in 2025 (Dupont, 2006).  
This is sufficient on average, but does not reflect uneven distribution: a total of 700 million 
people live in 43 water-stressed countries today, a figure which is only bound to increase as 
most experience very high population growth. The latest data regarding global statistics 
speak for themselves: in 2002, 1.1 billion people still do not have access to safe drinking 
water, while 2.6 billion lack access to improved sanitation (UN-WWAP, 2006b).  
Ecosystem-wise, freshwater biodiversity –which tends to be highest in tropical regions- is 
facing important losses: 50% of wetlands have disappeared in the past century, while 20% of 
all freshwater species are threatened or extinct, due in part to habitat destruction and 
pollution (IUCN, 2000).  
The second factor impacting water availability, in addition to its relative scarcity, is its 
contamination (UNEP GEMS/Water Programme, 2004). As a reminder, 1 m3 of contaminated 
water puts 8-10 m3 of freshwater out of use (Dupont, 2006).  
In developed countries, freshwater quality has degraded as a consequence of the socio-
economic development that rose after the Industrial Revolution. Point source pollution now 
being rather under control5, the priority is put on non-point source pollution (Somlyódy, 
1995). Intensive agriculture, with over-use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, is the main 
source of pollution of rivers and aquifers, makings the water dangerous and costly to treat.  
In developing countries, demographic changes are important factors for the future. These 
countries harbour the fastest growing cities –which are also those with low levels of 
infrastructure for both water supply and wastewater treatment. The major issue might thus 
well be urban pollution management (Somlyódy, 1995). In Latin America, for example, 75% 
of the population is urban and only 2% of total urban sewage is treated (IUCN, 2000). 
Industry and agriculture also bear the responsibility for freshwater pollution. 
Such pollution has chain-reaction consequences. Discharging untreated wastewaters into 
rivers alters freshwater species’ habitat, thereby impacting on the whole ecosystem’s 
functionality (IUCN, 2000). Consequently, rivers’ efficiency to auto-purify decreases 
(Dourojeanni, 2002). This creates many potential hazards for populations living downstream, 
such as the contraction of water-borne diseases. By way of reminder, due to lack of access to 
safe drinking water, poor sanitation and insufficient hygiene, water-related diseases cause at 
                                                 
5 Urban wastewater treatment has been ongoing for decades while important efforts were made to cut industrial 
pollution during the past twenty years. 
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least three million deaths each year6  –i.e. 8000 people per day, mostly children- essentially in 
developing countries (UN-WWAP, 2006b). But like hunger, lack of access to water of good 
quality is a silent crisis, not reaching the headlines like wars or natural disasters, although “it 
claims more lives through disease than any war claims through guns” (UNDP, 2006).  River 
contamination also affects livelihoods through reduced fishing yields, which provide cheap 
and high quality protein (Hardoy et al., 2001). 
These two factors (population growth and increasing contamination) contributing to 
decrease freshwater availability per person, are affecting a resource that is already very 
unevenly distributed, geographically speaking. About 60% of the resource is located in nine 
countries –Brazil, Russia, China, Canada, Indonesia, USA, India, Colombia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo- even though local variations inside the countries can also be 
significant (WBCSD, 2006). As a means of comparison, Latin America has 12 times more 
water per person than South Asia (UNDP, 2006). Where important seasonal variations take 
place, average national data do not reflect the reality of the water availability either.  
 
Future prospects 
“About one third of the world’s population already lives in countries considered to be ‘water 
stressed’ -that is, where consumption exceeds 10% of total supply7. If present trends 
continue, two out of every three people on Earth will live in that condition by 2025” (Annan, 
2000).  
  Map 2: Freshwater availability prospects in 2025 
 
  Source: WBCSD, 2005: 8  
                                                 
6 Mainly diarrhoeal diseases (1.8 million deaths) and malaria (1.2 million), along with dengue, schistosomiasis, 
Japanese encephalitis, intestinal nematode infections (0.6 million altogether) –but many more infectious and non-
infectious diseases related to water exist, for which sufficient data is unavailable.  
7  The threshold under which a country is considered to be experiencing water stress (i.e. translating that there is 
insufficient water to meet all agricultural, industrial, domestic and environmental needs) is 1700 m3/year/person. 
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By 2025, predictions estimate that “water withdrawal will increase by 50 percent in 
developing countries and 18 percent in developed countries” (UN-WWAP, 2003a). In regard 
to the future population increase and consequent water demand for food production, global 
demand for irrigation would rise by 17% compared to 2000, probably matched by a rise of 
20% and 70% respectively for industrial and municipal uses (WWC, 2000).  
As a consequence, water conflicts are bound to develop between demands for agriculture, 
human domestic supply, electricity production and ecosystems (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000), 
i.e. between the numerous human activities on the one hand, and between these and 
environmental needs on the other. With 60% of the world’s population projected to be urban 
by 2030 (United Nations Population Division, 2002), water policies worldwide must 
therefore ensure a more balanced distribution between irrigation purposes and urban 
demand for water –which usually coincides geographically with industrial demand: “In 
many of these areas, water is being allocated to higher valued industry and urban uses, 
leaving agriculture and the environment to compete for decreasing amounts of water” 
(Molden et al., 2001: 15). As a result, predictions are made that ”the area of water stress and 
conflict that is likely to intensify the most is not between cities and agriculture, but rather 
between nature and agriculture” (Moore, 2004: 49).  
To face the problems of decreasing freshwater availability, two main opponent approaches 
exist. The first is technical, oriented towards exploring new sources of water supply, through 
three paths: increasing the exploitation of groundwater resources through sinkings; pursuing 
the 20th century’s dam building policy; and desalinating sea water8. The second approach 
seeks to reduce our water consumption: although also based on technical innovation (such as 
drip irrigation or wastewater recycling), demand-oriented management requires an 
additional change in stakeholders’ mentality beforehand (Dupont, 2006). 
But the limited possibilities to increase supply as well as the current unsustainable situation 
in terms of impacts on the ecosystems lead many to conclude to the unbalanced arithmetic of 
water, under current management procedures9 (WWC, 2000). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The technology of desalinisation produces 20 million m3 of freshwater daily, i.e. 1% of world consumption. It is 
particularly developed in some rich coastal countries like Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and 
Qatar, whose petrol can sustain this energy-intensive and costly technology (USD 1000/m3 on average), but is 
also spreading in Asia and southern Europe (de Fillipis, 2000). 
9 This situation is all the more challenging in developing countries, where lack of information and resources offer 
even less optimistic prospects. 
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b. A management crisis 
In 2000, the World Water Vision, presented by the World Water Council at the 2nd World 
Water Forum clearly stated that the water crisis existing in many parts of the world is 
generally not caused by a lack of the resource, but by poor water management (WWC, 2000). 
The Human Development Report of 2006 concurs, insisting that most countries have enough 
water to meet all human and environmental needs and that “what passes for scarcity is a 
policy-induced consequence of mismanaging the resource” (UNDP, 2006). As resumed by F. 
Lasserre: “The actual crisis, much more than a question of scarcity, is one of sharing, 
distribution and choices made in the use of this water” (translated from Lasserre, 2005).  
Illustrative of this, the Water Poverty Index (WPI) developed by the UK Centre for Ecology 
and Hydrology, attempts to describe the different factors that influence relative water 
poverty10. Although it demonstrates the strong connection between water poverty and 
income poverty, it nevertheless finds that some of the world’s richest countries, also richly 
doted in water resources –such as the United States- score poorly, while some developing 
countries like Guyana or Suriname are in the top-ten list. As highlighted by Dr. Abu Zeid, 
former President of the World Water Council: “In many countries, water shortages stem 
from inefficient use, the effective loss of available water too polluted for use by humans or 
nature or by the unsustainable use of underground water in aquifers, which can take 
thousands of years to replace. The WPI lays this out statistically in a valuable road map” 
(WWC, 2002).  
Scientists like Falkenmark (1989) or Calder (2005) wish to avoid ringing an alarm bell. As the 
latter out points out: "Overstating the dangers may be counter-productive in terms of 
focusing necessary support. Policymakers and the public are not unaware of the vested 
interests of environmental scientists and environmental institutions in furthering crisis 
scenarios" (Calder, 2005: 1-2). Nonetheless, they also agree that more action is now needed to 
prevent irreversible environmental degradation currently underway. 
Indeed, although the current ‘global water crisis’ was already announced in 1977 at the Mar 
del Plata Conference, the decade of the 1990s is remembered as was one of debate rather than 
action to address the crisis, which in the meantime, has become more acute (Duda and El-
Ashry, 2000).   
                                                 
10 It grades 147 countries according to five measures: resources (measuring the per capita volume of surface and 
groundwater that exist), access (measures a country’s ability to access water for drinking, industry and 
agriculture use), capacity (a country’s level of ability to purchase, manage and lobby for improved water, 
education and health), use (measures how efficiently a country uses water for domestic, agricultural and 
industrial purposes) and environmental impact (water quality, environmental strategies and regulations, and 
endangered species). 
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It is first the complexity of the networks that water, by nature, creates –through its links to 
other resources such as land and biodiversity, or its linking of the various human interests 
vested in its use- that makes the implementation of adequate management measures difficult 
(Brüschweiler, 2003). There is a need to approach these linkages all together: “There is no 
denying the existence of a global water crisis. The root causes of the crisis are complex. At 
the same time, our planet and its residents are experiencing a global crisis in land 
management, environmental management, and governance that is closely linked to the water 
crisis and is made worse by over-consumption of the North, population growth in the South, 
and rapid globalization of trade and economic systems. Solutions to these crises cannot be 
formulated in isolation" (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 123).  
But according to Margaret Catley-Carlson, former Chair of the Global Water Partnership, the 
major issue that needs to be dealt with is not a lack of technical solutions or research on the 
topic: “The single biggest challenge isn’t that the science isn’t there, isn’t that we couldn’t 
devise better ways of managing water –it’s the extreme reluctance of governments, of states, 
of communities to take water management as a serious issue” (IDRC, 2005). People are 
generally unaware, she says, of the extent to which changes in the last fifty years are 
modifying habits acquired over the last millennium. Free, unlimited access to water is no 
longer a possibility. In the end “it is attitude and behaviour problems that lie at the heart of 
the crisis […] inertia at leadership level, and a world population not fully aware of the scale 
of the problem means we fail to take the needed timely corrective actions” (UN-WWAP, 
2003b: 4).  
At stake is the governance of the ‘Blue Revolution’ for the 21st century, stated as such by the 
United Nations to establish a parallel with the 20th century’s water-thirsty ‘Green Revolution’ 
(Meublat and LeLourd, 2001). Due to the specificities of each society in its relation to water, 
there is no one-size-fits-all governance response to the challenge (Peña and Solanes, 2002).  
More and more, discussions nevertheless take place at the global level to try and find 
solutions to the ‘global water crisis’. 
   
c. Water –and IWRM- at the forefront of the international agenda 
The complexity of water issues has become particularly obvious during the last quarter of 
the 20th century, with progress made in scientific knowledge, as well as rising geopolitical 
tensions, economic costs or social risks worldwide. An increasing awareness of this ‘global 
water crisis’ spurred an institutional effervescence (see annex 1 for a presentation of the main 
institutions and their objectives), along with a parallel acceleration of global events dedicated 
to water. Hereafter we present the main such events and their outcomes in terms of water 
management principles.   
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In the arena of international policy11, although initiatives had been undertaken as early as the 
1950s to assess water resources or review watershed management and its consequences 
(White, 1998), the United Nations Conference on Water, held in 1977 in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina, constitutes a major benchmark which defined the first general principles for 
national and international agencies12. Its Action Plan covered issues such as water resources 
assessment, water efficiency, environment, health and pollution control, legislation and 
international cooperation. One of its great successes was the preparation of the 1980-1990 
International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, which provided the incentive for many 
countries to move forward in the area13 (Biswas, 2004). After that, according to A.K. Biswas, 
no new ground was broken and “water disappeared from the international political agenda 
during the 1980s and 1990s” (Biswas, 2004: 81). 
In 1990 a global consultation was nonetheless held by the United Nations Development 
Programme to compile regional assessments of the Decade, producing the New Delhi 
Statement (Salman, 2003a). The principles on which it was based14 were recycled into what 
emerged, two years later at the International Conference on Water and the Environment, as 
the ‘four Dublin principles’: fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the environment; water development and management should 
be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all 
levels; women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; 
and water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an 
economic good (WMO, 1992).   
This was the beginning of a new economic approach to water management, which 
developed throughout the 90s decade. Rising statistics about water stress in many countries 
provoked a change in perception, which led from unbounded belief in water development 
projects, to realising the finiteness of the resource and the need for its careful management. 
The traditional approach of supply management (extending supply to meet increasing 
needs) was reversed towards one articulated around demand (Allouch, 2002). It also initiated 
the ongoing debate regarding the definition of water as an economic good versus that of a 
human right.  
                                                 
11 Over a span of 50 years starting in the 1950s, at scientific research level many international programmes were 
also initiated to address the need for basic data and research related to water: UNESCO's International 
Hydrological Program, the World Meteorological Organization, the World Health Organization, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Council of Scientific 
Unions, the World Bank and IUCN programme on large dams (White, 1998). 
12 It also constitutes the sole conference specifically dedicated to water under the aegis of the United Nations.  
13 Successes were unfortunately neutralised by the population growth during that decade (Salman, 2003a). 
14 Among these, the first was dedicated to the ‘Protection of the environment and safeguarding of health through 
the integrated management of water resources’ (Salman, 2003a).  
 10
For Biswas, in addition to the counter-productiveness of the form it took15, the Dublin 
Conference was organised far too late to be able to feed any input into the Earth Summit a 
few months later. In terms of content, nothing new was brought forth, ignoring “critical 
issues like major programme initiatives, including how much would such programmes cost, 
where would the funds come from, and how and by whom would the programmes be 
implemented” (Biswas, 2004: 83). Water was not mentioned in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, while the chapter of the global action plan (Agenda 21) 
dedicated to the Protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources: Application of 
integrated approaches to the development, management and use of water resources was largely 
inspired by the Mar del Plata Action Plan (Salman, 2003a).  
Further, at the Rio Conference, known worldwide for having launched ‘sustainable 
development’ as a global concept 16, water was relatively neglected compared to issues of 
biodiversity, climate change and deforestation and the ozone layer (Biswas, 2004). For 
Meublat (2001), water was left aside at Rio because during its preparation process at the end 
of the 1980s, global issues like climate change, biodiversity or deforestation provided more 
interesting stakes for some actors of this geopolitical game, like the USSR and the USA. 
According to him, it is actually this marginalisation of the water issue in 1992 which 
contributed to the institutional outburst that followed –creation of the International Network 
of Basin Organizations, the Global Water Partnership, the World Water Council, the 
Stockholm International Water Institute and various professional associations- in order to 
regain a high profile in the international political agendas, and access to corresponding 
financial sources.  
Starting 1997, World Water Forums have been held every three years, the theme of 
integrated water resources management more central each time17. In 2000, in The Hague, the 
landmark document The World Water Vision stressed that: “It is essential to take a holistic 
approach to integrated water resources management (IWRM). Decisions must be 
participatory, technically and scientifically informed, and taken at the lowest appropriate 
level –but within a framework at the catchment, basin, and aquifer level, which are the 
natural units by which nature manages water” (WWC, 2000). In 2003 in Japan, the Global 
Water Partnership’s IWRM toolbox was introduced. The main theme of the last such forum, 
held in Mexico City in March 2006, was ‘Local Actions for a Global Challenge’. Along with 
four other framework themes, IWRM was discussed, in particular “diverse river basin 
approaches and experiences […] in an attempt to further elaborate on the political, social, 
                                                 
15 It was conveyed as an experts’ meeting, whereas UN world conferences can only consider recommendations 
from inter-governmental meetings (Biswas, 2004).  
16 The actual first reference to sustainable development was in the Bruntland report Our Common Future, 
published by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (Holliday et al., 2002). 
17 The forums are organised by the World Water Council, a think-tank on IWRM issues.  
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economic, institutional, technological and cultural factors that have an influence over the 
performance of such integrated approaches” (CNA and WWC, 2004). According to Jean 
Fabre, Deputy Director of UNDP, although the official attendance to the Forum 
demonstrated that water is still not considered a priority, one of its positive outcomes was to 
increase awareness of certain technical problems, in particular the need to manage water in 
an integrated way and not according to different sectors (irrigation, industry…) as has 
traditionally been the case (Dubuis, 2006).  
In 2000, adopting integrated water resources management was recognised as one of the 
actions needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United 
Nations’ Millennium Assembly, now “the centrepiece of the global development agenda”18. 
The concepts underlying IWRM are recognised as important for MDG goal 1 (related to 
extreme poverty and hunger), goals 4, 5 and 6 (human health) and especially goal 7 
(environmental sustainability and access to water and improved sanitation) whose target 10 
specifically aims: “To halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation” 19 (UN Millennium Project, 2005: xix). Nevertheless, 
as Calder (2005) reminds, trade-offs will have to be negotiated between the different goals 
and vested interests constitutive of these goals, and control needed to ensure that MDG-
driven water and sanitation schemes do not damage the environment, while environmental 
schemes do not disadvantage poor people.  
Compared to the Rio Conference ten years before, in 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg focused on combating hunger and on access to water and 
sanitation (Chautard, 2002). To do so, “governments embraced integrated water resources as 
the model for the future” (UNDP, 2006: 153). As part of the claim for measurable progress of 
other water-related targets included in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, they sent a 
call to all countries to “develop integrated water resources management and water efficiency 
plans by 2005, with support to developing countries” (UN-DESA, 2002).  
In 2004, the Third World Centre for Water Management undertook a survey to assess the 
impacts of the conferences that have had direct implications for the water sector, held 
between 1977 and 2003 (Mar del Plata, Dublin, Rio, Marrakech, Bonn, The Hague, 
Johannesburg and Kyoto). Results show that although these events do increase awareness 
and provide opportunities for interaction, they have in general been very little cost-effective, 
offering too many homogenous solutions and producing too few impacts, and should be 
more output-oriented in the future (Third World Centre for Water Management, 2005). 
                                                 
18 Not surprisingly, Jeffrey Sachs, commissioned to report on progress made towards the MDGs, concludes that 
most countries will not make it by 2015; to do so would require a six-fold budget for UN antipoverty work, and 
investment in infrastructure (roads, ports, energy) and health care (Calder, 2005).  
19 The issue of sanitation was added in the aftermath of the Johannesburg Conference (Chautard, 2002). 
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According to Salman, the problem resides in the fact these conferences and forums produce 
resolutions or declarations that, contrary to Conventions, are statements with no legally 
binding effects on the countries adopting them, the same being true for their action and 
implementation plans (Salman, 2003b). To make things worse, these documents “awash in 
generalizations and compromising language, reflecting a clear inability to reach an 
agreement on any of these issues […] lack specific measurable actions and programs” 
(Salman, 2003b: 17).  
Below we have summarised the major milestones and institutional mushrooming that show 
a rising preoccupation for water in the international arena during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
to both raise awareness about and find solutions to the ‘global water crisis’. 
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International Water History Association (2001) 
Creation of major institutions
International Water Resources Association (1972)
Stockholm International Water Institute (1997) 
European Commission DGs Research, Development and  
Environment Task Force on Water and Environment (1997) 
World Water Council (1996) 
Global Water Partnership (1996) 
International Network of Basin Organizations (1994)
International Water Association (1999) 
UN Water (2003) 
International milestones
United Nations Conference on Water (Mar del Plata, 1977)
International Year of Freshwater (2003) 
1st Alternative World Water Forum (Florence, 2003) 
3rd World Water Forum (Kyoto, 2003) 
Millennium Summit (New York, 2000) 
2nd World Water Forum (The Hague, 2000) 
International Conference on Freshwater (Bonn, 2001) 
World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg, 2002) 
United Nations’ Commission on Sustainable 
Development sixth session (New York, 1998) 
International Conference on Water and Sustainable 
Development (Paris, 1998) 
Earth Summit +5 (New York, 1997) 
1st World Water Forum (Marrakech, 1997) 
International Conference on Water and the Environment 
(Dublin, 1992) 
United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio, 1992) 
International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade 
(1981-1990) 
International Decade for Action “Water for Life” 
 (2005-2015) 
2nd Alternative World Water Forum (Geneva, 2005) 
4th World Water Forum (Mexico City, 2006) 
Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation for 
the 1990s (1990) 
1950
1970
International Council on Irrigation and Drainage (1950) 
International Association of Hydrological Sciences (1971, 
evolving since 1922) 
1990
1980
UNEP Global Environmental Monitoring System for 
Water Programme (1978) 
1960 UNESCO International Hydrological Programme (1965-1974)
The International Water and Sanitation Centre (1968)
Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (1990, 
evolving since 1988) 
International Office for Water (1991) 
2000 The International Water Management Institute (2000, evolving 
since 1983) 
World Water Assessment Programme (2000) 
World Bank Water Resources Management Group (2000) 
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2. The research design 
The purpose of this section is to present the institutional setting in which this research took 
place, as well as the research’s backbone: its objectives, and the questions that guided it. 
 
a. Institutional framework  
Swiss research and North/South issues  
This PhD research project was developed in the framework of the Laboratory of Urban 
Sociology (LaSUR) of the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) in Switzerland.  
In 2001, the LaSUR, who has a long research tradition regarding urban societies in Latin 
American countries, was selected as one of the eight institutions to be part of the National 
Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) ‘North-South’, one of the fourteen such 
programmes implemented by the Swiss National Science Foundation to strengthen the 
country’s position in terms of international research.  
The NCCR North-South can be identified as an effort towards what Bolay refers to as a 
responsible and supportive scientific collaboration (Bolay, 2004d). Co-funded by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation, it has the objective “to engage in research 
partnerships for mitigating syndromes of global change” 20 (Hurni et al., 2004: 12). 
Disciplinary, interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary research focused on sustainable 
development is undertaken in both Switzerland and partner countries, in particular through 
support of PhD studies, while research results also feed into small development projects.  
During the first phase of this research programme (2001-2005)21, each of the eight Swiss 
partner institutions was in charge of a thematic –ranging from natural resources to water, 
sanitation and urban agriculture, health, environmental conflicts, livelihoods and 
institutions, governance. Research activities were also concentrated in specific regions 
throughout the world (NCCR North-South, 2003).  
The LaSUR focused its research activities on the theme of social practices and empowerment 
in urban societies, in the Caribbean and Central America region. The aim was “to identify 
and promote innovative forms of social practices that contribute to the integration of 
                                                 
20 Syndromes of global change are “clusters of ecological, social, economic, etc. problems or symptoms that form 
typical patterns, are based on similar processes and emerge in different regions of the world, thereby actually or 
potentially resulting in adverse impacts at the global level” (Hurni et al., 2004: 12). 
21 The second phase of the NCCR North-South (2005-2009) underwent very important restructuring (NCCR 
North-South, 2005), which we will not detail here as our PhD was designed prior to such changes.  
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different groups of urban stakeholders by examining strategies of populations compared to 
top down policies implemented by public authorities” (LaSUR, 2002: 2). 
Inside this overarching topic, various research projects were developed in several countries 
of the region, around three sub-themes: intermediate cities in borderlands such as Haiti-
Dominican Republic or Costa Rica-Nicaragua; urban violence and insecurity in Venezuela 
and San Salvador; and environmental risks, development and urbanisation: identification of 
strategies for sustainable regional planning focusing on natural resource management in the 
context of urban-rural interactions, in Mexico. 
 
Research collaboration in the Ayuquila watershed, Mexico 
This PhD project was developed as part of the third sub-theme, whose specific 
environmental core coincided with my personal interests. In particular, the institutional 
partner in Mexico, the Manantlán Institute of Ecology and Conservation of Biodiversity 
(IMECBIO) from the Centre for the South Coast of the University of Guadalajara (CUCSUR-
UdG), had been working closely with the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve. This is a 
protected area part of UNESCO’s International Network of Biosphere Reserves, an 
institutional set-up I had already had the opportunity to work for.  
Several other research projects were also developed under the theme of environmental risks, 
development and urbanisation in Mexico: another PhD study (that of Silvia Hostettler, on 
land use changes and trans-national migration), various MSc. and BSc. studies and a research 
project studying the impacts of urbanisation on the management of natural resources in eight 
municipalities in the region (Gerritsen et al., 2005).  
The topic of this research partially resulted from in-depth discussions with researchers from 
the IMECBIO during the first long period of fieldwork. In particular, water resources’ 
management had been identified as one of the priorities to be dealt with by these actors and 
the municipalities they work with, inside the Ayuquila watershed (more details are provided 
for in Chapter 3, which presents the area of study). 
One of these, the municipality of El Grullo, was chosen for several reasons: the challenges it 
is confronted with, as it is one of the rare municipalities in the region to expect an increasing 
water demand due to urban growth, and is also bordered by the Ayuquila River, thus 
offering interesting insights into riparian issues; the fact it has always been one of the leader 
municipalities in the region with respect to environmental initiatives; its small size, making it 
easier to study than any of the others; and its proximity to my municipality of residence 
(Autlán). 
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To say it in NCCR North-South terms, in this urban/peri-urban and highland-lowland 
syndrome context, my PhD research project aimed to contribute to a better understanding of 
three of the priority core problems identified in the Caribbean and Central America region: 
urbanisation (access to water, services, management of waste); river depletion and pollution; 
and inadequate institutional mechanisms to solve environmental conflicts. These core 
problems are linked to the syndromes of freshwater availability reduction and of urban 
sprawl (Barrera et al., 2004). 
Some personal anecdotes, highlights of seven months of fieldwork over a span of three and a 
half years, are presented in annex 2. They introduce the general context from which the 
research cannot be dissociated.   
 
b. Research objectives and questions  
Information gap  
As we saw in the first section of this introductive chapter, IWRM has been promoted 
worldwide since the mid-1990s by many international institutions. As we detail in Chapter 1, 
its actual implementation encounters many problems.  
According to A.K. Biswas, one of the most virulent opponents to such a promotion, the 
concept is being diffused despite the fact there is no agreement regarding its definition, 
implementation procedures, nor whether it has enabled any real difference in improving 
water management practices, and he calls for an assessment of the concept’s applicability 
(Biswas, 2005).  
Likewise, although Calder (2005) finds it positive that many of the UN water-related 
conferences played an important role in developing concepts such as IWRM, even more than 
their frequency22, he questions the usefulness of preaching the same thing to the converted. 
More useful would be to undertake studies of “what is going wrong on the ground, why 
these ideals are not being met” (Calder, 2005: 75). In particular, the specific constraints in 
developing countries –such as legal, institutional, political, technical, socio-economic, and 
informational constraints to integrated water management- must be better acknowledged 
(Thioubou, 2002). 
Basing ourselves on such appeals, and confirmed in such a topic by Mexico’s 2004 reformed 
Water Law that explicitly refers to IWRM as one of the national objectives, we decided to 
                                                 
22 At least 20 such conferences took place during the last three decades of the 20th century (Calder, 2005). 
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study the implementation of such a concept in our region of study, in particular to identify 
the pitfalls it encounters.  
Objectives and questions  
Due to limited time and scope within this individual research, it seemed neither realistic nor 
optimal to undertake the study of IWRM at the level of the whole watershed, its 
recommended scale of implementation.  
Convinced that the local scale, as highlighted at the last World Water Forum, has a very 
important part to play, and inspiring ourselves from the framework developed by a 
European research project in southern Africa , studying the constraints municipalities face in 
implementing IWRM23, we therefore narrowed our study down to see to what extent a 
municipality, part of such a watershed, can participate in the process.  
 
As a result, we defined the following research objective and questions:  
General research objective: The objective of this study is to analyse a concept that is 
promoted internationally –integrated water resources management- in order to identify the 
necessary local conditions for its practical implementation. 
Research question 1: In what respect is an IWRM innovative compared to traditional water 
management? 
Research question 2: How is the potable water management system designed in the 
municipality of El Grullo, Mexico? 
Research question 3: What are the local and necessary conditions to implement an IWRM?  
 
The methodology used to answer these questions is presented in Chapter 3.   
 
3. Thesis structure 
The dissertation is organised in four chapters.  
                                                 
23 The project is presented with more detail in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 1 presents an overview of the literature review regarding IWRM (its history, 
implementation tools, examples and the problems encountered), as well as the conceptual 
framework that structured this research (approaching IWRM through the lens of a 
municipality).  
After giving a snapshot of the water resources’ situation in Mexico, Chapter 2 outlines how 
IWRM has started to be implemented in the country, though a long legislative, institutional – 
and unachieved- process. 
In Chapter 3, we introduce the area of study, from the broad regional perspective of the 
Ayuquila-Armería watershed, narrowed down to the municipality of El Grullo. We also 
explain the research methodology we developed, in terms of data collection and analysis.  
Chapter 4 presents our main research results regarding El Grullo’s approaches to 
implementing IWRM, at both a local scale –through the provision of water and sanitation 
services- and a regional one –through its involvement in the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed 
Commission and the Inter-municipal Initiative for an Integrated Management of the 
Ayuquila River Basin. Emphasis is put on the necessary changes required to enhance these 
efforts on both scales. 
In a concluding chapter we wrap up our main findings, outline the limits of the exercise and 
contribute reflections to some of the ongoing debates related to IWRM (best implementation 
scale, international transposition potential and ways forward for a better applicability). 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: WHY, WHAT, 
HOW AND WHERE? LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
“Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
can be regarded as the vehicle that makes the general concept of sustainable development 
operational for the management of freshwater resources” (UN-WWAP, 2003a: 37).  
 
To prevent a further aggravation of the water management crisis, IWRM has been widely 
promoted by a number of organisations since the 1990s. In this chapter we first identify more 
precisely what it means, to then analyse its status of implementation. In a third part, we 
focus on the implications of IWRM for a specific scale of implementation: the municipal 
level. 
 
1. Why did IWRM come to exist, and what is it? Debate around its history and definitions 
No clear-cut consensus exists as to when IWRM actually started. 
According to A.K. Biswas, 2006 Stockholm Water Prize winner, its actual promoters falsely 
state that it stems in the 1992 Dublin International Conference on Water and the 
Environment. He explains this by the fact that in the 1990s, many in the water profession 
“began to appreciate that the water problems have become multi-dimensional, multi-
sectoral, and multi-regional, and filled with multi-interests, multi-agendas, and multi-causes, 
and which can only be resolved through a proper multi-institutional and multi-stakeholder 
coordination” (Biswas, 2005: 321). Such preoccupations led to a rediscovery of IWRM, and its 
subsequent prompt adoption, “to the extent that some people and institutions now consider 
it to be the ‘holy grail’ of water management” (Biswas, 2005: 328).  
Since then, a worldwide promotion of IWRM has been engaged, often without 
acknowledging its historical background (Biswas, 2005). What might explain such an attitude 
could be the important evolution, definition-wise, of the concept1, from its early beginnings 
until today. More cynically, it could also be the fact its actual promoters want to be 
remembered as the ‘inventors’ of the term. 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this research we refer to IWRM as a ‘concept’, even though it is far from being a pure academic 
product resulting from a theorist tradition. IWRM corresponds more to a hybrid between global preoccupations 
and a certain political ideology, and, as such, could also be termed as a ‘model’.  
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a. Evolution of the definition over the last 75 years 
The ongoing worldwide promotion of IWRM has taken place regardless of the fact no 
consensus has been found with regards to its definition (Biswas, 2005). In his analysis of the 
literature, Biswas identifies 37 different possible meanings of the concept, according to the 
authors’ viewpoint on the different issues that should be ‘integrated’ (see annex 3).  
Mitchell’s typology (1990) enables to simplify this broad spectrum, as he presents three 
possible interpretations of integrated water management. 
The first is the systematic consideration of the various components of water (surface and 
groundwater, quantity and quality) and their interrelationships. In this case, management is 
jointly concerned with water supply, waste treatment and disposal, and water quality. 
The second possible interpretation considers water as a component that interacts with other 
systems, in particular those of land and the environment. Land-based activities indeed have 
many impacts on water flows and quality, while water also impacts the land through 
erosion, salinity and wildlife support. Management then focuses on floodplains, erosion 
control, non-point sources of pollution, preservation of wetlands and fish habitat, 
agricultural drainage and recreational uses of water.  
Finally, the third interpretation concerns the interrelationship between water and social and 
economic development, water being both an opportunity and a barrier. Management focuses 
on hydroelectricity, transportation of goods and manufacturing or industrial production.  
Figure 3. The interpretations of IWRM according to Mitchell: an increase in scope and complexity 
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These three interpretations are not automatically exclusive of one another, as we will see: 
hereafter we have tried to date them all along the 75-year span of IWRM's existence during 
the 20th century. 
IWRM, understood as the interactions between the different water components (apart from 
that of its quality, still not considered an issue2) and those between water and the human 
sphere –i.e. respectively the first and third interpretation- first emerged in the 1930s.  
Until then, water management had essentially been organised around single purpose 
projects: dams on rivers were built either for hydropower or storage, irrigation or cities 
(White, 1998). Such an approach was the logical extension of the 19th century’s engineer 
works, whose achievement to provide water for industrialisation and urbanisation had been 
a main factor in improved quality of life and extended life expectancy (Calder, 2005).  
During the 30s, the move from single to multi-purpose water projects in the Tennessee, Loire 
and Ganges rivers marked the beginning of integrated water resources management (Duda 
and El-Ashry, 2000; White, 1998). Due to engineering developments, dams could then be 
used both for hydropower and storage for irrigation or cities, as well as flood protection 
(Aubert, 2000), while deep wells allowed extraction of groundwater for domestic uses 
(White, 1998). Reflecting the concurrent increasing needs for either new water sources –from 
either the surface or the ground- or to find places to discharge the wastewaters, the term 
“catchment” evolved from meaning the headwaters, to include the whole land surface part 
of a hydrological unit (Calder, 2005).  
It is also during this period that treatment of domestic and industrial waste was initiated 
(White, 1998). These first ever preoccupations of water quality issues were to grow stronger 
over the next decades (de Jong, 1995). 
Thus in this ‘first generation of IWRM’, the multi-use of water for human activities started to 
be considered, as well as water in its different components of quantity and quality, surface 
and groundwater. 
The last interpretation of IWRM –concerning the interactions between water, land and 
ecosystems- can be coined as the ‘second generation of IWRM’. It started in the 1960s, but 
really took shape twenty years later. The decade of the 1960s was when was initiated the first 
questioning of “the full social and environmental impacts of the great networks of river 
management works that were re-shaping the natural landscape from the Columbia to the 
Volga to the Mekong to the Snowy Mountains” (White, 1998: 22). The faith in technological 
and anthropo-centred approaches that dominated the first big half of the century had led to 
                                                 
2 Ever since the first water boards, set up around 1200 A.D. to control drained lands in the Netherlands, only 
water quantity had ever been an issue (de Jong, 1995).  
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such environmental problems and scarcity of freshwater of good quality, that this gave rise 
to calls for better water management (de Jong, 1995). But in spite of the environmental 
movement’s growing influence during the late 1960s and 1970s (Gleick, 2000), at the time 
integrated water management still meant considering how to manage water resources in 
order to satisfy the maximum of human uses (Le Coz, 1994). 
It was not until the late 1970s/early 1980s that the needs of the environment, recognised as a 
“valid ‘user’ of water” (Calder, 2005: 104), were taken account of in water planning and 
management (Gleick, 2000; Le Coz, 1994). The green movement had evolved into several 
branches: for the scientific ecologists or those from the Deep Ecology movement, this has to 
do with the fact that each living being has a right to live –each specie playing a specific role 
in the biosphere- while for the dominant utilitarian ecologists, nature must be protected for 
the services it provides us with (Nevers, 2005). 
In the 1990s, the approach evolved specifically towards integrating the management of land, 
water and ecosystems, leading some authors like Duda and El-Ashry (2000) or Calder (2005) 
to prefer the even more explicit term ‘Integrated Land and Water Resources Management’. It 
is the interrelationships between these natural elements that once more justify their 
integration into one management process (Martinez et al., 2002b). Such recognition coincides 
with the acknowledgment of the global land and environmental crisis, closely linked to the 
water crisis: land degradation through soil erosion or salinization, and loss of biodiversity 
through water diversion, wetland drainage or agricultural pollution (Duda and El-Ashry, 
2000). 
According to these authors: “Many cross-sectoral water conflicts stem from sector-by-sector, 
supply-side projects”, the worst-case scenario being the Aral Sea Basin, where focus on 
irrigation development in the 60s led to an environmental disaster in the region. On one 
hand, governmental subsidies and lack of water legislation and pricing policies led to water 
logging and salinization in 50% of the irrigated lands, entailing billions of dollars of 
remediation costs. On the other hand, the diversions for irrigation “permanently destroyed 
the downstream Aral sea ecosystem” –reducing its area by 50% and its volume by 70%- 
thereby disrupting not only fishermen communities’ livelihoods but also national economies 
(Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 118).  
Other examples of such interlinked crises’ include dryland basins in Africa, where “more 
than any continent, effective management of land and water resources and their ecosystems 
(…) constitutes a necessary condition for food security, poverty reduction, human health, 
and economic progress” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 120). Traditional systems, based on the 
multi-use of the same area through time by different actors (a rotation between floodplain 
recession farmers, herders and fishermen), inherently acknowledged the interlinkages 
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between water, land and other resources. They were widely affected by the building of dams 
for irrigation or hydropower production. Today, analysis show that the economic benefits of 
this new mono-use is less important than the former ones, and rehabilitation has sometimes 
enabled the old flooding system to coexist with the new infrastructure (Duda and El-Ashry, 
2000; André de la Porte, 2000). The continent suffers in general from “weak institutions, 
fragmented and ineffective policies and programs, and continued reliance on piecemeal, 
sector-based development approaches without considering upstream and downstream needs 
of biodiversity, people, and institutional reforms” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 120). 
The resulting dilemma then concerns water allocation between human livelihoods and 
ecosystems, two water dependent users: “Trade-offs will be needed between different water 
functions –a task even more complex than the more conventional efforts to deliver water for 
people, industry and irrigation” (Falkenmark, 2003: 9). 
This additional layer constitutive of an IWRM –considering the environment as a user in 
addition to all other users- does not however exclude the previous ones, as illustrated by de 
Jong (1995). In a synthesis of the worldwide contributions made to the Living with Water 
conference in 1994, he links the emergence of integrated water resources management to the 
awareness of sectoral management problems in the 1970s. According to him, the urgency of 
the situation is what explains why the concept of IWRM, already “in gestation for many 
years” (de Jong, 1995: 394), was brought forward so fast: after more than a thousand years of 
sectoral management, water is considered as a system whose different elements (quantity, 
quality, ground and surface) are linked together; consequently, the land and environment to 
which it is also linked are also considered, as well as the various uses of water.  
To summarise, be it dated to start in the 1930s or later according to the authors, the multi-
sectoral characteristic of integrated water resources management is the crucial core of the 
concept. 
Historically, the countries where the concept of IWRM was developed undertook an 
approach that was far from being integrated (which is still the case for most countries today): 
at first, water rights were related to land ownership (Chéret, 2004). Water is indeed 
considered as a good than cannot be appropriated, at least in its running form, in the 
jurisdictional systems of most countries: its uses can be shared by the various stakeholders 
who have the corresponding access and use rights (historically, allocation of such rights and 
related conflict resolutions were the responsibility of the water users’ assembly) (Barraqué, 
1994). With the development of capitalism between the 16th and 19th century in Europe, States 
nationalised important rivers in order to undertake bigger scale activities like hydroelectric 
production or navigation: the sectoral administration of water was born (Ibid.). In just a few 
centuries, such a sector-by-sector management has resulted in pollution, overexploitation of 
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aquifers, drying up of river portions and floods: IWRM was born from the need for all users 
to work together to manage their resource (Chéret, 2004).  
Consequently, there is now a growing recognition of the need to eliminate the boundaries set 
up by such sector-specific management, which ignored the inherent characteristics of water 
(i.e. the numerous interactions between water components themselves, as well as those with 
other systems, be they from the natural or the human sphere): 
“[Integrated water resources management] is an approach that 
regards water as a system (…) one that, wherever necessary, 
crosses the borders that man has artificially created” (de Jong, 
1995: 394).  
“The present sectoral organisation of water management 
institutions belies the multifunctional nature of water: the 
adaptation of integrated management concepts and methods is 
an urgent need. Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) is seen worldwide as THE solution to this problem” 
(Brüschweiler, 2003: 5).  
“Institutions are rooted in a centralised culture with supply 
driven management and fragmented and sub-sectoral 
approaches to water management. Few water managers view 
water holistically, but the integrated approach is required, 
among others, because of the biophysical reality where water 
movement through the catchment links the livelihood and 
resource perspectives” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 10).  
 
Now, integration is to take place both within the natural system (land and water 
management, surface and groundwater, upstream and downstream) and within the human 
system (cross sectoral integration of policies and strategies, and integration of all relevant 
stakeholders in the decision-making processes) (Jonch-Clausen, 2004). 
A holistic response is required to overcome the typical problems linked to fragmented water 
management, whatever the regulation choice adopted (public, private or both): there is a 
need for coordination between policies related to water supply and demand, the quantity 
and quality of water resources, the use of superficial or groundwater, water resources’ 
multiple uses, the management of land, vegetation and water, the management of 
externalities, etc. (Peña and Solanes, 2002; WWC, 2000). 
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Overall, during the 20th century, the meaning of integrated water resources management has 
been fleshed out with new dimensions of integration. Starting the 1930s, where it 
encompassed both multi-sectoral water management for human uses and taking the 
interrelationships of water components into account, it evolved to also include the uses of 
the environment from the 1980s onwards. Resuming this, in current keynote literature, 
IWRM refers to the need of integration, both within and between the natural system, which 
determines water availability and quality and provides related environmental services, and 
the human system, determining resource use and pollution (UN-WWAP, 2003a).  
 
b.  Recent institutionalisation of IWRM 
Since the 1980s, the call for water sector reforms was a recurrent one in all international 
water conferences, but lack of action resulted in extending the scope of local problems across 
borders (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000). This led to a more official stance being taken with 
regards to integrated water resources management at the international level. The different 
perspectives related to IWRM were embodied by the Dublin and Rio Conferences in 1992, 
and later reinforced by those in Bonn and Johannesburg (Odame-Ababio, 2004). 
The main output of the Dublin Conference, an experts’ meeting which was organised to 
provide input for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) taking place in Rio a few months later, were the four guiding ‘Dublin principles’. 
The holistic, participatory, gender and economic principles “provided an important ‘mind 
set’ for water resources development and management” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 15):  
Consequently, a few months later at the Rio Conference, chapter 18 of Agenda 21 had a 
programme area dedicated to integrated water resources development and management, 
based on these four principles (Calder, 2005): “Integrated water resources management is 
based on the perception of water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and 
a social and economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its 
utilisation. To this end, water resources have to be protected, taking into account the 
functioning of aquatic ecosystems and the perenniality of the resource, in order to satisfy and 
reconcile needs for water in human activities. In developing and using water resources, 
priority has to be given to the satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems. 
Beyond these requirements, however, water users should be charged appropriately” (United 
Nations, 1992). 
While Agenda 21 calls for an integrated management of land, water and ecosystems on a 
basin or sub-basin scale, the other main outputs of Rio –the three Rio Conventions- also have 
either direct (the UN Convention to combat desertification) or indirect (Convention on 
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Biological Diversity, Framework Convention on Climate Change) links with water and land 
management (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000). 
As we saw in the introductory part of this research, while some, like the prominent A.K. 
Biswas, are very critical of the Dublin and Rio conferences in terms of their actual added-
value for water resources management, for others on the contrary, the Dublin-Rio principles 
“are the cornerstones of IWRM and provide the basis for the blue revolution” (Calder, 2005: 
113). According to Calder, while the green revolution was a technical one, based on plant 
breeding, pesticides and fertilisers, with the objective to increase productivity, the blue 
revolution is one of a more philosophical nature, although also relying on technical 
advances. It is concerned with the way we treat the environment and one of its assets in 
particular, water, to guarantee a sustained access for drinking and sanitation needs, as well 
as various industrial uses along with the needs of ecosystems (Calder, 2005). IWRM 
“replaces the traditional, fragmented sectoral approach that has led to poor services and 
unsustainable resource use. IWRM is based on the understanding that water resources are an 
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource, and a social and economic good” (UN-
WWAP, 2003a: 377). 
The Global Water Partnership, “established in 1996 as a response to the Dublin and Rio 
conferences” (GWP, 2003a: 9) defines itself as “an international network of organizations 
involved in water resources management which promotes IWRM through both the creation 
of fora at global regional and national levels directed towards facilitating change, and the 
systematic creation, accumulation, and dissemination of knowledge to support the process of 
change” (GWP, 2003a: 7). It was set up by the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the Swedish government, because there was no home agency dedicated to 
water inside the United Nations –but the partners also wished a more flexible set up than, 
precisely, an UN agency (Alan Hall, GWP Network Director, personal communication).  
The GWP explicitly recognises the Dublin principles as the basic IWRM principles (GWP, 
2004b; GWP, 2000). 
One of the conditions to facilitate the introduction of an integrated approach is a clear 
definition of the concept: “Too often, people have had only a vague idea as to what 
‘integration’ means, and/or there have been differing perceptions as to what it means. In 
such situations, it is not surprising that confusion has been frequent, and that many planning 
documents have been characterised by vagueness or fuzziness” (Mitchell, 1990: 5). The 
author further argues that: “unless the concept is defined clearly, it will be difficult to 
establish goals and targets, and to monitor progress” (Mitchell, 1990: 3).  
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Acknowledging this need, to provide a common framework the Global Water Partnership 
proposed a definition of IWRM in 2000 –until then never unambiguously defined- “with the 
‘M’ referring to both ‘development and management’”:  
“IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated 
development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000: 22). 
The integration dimension concerns both the natural and the human system and must take 
place both within and between these categories (GWP, 2000). 
 
Hereafter, we have broken down this rather long definition into several elements, to quickly 
explain what is meant by each:  
“A process which promotes...” 
 
The concept of ‘process’ clearly indicates a lengthy time 
frame. This is something many promoters of the concept 
tend to forget, so even the GWP is trying to calm spirits 
down by insisting on this aspect (Alan Hall, personal 
communication) 
“the co-ordinated development 
and management…” 
 
According to Martínez et al. (2002b), development is 
delimitating zones of different capacity of use and 
defining forms of intervention and use of the natural 
resources included in the watershed, while management 
includes the executing operative procedures of 
development, follow-up, control and evaluation 
“…of water, land and related 
resources…” 
Explicit reference is made to the interrelationships 
between water and other natural systems 
“…to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in 
an equitable manner without 
compromising the 
sustainability of vital 
ecosystems” 
The balance sought is that “between the use of the 
resources as a basis for the livelihood of the world’s 
increasing population and the protection and 
conservation of the resource to sustain its functions and 
characteristics” (GWP, 2000: 12). 
 
In other words, this definition encompasses the three interpretations suggested by Mitchell 
presented earlier. It is now the most commonly used definition of IWRM (Smits and 
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Butterworth, 2006; Biswas, 2005). This can be explained by the fact the GWP’s definition 
filled a vacuum, and also because it has been promoted through important visibility efforts 
like the world water forums, workshops and partnerships (Alan Hall, personal 
communication). 
But for Biswas, IWRM’s popularity is also linked to its fuzziness: “This type of almost 
universal popularity of a vague, undefinable, and unimplementable concept is not new in 
the area of natural resources management. (...) it can be argued that the vagueness of a 
concept to a significant extent increases its popularity, since people can easily continue to do 
whatever they were doing before, but at the same time claim that they are following the 
latest paradigm (...) in order to attract additional funds, or to obtain greater national and 
international acceptance and visibility” (Biswas, 2005: 325-326).  
The information and communication revolutions just lead to spread such gospels all over the 
world and Biswas is quite critical of the concept’s usefulness: “is it just an aggregation of 
trendy words collectively providing an amorphous definition which does not help water 
planners and managers very much in terms of actual application of the concept to solve real-
life problems?” (Biswas, 2005: 322).  
According to a panel of researchers that reviewed experiences of IWRM in projects of the 
European Union, it is the inadequate definition of IWRM that prevents understanding why it 
is difficult to make it operational (Gyawali et al., 2006). To overcome this, they suggest the 
concept of Constructively Engaged Integrated Water Resources Allocation and Management 
instead, but acknowledge that for other researchers, it is essentially a concept that cannot be 
made operational (Ibid.). 
A.K. Biswas (2004), for example, points out the numerous questions raised by the GWP’s 
definition, such as: who promotes the process? What are the boundaries of ‘related 
resources’? How do you realistically organise a management between various ministries 
where there is so little coordination (like water vis-à-vis agriculture) or where expertise is so 
different (water vis-à-vis environment)? And how are the trade-offs operated between the 
maximisation of economic welfare, social welfare and the sustainability of ecosystems? In 
particular, which parameters are to be maximised? How to maximise ‘economic and social 
welfare’? Who decides what is ‘equitable’? What about the ‘sustainability’ of ecosystems: 
how is it measured? How are ‘vital ecosystems’ identified? 
“Some have argued that integrated water resources management is a journey, and not a 
destination, and the concept provides only a road map for the journey” (Biswas, 2005: 333). 
For this researcher, such an argument is not very useful in terms of practical implementation, 
and he clearly condemns the inapplicability of IWRM: “In the absence of both an operational 
definition and measurable criteria, it is not possible to identify what constitutes an integrated 
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water resources management at present” (Biswas, 2005: 324). As a result, “the only objective 
conclusion that can be drawn is that even though on a first reading the definition formulated 
by the Global Water Partnership appears impressive, it really is unusable, or 
unimplementable, in operational terms” (Biswas, 2005: 323) and “it does not provide any real 
guidance to water professionals as to how the concept can be used to make the existing water 
planning, management and decision-making processes increasingly more and more rational, 
efficient and equitable” (Biswas, 2005: 323). 
Biswas insists that IWRM’s long lasting permanence is conditioned by the capacity to change 
this: “Unless the current rhetoric can be translated effectively into operational reality, 
integrated water resources management will remain a fashionable and trendy concept for 
some years, and then gradually fade away like many other similarly popular concepts at 
earlier times” (Biswas, 2005: 328). 
 
 2. Implementing IWRM  
In the last section, we presented the variety of definitions attached to the concept of IWRM. 
Hereafter, we focus on issues related to its implementation: first, the array of tools that are 
associated with the process; then, examples of IWRM officially recognised as such; finally, 
we discuss some constraints linked to the implementation process.  
a. How to implement IWRM?  
An array of tools  
Historically, until the end of the 1980s, the trend in the area of water resources was to 
increase infrastructure (Tortajada, 2005). Water development works were everywhere:  
“During the 20th century, developed countries invested heavily in hydraulic works (dams, 
canals, dykes, locks, etc.) to provide their increasing populations with food through 
irrigation, energy through hydropower and transport through navigation, and to protect 
them from floods” (SIWI, 2005). Starting the second half of the century, the same is true for 
developing countries, supported by international institutions or bilateral cooperation 
(Meublat, 2001). In all cases, these policies, with an underlying ‘plumber rationality’, were 
usually designed by technical State administrations (Meublat, 2001).  
In the early 1990s, a switch was operated towards a sector-by-sector management of water 
resources, and in the late 1990s, towards IWRM –i.e. a multi-sectoral management, 
integrating environmental and social issues (Tortajada, 2005). 
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This switch from the central concept of water development (i.e. facing increasing demand by 
building new dams, pipes, etc.) to water management (i.e. facing demand with whatever 
water is already available) can also be referred to what Gleick calls a “changing water 
paradigm” (Gleick, 2000: 127):  from that of the 20th century, focused on growth and 
increased water supply, to a post-20th century one, where we must think differently in order 
to find ways to meet our needs within the limited water supply, while also preserving the 
ecological cycles.  
According to Allan (2005), the switch corresponds to the end of the ‘hydraulic mission’ of 
‘industrial modernity’ in the North3, which had started in the 19th century, and to the 
beginning of ‘reflexive modernity’ in the late 1970s. Since then, three successive paradigms 
dominated each decade (green in the 1980s, economic in the 1990s and political-institutional 
starting 2000) and ‘certainty’ that larger water withdrawals for food production were sound 
had definitely been replaced by ‘uncertainty’.  
 
However we choose to name such a drastic change of mind-frame, this evolution or ‘blue 
revolution’ can be explained by a conjunction of several factors. 
The first one is that by the end of the 1980s, most water developments in interesting sites had 
been realised, and the only ones remaining had prohibitive economic costs (Calder, 2005; 
Gleick, 2000).  
Then, at the level of development banks such as the World Bank or the Asian and Inter-
American Banks, infrastructure projects alone had revealed their limits to improve the social 
and economic conditions of people's livelihoods (Tortajada, 2005). Worse still, in many cases 
they also generated important social and environmental costs, which led to the creation of 
the World Commission on Dams in 1997 (Calder, 2005). In 2000, its report assessing the 
development effectiveness of large dams, stipulates that their positive contribution to 
irrigation, domestic and industrial consumption, electricity generation and flood control, is 
counterbalanced by many significant unacceptable social and environmental impacts (Ibid.). 
By trying to anticipate the water demand, such a supply-oriented strategy proved 
counterproductive, leading directly to exhaust both surface and groundwater sources, to 
degrade ecosystems and to more poverty (Meublat, 2001). 
A third factor leading to the ‘blue revolution’ –and linked to the previous one- was the 
growing influence of the environmental movement on the type of responses needed, to 
implement the new mind-frame it had given birth to: from purely technical, these broadened 
                                                 
3 This ‘hydraulic mission’ is still ongoing in the South, however. 
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to require all actors to take their responsibilities (Barraqué, 1994). As explained by Dr. 
Caroline Sullivan, head of the interdisciplinary team who developed the Water Poverty 
Index at the UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology: “In the past, water problems were often 
dealt with by providing engineering solutions, which to a large extent were productive, but 
sometimes neglected important social or cultural issues. Today however, with increasing 
public empowerment, devolution of responsibilities in the water sector, and an increasing 
awareness of ecological issues, such solutions are no longer adequate to address most water 
management problems” (WWC, 2002). 
The ‘blue revolution’, by increasing the complexity of both decision-making and action, 
implies a new model to face water demand within the limits of water supply. Such a model 
is supported by two main strata: on one hand a participative and negotiation-oriented 
institutional framework; on the other hand, pricing mechanisms to ensure that water supply 
meets demand (Meublat, 2001).  
At the level of development banks, the shift from development of water resources in sub-
sectors to its holistic management materialised through activities like: demand management, 
water pricing, private sector involvement, social participation, river basin management... 
(Tortajada, 2005: 298). Such policies had mostly been implemented in countries with market-
based economies, but following the end of the Berlin wall in 1989, many centrally planned 
economies –such as the former Soviet Union, China or India- joined in this neo-liberal 
programme, aiming at more efficiency and often ‘supported’ by structural adjustment 
programmes, through trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, stakeholder 
participation and decentralisation (Calder, 2005). 
Taking into account environmental, social and economic aspects, these policies were 
expected to result in more effective regulations, incentives and environmental protection. To 
achieve IWRM, it was also recognised that “appropriate institutions would have to be 
developed, with adequate managerial and technical expertise and financial resources” 
(Tortajada, 2005: 298).  
For example, the World Bank’s Water Resources Management Policy, adopted in 1993, “calls 
attention to the need for countries and development organisations to adopt a more 
comprehensive approach to water resources management (World Bank, 1993). This 
represents a quantum shift from sector-by-sector projects to a more holistic approach 
recognising the river basin as the appropriate unit to not only manage water quality, 
quantity and ecosystems, but also sectoral development initiatives. Economic sectors are 
now asked to take full responsibility for preventing the degradation of water resources by 
modifying existing activities, using pollution prevention strategies in new activities, and 
coordinating across sectors so that the water environment can be sustained for its multiple 
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purpose uses. (…) A whole host of financial, management, economic, policy reform, 
technological, and participatory tools are also recommended, including use of market-based 
instruments” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 122).  
Hereafter we shortly present these main tools, set forward to implement IWRM. 
 
Demand management 
It was promoted at the eighth session of the United Nations’ Commission on Sustainable 
Development in 2000, where the need to increase productivity of water use in irrigated as 
well as rain fed agriculture was recognised as a key policy priority (UN-WWAP, 2003a).  
“Water demand management aims to improve water use efficiency by incorporating soft 
solutions, such as capacity building, with hard solutions, such as water reuse. […] While 
motives and social norms are often underestimated in water resources management, 
attitudes and perceptions of policy-makers, water managers and users do actually shape the 
outcome of a strategy such as demand management”(SIWI, 2005). 
The two types of solutions needed – both soft and hard- were the themes of the Stockholm 
2005 World Water Symposium: avoid waste and increase recycling (through economic 
incentives, price structures and pollution charges in the industry, and technical measures 
such as drip irrigation, scrutiny of water subsidies, price incentives, etc. in the agricultural 
sector).    
Recycling systems, in addition to their “sustainability” characteristic –by reducing water 
abstraction and wastewater discharge- also seem particularly interesting for low income 
countries as they have a potential of being affordable, and can become income-earning 
activities (solid waste management for the time being, but sanitation also has potential) 
(Eawag, 2005). 
 
Water pricing  
Water was recognised as an economic good at the Dublin conference in 1992: having a 
multiplicity of ends it cannot simultaneously satisfy, it indeed meets the requirements for 
such a categorisation –as a reminder, economics was defined by Robbins (1935) as “the 
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means 
which have alternative uses” (Perry et al., 1997). This definition is actually a compromise 
between those that wanted to allocate water through competitive market pricing –thus 
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treating it as a purely private good- and those that wanted to treat water as a human right4. 
But the difficulty to reach a consensus reflects a sterile ideological debate: the confusion lies 
in assuming that an economic good is necessarily a private good, while it is on the contrary 
possible to have a full-cost pricing approach in the framework of public management 
(Allouch, 2002).  
Water being an economic good, its price is determined on one side by demand (the utility 
provided to humans and their corresponding willingness to pay) and on the other by supply 
(the cost of providing the resource in a certain quantity, quality and location) (Cech, 2005).  
Historically, as water resources were plentiful with respect to demand, they had a very low 
price or were even provided for free. The ‘blue revolution’, however, requires this to change: 
“Where water is provided to users at a price less than the supply cost, a situation common in 
most parts of the world except the UK, the incentive for conservation and waste reduction is 
absent. This negative demand management leads to the paradox that in a situation where the 
water resource is already under stress, the subsidy is actually encouraging users to make 
additional demands upon it” (Calder, 2005: 81). For example, in Mexico, irrigators pay only 
11% on average of the water’s full cost (Cech, 2005). 
The alternative is to admit the limits of the water resource and sources, and price it in order 
to cover the costs of supply and discourage low value uses. Water-pricing at the true cost of 
the resource (integrating its economic, social and environmental values) is defended by the 
United Nations Environment Programme as a way to ensure more water for the poor, at a 
lower price then the one they actually pay –much heavier, both in monetary terms and 
health-wise, than the rest of the population (UNEP, 2002). According to Fournier, a 
differentiated tariff system enables to subsidise the needs of the poorest citizens that cannot 
cover them, while introducing an incentive tax for less vital uses, which can also be different 
according to the uses (recreational uses like water for swimming pools would be more 
expensive than uses for industry or agriculture) (Fournier, 2000). 
Such policies are difficult to implement, first and foremost because of the risk of 
unpopularity they entail. Their benefits are nonetheless starting to be acknowledged as 
outweighing their drawbacks, and methods to value water (so as to calculate the price) have 
been devised for various uses such as domestic, irrigation, hydroelectricity generation or 
recreational uses (Calder, 2005). 
                                                 
4 Following a citizen movement initiated in 1998 to defend the recognition of water as a human right –among 
other things, through Alternative Water Forums- in 2002 the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General Comment 15, stated that: “the human right to 
water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible, and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses” (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2002). 
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“Full-cost pricing of water, coupled with innovative approaches to subsidies, and 
technological innovation (…) will be the instruments that make the overall approach of 
holistic integrated water resource management (IWRM) and participatory governance yield 
their hoped-for results. Implementing these measures will take political will and implies 
changes from current practices” (WWC, 2000: 18-19).  A package of reforms is needed:  
- Full-cost pricing requires efficient, transparent and accountable service institutions, as 
well as governmental support to poor customers to pay their bills; 
- Participation requires users to raise money and agree on spending purposes; 
- The private sector needs a predictable, transparent regulatory framework and the 
guarantee of getting a reasonable return on investment before it invests financially or in 
terms of know-how; 
- Public providers need to compete on a level playing field with private ones to be efficient.  
To realise this, innovative approaches to institutions and technology will be needed (WWC, 
2000).  
 
Private sector involvement  
Privatisation is sometimes an openly wished-for alternative to unsatisfactory public water 
management (linked to inefficiency, insufficient financial resources or technical expertise).   
Private sector involvement in water resources management and development –which does 
not imply private ownership of water resources- was called for at the Bonn conference in 
2001 (UN-WWAP, 2003a). 
There are two main types of water privatisation: the ‘British model’ (where both the assets –
the network, treatment plants, etc.- and their operation are privatised) and the ‘French 
model’ where the assets remain publicly owned and the management, operation and 
development of systems is concessioned for a limited period of time. In addition, two other 
types of privatisation also exist: the Build-Operate-Transfer and Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer schemes (usually for treatment plants), where the private sector is involved in the 
financing, construction and operation and makes a return on investment by selling the 
treated water, and the service contracts, where goods and services (like billing or revenue 
collection) are bought from the private sector (UN-WWAP, 2003a). 
Today, the private sector controls only 5% of water and sanitation services, but 40% of this 
market, localised in 100 countries, is controlled by ‘the big three’ (all French firms): Veolia 
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(ex-Vivendi, from the Générale des Eaux), Ondeo (subsidiary of Lyonnaise des Eaux) and 
Saur (which belonged to Bouygues until 2004 and is now property of the investment fund 
Paribas Affaires Industrielles). The other most important firms involved are Suez (France), 
Bechtel (USA) and RWE/Thames Water (Germany and Great Britain) (Laimé, 2005). 
These water multinationals keep on gaining market shares, especially since the 1980s, where 
several factors concurred to increase their usefulness: the decrease of public research in this 
sector, the public deficits’ surge and the increasing rigor of European standards, requiring 
specialisation (Laimé, 2005). According to Barraqué, in the recent European Union’s 
Framework Directive on Water (from 2000), the new quality standards are so high that the 
investments needed to meet them can only be supplied by important capital –implying mass 
privatisation. Each country is indeed facing costs varying between 10 to 60 billion euros (to 
realise the census of all their reserves, clean up lakes and rivers, enhance wastewater 
treatment and massively renovate pipes) (Labarthe, 2005). 
This trend is encouraged by the World Bank5 and other financial institutions, putting 
forwards the fact it will help eliminate monopolies and thus entail better conditions for the 
local population through automatically lower prices (Brüschweiler, 2003).  
Nonetheless, in practice, many examples highlight that the opposite has happened, the most-
well known being that of Cochambamba, in Bolivia. In 1997, the extension of a World Bank 
loan to the government, conditioned by the privatisation of water and sewage utilities in La 
Paz and Cochabamba, led to a tariff surge (+300%) realised by Bechtel. The popular reaction 
triggered the famous ‘water war’ in Cochabamba, leading the company to leave the country 
and since, water is co-managed between the State and community organisations (Gago, 
2005). Problems also occurred in Argentina or in Manilla, the capital of the Philippines, 
where a similar arm-wrestling, this time between the company and the local authorities (who 
refused a fee raise in 2002) led the company to suspend the payment of its concession. Since 
then, debts have been exchanged against the entrance of the government into the 
shareholding, but prices are five times those of 1997, and between one to five million 
inhabitants do not have access to potable water (Petite, 2005a).  
Numerous NGOs (grouped for example in the Council of Canadians or the Latin-American 
Water Tribunal) are criticising the World Water Council and its water forums for trying to 
give the impression that a ‘worldwide consensus’ has been reached to impose privatisation. 
In addition, the lack of recognised authority of the Council (it has no mandate whatsoever 
from the United Nations) makes it feebly representative, and it is generally accused of 
representing the interests of the World Bank and water multinational firms.  
                                                 
5 Between 1990 and 2002, the World Bank attributed USD 19.3 billion to reform water systems worldwide (Petite, 
2005b). 
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“Admittedly, there is no ready solution to be applied worldwide. State governments, civil 
society, the private sector, or any combination of these three, might have to cooperate to 
make the water sector more profitable” (Brüschweiler, 2003: 7). Public-private partnerships, 
presented as the solution at Johannesburg, have so far given disappointing results, both for 
the States who thought they had found the perfect alternative to succeed where they had 
failed, and for the firms, which thought they could apply the same profitability schemes as in 
other sectors like electricity (Caramel, 2005). With only 5% of water infrastructure financed 
by the private sector between 1990 and 2002 (compared to 44% in telecommunications for 
instance), it is predicted that public capital will remain the major source on a predictable 
horizon (Ibid). 
 
Social participation 
The second Dublin principle stresses the need for water development and management to be 
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels.  
But participatory methodologies are much older than 1992, developed by social and 
management scientists in governmental and non-governmental organisations working on 
development issues (Calder, 2005).  
Although participation of stakeholders is recognised as a necessary condition to the success 
of the new approach to water management, the problem with such approaches is that “it is 
not difficult to stage-manage ‘participation’ to provide the ‘gloss’ on decisions and 
approaches that are being sought by particular pressure groups” (Calder, 2005: 296).  
As illustrated by Pimbert and Petty (1995) in their typology, a whole continuum exists, 
spanning from passive participation, where people are purely informed of decisions, to self-
mobilisation, where actors actually take independent initiatives, intermediate types of 
participation ranging from that by giving information, by consultation, for material 
incentives, functional (to meet determined objectives) and interactive (joint analysis).  
As ‘participation’ is seldom absent from any project or programme nowadays –be it related 
to water or not- the real challenge resides in managing to instil a participatory approach 
closer to the far end of the spectrum than to its beginning.  
In the long-run, participation can only be effective if certain conditions are in place: a real 
political will to create and maintain spaces for participation, along with the capacity of civil 
society to organise itself and make good use of such opportunities (Bolay et al., 2004).   
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River basin management 
The concept of ‘integrated water resources management’ is often mistaken with that of 
‘integrated watershed6 management’ (or ‘integrated river basin management’) because of the 
similarity of the wording. 
The distinction is that IWRM does not automatically take place at the basin level, it can be 
applied at different scales: international (for transboundary waters), national or sub-national 
(like municipalities) (Alan Hall, GWP Network Director, personal communication). 
The river basin, nonetheless, constitutes the officially favoured implementation scale since it 
was recognised as the most logical implementation unit in 1992. This is because, as 
highlighted by researchers working in the Ayuquila watershed in Mexico, it is the scale that 
allows, on one hand, to analyse the consequences of decisions taken in terms of water, land 
or vegetation management, while also providing the appropriate framework to plan the 
means to correct the environmental impacts of such management (Martínez et al., 2002b). For 
example, it is the interdependencies between upstream forest management and downstream 
land and water quality, which provided the basis for the classical example of payments for 
environmental services: the Catskills scheme, supplying New York City with clean water at a 
reasonable cost.  
According to Martínez and his colleagues, other links that watersheds encompass which are 
not normally highlighted are those between natural resources and human activities and 
between inhabitants of the watershed themselves, by the simple fact that they depend on a 
common hydraulic system (Martínez et al., 2002b). “At the basin level is where the diagnosis 
of interlinkages must occur to take into consideration characteristics of the basin, its 
ecosystems, and its communities” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: p.124). 
This is made more explicit in the alternative formulation to watershed management 
suggested by Falkenmark and Folke (2002): ‘socio-ecohydrological catchment management’. 
Part of the problem is that the inhabitants of such a catchment are not automatically aware of 
these interdependencies…or sometimes quite voluntarily unaware of them (Ibid.) As 
Falkenmark (2003) states: “The catchment can basically be seen as a mosaic of partly 
incompatible land and water demands so that the overall challenge is to orchestrate this 
complex system for compatibility. This will involve three different types of balancing, in 
order to:  
                                                 
6 The watershed (or river basin, drainage basin or catchment) is the total land area that drains surface water to a 
common body of water (usually a river) (Cech, 2005). The various interchangeable terms that exist either reflect 
national subtleties or scientific backgrounds (with a focus either on water or land) (Alan Hall, personal 
communication).  
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 Satisfy societal needs while minimizing the pollution load added and accepting the 
consumptive water use that is involved; 
 Meet ecological minimum criteria in terms of fundamental ecosystem determinants: 
environmental flow to be left uncommitted in the rivers, secured flood flow episodes, and 
acceptable river water quality; 
 Secure hydrosolidarity between upstream and downstream societal and ecosystem 
needs” (Falkenmark, 2003: 30). 
For such an orchestration, management agencies at basin and aquifer level are required. 
Watershed organisms or councils vary immensely from country to country, due to the 
various structures they can take, responsibilities they can be in charge of and legal 
frameworks in which they operate. They should nonetheless have certain basic 
characteristics: they must be inserted in the country’s legal framework, have a juridical 
personality, include the main actors and dispose of an independent budget. Their functions 
traditionally include: the coordination of the management of water resources in the 
watershed; planning water use and management; a role of arbitration in case of inter-sector 
conflicts in water use; the generation of basic information about the watershed, and control 
of extreme events, water availability and quality; and fund-raising for the planned actions. 
They must not replace other organisms in charge of water management, but instead provide 
a coordination and stimulation platform to implement its objectives (Martínez et al., 2002b).    
River basin organisations can be authorities, entities, commissions or councils with more or 
less decision-power, and their role must be clarified and made official to promote 
cooperation and avoid duplication of activities and lack of both human and financial 
resources (Tortajada, 2005). 
The concept of river basin management has been particularly promoted since the Dublin 
Conference in 1992, but it has actually been evolving for two centuries (Meublat and 
LeLourd, 2001). Initiated in France in 1803, and adopted by countries such as Spain or the 
United States of America, the first model of watershed management was dedicated mostly to 
canalising the resource through dams, to provide water for irrigation, hydroelectricity 
production and domestic use. The second generation of watershed management –which 
integrated more participation- was also originally developed in France7, with six river basin 
agencies created in 1964. These raise their revenues through user fees and polluter fees to 
then invest them in priority issues, usually environmental enhancement in basins. 
                                                 
7 Although according to some, France only scaled up the first model of participative basin management, which 
developed in the Ruhr basin at the beginning of the 20th century. 
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Since then, the approach of basin management, the central feature of which is the integration 
of participation and economic instruments, has gained widespread recognition, particularly 
boosted by the global water forums. The European Union’s Water Framework Directive 
(2000), largely inspired by the French experience, promotes integrated river basin 
management for Europe. The International Network of Basin Organizations, created in 1994 
by the French Ministry of the Environment, now counts 62 member countries and has 
regional networks covering all continents (INBO, 2006). 
But according to Alan Hall, GWP Network Director, it is mainly environmentalists with a 
scientific background who tend to see integrated river basin management as ‘the’ solution, 
while political and social scientists do not, because river basin management does not take 
socio-political systems into account. For him, the river basin is one management unit among 
others –not the only possible one, and not always the best one either. In particular, too often 
than not, moribund basin water management authorities do not benefit from revenue-raising 
mechanisms, but are imposed as part of a top-down scheme anyway, to fit into national or 
regional ambitions8 (Alan Hall, personal communication). 
 
Information  
Another important tool for effective planning and management is that of good quality 
information, be it regarding the ecological status (quantity and quality of water sources) or 
more societal elements such as the capacity and condition of infrastructure, as well as the 
demand for and access to water supplies for different purposes (Batchelor, 2005). 
For Calder, one of the problems is that a lot of policies are based on “land and water myths” 
(such as the fact that water harvesting is benign, or that increasing tree cover will increase 
local rain), instead of modern science. He stresses the need to better share knowledge, 
including between countries (Calder, 2005). 
Due to the frequent inaccurate or out-of-date secondary information held at ministerial or 
NGO level, participatory survey and GIS software can be useful tools to generate such 
information. Indeed, the ‘blue revolution’ requires combining both hard tools like computer-
based models, with socio-economic ones, like participatory approaches, to determine the 
impact on the environment, socio-economics, equity (Calder, 2005). Among hard-system 
tools, “decision support systems have a role to play here not only in testing out the impacts 
of water resource management strategies on stakeholder interests (…) but can also assist 
                                                 
8 For example, in Sweden, submitted to the Water Framework Directive and the catchment management 
approach, the past successful water management based on districts is being fitted into basins to attain conformity 
(Alan Hall, personal communication).  
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water resource managers by providing a focusing framework for defining stakeholder issues 
and interrelationships. The greatest strength of these systems is that they provide the means 
for integrating information from different disciplines” (Calder, 2005: 299). To make this a 
common reality will require time: today, different databases still are the norm, even for the 
different elements of water (surface water, groundwater and water quality). 
Examples of such tools include: the European Union’s WaterWare Decision Support System, 
applied to the Thames Basin in Great Britain and the Rio Lerma/Lake Chapala in Mexico, to 
evaluate impacts of new water legislation, see where new developments can be made, and 
develop strategies to control pollution; or the NELUP database, more oriented towards land-
use changes and their impacts on hydrology. More easily used by decision-makers, the 
EXCLAIM tool (Exploratory Climate Land Impact and Management), based on GIS, to see 
both biophysical and socio-economic impacts of watershed interventions (like changes in 
forest cover, irrigation), is used in the Limpopo basin of South Africa (Calder, 2005). 
In this new framework, “the largest task is going to be managing the allocation of water for 
direct use to meet human needs and protect the environment” (WWC, 2000: 25). But for 
some, the environment should not be considered as a similar claimant to human uses, as the 
“environment (broadly defined) is the foundation on which the entire ecological and 
hydrological systems function and thus must be seen as part of the reality we are dealing 
with. Human uses are the ones to be arbitrated, but in a context that ensures the robustness 
of the underlying ecological and hydrological systems –and their ability to regenerate from 
the vagaries of seasonal or long-cycle fluctuations and continue to sustain the growing 
human and biological populations that will rely on these systems for their existence” (WWC, 
2000: 27). Research priorities should be on providing more data on the “acceptable levels of 
human interference with the environment” for awareness raising and informed decision-
making (Ibid.) 
Historically water allocation was ‘first come, first served’ (or ‘prior appropriation rights’). 
Now the question is: how to prioritise the manifold demands for water, especially when all 
outflows are committed, and no new rights can be allocated? Three different options exist:  
- Top-down approaches, like the priority system in South Africa (highest priority for 
human consumption, then the environment, then productive uses). But to face supply 
shortage, some non-price instruments such as rationing or prohibiting use are 
inconvenient and do not take account of the different values of water for different 
consumers; 
- Market-based approaches: either allocation of water to those able to pay higher price, 
(difficult when lobbies like agriculture want to protect the subsidies they receive) or 
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transferable rights, enabling to increase efficiency by helping to transfer water to 
higher use values.  
- Virtual water through the transfer of commodities, operating in the Middle East and 
North Africa for 25 years: countries with water scarcity buy goods requiring high 
water inputs (like cereal), freeing water for high value uses like domestic or industrial 
(Calder, 2005).  
 
 
The Global Water Partnership’s approach to implementing IWRM 
As part of its terms of reference –“the Global Water Partnership was established to 
encourage programs to fill gaps in research and technical assistance required for the 
implementation of integrated water resources management” (WWC, 2000: 67), the GWP 
produced a whole series of technical papers addressing pressing issues linked to the theory 
and practice of IWRM (Jonch-Clausen, 2004). Among these are the GWP guides on how 
to implement IWRM. 
The first guide, called the Toolbox, is the result of an effort to organise the vast array of 
possible tools for IWRM. It was produced in 2002 and a second version was updated for the 
2003 World Water Forum. An interactive on-line version is also available, which also 
provides case studies illustrating practical experiences related to each tool.  
The toolbox groups 50 tools in 13 key change areas, all together constituting ‘the three pillars 
of IWRM’: the enabling environment of policies and legislations (laws and regulations), 
financing and incentive structures; the institutional framework through which these can be 
implemented (central-local, river basin, public-private); the management instruments 
required for this (water resources and demand assessment, information and monitoring, 
allocation instruments) (Jonch-Clausen, 2004). 
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 Figure 4: The three pillars of IWRM 
 
Source: Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 16 
 
Such a framework is acknowledged for example in the United Nations 2003 World Water 
Development Report (UN-WWAP, 2003a: 376).   
 
The ‘GWP comb’ illustrates the cross sectoral integration wished for, and the role of IWRM 
in their linkage:  
 
 Figure 5: The three pillars’ role in cross-sectoral integration 
 
 Source: GWP, 2000: 29 
 
There is no sequential order, although the instruments are logically used after the ‘rules of 
the game’ and the institutional framework are both in place (Jonch-Clausen, 2004). Figure 6 
presents the 13 specific key change areas: 
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Figure 6: The IWRM Toolbox  
 
Source: Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 38 
According to Mollard and Vargas (2005a), who analysed the GWP’s introduction paper to 
IWRM for the 4th World Water Forum, among the tools put forward to realise an IWRM, 
cost-benefit analysis remains the central tool, even though social and environmental should 
also be taken into account. Two criteria are thus essential: technical efficiency (with both 
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technical-agricultural techniques, reducing leaks, recycling- and economic tools- water fees) 
and allocative efficiency9 (calculating where water has the highest productivity).  
Both these criteria result from the growing concern to raise water productivity: its physical 
productivity, through the approach aiming at ‘more crop per drop’, or its productivity as 
measured by added value in production, i.e. transferring water to uses which proportionally, 
contribute more to the country’s wealth (UNDP, 2006). The first has recorded good progress, 
albeit mostly concentrated in developed countries –the development of affordable drip 
irrigation technologies should nonetheless change this (Ibid). The worry with technological 
innovation indeed remains the social discrepancies it can contribute to exacerbate, as 
frequently “access to water-thrifty innovations requires access to capital, knowledge and 
wider infrastructure” (UNDP, 2006: 152). As for the option of diverting water to higher 
added-value uses, promoted by those in favour of a ‘softer’ solution than technical 
innovation, it suffers from two main drawbacks: first, there is little evidence that any high-
value industry was delayed in its development because of competition for water with 
agriculture; second, such diversions remain dangerous in countries where most of the 
population’s livelihoods still depends on it –particularly the most vulnerable people (UNDP, 
2006).  
In 2002, ten years after the Rio Conference and Agenda 21, 193 countries committed to the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Its 
Chapter IV dedicated to Protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social 
development includes a call to “develop integrated water resources management and water 
efficiency plans by 2005, with support to developing countries” (United Nations, 2002). 
Referred to more simply as National IWRM Plans, these differ from the IWRM approach in 
that “whereas an IWRM approach results from a process of change, an IWRM Plan is a time-
bound exercise to guide the implementation of such changes” (GWP, 2004a: 5).  
Torkil Jonch-Clausen, former Chair of the GWP’s Technical Committee, recognising that the 
WSSD target is unlikely to be achieved in so little time, encourages the interpretation of such 
an objective as a planning process which should be completed or well underway, and which 
would “progressively identify necessary strategies and actions in water resources 
management, water infrastructure development, improved water efficiency and better water 
service provision” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 14).  
                                                 
9 In practice, the drawback of this approach is that it does not take into account other aspects than economic 
criteria, such as social wellbeing and environmental protection (Mollard and Vargas, 2005a).  
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To help face the major challenges raised by this call for IWRM Plans, alongside the Toolbox 
the Global Water Partnership and its partners produced other sources of information10, more 
specifically aimed at providing support for IWRM planning, because “though the process, 
structure and content of a Plan will vary from country to country, every Plan will share 
certain features” (GWP, 2004a).  Important to highlight is the switch from ‘plan’ to ‘strategy’ 
in the document Catalyzing Change: it was undertaken “to emphasize the dynamic and 
change-oriented nature of the process”, thus better reflecting “the spirit of the WSSD call” 
(GWP, 2004b: 3). Nevertheless it is also an acknowledgement of the need for a more realistic 
time-frame: “A water resources strategy is usually a step on the way to the development of a 
plan as the basic goals and objectives need to be set and the key directions of the changes 
agreed before embarking on detailed planning” (Cap-Net, 2005: 5). 
These more action-oriented references correspond to a new phase in the Global Water 
Partnership’s work, after having contributed to influence the global water agenda and raise 
awareness of the IWRM during its first seven years of existence (GWP, 2003a).  
To implement IWRM Plans, Jonch-Clausen (2004) identifies seven major steps:  
1 Establish status and overall goals: identify livelihood-demand and resource-impact water issues, 
elements in place and where progress is needed towards IWRM, endorsed international 
agreements like water forums 
2 Build commitment to reform (via political will, awareness raising, multistakeholder dialogue) 
3 Analyse gaps in IWRM framework (identify required management and development functions):  
- Resource management functions, such as formulation of policies for water allocation and 
wastewater discharge permits, water resources assessments, monitoring, enforcement, 
information 
- Water services and infrastructure management functions, including policies, laws, regulations 
and enforcement (and infrastructural requirement and water efficiency) 
- Financing functions and mechanisms: grants and internal sources, user fees, subsidies, loans 
and equity capital 
4 Prepare Strategy and Action Plan (actions to address identified gaps in the enabling 
environment, institutional roles, management instruments, and links to national policies) 
5 Build commitment to action (political adoption at inter-ministerial coordination and Parliament 
level, stakeholder acceptance which often requires communicating how actions can improve 
lives of both men and women, fund raising): institutionalisation of water resources in domestic 
budget preparation is necessary 
6 Implement frameworks: 
- IWRM framework with potential resistance to reform from those who do not wish to see a shift 
in power from centralised to basin organisations 
                                                 
10 In particular: “...Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and Water Efficiency Plans by 2005": Why, What 
and How?; Catalyzing Change: A handbook for developing integrated water resources management (IWRM) and water 
efficiency strategies; and The Cap-Net Integrated Water Resources Management Training Manual and Operational. 
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- Framework for water infrastructure development: “The IWRM framework is developed to 
manage resources in such a way that economic and social welfare is improved. (…) The IWRM 
may for instance, prioritise water for domestic water supply, set ‘game plans’ for water user 
groups and include regulations that prevents pollution of sources” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 30) 
- Framework for water efficiency with shift from supply to demand management 
- Capacity building 
7 Monitor and evaluate progress11: there should be both universal indicators to be used for 
worldwide joint assessments, but also tailor-made indicators to the country context: 
- Impact indicators on water resources availability and trends: demand for major uses, demand-
livelihood challenges, threats from pollution, user conflicts 
- IWRM process indicators: awareness and political will, framework for stakeholder 
participation, prioritisation of water management issues, roles and functions within WRM 
identified and defined, potential and constraints identified, stage of development of IWRM 
framework 
- Performance indicators on how the IWRM framework works (national policies, legislative 
frameworks, financing and incentive measures, organisational set-ups) 
Important to remember is that: “No country ever ‘completes’ the cycle, it is an ongoing 
learning and development process in which countries find themselves at different stages” 
(Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 33). 
Figure 7: The IWRM cycle 
 
Source: GWP, 2004b: 12 
Recognising that putting the IWRM goal into practice is very context-specific, the Global 
Water Partnership is diffusing its Toolbox and other IWRM information sources through its 
worldwide regional and country networks, as well as the World Water Forums.  
                                                 
11 The GWP produced two technical briefs dedicated to help define such follow-up tools (indicators for defining 
the strategy, as well as monitoring and evaluation). 
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To summarise, according to A.K. Biswas, a paradigm shift took place between the Mar del 
Plata Conference in 1977 (where the focus was on formulating national and operational 
water policies) and the subsequent “UN major water fora” after the Dublin and Rio 
conferences in 1992, promoting instead sustainable development, integrated water resources 
management and integrated river basin management (Biswas, 2002).  
One can associate the evolution between the two with that between the Industrial Society’s 
values (focused on specialisation, planning, an impression of abundant resources and 
infrastructure) reflected in the Mar del Plata Declaration, and the values of the Post-
Industrial Society (focused on integration, participation/negotiation, awareness of limited 
resources and management) reflected in the Declaration of Dublin (Peña and Solanes, 2003). 
 
Figure 8: Paradigm shifts in water management during the 20th century 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compilation from Calder (2005), Tortajada (2005), White (1998) and Mitchell (1990) 
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b. Examples of IWRM worldwide  
According to experts that have taken into account the experience of countries which have 
started to try and implement IWRM and water efficiency plans: “An IWRM plan is a blue 
print that adapts IWRM principles to country conditions to permit a change from 
fragmented ways of managing water resources to an integrated way” (Chéret, 2004: 7). 
In an effort to monitor efforts undertaken towards IWRM, the Global Water Partnership 
undertook two surveys to evaluate the status of IWRM plans12 that had been called for at 
Johannesburg13.  
The first survey, which took place in 200314, indicates that out of the 108 countries surveyed 
(45 in Africa, 42 in Asia and the Pacific, 22 in Latin America), “around 10% have made good 
progress towards more integrated approaches, 50% have taken some steps in this direction 
but need to increase their efforts, while the remaining 40% remain at the initial stages of the 
process” (GWP, 2004: 3). In addition to this rather general classification, a more detailed 
assessment also concentrated on each country’s IWRM related policy, institutional and 
operational developments, in ten areas seen as important building blocks to develop an 
IWRM Plan.  
Interestingly they point out that “those countries that have made the most progress towards 
adapting and reforming their water management systems towards more sustainable water 
management practices have often started by focusing on specific water challenges” (GWP, 
2004: 3), such as South Africa which focused on drinking water and sanitation. 
In annex 4, we present an overview of the 14 countries assessed as having made good 
progress.  
A second survey assessed the status of the 2005 target for National IWRM and Water 
Efficiency Plans, and was released at the  4th World Water Forum in Mexico in March 2006, a 
place for countries “to report on their progress, to share and learn from their experiences, 
and to further refine their implementation strategies” (Japan Water Forum, 2004: 4). 
                                                 
12 In the surveys, “IWRM Plan” refers to “integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans”.  
13The surveys were conducted through the GWP’s regional networks in non-OECD countries (so Mexico, for 
instance, is not included), therefore limiting the scope to countries where the GWP has either a Regional or 
Country Water Partnership. The resulting regional reports, while integrating official viewpoints (through either 
the analysis of official documents or the involvement of government officials in the GWP’s multistakeholder 
platforms), were not official government documents, but based on qualitative assessments of senior professionals 
which did not dispose of a common normative grid.   
14 Although this was only one year after the call for IWRM plans had been made, the objective of this first survey 
was to establish “a status baseline, to be able to measure a moving target” (Alan Hall, personal communication).  
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Following the same classifications, but with 95 countries having responded this time, the 
results indicate 21% of countries with plans in place or substantial progress, 53% having 
progressed but needing to do more and 26% at the initial stage only.  
Although the two surveys are not directly comparable as they do not concern the same 
countries and did not use the same questionnaires, “they do indicate a trend with an increase 
from 60% to 74% in those countries that have taken steps towards better water resources 
management through the IWRM approach” (GWP, 2006b: 5). 
But in spite of the growing awareness these figures suggest, lack of implementation is a 
preoccupation: 
“While it shows a growing degree of seriousness about setting 
national strategies and plans, there are only occasional 
comments related to progress in actually implementing the 
elements of an IWRM approach” (GWP, 2006b: iii). 
“IWRM is a process that leads to improved planning, better 
governance and a balancing of social, environmental and 
economic goals and is not easily measured. The survey is based 
on a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures and it 
has shown that more work is needed on how to monitor 
progress on achieving a more integrated approach to water 
resources management and development ” (GWP, 2006b: iii). 
This survey will be followed by “a more comprehensive initiative on monitoring integrated 
water resources management that GWP and others aim to carry out with the World Water 
Assessment Programme during 2006-2009” (GWP, 2006b: 2). It is indeed recognised that the 
2002 call for 2005 IWRM plans was too short term15, as apart from the actual fact of drawing 
up the plans, the real issue is to embed these into national development plans; nonetheless, 
the call enabled to set forward the process and change mentalities (Alan Hall, personal 
communication).  
Another similar survey was realised by the Japan Water Forum and presented at the 4th 
World Water Forum, concerning 85 countries and including OECD countries. In addition to 
such surveys, several platforms exist to exchange experiences regarding IWRM at country 
level: the Global Water Partnership’s Toolbox, the UN-World Water Assessment 
Programme’s case studies, and the World Bank’s case studies.  
                                                 
15 The CSD has in fact decided to revise the targets at its next meeting in 2008 (Alan Hall, personal 
communication).  
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By crossing these various sources of information, several countries are identified as having 
reformed their water policies, on the basis of IWRM, such as China, India, Thailand, Uganda 
and Burkina Faso (UN Millennium Project, 2005; Jonch-Clausen, 2004). For example, Uganda 
started an IWRM process in 1993, and managed to build a “consistent policy and legislation 
[that] provides the guidance and rules for priorities of water use, allocation and wastewater 
discharge and where stakeholder participation and decentralisation provides local level 
involvement” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 32). However, as with other such countries: 
“Implementation will prove a stern test” (UNDP, 2006).  
Since 1997 and 2000 respectively, Brazil and South Africa have water laws that encourage the 
integration of ecological considerations (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000). Brazil has put in place a 
considerable decentralisation process, while South Africa has put in place a top-down 
priority system for water allocation (the highest priority for human consumption, then the 
environment, then productive uses) (UNDP, 2006). 
But the model put forward is Australia's Murray River basin approach to face a severe 
environmental crisis caused by over-allocation of irrigation water in a semi-arid region 
(UNDP, 2006). The Murray-Darling Basin Commission uses IWRM as a foundation guiding 
principle, with a specific focus on cost sharing arrangements between different levels of 
government –states distributing water rights to users- as well as community and private 
sector organisations (Jonch-Clausen, 2004). One fourth of the river flow is reserved as an 
environmental flow by combining several economic instruments (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000).  
It is recognised that reproducing the conditions Australia benefits from in developing 
countries will be a challenge, as this would require a highly decentralised national water 
planning, institutional arrangement bringing together all ministries involved in water 
allocation, priority given to the environmental reserve before starting annual allocation for 
other uses (UNDP, 2006).  
There have also been important efforts at a regional level, such as the European Union’s 
Water Framework Directive (WFD), entered into force in 2000. The WFD’s principles are: 
taking a river basin approach, protecting the quality of water by integrating four key 
objectives (protection of the aquatic ecology, specific protection of unique and valuable 
habitats, protection of drinking water resources, and protection of bathing water), through a 
combined approach of both source and effects controls –emission limits and quality 
standards- as well as extending public participation and adequate pricing (European 
Commission, 2000). At the 2005 World Water Week in Stockholm, the European Commission 
published a leaflet presenting the coherence between IWRM principles and WFD 
requirements. 
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The Directive requires all water bodies –inland and coastal- included in the European Union 
to reach a good status by 2015. Transposition in national legislation was to be reached by 
2003 and publication of management plans by 2009 (European Commission, 2000). River 
basin districts are to be established in which river basin management plans (six-year cycles 
for preparation, implementation and review) have four elements: characterisation of impacts, 
environmental monitoring, environmental objectives and design and implementation of 
programmes of measures (Calder, 2005). Problems identified include high costs for 
implementation of regulatory standards, and technical problems in defining good ecological 
status (as there is a need to find reference sites without human influence or activities) 
(Calder, 2005). 
In 2003, acknowledging that “within the European Union, the need to comply with the Water 
Framework Directive has made IWRM a priority for all water authorities” but that national 
efforts are not coordinated in any way, the French Office International de l’Eau and the 
International Network of Basin Organisations undertook the project IWRM.Net. It aims at 
constituting “a European-wide research network for improving dissemination of Integrated 
Water Resources Management research outcomes”. To do so, the project inventories all 
European research on IWRM in the 25 countries, and groups the various research managers 
in order to define common demand-driven research strategies (Office International de l’Eau, 
2003). 
Beyond the strict European Union (EU)’s borders, the EU Water Initiative, launched in 2002, 
was designed to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals for 
drinking water and sanitation, within the context of an integrated approach to water 
resources management (European Commission, 2004). It is based on regional partnerships 
and multi-stakeholder involvement. 
Further, the European Union commissioned a review of a sample of 67 projects undertaken 
by its International Scientific and Technological Cooperation (INCO) Programme, during 
three EU research framework programmes (from 1994 to 2006). The EU-INCO had indeed 
adopted the IWRM paradigm since the mid-1990s and the objective of the review was “to 
learn lessons from past investments in water research with an IWRM focus, [and] identify 
strengths and weaknesses with particular emphasis on the problems of implementing IWRM 
principles” (Gyawali et al., 2006:1). Alongside recognising the tangible benefits of 
investments in human and institutional capital in the partner countries, one of its main 
outcomes is the call for scientists to develop more communication with water managers and 
decision-makers (including to sometimes communicate unpleasant results), in order to 
increase the impact of these research activities: “They must learn how to engage in political 
processes” (Gyawali et al., 2006:12). To do so, the reviewers conclude on the need for a 
constructively engaged integrated water resources allocation and management – ‘allocation’ 
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being added to be more explicit on the need to undertake re-allocative policy reforms 
(Gyawali et al., 2006).  
Other regional initiatives include the West African Regional Action Plan on IWRM and the 
Central American Action Plan for IWRM (Jonch-Clausen, 2004); the Global Water 
Partnership’s 14 regional partnerships (GWP, 2006a); the partnerships developed by Cap-
Net, an international network focused on capacity building in IWRM, supported by the 
United Nations Development Programme and the Netherlands (Cap-Net, 2006); or the 
United Nations’ Environment Programme’s IWRM 2005 Programme, to accelerate the 
implementation of IWRM plans in seven regions through technical and financial assistance 
(UNEP, 2006).  
But for Mollard and Vargas (2005a), assessing the introduction paper of the theme Integrated 
Water Resources Management produced by the Global Water Partnership for the 4th World 
Water Forum in Mexico in March 2006, not one example of successful IWRM implementation 
is given, because there are no successes anywhere. For them, this is where the cleverness of 
the approach resides: the conditions are never realised for an IWRM to spontaneously take 
place, which is why politicians should put in place top-down ones (and if by chance, a 
success did take place somewhere, they would immediately say this is a successful IWRM).  
For these researchers, the examples put forward, insufficiently documented, actually 
question the usefulness of an IWRM more than anything else, as they do not result from such 
an approach but from the type of water management in place (either participative or 
authoritarian). Suggesting a classification of countries according to their governing 
characteristics (either legitimate, i.e. based on social participation; authoritarian; or neither), 
they suggest that IWRM favours authority with administrative neutrality, something 
dangerous for both societies and democracy (Mollard and Vargas, 2005a).  
 
c. Problems of applicability  
However, all those working on IWRM coincide on recognising that it is “a difficult concept 
to achieve in practice” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 118). As illustrated by the results of the 
two surveys led by the GWP: “Integrated approaches are widely accepted as the main 
vehicle or instrument to manage water in more effective ways, and the international 
community has made considerable efforts and progress in increasing awareness of water 
resources and their management. However, their implementation remains incomplete in 
both developed and developing countries” (UN-WWAP, 2003a: 371). 
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Dourojeanni (2004), questioning precisely why IWRM is such a difficult concept to put into 
practice, warns that there is no simple answer (or else the problem would already have been 
solved). 
The literature interested by this question identifies several constraints to IWRM 
implementation, both in terms of integration between sectors and with the environment.  
 
Sectoral integration problems  
According to Tortajada (2005), the acceptance of IWRM, which promotes a multi-sectoral and 
multi-disciplinary approach, has been prompted by the specificity of the water sector: its 
numerous linkages with many others sectors makes it difficult to rely on one discipline, 
institution or sector only to resolve the problems. As highlighted by Gyawali: “The different 
definitions of the basic concept have in common that they recognise that water’s natural and 
socio-economic functionalities transcend sectoral approaches to planning, intervention and 
management and thus also disciplinary boundaries of knowledge” (Gyawali, 2006: 83). 
It is s precisely the numerous interdependences it has with other spheres such as energy, 
agriculture, or the environment that render such a holistic approach unrealistic, according to 
Biswas (2005). He explains that IWRM’s very fast popularity can be linked to the reassurance 
it provides: an inherent comprehensiveness, in a world where such encompassing 
approaches are far from being the norm. Due to the explosive increase in information and 
knowledge in both social and natural sciences since the end of the 16th century, nowadays 
disciplinary fragmentation is inevitable, to the extent that “with the frontiers of knowledge 
expanding continuously, it is becoming increasingly difficult for professionals to keep up 
with the advances even in their limited areas of interest” (Biswas, 2005: 329).  
Somlyódy, referring specifically to water quality issues, for example, suggests the existence 
of an inherent contradiction between the increasing amount of knowledge needed to manage 
their complexity on one side, “and more efficient integration across various disciplines, 
emissions, sectors, countries, cultures, and societies on the other side” (Somlyódy, 1995: 250).  
For Biswas, the same applies to institutions: IWRM would seem to stir nostalgia of a time 
where things were simpler and could be grasped holistically, institutional-wise. Today, it 
would also be impossible to put all interlinked sectors together in one same institution: this 
would require too many different technical capacities, and would be too big to manage 
(Biswas, 2005). Due to the inherent intersectoral linkages with agriculture, energy and 
transportation, it is impossible for any organisation to undertake a comprehensive analysis 
of all water management measures, while aiming at efficient water use for food production.  
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Various reasons explain this organisational constraint: the limits of professional training and 
competence, the limits of any organisation in terms of authority, the unpredictability of the 
future, etc. (White, 1998). Citing Falkenmark, Somlyódy points out that “the administrative 
infrastructure basically mirrors the scientific divisions” (Somlyódy, 1995: 257). This is echoed 
by Mariño and Simonovich’s analysis: “Current institutional arrangements (laws, policy, and 
organizations) in many countries are probably the greatest single impediment to effectively 
managing water resources. They are generally complex, bureaucratic, competitive, ad hoc, 
inflexible, unresponsive, poorly integrated, and they result in systems that have poor 
accountability, lack foresight and prevent open communication and robust debate between 
stakeholders” (Mariño and Simonovic, 2001: v).  
In any case, sectoral integration is still lagging, even in OECD countries (Duda and El-Ashry, 
2000: 118). “The reality is that the traditional institutions are still basically sectoral, where 
most of the sectors tend to focus on activities related to one specific use and not to their 
multiple use or management at appropriate regional levels” (Tortajada, 2005: 300).  
The administrative sectoral management –involving the different ministries of irrigation, 
agriculture, water and the environment- was set up to manage resources of land, water and 
forests “long before the need to coordinate them was fully appreciated” (Tropp, in press: 30). 
Be it between technical or economic priorities or professional specialisations (such as water 
engineers and soil conservators), although “policy documents and guidelines in most 
countries will urge co-ordination and co-operation (...) generally the attitude is not toward 
integration and co-operation” (Mitchell, 1990: 216). Boundary problems, such as professional 
biases or suspicions, arise whenever two or more interests overlap: wetlands, for example, 
provide important habitat for wildlife, while their drainage frees up land for agriculture; or 
dams produce hydroelectricity but prevent fish migration (Mitchell, 1990). 
Resistance to change can be motivated by fear of losing authority or influence and leads to 
‘garbage can’16 decision-making, like in the USA where the water sector is extremely 
fragmented according to physical, institutional and political-technical dimensions (Deyle, 
1995). In addition to hidden agendas, fuzzy legitimation, unclear functions and huge 
structures also undermine integration: “The combination of organizational culture, 
personalities and participants’ attitudes can pose a major obstacle to integration and co-
operation” (Mitchell, 1990: 15). This is also true for de Jong (1995), who identifies the feeble 
will inside organisations to take a broad view instead of defending their interests, as one of 
the three bottlenecks to implementing IWRM, alongside communicational problems and 
historical anthropocentric approaches. 
                                                 
16 Deyle explains that ‘garbage can decision-making’, developed by Cohen et al. (1972), relates to decisions made 
“when a mixture of problems, solutions, and participants come together in an organizational ‘space’”, but 
unlimited in their flux (Deyle, 1995: 389). 
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Participation of stakeholders and decentralisation might not favour integration either, when 
in the name of integration, some national water institutions might wish to extend their 
responsibilities, risking more centralisation and concentration (Biswas, 2005). 
In three sessions held at the 4th World Water Forum in Mexico, in April 2006, dedicated to 
examine to what extent and how countries have adopted and implemented IWRM 
principles, the main obstacles identified to crucial institutional reform are “limited capacity, 
low public awareness, poor political support, and inadequate funding” (UN-WWAP, 2006a: 
7). Political support and funding is bound to increase, as the growing understanding of the 
importance of water for development, a success recognised to the IWRM approach, 
intensifies (UN-WWAP, 2006a). On the other hand, also required are increased civil society 
involvement and monitoring mechanisms with “indicators, quantitative as well as 
qualitative, which can more clearly reflect the progress toward implementing IWRM and 
meeting IWRM-goals and objectives, namely more equitable, efficient and environmentally 
sustainable use of water. The challenge is to develop indicators sensitive to local differences 
and priorities while able to deliver at the global level” (UN-WWAP, 2006a: 10).  
In order to overcome such sector-integration difficulties, various solutions are suggested. 
Countries implementing integrated approaches rarely first establish objectives to then 
distribute activities to the agencies in place, as these usually had their own interests 
beforehand: coordination mechanisms are sought for afterwards (Mitchell, 1990). So in order 
to create synergies “to produce collective benefits for all sectors in the basin (…) rather than 
inducing competition among sectors” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: p.124), a first step could be 
the creation of interministerial committees at the national level, as well as basin specific 
interministerial committees to ensure that sectoral ministries collaborate among sub national 
political jurisdictions for basin management (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 124).  
These recommendations coincide with the finding of the WWF’s Water and Wetland Index 
survey, led in 20 countries in Europe and northern Africa in 2003, to assess, among other 
things, the extent to which water policies and legislations have applied the IWRM principles. 
The results conclude that focused communication –still absent in most countries- must 
increase between bodies responsible for water and other sectors like land use planning and 
agriculture. Even more important, cross-cutting committees should be created to remedy to 
the lack of coordination, in all of the countries, between authorities managing different water 
components (ground, surface, coastal…) (WWF, 2003).  
Such committees would constitute processes to facilitate what Mitchell calls ‘bargaining at 
the boundaries’, where most management problems are located: between levels of 
government (local, state, federal), among agencies at the same level of government (water, 
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agriculture, forestry, wildlife...) or among divisions within departments, which usually have 
fragmented and shared responsibilities (Mitchell, 1990).  
In addition to boundary problems, Mitchell identifies the range of concerns to be addressed 
and integrated as one of the two main barriers to effective integrated water management. 
Apparently, a common pattern in most countries had been to start off with a few elements: 
navigation, flood control and drainage (eastern States of USA) or hydropower generation, 
irrigation and flood control (western States), or irrigation, hydropower and flood control (in 
Japan). Then in the 70s, the questions of pollution and quality started to emerge and new 
management functions appeared. Realising the difficulty to implement these 
comprehensively, the tendency was generally to narrow all these down to only a few 
functions - those of primary concern in each specific country- while considering their 
linkages (such as irrigation and water supply in Nigeria) (Mitchell, 1990). Though 
acknowledging that at a strategic level (what can be done), it is desirable to think 
comprehensively, i.e. taking into account the broadest possible range of variables that may 
be significant, at the operational level (what will be done), a more focused, ‘integrated’ 
approach is needed, implying a smaller number of variables (the most significant, i.e. which 
account for a big proportion of the management problems) and their interrelations (Mitchell, 
1990). 
The six instruments used for integration that Mitchell identifies are very context-specific: 
legitimation through a mix of legislation, political commitment, and administrative 
decisions; a small number of functions to integrate; structures evolving from centralised 
organisations with many functions towards decentralisation; formal and informal 
mechanisms to facilitate coordination and integration between legitimation instruments, 
functions and structures is one of the greatest needs of the moment, with existing 
mechanisms ranging from inter-departmental or inter-agency committees to other tools like 
water rights (New Zealand), pricing policies (Canada), abstraction licences (Great-Britain), 
water supply and waste management charges (Poland), or public participation in decisions 
(the United States and Canada); finally a need for more organisational culture reinforcing the 
benefits of integration (Mitchell, 1990). 
To overcome institutional bottlenecks, de Jong calls for broad, open-minded analyses of the 
current situation, eventually leading organisations to adapt. He also highlights the need for 
implementation on a small scale –leading to further expansion once it has proven good 
results- and the need to keep area-specific due to specificities in history, hydrology and 
culture: sometimes water companies will be best, other times environment boards will (De 
Jong, 1995). He stresses the need for clearly defined, commonly accepted, properly 
supported, and more anticipatory than reactive goals, as well as inclusion of citizen 
participation for wide support (De Jong, 1995). 
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Deyle also identifies convening appropriate stakeholders to define a shared problem 
(interdependency) and identify shared goals (vision) as necessary steps to move from 
‘garbage can’ decision-making to potential long term collaboration. The transformation into a 
long-term alliance also depends largely on favourable circumstances (political will and 
leadership, time for the trust to build and relationship to mature) and conveners: “Where 
efforts to consolidate or integrate water management institutions have succeeded, the 
political, organizational, and environmental conditions have generally been exceptional. (...) 
A fortuitous crisis has often created a problem policy window that facilitates such an 
initiative” (Deyle, 1995: 396) 
A very important condition for an effective implementation is to first identify common goals 
and activities and then see how individual organisations can contribute to these (instead of 
the other way around, i.e. trying to find how various organisations’ goals can be coordinated 
to establish the context for integrated water management) (Mitchell, 1990).  
For Mostert et al. (in press), these steps are part of the social learning approach they prompt 
to improve cooperation across boundaries (‘learning together to manage together’). 
Although IWRM is recognised as being context-specific, striking implementation problems 
identified in the Netherlands, which has a relatively long history of IWRM, include limited 
process management (decision-making through a lot of cooperation) and contextual 
constraints (the general culture still favours individual initiatives compared to shared 
responsibilities) (Mostert, submitted). 
 
Environmental integration problems 
Too often, environmental concerns receive inadequate attention in IWRM planning. This is 
the common conclusion of several national reports submitted to the 4th World Water Council 
in April 2006: “Negative environmental externalities, which detrimentally affect water 
resources, continue to be too often ignored, while the positive contribution of ecosystem 
services to the water regime, a healthful environment and rural livelihoods is consistently 
undervalued” (UN-WWAP, 2006a: 8).  
Most progress remains to be made in integrating land management and downstream 
biological diversity: “The challenge in dealing with the complex nexus of global 
environment, development, and water resources is to reform these policies, reduce damaging 
subsidies and bring the environment into the mainstream of economic decision making” 
(Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 124).  
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“Approaches focusing on preventive action still lag behind traditional curative solutions. 
Risk reduction had not been well integrated into water resource management, which 
continues to be viewed primarily as a technical problem with economic repercussions, while 
its sociocultural and environmental aspects are often ignored” (Brüschweiler, 2003: 5). 
Environment is often the weak link of IWRM because the needs of the environment in water 
are not yet scientifically established, which is the purpose of calculations linked to 
environmental flows (Odame-Ababio, 2004).  
Further, it is interesting to note that few studies have focused on the linkages –be they 
economic or ecological- between upstream and downstream areas in the framework of 
freshwater ecosystems (IUCN, 2000). Those who have mostly concentrate on case studies 
where upstream rural land-use activities, such as forest-clearing for agricultural or pastoral 
activities, impact on downstream urban water use. On the contrary, the issue of the impacts 
of urbanisation on downstream water quantity and quality for rural areas seems 
insufficiently addressed (FAO, 2000). A possible explanation could be the fact downstream 
rural stakeholders might not have the power to voice the environmental problems they are 
faced with, nor the financial capacity to pay the upstream stakeholders to reduce the damage 
they incur (Kiersch, 2000b). However, “competition over water allocation within river basins, 
especially between upstream and downstream areas, between large-scale and subsistence-
level uses and between commercial and ecosystem uses, is becoming a source of severe 
economic and political conflict” (Iftikhar and Emerton, 2003).  
In this respect, the socio-economic dimension of environmental flows is now gaining 
momentum, while focus was initially on its biophysical aspects: the evaluation of the impacts 
of water allocations on downstream socio-economic activities is necessary in order to 
undertake informed tradeoffs (Niasse et al., 2004). In a worldwide survey on environmental 
flows (Moore, 2004: 45), it was highlighted that IWRM and its application needs attention in 
many areas of the world.  
As highlighted in a worldwide survey on Environmental Flows (Moore, 2004: 26): “In the 
context of Integrated Water Resource Management, it is crucial that both water quality and 
environmental flows are considered and integrated in water management decisions”. The 
author concludes that to remedy the current imbalance, there is a need for acknowledging 
the tradeoffs existing between the economic, social and environmental flows.  
It is important to highlight that the concept of environmental flows has evolved from a 
purely environmental focus (their necessity for specific fish species’ survival), to a more 
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holistic approach including socio-economic aspects17. The human dimension of 
environmental flows is receiving increasing attention, due to the direct link between flows 
and livelihoods, including economic costs and benefits –the poorest communities in 
developing countries are often dependent directly or indirectly on the ecological goods and 
services provided by environmental flows for their livelihoods like subsistence fishing or 
small-scale irrigation activities- but also other social dimensions such as aesthetics, important 
cultural features and recreation (Moore, 2004).  
So calculating the environmental and social benefits and costs of different environmental 
flow regimes (the basis of Environmental Flow Assessment) is a necessity to contribute to the 
environmental sustainability and social equity dimensions of IWRM (IWMI et al., 2004a). 
Further, the results show that environmental flows are being taken into account in IWRM to 
some extent, demonstrating that further integration in water policy and management is 
possible, provided more experiences are shared. In particular, results show that there is a 
particular need for a better understanding of the costs and benefits associated with the 
implementation of the concept environmental flows: “By establishing a structured and 
transparent decision-making process that incorporates environmental, social and economic 
costs and benefits, more informed tradeoffs can be made” (Moore, 2004: 48).   
According to Duda and El-Ashry, the key obstacle to integrated management of water, land 
and their biological diversity is the lack of commitment to undertake the necessary reforms. 
In particular, policy reforms are needed to encourage irrigation efficiency, through change in 
water pricing and removal of the massive government subsidies for irrigation water and 
land development. Other policy reforms must be designed to prevent unsustainable 
irrigation practices leading to salinization, contamination, eutrophication – a problem in 
many seas, due to excessive application of nitrogen fertilisers- or excessive diversion which 
disrupt ecosystems and livelihoods (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000). 
But despite the call for such policy reforms at the end of each international conference for the 
past two decades, nothing much has changed. This is why countries willing to undertake 
such reforms are offered support by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its 
implementing agencies (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank), through incremental cost grants. 
The GEF is encouraging an IWRM at river basin level, “an integrated approach to land, water 
and ecosystem management”. To do so, it encourages using the synergies between the three 
Rio global environment conventions (desertification, biodiversity and climate change) (Duda 
and El-Ashry, 2000: 116).  
                                                 
17 This explains why other notions are also being used: in a global survey undertaken to evaluate the perceptions, 
specific implementation procedures and challenges related to the topic (Moore, 2004), a total of 57 different terms 
were identified, the most common being “environmental flows”, “minimum flows” or “in-stream flow 
requirements”. 
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For example, in the transboundary Aral Sea basin, environmental flows, elimination of 
subsidies, introduction of water charges and investment in irrigation efficiency are being 
undertaken. Essentially, the policy, legal and institutional reforms consist of: reform of water 
pricing policies, taking into account environmental considerations (through either regulatory 
or market-based instruments), stakeholder participation and creation of institutions at the 
river basin level, taken as the management unit. 
For Calder, many of the problems lie in governance, defined by the UN-WWAP as the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at 
all levels, i.e. “the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences” (Calder, 2005: 269). 
Similarly, Dourojeanni recalls that although water managers may have given their allegiance 
to IWRM, their decisions might be affected if this has not also been adopted outside of the 
national borders: often, decisions are taken by “powerful groups which make decisions on 
themes that seem far away from water and the environment, but that in practice affect these 
elements and resources much more than the decision made in the narrow circle of water and 
environmental experts” (Dourojeanni, 2004: 136). He refers in particular to free-trade 
agreements, foreign investment and trans-border river basins. 
 
Trade-offs 
Perhaps one of the reasons there are so many criticisms with regard to the implementation of 
IWRM “is that it is presented as a ‘win-win’ situation” (GWP, 2003a: 11). In the definition 
promoted by the GWP, no mention is made to the hard choices and trade-offs it necessarily 
entails: “The lack of implementation of IWRM is therefore due to a large extent to the lack of 
attention devoted to understanding political, social and financial conflicts”, whose resolution 
requires empowerment of water stakeholders and effective partnerships (GWP, 2003a: 11). 
For example, where trade-offs do not seem to be recognised: In the United Nations World 
Water Development Report, it is mentioned that although “the idea of Integrated Water 
Resources Management is widely accepted as the starting point for water policies […] there 
is also a need to ensure that developing integration is not done at the expense of meeting 
such pressing needs that may arise in one particular aspect of water management such as 
drinking water supply, improved irrigation or threatened ecosystem functions” (UN-
WWAP, 2003a: 7).  
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Whereas “although some ‘win-win’ solutions may exist, it is likely that meeting the joint 
objectives of long-term environmental sustainability and poverty reduction will almost 
inevitably involve negative trade-offs” (Calder, 2005: 270).  
While there should be precise, uniform and standardised criteria for evaluation of options in 
water management, these actually vary from one place to another, and with time: there is a 
need to deepen the criteria quality to reconcile evaluation principles (White, 1998). 
Falkenmark, using the green and blue water classification18 calculates that to increase the 
food production in order to meet future needs, the next generation will need additional 
green water equivalent to the total blue water today. To do this, trade-offs will have to be 
bargained between using water from the rivers, increasing the efficiency (more crop per 
drop) and expanding crops areas to use the green water currently used by natural 
ecosystems (Calder, 2005). Politics make trade-offs and balances between development and 
ecosystem functioning: participatory approaches are required to legitimise them 
(Falkenmark, 2003). 
Tropp makes a distinction between countries having been through the Green revolution 
irrigation, facing population growth, urbanisation, industrialisation, changing lifestyles, with 
problems of over-exploited aquifers, polluted rivers, and where the challenge is the need to 
increase blue water productivity. Technological innovations enabling to use water more 
efficiently will not be sufficient to face increasing water demand: decision-making systems 
will increasingly have to deal with tough trade-offs between water for human demands and 
ecosystem needs. The application of pricing regimes for more efficient and equitable water 
use has proven difficult, while results of governance options such as decentralisation, 
participation, water rights, need to be strengthened and clarified. He recommends, for 
example, an enhanced involvement of user groups for rights clarification and enforcement of 
pricing mechanisms, inclusion of customary rights into national legislations, etc. 
As for countries of semi-arid rain-fed agriculture, they must learn to tap green water 
potentials, i.e. increase green water productivity/soil moisture: “Affordable, small scale 
technologies and approaches for farmers hold tremendous promise for improving local 
livelihoods” and they need to support innovation, small-scale credit, intensify integrated 
land-soil approaches. In both cases, governance must be more transparent and provide for 
balanced decision-making, even though tough trade-offs will probably be inevitable (Tropp, 
in press). 
                                                 
18 Green water is water going out by evaporation due to irrigation, while blue water are return flows from 
irrigation, industrial and domestic use in addition to natural flows. 
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Such refusal to acknowledge trade-offs reflects what Mollard and Vargas (2005a) very 
critically denounce: according to them, IWRM is a technocratic doctrine-to-be that ignores 
history and social sciences, as well as the importance of politics. This is particularly 
unrealistic, because, as highlighted in the last Human Development Report, “in practice it is 
difficult to balance the competing claims of different users for a resource that goes to the 
heart of power relationships in society –and to questions of political voice and institutional 
accountability” (UNDP, 2006: 153).   
Similar echoes originate from panel of researchers that reviewed experiences of IWRM in 
projects of the European Union’s International Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
Programme Results indicate that it is the ignorance of the political dimension of IWRM in the 
international discourse of its proponents –the World Water Council, the Global Water 
Partnership, the European Union, the World Bank and many bi-lateral donor agencies- that 
has led practitioners to understand IWRM as a purely technical and economic-based 
approach, thus leading to do business-as-usual under its cover (Gyawali et al., 2006). 
Inside the GWP itself, this is recognised as one of the biggest challenges the organisation 
needs to come to terms with: “We are now more in the political and governance issue, but 
suffer from insufficient social science capacity. The same goes for the countries in which we 
work, so there is a mismatch between what we want to do, and the people we need to do it 
with: people working at the GWP are water experts, but are not always prepared with the 
skills needed to deal with the real world, such as negotiation, conflict resolution…This is a 
new world for water people, one of process-driven social change” (Alan Hall, GWP Network 
Director, personal communication”.  
 
3. Repercussions at municipal level  
As we have seen previously, IWRM, based on the Dublin principles, is promoted worldwide. 
According to principle 1, the large catchment or watershed (in thousands of km2) is the most 
effective management scale, corresponding to hydrological run-off; according to principle 2, 
there is a strong call for management at the lowest appropriate level (Smits and Butterworth, 
2006). Indeed “the challenge of integrated land, water, and ecosystem management on a 
basin scale can only be met by management at the lowest possible levels. The national 
management level has certain responsibilities, the basin level has other responsibilities, and 
the local level has its contribution as well, be it community-based catchment management, 
irrigation users organizations, or urban water utilities. Reforms at the national level are 
needed to empower management at the other lower levels, including full cost pricing for all 
water service delivery” (Duda and El-Ashry, 2000: 124). 
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a. Scales of implementation of IWRM 
Today, after some years of experience in the matter, we are faced with the following 
situation: “although it is widely recognised that the catchment level is the most appropriate 
for planning and management of water resources, this is increasingly challenged as being the 
best unit for implementation” (Smits and Butterworth, 2006: 11). This is because while the 
run-off takes place at the basin scale, most water uses, driven by socio-economic processes, 
take place within administrative boundaries (Smits and Butterworth, 2006). Several authors 
have highlighted the problems linked to the mismatch between hydrological and 
administrative boundaries (Calder, 2005; Brannstrom, 2004; Jouravlev, 2003; Pollard and Du 
Toit, 2004). So “clarification is needed for how a geographic-based agency relates to the 
mandate of the sectoral agencies and the administrative and political units which do not 
generally correspond to the basin boundaries” (WWC, 2000: 28).  
Figure 10: Disjoints between hydrological and administrative  
boundaries need to be recognised by governance systems 
 
Source: Calder, 2005: 271 
 
A physical unit such as a catchment or watershed indeed usually encompasses different 
administrative entities, such as municipalities. As we will see hereafter, due to 
decentralisation processes, municipalities have a key role to play in water resources 
management. Thus all municipalities are also concerned with the application of IWRM: 
along with other actors, they share a responsibility in implementing the principles defined 
for the entire watershed. 
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b. Municipalities and IWRM  
As part of the worldwide efforts started in the 1980s (World Bank, 2000), natural resources 
management has been at least partially decentralised in sixty countries (Larson and Ribot, 
2004). Water is one such resource, identified as an issue of particular importance at the local 
scale: ten years after the Rio Conference, a survey to assess the implementation of Local 
Agendas 21 undertaken by ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability, shows that “water 
resource management is the common priority issue for municipalities in all world regions 
and regardless of economic situation” (ICLEI, 2002: 3).   
Different categories exist, listing the various water-related functions in which municipalities 
can be involved as a result of such decentralisation processes (Smits and Butterworth, 2006).  
According to Jouravlev (2003) for example, these range from local public services provision 
(water and sanitation, storm water management, solid waste management), to planning, 
promotion of development and control (spatial planning and employment creation): local 
governments play a double role of both big institutional water users, that affect and are 
affected by other users, along with that of promoters and managers of local socio-economic 
development. 
In the framework of the European Union’s 6th Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development, several projects are financed on the theme of the participation 
of local authorities to IWRM, among which the LoGoWater project (‘Local Governments and 
Integrated Water Resources Management in Southern Africa’). Coordinated by the European 
Secretariat of ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, this project brings together 
African and European researchers along with local governments from Southern Africa, to 
support these in improving water resources management in the Limpopo basin, between 
2005 and 2008. 
One of the project’s objectives is to gain an overview of models and frameworks of local 
governments’ participation in IWRM, and to highlight the constraints they face in fulfilling 
this role, to help them overcome such limits.  
As part of the project’s outputs19, a literature review on local government and IWRM 
undertaken by Smits and Butterworth (2006) highlights three interests that local 
governments or municipalities have in relation to IWRM at the catchment level:  
 “Ensuring access to water resources for basic human needs (water service delivery); 
                                                 
19 The LogoWater project is also developing guidelines, with a methodology and a toolkit to support local 
government in actively participating in IWRM (ICLEI, 2006). 
 65
 Ensuring proper management of water and sanitation (including pollution impacts), and 
other water-related services such as storm water management and flood protection; 
 Encouraging accountability of new catchment-level authorities (local governments 
represent a constituency and may be democratically elected) and alignment with the 
policies and priorities of local governments (i.e. development priorities)” (Smits and 
Butterworth, 2006: 39). 
 
Four limits to implementing IWRM principles while fulfilling municipal functions are 
identified: the sub-sectoral fragmentation inside the water-related services; the weak 
accountability of both local authorities vis-à-vis water resources ones and vice-versa; the 
feeble community participation in water services; and the limited capacity of local 
governments both in terms of human and financial resources (Smits and Butterworth, 2006).  
For local governments to overcome such challenges and better support the implementation 
of IWRM principles, the report advances two main approaches:  
 Engage in new IWRM institutions, often at catchment level; 
 Implement IWRM principles through local actions 
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary: such a ‘twin-track 
approach’ is encouraged because in many developing countries, institutions at catchment 
level have not yet been set up (Smits and Butterworth, 2006). 
They also correspond to the macro/micro levels recommendations made by ICLEI in its Local 
Government Implementation Guide for the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (ICLEI, 
2005). The Global Water Partnership also recognises that “local authorities can play an 
important role in overseeing the implementation of IWRM activities both within their 
boundaries and within the local and regional watersheds” (GWP, 2006c). 
 
Hereafter we present these two approaches in more detail 
Engaging in IWRM by being active in new water resources management institutions 
These new institutions are those established to implement IWRM, along with the policy and 
legal reforms undertaken. Among the different forms reviewed, those enabling a municipal 
participation are catchment coordination bodies and municipal associations.  
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The first suffer from local governments’ limited awareness, whose participation is not 
stimulated by “seeing this body as a slowly-progressing discussion forum, in which it does 
not need to take part, only to be an invited guest” (Smits and Butterworth, 2006: 29).  
On the other hand, municipal associations have been developing, with a number of examples 
in Latin America inventoried by Jouravlev (2003). The examples mentioned are those of 
institutional arrangements purportedly organised to cover a watershed and overcome the 
limitations of water management at a municipal scale: firstly, the watershed is more 
appropriate for decision-making related to multiple uses, as it is the scale at which all 
interactions take place; the same can be said of the interactions between water, land and 
related natural resources; finally, it is also the scale at which these two socio-economic and 
physical-biotic systems interact (Jouravlev, 2003). In the case of such municipal associations, 
the problems include: the heterogeneity of municipalities, the frequent turnover in municipal 
authorities and its consequences in terms of administrative team changes, rivalry between 
municipalities of different political parties, and the subsequent important transaction costs to 
coordinate an important number of municipalities with varying characteristics and objectives 
(Jouravlev, 2003).   
 
Engaging in IWRM by implementing its principles at the local level 
Examples of local actions identified in which different sectors of local governments can 
implement IWRM principles include linking water services and livelihoods, reusing 
wastewater, and de-coupling storm water and wastewater (Smits and Butterworth, 2006). It 
is worthwhile mentioning here that it is only since the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002 that the issue of wastewater is considered jointly with that of water 
management. Previously, they had been separated since the 19th century when scientists 
discovered waterborne diseases, and treatment infrastructures were built far away from 
drinking water sources, whose distribution was centralised (Seacrest, 2005). 
Smits and Butterworth (2006) give three examples where IWRM principles can be applied at 
the local level:  
First, water for domestic and productive purposes are generally not provided together, and 
when the second comes to missing (for example for small scale irrigation), it is frequent for 
users to tap into the first. This can lead to overuse of the domestic water supply service, not 
designed for both purposes, while benefits of multi-use should be considered to avoid this.  
Reusing wastewater is also identified as a possible local action to link various sectors (water, 
sanitation, agriculture). It enables to both reduce pollution and treatment costs, while also 
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constituting an alternative source of irrigation water, even though precautions are needed to 
avoid health risks. 
Finally, de-coupling of storm water and wastewater is also an important local action that is 
increasingly being considered in Europe, as it has been evaluated that it is cheaper to 
separate the flows and treat only the wastewaters, instead of having both flow into the 
sewage system.  
In addition to these three examples, several series of guidelines have been drawn up to 
promote a sub-sectoral application of IWRM principles, either in the water, sanitation and 
hygiene sector or more broadly.  
To summarise, in this chapter we have presented our conceptual framework through a 
historical and geographical overview of IWRM, its implementation tools and constraints, 
with a final specific focus on its implementation from a municipal point of view. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE MEXICAN PATHWAY TO IWRM 
 
After having introduced the concept of integrated water resources management, the 
objective of this part is to give a broad picture of the main water issues in Mexico, and 
present the general water management framework of the country. 
 
1. National level data  
Mexico, covering 2 million km2, has a population of more than 103 million in 2005 (INEGI, 
2005). With 4,360 m3 of water per capita in 2005, it is a country with medium water 
availability1 (UN-WWAP, 2006b). In 1950, this figure was 11,500 m3 per capita, while it is 
projected to reach 3,800 m3 per capita by 2025 (Carabias et al., 2005). 
In terms of comparison, water availability per capita was almost 28,000 m3 in 1997 on 
average in Latin America and the Caribbean2, ranging from 2,804 m3 in the Greater Antilles 
(Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic) to 191,422 m3 in the Guyana sub-region 
(Suriname and Guyana) (FAO, 2006).  
 Map 3: National internal renewable water resources per capita around 1995 
 
 Source: WWAP, 2003: 11 
                                                 
1 The conventional threshold of 1,700 m3 per capita is that above which a country can meet water requirements 
for agriculture, industry, energy and the environment. Below, countries experience ‘water stress’; below 1,000 m3 
per person, they are faced with ‘water scarcity’, and below 500 m3 per person, with ‘absolute scarcity’ (UNDP, 
2006). 
2 Even though at country level there might be a difference between the two, at regional level like here it is possible 
to use data provided for the Total Internal Renewable Water Resources, as they can be considered more or less 
the same as the Total Actual Renewable Water Resources, according to the FAO Aquastat communication office. 
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To calculate such data, a country’s total water availability (476 km3 in Mexico) is first 
obtained by substracting evapotranspiration, water imports and exports from the annual 
rainfall. This figure, divided by the total population, then gives the average annual water 
availability per capita. 
Figure 10: Mexican hydrologic cycle (average annual figures) 
 
Source: Carabias, 2005: 24 
 
But this medium national water availability does not reflect the strong disparities in water 
runoff throughout the country, in both time and space3 (Carabias et al., 2005). 
First, in Mexico, rainfall is concentrated in a unique rainy season that runs from June to 
September. Its torrential characteristics make “the resulting runoff difficult to regulate” 
(Aldama, 2005: 307). 
In addition, there is also an important spatial heterogeneity: due to its geographical features, 
Mexico is a country where all climates are found –except for the extreme cold ones (Carabias 
et al., 2005). Almost two thirds of Mexico is submitted to an arid or semi-arid climate 
(Palacios, 2004) while the rest ranges from temperate to tropical (Centro del Tercer Mundo 
para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
 
                                                 
3 The Relative Water Stress Index, developed by Vorosmarty, attempts to overcome this limitation (WWAP, 2006: 
116). 
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 Map 4: Climatic variations in Mexico  
 
 Source: Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003: 20 
 
These climatic variations in turn have a strong impact on natural water availability: while 
20% of the territory receives 40% of the rainfall, 40% of the territory receives 20% of the 
rainfall, impacting both surface and groundwater availability (Aldama, 2005). 
  Map 5: Variety in the runoff availability throughout Mexico 
 
  Source: Aldama, 2005: 307 
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 Map 6: Variety in groundwater availability throughout Mexico 
 
 Source: Aldama, 2005: 308 
 
The National Water Commission recognises that there is no knowledge of the exact quantity 
of water used in the country: the reference data is that of the Public Register of Water Rights 
(Repda, according to its Spanish acronym) which lists all water concessions4 (CNA, 2005).  
According to this official database, total water demand (225 km3 in 2005) is largely below 
total water availability (476 km3), representing only 47%. This is despite the fact demand has 
almost doubled in ten years, essentially for consumptive uses5. Inside these consumptive 
uses, agro-pastoral activities occupy the first rank with 76% of water use, largely in front of 
public supply (14%) and industry (10%). These consumptive uses still use up twice less water 
than non-consumptive uses (75 km3 and 150 km3 respectively) (CNA, 2005b). According to 
certain United Nations organisations, it is the fact total consumptive use represents only 16% 
of total available water that qualifies the country as having a moderate pressure on water 
resources (Carabias et al., 2005).  
                                                 
4 According to studies undertaken in the framework of the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission, the Repda 
severely underestimates the total water use (up to 40% is not registered). This is because it has never updated 
water use in small-scale irrigation systems (i.e. not included in larger irrigation districts), locally known as 
irrigation units (Paula Silva, Personal communication).  
5 Consumptive uses are those for which water is transported to the place of use and part of it does not return to 
the original water body, while non-consumptive uses are those for which water is used on-site or through a 
minimal diversion and totally returned to the water body (CNA, 2005b).  
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Figure 11: Consumptive and non-consumptive uses of water in Mexico (2004)  
Agro-pastoral 
(agriculture, livestock, 
aquaculture, others)
25%
Public supply (urban 
and domestic)
5%
(industry, 
agroindustry, 
services, trade and 
thermoelectric ity)
3%
Non consumptive 
uses (hydro-
electricity): 67%
Consumptive 
uses: 33%
 
Source: Elaborated from CNA, 2005b 
 
Consumptive and non-consumptive uses share superficial water as their main source (up to 
64% for the first, 100% for the second). But inside consumptive uses, important variations 
exist: while groundwater is mostly resorted to for public supply, agro-pastoral and industrial 
activities preferably recourse to surface water.  
Table 1: Volume of water concessions for consumptive uses (in km3 in 2004) 
Origin Use 
Surface water Groundwater 
 Total volume 
Agro-pastoral 38.7 18.7 57.4 
Public supply 3.9 6.8 10.7 
Auto-supplied 
industry 
5.6 1.7 7.3 
Total 48.2 27.2 75.4 
Source: CNA, 2005b 
In addition to the fact the official ample margin between total demand and availability is 
probably overestimated, it does not reflect the very distinct realities throughout the country. 
The problem resides in the fact that territorial distribution of population and economic 
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activities is inversely related to that of water availability: 77% of the population lives and 
84% of gross domestic product is generated where only 28% of the runoff occurs (Aldama, 
2005; López, 2004)). Similarly, while 75% of the population lives more than 500 m above sea 
level, 80% of water storage structures are located at lower altitudes.  
 Map 7: Contrast between development and water availability  
 
 Source: CNA, 2005a: 27 
 
Since the first National Water Plan in 1975, thirteen administrative regions based on 
hydrologic criteria have been established (themselves grouping 37 hydrological regions 
containing 314 hydrological basins). Each region is endowed with a regional coordinating 
agency of the water ministry. As a consequence of the above, some regions overexploit the 
resource while others under-utilise it (Tortajada, 2005). 
In the northern part of the country, for example, the water availability is only 1,336 m3 per 
capita per year, while in the south-east State of Chiapas, it reaches 24,674 m3 per capita per 
year6 (Carabias et al., 2005). Certain watersheds of the country, like that of Valle de Mexico or 
those in the state of Guanajuato are already under water stress (García, 2004; Aldama, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 According to Tortajada (2005), the fact the southern part is also the poorest of the country, despite the 
abundance of the resource, can be explained by the weak interest of successive governments in regional 
development impacts of sector-by-sector policies, mainly developed at federal level. 
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  Map 8: Variable pressure exerted on the water resource7 
 
  Source: Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003: 45  
 
In order to face the disjunction between water supply and demand, massive efforts have 
been undertaken to develop the necessary infrastructure for the various water uses, mainly 
agro-pastoral activities and public supply.  
Currently there are approximately 4000 dams, out of which 850 are considered as big dams. 
These were mainly built between 1910 and 1977 to provide for both urban and irrigation uses 
– starting 1946, multi-use dams also enabled to generate hydroelectricity and provide 
protection against floods (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
There are also 3,000 km of aqueducts (CNA, 2005c). In the 1960s and 1970s, basin-to-basin 
transfers were initiated, the most notorious being that from the Cutzamala and Lerma-Balsas 
basins to provide water for irrigation in the northwest, as well as additional water supply for 
the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (Tortajada, 2005).   
As a result, according to the census of 2000, potable water supply coverage reaches 87.8 % at 
national level (respectively 94.6% and 68% for urban and rural areas). In terms of sanitation, 
the figure is quite lower, 76.2% on average (respectively 89.6 % and 36.7 % for urban and 
rural areas) (CNA, 2005c: 56). This means that approximately 13 million people lack access to 
potable water and 27 million to sanitation (Aldama Rodríguez, 2004).  
As for agriculture, there are 6.3 million ha under irrigation (CNA, 2005c), representing 
roughly a third of the total cropped area (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 
2003). Up to 60% of the irrigated land is divided in 81 irrigation districts (managed by both 
                                                 
7 It is calculated by dividing the total volume of water under concession by the average natural availability. 
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the government and water users’ associations since the decentralisation process started in 
1989), the remaining 40% corresponding to 30,000 irrigation units (managed solely by water 
users’ associations) (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
 
Overall, the two main issues are groundwater overuse and the increase in water 
contamination (Aldama, 2005). 
Groundwater, which represents only 36% of total water for consumptive uses, supplies 
almost two-thirds of domestic water and a third of the total irrigated area (Carabias et al., 
2005). According to Carabias et al. (2005), close to 16% of aquifers are over-exploited – see 
map 10-, a figure that has tripled during the last thirty years. Uses exceed availability in at 
least four administrative regions –I, II, VII and XIII (Península de Baja California, Noroeste, 
Cuencas Centrales del Norte and Valle de México)- while this is close to being the case in 
regions III, VIII and IX (Pacífico-Norte, Lerma-Santiago-Pacífico,Golfo Norte) (Centro del 
Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
The situation is worsened by the fact the aquifers do not recharge as fast as before, due to 
deforestation, land use changes as well as longer dry seasons due to climate change 
(Carabias et al., 2005). Where rainfall is low, recharge is particularly slow so if overuse is 
maintained on a long period, this can lead to the aquifer drying up: groundwater reserves 
are shrinking at a rhythm of 6% per year (Ibid.).  
Using almost 70% in volume, agriculture is one of the main users of groundwater (CNA, 
2005b). Its low efficiency can be explained by several factors. First, 90% of irrigation is 
realised by gravity (IMTA, 2002). Then, a common practice to limit the risks of lower 
productivity is that of over-irrigating, compared to the needs of the crop (Scott et al., 2004). 
Finally, while modernisation programmes were set up since the 1960s to increase 
productivity in the irrigation districts, the economic and financial crisis of the 1980s initiated 
several decades of infrastructure deterioration due to insufficient maintenance (Tortajada, 
2005). The resulting low average efficiency of 46% translates by a “loss” of almost three times 
the total public water supply –where losses due to leakages already revolve around 40% 
(Carabias et al., 2005). Even though the irrigation “losses” usually either infiltrate back into 
aquifers or feed into other water bodies, the aquifer extraction is rarely totally compensated, 
explaining why one of the priorities is to increase irrigation efficiency (Carabias et al., 2005).  
In addition to the transfer of irrigation districts to water users, one component of the 
modernisation programme started in 1989 was indeed to increase the water use efficiency 
(Johnson, 1997). By the end of 1996, 88% of the total gross area of the irrigation districts had 
been transferred to 386 water user associations, and out of 82 irrigation districts, 59 had been 
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totally transferred and 13 partially transferred (Palacios, 1998). In terms of water efficiency, 
the programme is ongoing, with gravity irrigation progressively being replaced by 
underground channels or drip-irrigation.  
Nevertheless, such technical programmes are not sufficient to curb the groundwater over-
use, as the “savings” in water they enable are generally used to either extend the irrigated 
area, increase the number of harvests per year or cultivate water-thirstier crops (Carabias et 
al., 2005). There is also a need to change the regulation of concessions to provide incentives 
for a more efficient use of groundwater: under the current system, farmers are at the risk of 
losing their concession if they do not use all the water it includes. This could also be 
combined with regulating the demand between users of a same aquifer, using pricing tools 
or monitoring extractions more carefully (Carabias et al., 2005). In particular, as prohibitions 
to bore new wells are not always respected, a more effective incentive might be to increase 
the price of electric energy (for pumping) or restrict the number of new electric connexions 
(Scott et al., 2004).  
The second biggest problem in Mexico is the contamination of water bodies: in 2001, 70% 
had some degree of contamination (Carabias et al., 2005). 
  Map 9: Quality of surface water (data from 1975-1992)  
 
  Source: Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003: 146 
There are three main sources of contamination: municipal, industrial and agricultural8. 
According to data from the Third World Centre for Water Management, only 19% of the total 
7.54 km3 per year of municipal wastewater (also including industry connected to municipal 
sewage) receives a treatment. For industrial wastewaters not connected to the municipal 
public sewage (5.36 km3 per year), this proportion is only 16%. Diffuse pollution is more 
difficult to estimate, but studies have assessed a generation of 21.2 km3 per year of 
agricultural discharges (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).   
                                                 
8 In addition, groundwater suffers from saline intrusion in the case of coastal aquifers.  
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Solid and dangerous waste is also a major contamination factor: in 2000, 47% of municipal 
solid waste does not receive an adequate treatment (monitored landfill site or recycling 
process)9. Industrial waste is also a big issue, in particular that with toxic components, either 
chemical or petrochemical.   
Map 10: Aquifers (in 2004): over-exploited, submitted to saline intrusion and/or 
land salinisation  
 
Source: CNA, 2005a: 33 
 
This contamination has important economic, environmental and health impacts, such as 
causing important gastrointestinal infections, the second cause of infant mortality, or leading 
to the resurgence of cholera at the end of the 20th century (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el 
Manejo del Agua, 2003). Combined with important water deviations, it also heavily affects 
aquatic biodiversity, such as humid zones, who play an important role in the hydrological 
cycle (Carabias et al., 2005).  
While natural de-contamination of surface water can be rather quick, if the source of 
pollution is halted, this is much more of an issue in the case of groundwater, where such 
remediation can take several decades (Carabias et al., 2005). This is particularly 
preoccupying for arid areas, where groundwater is often the unique source of water. In any 
case, increasing contamination of both surface and groundwater leads to treatments that are 
more and more costly in order to be able to allocate such water for consumptive uses (Centro 
del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
                                                 
9 These data remain indicative only, as the sources are not always very consistent (Centro del Tercer Mundo para 
el Manejo del Agua, 2003). 
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In the following section we will see how the Mexican institutional framework has evolved in 
an attempt to face these pressing issues of overuse and contamination of water sources. 
 
2. The regulatory and institutional framework: working towards an IWRM? 
As Aldama (2005) recalls, water has been an important feature throughout the whole of 
Mexican history. The most well-known legacy of the pre-Hispanic civilisations –the Olmec, 
Teotihuacan, Toltec, Mexica (Aztecs) and Maya, who flourished from 2300 B.C until 1521 
A.D.- are the irrigation and aqueduct systems in the Valley of Mexico (the floating gardens of 
Xochimilco are classified as a World Heritage cultural site). Then, during the three hundred 
years of Spanish colonialism until the Independence (declared in 1810 but completely 
realised in 1821), waterworks continued on being developed, in particular irrigation systems 
in the haciendas and aqueducts to supply colonial cities10. Since the Revolution of 1910-1917, 
and especially since the population increase in the 1930s, successive federal governments 
have supported the accelerated development of hydraulic infrastructure for irrigation, cities 
and industry across the 31 states and the Federal District (Aldama, 2005; Centro del Tercer 
Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). As reminded by Rodríguez (2004), the country is 
indeed officially a federation of independent states with autonomous municipalities, even 
though in practice centralism remains a preponderant characteristic of the Mexican 
governance system, as we will see throughout this section. 
The modern water policy is anchored in the Constitution of 1917. Its article 27 defines all 
surface water previously declared as such as public property, while groundwater are the 
property of the landowner under which they are located; nonetheless, both sources can see 
their uses regulated by the federal government (García, 2004). Since then, the legal and 
institutional framework has undergone important reforms. Major milestones include the 
creation, in 1926, of the first water administration (the National Irrigation Commission) and 
of the Irrigation Law, in response to the necessity to increase food production and populate 
the northern border areas; the integration of water development and management in a 
unique central organ –the Ministry of Water Resources- in 1946, at a time when water 
demand for both industrial and urban uses was substantially increasing; the creation of River 
Basin Commissions in the 1940s and 1950s, to implement large scale waterworks and spur 
regional development11; in the 1960s and 1970s, national sectoral water plans for the 
                                                 
10 At the time, water rights were delivered by far-away administrations or the King of Spain himself (Mollard and 
Vargas, 2005b).  
11 The territorial scale chosen for such regional development was the river basin, states being deliberately ignored 
in order to reduce their political power. But it was precisely such a technocratic approach that led these river 
basin organisations to collapse, under the pressure of the political-administrative forces in place (Mollard and 
Vargas, 2005b). 
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development of regions such as the northwest, and rehabilitation of irrigation districts to 
increase agricultural productivity; the National Water Law of 1972, which defined 
institutional responsibilities, created irrigation districts and led to the first National Water 
Plan in 1975; in 1976, the fusion of the Ministry of Water Resources and that of Agriculture, 
reflecting governmental priorities (only urban water supply stayed at the Ministry of Human 
Settlements and Public Works) (Aldama, 2005; Schmidt, 2005; Centro del Tercer Mundo para 
el Manejo del Agua, 2003).   
With domestic water defined as a constitutional right, it was provided almost free of charge 
by the federal government (Pineda, 2004). Indeed, although potable water and sanitation had 
been defined as a municipal responsibility in the Constitution, the federal authorities were 
generally in charge of providing the services, at least during the period of municipal 
consolidation (Rodríguez, 2004). Irrigation water, the government’s priority in the sector 
until the 1980s, was also almost free (Linck, 2006).  
Such subsidising practices were not a problem during the forty years of economic growth 
that started in the 1940s12, and contributed to reinforce the image of benefactor of the unique 
political party in power (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). From the 
1960s until the early 1980s, in a context of apparent financial abundance, large-scale basin 
transfers were devised to supply public and irrigation water, irrespective of the costs these 
entailed (Tortajada, 2005a). 
As Linck (2001) explains, this period corresponds to the implementation of the green 
revolution in Mexico, resting on the occidental model of productivity and set up to feed an 
increasingly urban population (the figure of 50% is reached in the 1960s). Indeed, the 
development model chosen was one of industrialisation (based on import substitution), 
thereby contributing to urban concentration. The green revolution system, based on 
subsidised inputs and industrial equipment as well as standardised large-scale production, 
contributed to exclude all traditional small-scale agriculture (mainly producing rain-fed 
maize), thus initiating the beginning of the ‘rural decline’ and the end of self-sufficiency in 
maize13. To reverse this, towards the end of the 1970s, the subsidies were extended to include 
rain-fed agriculture but without helping the small farmers sell their products, thus leading to 
create what a following neoliberal government would qualify as “a low-efficient, assisted 
and deresponsiblised agriculture” (Linck, 2001: 59).  
                                                 
12 Petrol exports enabled to boost growth and finance the industrialisation model. Nationalised since 1938, the 
petrol industry particularly benefited from the rise of petrol prices in the 1970s, with related income representing 
up to 80% of export-based income at the end of the decade (Bolay, 1985). 
13 In addition to damaging the small farmers’ dignity and producer identity, the green revolution also generated 
important environmental impacts such as the destruction of ecosystems and the overuse of aquifers (Linck, 2006). 
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In terms of water, although the subsidies put in place for both potable and irrigation uses 
undeniably contributed to increase living standards, they also resulted in inefficient cost-
recovery and incentives to waste (Tanaka, 2002). At the end of the 1970s, the idea of 
transferring the provision of potable water to states and municipalities was reinforced with 
the dissolution of the Ministry of Water Resources in 1976, delegating various sectors to 
different ministries.  
An end was put to these subsidising practices with the major economic crisis that started in 
1982 –a debt crisis14, due to high international interest rates and which triggered the ‘lost 
decade’ in most of Latin America- later followed by a financial crisis due to the brutal 
devaluation of the peso in 1994 (Tanaka, 2002; Cordonnier and Santiso, 2001). Provoked by a 
general context of violence (the zapatist uprising, the assassination of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party’s candidate), the latter entailed a flight of capital, contended only by a 
massive financial support from the international community (Cordonnier and Santiso, 2001). 
In exchange, the country was submitted to strict structural adjustment by the lending 
agencies, mainly the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
As a result, a restrictive budgetary policy was put in place (Ibid.). Budget constraints 
severely capped all water development projects, while insufficient subsidies did not allow 
for proper infrastructure maintenance anymore (Tortajada, 2005a). In spite of fiscal reforms, 
tax collection remained low (Saade, 1997). Also, while at the beginning of the 20th century, 
water was a priority for agricultural needs to feed a population which was mainly rural (75% 
in 1940), urbanisation trends changed this, also influenced by the hygienist discourse 
encouraging more water uses through personal facilities (Peña, 2003; Linck, 2001). So in the 
context of growing urbanisation, the government was confronted with its incapacity to 
respond to the increasing water demand (Pineda, 2004). 
 
a. Encouraging road signs 
After half a century, the revolutionary regime had not delivered its promises: with respect to 
the agrarian reform for example, fees owed to the central government by the irrigation 
administration were seldom paid, while limits to groundwater forage rarely respected 
(López et al., 2004).  
To face this situation and implement significant cost savings, the federal government 
undertook four main policy actions: the restructuring of the legal and institutional 
framework, the promotion of decentralisation on one hand and of private sector involvement 
                                                 
14 The fall of petrol prices combined with a high dependence on petrol exports led to a crisis of over-indebtedness 
(Mollard and Vargas, 2004b; Bolay, 1985). 
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on the other, and the design of new financing schemes (Saade, 1997). These initiatives 
illustrate the transition that took place during the 1980s, between the model of 
industrialisation by import substitution accompanied by a strong governmental 
involvement, to one of a more neoliberal tendency (Cordonnier and Santiso, 2001; Linck, 
2001). As Schmidt (2005) recalls, two successive so-called ‘technocratic’ presidents undertook 
and consolidated this approach of free trade, deregulation and privatisation: Miguel de la 
Madrid (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). They would be followed by 
the last PRI president, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), before the election of Vincente Fox, from 
the National Action Party15.  
Hereafter we chronologically present the main highlights of these interdependent reforms in 
the water sector, some of which represent promising steps towards a process of integrated 
water resources management.  
In 1980, a Presidential Agreement transferred the management of water supply and 
sanitation systems to the states; each state having the freedom to decide on the preferred 
configuration (state or municipal level operative organisms), this transfer gave way to a 
variety of institutional set-ups (Rodríguez, 2004). Investment in infrastructure, however, 
remained an exclusive federal responsibility (Pineda, 2004).  
Then, in 1983, the ‘municipalisation of potable water’ started, through an amendment 
brought to Constitutional article 115 –which regulates municipal activities (Pineda, 2004). It 
allowed the transfer of spending power from state and federal level to municipal 
governments, assigning these a number of responsibilities among which that of providing 
potable water, drainage and sewerage systems (Moreno, 2004). However, in case of 
insufficient financial or technical means, state support could still be appealed to. The 
exploitation, use, distribution and control of national waters were nonetheless kept in the 
hands of the federal government (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo de Agua, 2003). 
The reform also enabled to increase municipal governments’ ability to respond more 
effectively to local needs, by establishing their right to manage their own finances and 
specifically keep all revenues collected from property taxes and public services’ provision 
(Edmonds, 1997).  
The reform was implemented in several steps (Pineda, 2004). That same year, the 
construction and administration of hydraulic systems –which had been the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Water Resources and partially that of the Ministry of Human Settlements and 
Public Works since 1976- were transferred to the state governments. These could then decide 
                                                 
15 V. Fox’s election in 2000 represents the first change of political power in 71 years of PRI reign. Mexicans seem to 
want to pursue this path, as showed by the recent presidential elections of July 2006 where both the candidate of 
the same PAN (Felipe Calderón) and that of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador) were largely ahead of the PRI candidate (around 35% of votes compared to 21%).  
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whether they downloaded them to municipalities or not, or as a third option, operated 
jointly. As a result, by 1988 eleven states had chosen the transfer option, and by 1996 this 
figure had doubled. Later, in 1999, another reform to Constitutional article 115 made the 
transfer mandatory, with exceptions being authorised only in case of municipalities’ justified 
demand (García, 2004).  
But the reforms have been severely criticised, because accompanied by insufficient means to 
guarantee their smooth implementation. Indeed, as of 1982, only municipalities that were 
also state capitals could eventually manage such operating systems in a financially auto-
sufficient way (Rodríguez, 2004).  
As a result, municipal drinking water and sanitation systems today still suffer from heavy 
criticism, the first problem being their lack of financial resources to provide a service of 
quality (Solanes and Gonzalez-Villareal, 1999).  
As analysed by Joumard (2005), this can partly be explained by the mismatch between the 
highly centralised taxing powers since 1980 –a change operated to increase the efficiency of 
the system, very low in times of state taxes- and the decentralisation of spending 
responsibilities a few years later. Reflecting this, municipal level taxes in 2002 only account 
for 10% of their revenue. Moreover, inside such own tax revenue, 60% is generated by the 
real estate tax, limited by outdated land registers (their update is rarely undertaken as such 
operations entail short term political costs and benefits on the long run only). To compensate 
this fiscal unbalance, a system of revenue sharing was designed, requiring that 20% of 
transfers received by states from the federal government –in exchange for giving up their 
revenue raising powers- be allocated to municipalities (Joumard, 2005).  
Another factor explaining the financial shortage of municipalities is their common clientelist 
attitude: fear of electoral reactions prevents them from raising water fees (Solanes and 
Gonzalez-Villareal, 1999). This is the prime factor, even before the population’s capacity to 
pay (Rodríguez, 2004) but more generally, it is a complex web of social, judicial and political 
constraints that prevents operators from fixing fees enabling them to cover their costs: as a 
result, on average, out of the 60% of supplied water actually used –40% being lost in 
leakages- only half is paid for (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). 
Thus, in the best of cases, fees cover operation costs, but are rarely sufficient for investment 
costs (to rehabilitate or extend the infrastructure) (Guerrero, 2004; Saade, 1997). Accordingly, 
municipal budgets usually only manage to cover salaries and other administrative expenses 
and the level of indebtedness of municipalities is extremely high: in 1994 around 84% of 
public investment was realised by the federal government, 13% by the states (Saade, 1997). 
At the end of the 1990s, the institutional setting of financial markets was reformed to 
encourage the access of municipalities and states to credit markets; but the initiative 
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encountered limited success, in the absence of an accounting framework for their repayment 
capacity (Joumard, 2005).  
A second criticism addressed to municipal potable water and sanitation systems is their lack 
of technical capacity and experience in the sector. Combined with insufficient resources, this 
reality explains why today, municipalities continue to depend on state and federal support 
to provide water and sanitation services (Moreno, 2004; Centro del Tercer Mundo para el 
Manejo del Agua, 2003). For instance, the federal government still finances 45% of water 
infrastructure (Joumard, 2005). As detailed by Rodríguez (2004), it is very difficult to break 
the vicious circle thus created: low tariffs and insufficient resources maintain a low service 
quality; thus the users are not willing to pay more and it is impossible to employ more and 
better qualified staff, therefore contributing to maintain a status quo.  
Finally, municipal water administrations are criticised for certain practices induced by 
discontinuity in policies and programmes and the lack of accountability of sub-national 
governments: short term planning, lack of incentives for leakage control and tariff updating, 
and passing on the problems to the next administration (Saade, 1997). A characteristic of sub-
national Mexican governments is indeed the no-re-election rule: governors of the 31 states 
and mayors of the 2,445 municipalities are elected for non-renewable six-year and three-year 
terms respectively, deterring elected authorities from investing in any programme with up 
front costs and long term benefits (Joumard, 2005).  
The specific issue of municipal point-source pollution was raised in 1988, when the General 
Law for Environmental Protection and Ecological Equilibrium was promulgated. But at the 
time, wastewater treatment only became compulsory for large cities and those bordering the 
U.S.A. (Martínez et al., 2000a).  
In parallel with these decentralisation efforts of the 1980s, maintained involvement of the 
central government for the planning and building of aqueducts created important 
coordination problems, which only aggravated those of scarcity, conflicting uses and 
pollution already existing in many watersheds (Aldama, 2005).  
To resolve this, the National Water Commission (hereafter CNA, according to its Spanish 
acronym) was created in 1989. This represents a turning point in Mexican water 
management, as it enabled to streamline administration and financing of the water sector, 
previously dispersed among several institutions of the federal government (Tanaka, 2002; 
Saade, 1997). First an autonomous agency attached to the Secretariat of Agriculture and 
Water Resources, the CNA integrated the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and 
Fisheries in 1994 (which became the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources in 
2000).  
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As listed by Aldama, its responsibilities are to “define the country’s water policies, and 
formulate, update, and monitor the implementation of the National Water Plan; measure 
water quantity and quality; regulate water use; allocate water to users and grant the 
corresponding licences and permits for both water withdrawals and water discharges; plan, 
design, and construct the hydraulic infrastructure, totally or partly financed by the federal 
government (with some exceptions, such as hydropower development); regulate and control 
river flows, as well as improve the safety of major hydraulic infrastructure; provide technical 
assistance to water users; define and, if necessary, implement financial mechanisms to 
support water development and the provision of water services for irrigation and urban 
water supply and for sewerage and sanitation” (Aldama, 2005: 310-311).   
The CNA is in charge of regulating both urban water supply systems and irrigation districts, 
operated respectively by municipal or state authorities and water users’ associations. In the 
specific sector of water supply, acknowledging the difficulties faced by municipalities –lack 
of technical capacity, very low service tariffs and tax recollection levels- it suggested to 
reinforce the operating organisms by encouraging states to reform their laws, organisational 
and financial procedures accordingly (Pineda, 2004). It specifically proposed to: create 
municipal water utilities in charge of water and sewerage services and disposing of tariff 
autonomy (i.e. not dependent on state legislation anymore); enforce suspension of service to 
penalise non-payers; establish a tariff inventory (according to types of uses, volume, types of 
service charges like sewage, wastewater treatment, connexion and meter installation); 
reinvest generated revenues into the same service; and provide fiscal credit to users’ debts 
for water services (Pineda 2004; Tanaka, 2002). In short, the CNA started fashioning the 
operating organisms towards a more entrepreneurial management mode (Schmidt, 2005).  
Six years later, each of these measures had been adopted by at least half of all states, but their 
actual implementation requires overcoming many obstacles, among which users’ being 
accustomed to a long tradition of free water (even if this entails bad service) or the 
importance of political and electoral interests (Pineda, 2004; Tanaka, 2002).  
Further, the creation of state water commissions through the reformed state water laws could 
have been a real step forward to reinforce federalism, had these commissions been attributed 
more than just the operation of potable water and sanitation or the coordination of 
investment programmes to enable this, and actually been in charge of improving water 
management in their respective state (García, 2004).  
In order to readjust the legal system to the country’s necessities, in 1992 a new National 
Water Law was designed, recognising the CNA as the sole federal water authority (Sánchez, 
2006). According to the law, the CNA is in charge of the management of national waters, 
integration of planning and management, promotion of an efficient water use, design and 
 86
construction of infrastructure for water provision and treatment, and institutional 
coordination of the three levels of government (Martínez et al., 2002b). Implementation 
procedures were specified by the law’s Regulation of 1994.  
The law was also designed so as to allow and foster private sector participation in the water 
industry, until then forbidden by the Constitution and the first water law of 1972 (Pineda, 
2004; Saade, 1997). In addition, three other components were to be implemented in the 
guiding National Water Plans: institutional capacity building, decentralisation of functions 
and use of economic instruments (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo de Agua, 2003).  
The National Water Law indeed reinforced decentralisation on a number of levels.  
First, encouraged by lending conditions of international organisations such as the World 
Bank or the IMF, the neoliberal water reform reduced the role of the federal government in 
water management by decentralising both urban and agricultural water services, while 
emphasising the role of privatisation. In particular, the reform entailed: the transfer of urban 
water services to states and municipalities or private concessionaries; the transfer of water 
management to the water users’ in the 81 irrigation districts; the evolution towards full-cost 
pricing so as to encourage financially-sufficient systems; the privatisation of water 
infrastructure financing and development; and the creation of water rights’ markets for 
agriculture (Browning-Aiken et al., 2004). The process aimed at full cost pricing also included 
removing irrigation-targeted subsidies (covering 60-80% of total irrigation systems’ costs) 
(Wilder, 2005). 
Results of such initiatives have been uneven, the most positive being those of water 
management transfer to irrigation districts. Users have been able to participate in water 
administration, use and conservation, even though in some cases water concessions and fees 
remain arbitrarily controlled by the local notable of the irrigation district (García, 2004). The 
good cost-recovery that resulted from this transfer also enables a better maintenance in the 
infrastructure, although significant water savings still constitute the main weakness of this 
operation, generally speaking (López et al., 2004). Another drawback is that due to 
insufficient financial capacity to invest in their land (in a context of low agricultural prices in 
general) and to a lack of organisational structures, most small producers have not benefited 
from this process, thus constrained to sell their lands to bigger landowners and search for 
alternatives –mostly employment as daily workers or emigration (Centro del Tercer Mundo 
para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). 
In terms of potable water and sanitation provision, state governments have the responsibility 
of planning and financing, although still under the control of the CNA (Third World Centre 
for Water Management, 2003; Tanaka, 2002). But as far as the operative level is concerned, 
several states still choose to ignore that it is a municipal attribution, under the pretext of 
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municipalities’ technical, administrative and financial capacity problems (Guerrero, 2004). 
This argument is nevertheless a justified one if these prevent a good service provision, and 
underlines the fact that the policy of municipalisation was too ambitious and undertaken 
without sufficient means (Pineda, 2004).  
Officially, water tariffs are established in order to cover all operation, conservation and 
maintenance costs for urban areas, industries or irrigation districts (Centro del Tercer Mundo 
para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). As far as groundwater is concerned, urban/public and 
industrial users must pay for water rights in addition to the tariffs, variable according to the 
volume, and representing up to half of the CNA’s income at national level (Scott et al., 2004). 
On the contrary, agricultural users do not have to pay for rights, even though they represent 
the major users of groundwater in absolute terms (Ibid.).  
As for the private sector, although it was appealed to for its technical expertise and 
continuity in services’ management (contrasting with municipalities), its practical 
involvement has been more important in processes of Build-Own-Transfer –especially for 
wastewater treatment plants- and aqueduct construction than in operating potable water 
systems, due to more constraining conditions such as important financial risks and political 
consequences in this area, as well as lack of experience, (Pineda, 2004; Centro del Tercer 
Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). The fact ownership of infrastructure and tariff 
setting is maintained a governmental prerogative is also put forward as a possible 
explanation (Tanaka, 2002). 
Finally, the law fixed the conditions of water rights’ exchanges, especially for transactions in 
irrigation districts or when agricultural uses compete with industrial and urban demand 
(Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). In this perspective, the law also 
established the Public Register of Water Rights that lists all water concessions, and is 
managed by the CNA. In order to update the registration of concessions, and specifically 
increase the participation in the process of regularisation of such water rights –many wells 
having been bored without authorisation16- the authorities fixed a deadline after which 
energy costs would not be subsidised anymore (Scott et al., 2004). The 1992 Energy for the 
Countryside Law, which had the ambition of limiting water extraction to that under 
concession, represented something of a challenge (Ibid.).    
In addition to encouraging more decentralisation towards states, municipalities and 
irrigation districts, the new 1992 water law established that integrated water resources 
management constitutes the basis of the national water policy (Valencia, 2004). Therefore it 
also reinforced decentralisation at watershed level: river basins and aquifers are the 
                                                 
16 This was the consequence of the fact that in the Constitution of 1917, groundwater was not considered as being 
part of public property, with its regulation thus being totally ignored (López et al., 2004).   
 88
hydrological units for planning and management, and watershed councils are to be created. 
Although in the country, interest in integrated river basin management exists since the 1940s 
–when the objective was to replicate the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority, seen 
as a model to promote development and industrialisation- the new law makes Mexico one of 
the rare countries in Latin America, along with Brazil, to have legally mandated river basin 
organisations (Tortajada, 2005a; Dourojeanni, 2002). These filled up the institutional void left 
by the 1975 National Water Plan, which had set up a regional division based on hydrological 
criteria (the 13 administrative regions). The structure of these river basin coordinating bodies 
specifically includes: the Director General of the CNA, governmental voices from the states 
that are part of the watershed, and at least their corresponding amount of user 
representatives, from sectors such as urban, agriculture, industry, etc. (Martinez et al., 
2002b). When several states are involved, there is exactly the same number of representatives 
for each, be it in terms of governmental voices or user representatives.  
The watershed councils’ functions range from: balancing supply and demand for the 
different uses; preventing and cleaning-up contamination; conserving, preserving and 
enhancing ecosystems; realising an efficient and sustainable water use; and stimulating a 
‘water culture’ that considers water as a vital and scarce resource (Dourojeanni and 
Jouravlev, 2002). The councils approve river basin plans which, when integrated into the 
National Water Master Plan, become compulsory for the federal government and indicative 
for state and local government and water users (Tortajada, 2005a). 
 
In order to implement the river basin councils’ objectives, auxiliary supportive organisations 
were also created, to deal with particularly acute or complex problems at smaller scale: 
watershed commissions for sub-watersheds, watershed committees for micro-watersheds 
and groundwater technical committees (called COTAS) for aquifers17 (Dourojeanni and 
Jouravlev, 2002).  
Hereafter we briefly present the corresponding institutional evolution, reached by October 
2004.  
Twenty-five watershed councils have been created, dispersed all across the thirteen 
administrative regions (CNA, 2005e). The first one, that of the Chapala watershed, was 
established less than two months after the new law was enacted, due to its particular 
complexity –its administrative boundaries cross five states (Querétaro, Guanajuato, 
Michoacán, México and Jalisco)- and pressing environmental issues. On one hand, out-of-
                                                 
17 In the state of Guanajuato, the most advanced in terms of IWRM, these COTAS have the exceptional status of 
being committees for both micro-watersheds and aquifers (Rodríguez, 2004). 
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basin transfers at the headwaters supply Mexico City and Toluca for regional domestic, 
industrial and agricultural uses, while deforestation was leading to building up 
sedimentation. On the other hand, locally, aquifers were over pumped to irrigate 700,000 ha 
of intensive agriculture and to supply Guadalajara18 in potable water. Combined, these 
processes had drastically affected Lake Chapala, located downstream in the watershed, by 
both reducing its size –it lost more than 80% of its volume in the last 20 years- and 
concentrating effluent discharges from domestic, industrial and agricultural sources. As a 
result, in 1989, 90% of Mexico’s biggest lake had been classified as unacceptable for drinking 
or fishing (Castelan Crespo, 1999; Mestre, 1997). The major conflict in the watershed opposed 
Jalisco state on one hand, defending the lake, and Guanajuato state on the other, defending 
the farmers (Mollard and Vargas, 2004a).  
Building on lessons learnt through this first experience of watershed council, amendments 
were made to the Regulation of the National Water Law, resulting in a more balanced 
distribution between federal authorities and users, in number and decision-making power 
(Martínez et al., 2002b). Apart from that of Valley of Mexico (created in 1993), the big 
majority of watershed councils were then created between 1999 and 2000.  
Ten watershed commissions have also been established, at a more regular rhythm starting 
1995, but with half of them concentrated in one administrative region only19 (CNA, 2005e). In 
addition, starting 1999 and with an accelerated pace towards 2002-2003, 16 watershed 
committees were designed, mainly located in two regions of the southern part of the 
country20. Finally, a total of 66 groundwater technical committees have also been set up, at a 
regular rhythm of approximately ten per year since 1997, and distributed quite unevenly 
across the first ten regions only21 (CNA, 2005e). 
Next to these regulatory and negotiation-oriented instruments –the National Water Law, 
watershed councils and their auxiliary bodies- water management was also organised using 
economic instrument: the water law was complemented by the Federal Law on Water Rights, 
establishing that users must pay contributions for the rights to use the national waters 
(Sánchez, 2006). But as explained by Guerrero (2004), the lack of financial resources at federal 
level can be explained by a low recovery rate: the payment of water rights for urban and 
industrial concessions (rights being free for agricultural uses) and permits for discharges 
have not always been respected, especially in states with low water availability and thus 
high costs. In order to encourage such payments, a decree in 2004 cancelled all debts 
contracted on the condition of initiating payments, but did not give much result (among 
                                                 
18 With a population of five million, it is the country’s second largest city.  
19 The region VIII Lerma-Santiago-Pacífico also happens to be our region of study. 
20 Eight committees were set up in administrative region V Pacífico Sur, and five in region XI Frontera Sur.  
21 One quarter is in region I Península de Baja California, another quarter being in regionVIII Lerma-Santiago-
Pacífico. 
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other things because the CNA failed to give the received money back, at it had promised to 
do so).  
The reforms of 1992 coincided with other larger ones, also reflecting the liberalisation trend: 
the amendment of constitutional Article 27 allowing communal producers to rent or sell their 
land –thus making official practices that were until then illegal albeit common (Linck, 2001)- 
and the adhesion of Mexico to the North American Free Trade Agreement two years later 
(Browning-Aiken et al., 2004).  
In addition to these legal and institutional reforms, which initiated decentralisation and 
private sector involvement, the government’s fourth element of policy action was the 
promotion of new financing schemes. As part of these, the Infrastructure Investment Fund 
was created in 1995 to finance infrastructure projects, promote investment opportunities and 
develop foreign investment (Saade, 1997). But this system seems to have only exacerbated 
regional disparities, as foreign investment has mainly been attracted to regions already 
endowed with important human and infrastructure capital, in addition to the northern states 
benefiting from proximity with the United States (Joumard, 2005). 
In 1996, small and medium-sized cities (20,000-50,000 inhabitants) were summoned to join 
bigger ones in efforts to treat municipal wastewaters, the law setting a deadline for 2005 
(SEMARNAT, 1996). No specific system was imposed, and the state or central government 
was to provide funds to cover construction costs. As no detailed management plans for the 
operation costs were required, it is not rare to see treatment plants become obsolete before 
they are actually run. One element of explanation of this situation is the fact that local 
authorities in the South have one hundred to one thousand times less financial resources 
than the ones in the North –on average- but with comparable responsibilities (Hardoy et al., 
2001). Another one might be the vicious circle linking weak capacity and/or willingness to 
pay for such services with inefficient management, which is a problem for both water supply 
and water treatment in the whole of the Latin American region (Peña and Solanes, 2002; 
WWC, 2000). 
In the late 1990s, the end of the 70-year domination of the political scene by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party coincided with more demands for autonomy at state and municipal 
levels (Joumard, 2005).  
To overcome several shortcomings of the National Water Law such as the lack of explicit 
reference to decentralisation, and give it a more cooperative orientation (Sánchez, 2006), the 
law was profoundly reformed between 1992 and April 2004. The amended law now includes 
several paradigms promoted worldwide related to water management, such as watershed 
management, integrated water resources management, the consumer and polluter pays 
principles and social participation, as well as the subsidiary principle (Guerrero, 2004).  
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Specifically, the national water policy is based on an integrated water resources management 
organised by watersheds (Article 14 Bis 5), where ‘integrated water resources management’ 
is defined the same way (Article 3.XXIX) as in the Global Water Partnership’s definition22 
(CNA, 2004).  
One of the amended law’s innovations was the creation of river basin organisms: these 
deconcentrated organs of the CNA with administrative and technical autonomy are to 
replace the CNA’s thirteen administrative regions and state offices (López, 2005; Tortajada, 
2005a).  
At the river basin level, water management is still based on river basin organisations, which 
officially are not subordinated to either the CNA or the river basin organisms (Article 13) 
(CNA, 2004). River basin councils will continue to be coordinating bodies between the CNA 
–including the river basin organism in the territory of which they are located- and the 
federal, state and municipal level dependencies and entities, as well as representatives from 
users and civil society from the watershed or the region. But a more important participation 
in river basin councils will be possible: users, citizens and non-governmental actors must 
now represent a minimum of 50% of participants, while representatives of state and 
municipal governments are limited to 35%. The councils will be based on the operation of 
four complementary groups: a General Assembly of Users (water users’ and civil society 
representatives), a Management Board, an Operations’ and Control Commission and an 
Operative Office. In addition to the auxiliary river basin commissions and committees as 
well as the COTAS, a Consultative Water Council will also participate in the water planning.  
Possibly, one of the biggest changes the reform will entail concerns the planning process: the 
river basin plans, elaborated by the river basin organisms along with the councils, 
commissions, committees and COTAS, will be the ones to determine the priorities, even 
though the National Water Plan elaborated by the CNA will remain the general framework 
(López, 2005).  
As part of the implementation of the consumer and polluter pays principles, when the law’s 
regulation is published, water banks should start operating, encouraging more users with 
water rights to buy or sell these, especially in areas where aquifers are being over-exploited 
or the resource is under pressure, and no new concessions will be allocated. During the 
period between 1992 and 2006, only a bit more than 1% of the 330,000 existing water rights 
were exchanged, mainly sold by agricultural users to industrial users; this practice should 
                                                 
22 The Global Water Partnership does not work specifically with Mexico, as it is an OECD country and therefore 
cannot receive any funding. Further, the GWP’s regional partnerships, such as that in Central America, does not 
want to include Mexico either. So an internal partnership is trying to be set up with the IMTA (define), but this is 
rendered difficult by the CNA’s non-cooperative attitude (Alan Hall, GWP Network Director, personal 
communication).  
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now develop in the centre and northern part of the country, where water is scarce and 
demand for urban use is significant (Enciso, 2005). Further, the reformed law also increases 
fining charges and allows revocation of permits for releasing wastewater into rivers and 
lakes, suspension of activity in case of industrial discharges without permits and interest 
charging on unpaid water usage fees (Nido and Hutt, 2004).  
 
b. Still a long way to go  
As we have seen, the Mexican regulatory landscape underwent several important reforms, 
enabling the country to take some promising steps on the path towards an integrated water 
resources management: the creation of a sole agency in charge of water, and included in the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources; the establishment of watershed councils 
and smaller-scale supportive institutions; the promotion of social participation in these 
coordinating bodies; and that of water resources’ full-cost pricing. Nevertheless, as Aldama 
specifies: “Current challenges in Mexico’s water resource management are to increase the 
effectiveness of the legal and institutional framework, the physical yield of water 
infrastructure and the efficiency of water use” (Aldama, 2005: 311). 
In the following sub-section, we analyse the reasons that motivate many researchers working 
in the area of water in Mexico to be so critical of the reforms, from an IWRM point of view. 
Recurrently put forward are the reforms’ weak effectiveness and slow implementation. More 
specifically, criticisms span over several elements of the current water management set up: 
the absence of coordination between the different sectors using water; the lack of inclusion of 
resources other than water; the low degree of participation in watershed management; and 
the absence of real independence of watershed councils from the CNA.   
 
Absence of coordination between different sectors using water 
Work undertaken by the different actors of the water sector, at various governmental levels, 
is too individual and isolated (Guerrero, 2004). Traditionally, there has never been much 
coordination between the three levels of government, and the same is true inside each level 
itself, due to the different interests of each dependency (García, 2004; López, 2004). This can 
be particularly the case between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the CNA, for 
example.   
In addition, other ministries also concerned by water problems, such as those of Finance, 
Agriculture and Education, should be more involved (Guerrero, 2004).  
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No inclusion of biodiversity or land inside water management  
In 1994, the incorporation of the CNA into the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT, according to its Spanish acronym) reflected a will to treat water as a 
natural resource with many uses –instead of focusing on its agricultural use only, as was 
previously the case (Saade, 1997).  
But in practice, the two institutions remain very independent: each reports directly to the 
President of the Republic and the SEMARNAT has almost no control over the CNA (Centro 
del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). The reason is that the CNA has much 
more money than the SEMARNAT, so it does not pay much attention to its ‘home 
institution’.  
As a result, like in the rest of Latin America, management at the river basin level is focused 
almost exclusively on water resources, instead of natural resources in general (Tortajada, 
2005a). As Martínez and others (2002b) explain, rivers for example are treated exclusively as 
conduction canals of water for the various human uses, without much consideration for the 
fauna and flora of which they constitute the habitat. For these authors, this reflects the 
CNA’s traditional engineering vision with respect to water, and explains why environmental 
flows are still inexistent in the country. Similarly, land is not much more taken into account 
of, in spite of the recognised interactions it has with water and the official protection it must 
receive, as specified in the watershed councils’ objectives. 
The reformed law of 2004, which includes the protection of ecosystems in its mandate and 
functions, should allow for a better management of natural resources in general, by enabling 
more participation of citizens and non-governmental actors (André de la Porte et al., 
submitted). 
 
Limits to an effective participation in watershed management 
The basis for participation had already been set out in 1988 with the General Law for 
Environmental Protection and Ecological Equilibrium, requiring public involvement in the 
design and execution of environmental and natural resources policy (Centro del Tercer 
Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). But the participatory process really started with the 
National Water Law of 1992 and the creation of watershed councils it spurred. Reinforcing 
this orientation, the National Water Plan of 2001-2006 was the first to specifically recognise 
the importance of involving users and civil society in the planning process (Centro del Tercer 
Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). It must nonetheless be kept in mind that compared 
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to other strategic priorities, social participation received a considerably smaller portion of 
financial support (Guerrero, 2004).  
Ten years after the participatory process was initiated, evaluations do not seem very 
optimistic: to overcome its weaknesses –which concern in particular environmental 
degradation- more social participation and decentralisation are required, detailing precisely 
the responsibility of both authorities and citizens (Mollard and Vargas, 2005b).  
According to Guerrero (2004), centralised policy-making inherited from the anachronic 
Mexican Constitution of 1917, will only be overcome with politicians capable of seeing 
beyond their parties’ political interests, and motivated to collaborate for the benefit of the 
country. For him, although the government uses the double language of federalism 
(reassignment of functions between different levels of government) and decentralisation 
(transfer of responsibilities to states and municipalities, so that decisions are taken at the 
same level at which problems are generated), the participation of states, municipalities and 
users still lacks effectiveness, due to the resistance of some CNA officials that dread such 
power-sharing. For example, priority watersheds focus the attention to the detriment of 
smaller ones, where preventive and local actions are dismissed to the advantage of top-down 
missions (Martínez et al., 2002b). 
In terms of watershed management, participation of users, civil society and municipalities 
has up to now not been very important. 
First, participation of water users in watershed councils is quite feeble. It seems that the 
question of the size of the institutional coverage has a lot to do with weak participation 
(users “pay with their money to be able to attend, while official representatives are paid to 
do so”), and it is hoped that this will be taken into account for the creation of the future 
watershed organisms and other watershed councils (Mejía, 2006). As Guerrero points out, 
participation is now increasing as representatives of the different sectors have realized that 
their participation is essential, if changes in the region are to be achieved (Guerrero, 2004), 
with “stakeholders [...] gradually becoming actors instead of being spectators as was mostly 
the case earlier” (Tortajada, 2005a: 311). According to some researchers, users must 
nevertheless organise themselves to work towards real representativeness, as in many cases 
user representatives are totally controlled by the CNA, or by powerful sectoral interests.  
Secondly, civil society participation can only increase with the 2004 reformed law, as the 
1992 law had given an important discretionary power to the CNA to decide whom to invite 
to the watershed councils or not (in terms of civil society, NGOs, educational institutions or 
research centres) (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).    
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Finally, as far as municipalities are concerned, these are invited to participate in watershed 
council meetings but rarely do so, due to financial limits and limited decision-making power 
–apart from those bigger urban municipalities representing the urban water uses. Indeed, 
although municipalities are in charge of urban water and sanitation, they are not involved in 
decisions related to water management in the watershed, even when these resources are 
strongly related to their territory23. The municipalities’ acceptance of the transfer of 
sovereignty implied by the creation of water basin organisations is nonetheless a crucial 
element of these institutions’ success as it founds their legitimacy, which is why the 
municipalities’ representation in such councils or commissions must be carefully designed 
(Mollard and Vargas, 2005b).   
According to Pacheco-Vega (2004), it is the lack of spaces for dialogue and the mandatory 
aspect of participation that questions its effectiveness. 
IWRM is indeed seen by some as a ‘technocratic counter-attack’ (Mollard and Vargas, 2005b), 
an instrument used by the water administration to justify its existence, and compensate the 
decreased solicitation it is now faced with, after periods of big hydraulic works and the 
transfer of irrigation systems to users. But endowed with an engineer culture, the 
administration is less well prepared to face the social dynamics entailed by the recognition of 
a finite resource –in other words, the need to share the water between various users.  
Nonetheless, when assessing the ten-year experience of participation in river basin 
organisations, these authors conclude that in spite of the difficulties ahead, it seems that the 
country has now engaged in the path towards more participation –to both respond to the 
growing demand for more democracy and reap the potential benefits promoted by 
participation supporters, as well as avoid going back to the more interventionist era (Mollard 
and Vargas, 2005b). It seems this is indeed the only path forward for a country greatly 
impacted by decades of authoritarism, “to rebuild confidence, credibility, and legitimacy 
towards institutions and representatives” (Mollard and Vargas, 2004b).   
 
The absence of real independence of watershed councils from the CNA 
Until now, contrasting with the weak participation of users, civil society and municipalities, 
in watershed council meetings there is a preponderance of representatives coming from the 
CNA, central agencies or state authorities, which enables easy internal resolution of conflicts 
(Martínez et al., 2002b). Such an unbalance also enables to orient decisions towards objectives 
                                                 
23 In particular, they have no say in terms of infrastructure for irrigation, which is one of the main economic 
activities in many municipalities of the country. This might create planning problems for municipalities where 
sources of potable and irrigation water coincide. 
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fixed beforehand in other instances (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 
2003). It might be pertinent to ask whether those councils created in the 1990s or 2000s are 
any more effective than those of the 1940s, which had no other function than that of advising 
(Tortajada, 2005a). Indeed, lacking in any form of authority, the councils’ results can only be 
based on the participants’ good will (Guerrero, 2004). 
In addition, watershed councils also lack in human and financial resources. Illustrating this, 
out of the 25 river basin councils created by 2005, only one is operational (the Lerma 
Chapala): the others have not yet benefited from the decentralisation of functions or funds: 
“In most cases, the councils still do not even have staff or offices, not to mention 
implementable plans, financial support, and technical and management expertise” 
(Tortajada, 2005a: 310-311).  
The same can be said of the aquifers’ Technical Committees for Groundwater, more virtual 
than anything else apart from a few exceptions (Guerrero, 2004). Indeed the over-
exploitation of aquifers is likely to continue as long as the central authority, here again, is 
reluctant to give up decision-making power and grant the COTAS some legal authority 
(Tortajada, 2005a).  
In Mexico there is a saying that goes: “In order not to solve problems, we create 
commissions” (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). Assessments to explain the absence 
of an integrated water resource management in Mexico have identified the need for capacity 
building, more specifically “the need to improve and make more efficient the management 
practices at the federal, central and local levels in the country” (Tortajada, 2001). 
  
But it is not so much the lack of experience at local and state level than the fear, at the level of 
the CNA, of delegating power and decision-making regarding the resource (Centro del 
Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003). As highlighted by a researcher working in the 
Ayuquila watershed: “The CNA does everything related to water… too much: it allocates 
concessions and sanctions, authorises wastewater discharges and distributes fines…this does 
not work”. This is despite the fact the CNA is itself faced with a shortage of human and 
financial resources to implement its objectives, not restricted to infrastructure development 
anymore (Guerrero, 2004). The country is faced with a deficiency in good administration in 
terms of planning, management, supervision and control (García, 2004). The vertical 
planning and decision-making process needs to evolve so that watershed councils can really 
start to play their part (Centro del Tercer Mundo para el Manejo del Agua, 2003).  
Even with the reformed law, watershed councils remain coordinating bodies with no 
decision-making power, which still resides in the central water authority (Tortajada, 2005a). 
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As stressed by Tortajada, Article 13 Bis 2 of the new law precises that “The basin councils 
will be organized and will work based on what this Law defines, as well as its regulation and 
the rules developed by the National Water Commission of Mexico. (…) the councils are 
neither entitled to develop any regulations, nor can they execute any administrative or legal 
action” (Tortajada, 2005a: 310). Worse still, their operational functions remain unclear. As a 
result: “The main institutional challenge for the future is how best to transform the basin 
councils, which in practice are advisory agencies with very little real authority, into river 
basins that govern, plan, organize, run, control and supervise water management at the river 
basin level” (Tortajada, 2005b: 6).    
The CNA maintains its centrality even though it tries to camouflage this through the creation 
of river basin organisms (Sánchez, 2006; García, 2004). Indeed, as their directors will be 
subordinated to the director of the CNA, these organisms are really replicates of the past 
regional offices, making this institutional shift more a matter of deconcentration (delegation 
of attributions to lower and operational levels of the same dependencies) than of 
decentralisation (García, 2004). As Tortajada highlights: “It remains to be seen how and by 
whom the decisions will be taken, and to what extent the river basin organisms will be 
autonomous” (Tortajada, 2005a: 309).  
Further, a modern conception of planning is required: although the reformed law speaks of 
bottom-up defined social priorities, it is not clear how this will be implemented in the 
general context of centralised decision-making (Sandoval, 2004). Water resources planning is 
indeed still extremely centralised and the CNA continues to concentrate so many functions 
that it will have trouble in realising them all, in particular to coordinate more with other 
levels of government and users for questions of control (García, 2004). The water 
administration, implementing staff reduction policies and also faced with human resources 
withdrawals due to internal conflicts, is unable to cope: to regain its credibility, it needs to 
separate the functions it exercises (control but not sanction, application of the law but not its 
elaboration) (Mollard and Vargas, 2005a). 
Finally, the fact the 2004 regulation took several more months than the planned 18 months to 
be published has worked against the central authorities’ credibility: “The Regulation of the 
Law of 2004 is still not published because, we Mexicans, are different, they told us the other 
day at a meeting, and for this reason it will take more time to publish. As a result, we live in 
a state of semi-law […]. A law that doesn’t have a regulation in spite of the fact a deadline 
was fixed, and today, nothing is happening. What can you and I as citizens do, to push 
upfront the issue of water in Mexico if we don’t even respect our laws, if the highest water 
authority doesn’t respect the law; if the highest authority of the country, the president of the 
Republic, doesn’t respect the law?” (translated from Vargas, 2006). Some point out that the 
presidential elections’ in August 2006 had something to do with it, others that the CNA has 
 98
been so slow because it is battling to try and keep financial control over all these new 
instances. Others, such as Mollard, are sceptical that it might change much as nothing is said 
about financing, which is the core issue (Eric Mollard, personal communication). 
 
Chapter conclusion 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Mexican government, faced with increasing water issues 
(competing demand, generalised contamination, over-exploitation of aquifers, inefficiency of 
infrastructure) and limited in its moves by a context of economic and financial crisis, put in 
place a series of measures. Successive legal and institutional reforms led the country towards 
federalism and decentralisation: establishment of state water commissions, transfer of water 
and sanitation operations to states and municipalities, transfer of irrigation districts to users, 
and creation of watershed councils, commissions, committees and COTAS.  
These decentralisation efforts, necessary basis for an integrated water resources 
management, have for the most encountered major difficulties in becoming really effective 
(except for the transfer of irrigation districts). This is essentially due to resistance inside the 
National Water Commission to abandon its pyramidal model –particularly strong in the 
management division where power is concentrated in the national offices, which impose 
their decisions to regional and state level-offices- and evolve towards a modern system 
entailing power sharing (García, 2004).   
For this to happen, changes are required at all scales. Real autonomy must be enabled at state 
level, instead of the current fictitious federalism, otherwise due to the country’s extension 
and regional variations, water issues will not be resolved (García, 2004). At both state and 
municipal level, decentralisation efforts, limited by a centralised tax system, discontinuous 
programmes and lack of accountability of elected officials, must also be accompanied by a 
larger change in citizens’ mentality to accept higher water prices and the need to protect the 
environment (André de la Porte et al., submitted); also keeping in mind what Walsh (2004) 
recalls, i.e. that there should not be one sole model of ‘water culture’, based on efficiency and 
conservation values, but a recognition of the diversity of existing water cultures in the 
country. Finally, watershed councils, their smaller-scale auxiliaries and the COTAS need to 
be granted sufficient human and financial resources as well as decision-making power to 
become autonomous and sustain real participatory processes to avoid what Vargas and 
Mollard call the “Mexican model of directed participation” (translated from Vargas and 
Mollard, 2005: 74). Indeed, as emphasised by Biswas, it will only be by implementing social 
and environmental laws and reinforcing institutions at federal, state and municipal levels, 
that actors –the public and private, users and citizens- will take their responsibilities to stop 
the process of environmental degradation (Tortajada, 2004).  
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The excessive federal control Mexico is renowned for is the result of seven decades of 
uninterrupted domination of the political processes by the unique party and the president –
both head of party and federal executive (Edmonds, 1998). The election of an opposition 
candidate in 2000 gave rise to much hope for more decentralisation, which, after a few years 
seems to have vanished.  
Fox’s administration did not bring sufficient in-depth changes to overcome the criticisms 
addressed to the previous legal framework. On the contrary, with the creation of river basin 
organisms, we might very well be in presence of what Sánchez (2006) calls: “an increased 
sophistication in the centralised control of the water policy in the country, by 
deconcentrating at regional level the presence of the central government with all water 
management attributions” (Sánchez, 2006: 21).  
To resume: “Only time will tell if the new institutional arrangements in terms of partial 
decentralisation and continuous control by the central institutions will solve the present and 
future problems of the country through the implementation of the concept of integrated 
water resources management” (Tortajada, 2005a: 316). 
According to Calvo-Mendieta’s classification (2005), we might say that Mexico is close to 
being in a complex regime (almost taking into account all water uses – apart from that of the 
environment- but without sufficient coherence) and that the new 2004 reform might enable it 
to transit towards a more integrated regime (with more planning), even though several 
elements are still at an insufficient stage for the time being. 
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH SITE AND STRATEGY 
In this chapter we first present the fieldwork area: a detailed account of the context is 
necessary to introduce the actors who played an important role in the region’s specific 
historical configuration; then follows a shorter but more in-depth presentation of our 
municipality of study in its various dimensions. In a second section, we explain the 
methodological steps followed during the research. 
 
1. Description of area of study 
a. A bird’s eye view of the region 
The Ayuquila-Armería watershed 
Situated in the centre west of Mexico, the Ayuquila-Armería watershed covers 9,803 km2, 
among which 8,078 km2 are part of the State of Jalisco, while the remaining 1,725 km2 are in 
the State of Colima. Indeed the Ayuquila-Armería River has its two sources in Jalisco, but 
joins the Pacific Ocean in Boca de Pascuales, Colima.  
Although the Ayuquila-Armería watershed is made up of three sub-watersheds 
(corresponding to the Ayuquila, the Tuxcacuesco and the Armería Rivers), the Ayuquila-
Armería River in itself, about 240 km long, can be divided into two portions: the Ayuquila 
River on one hand (150 km, which is the main arm compared to the Tuxcacuesco River), and 
the Armería River on the other (90 km), starting at the junction between the Ayuquila and 
the Tuxcacuesco Rivers (Martínez et al., 2002a). More or less, the Ayuquila River corresponds 
to the part of the watershed in the State of Jalisco, the Armería to that in Colima. 
Map 11: The Ayuquila-Armería watershed  
 
Source: Graf et al., 2006: 300 
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The Ayuquila-Armería watershed is part of administrative region VIII Lerma-Santiago-
Pacífico and of the hydrologic region XVI Armeria- Coahuayana. It is located in a complex 
physiographic area surrounded by various mountain chains: the Eje Neovolcánico, the Sierra 
Madre del Sur and the Sierra Madre Occidental (Comisión de Cuenca del Río Ayuquila-
Armería, 2005). 
The Mexican National Commission for the Use and Conservation of Biodiversity 
(CONABIO) considers the Ayuquila-Armería watershed as one of priority in terms of flora 
and fauna (Martínez et al., 2002a). Protected areas make up about 10% of the watershed: it 
includes more than 50% of the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, and partly four other 
protected areas (the national park Nevado de Colima, the forest reserve of Quila, the fauna 
reserve El Jabalí and the crocodile production programme in Boca de Pascuales on the Pacific 
Coast) (Martínez et al., 2005).  
The watershed encompasses, partially or totally, the territories of 30 municipalities. 
According to the last census in 20001, the total population (approx. 492,391 inhabitants) is 
very unequally distributed between the two states: 37% (approx. 182,185) are located in the 
21 municipalities of Jalisco (covering 82% of the watershed), while the nine municipalities in 
Colima concentrate 63% of the population (approx. 310,206) on 18% of the area. This is 
because Colima has several large cities, like the conurbation Colima (approx 119,639) - Villa 
de Álvarez (76,679) (INEGI, 2000). The part of the watershed in Jalisco, on the other hand, 
has only a few urban municipalities (i.e. with a capital of more than 2500 inhabitants) 
(Lomelí et al., 2003). Also to take into account is the fact that 79% of the Sierra de Manantlán 
which is included inside the watershed (55,038 ha out of 69,810 ha) is part of the State of 
Jalisco, making it all the more improper for human settlements. 
The two sources of water in the watershed are as follows: in terms of surface water (the 
Ayuquila-Armería River as well as other sources), the total volume of recharge is 2,076 
million m3 per year. Surface water is mainly used for agriculture (98%), among which: 
- 60% is for the two irrigation districts (such as number 94 in the valley of Autlán-El 
Grullo, which was the first in terms of management transfer to the users), which get 
their water from big dams; 
- 40% is for small-scale irrigation systems, locally known as irrigation units 
(corresponding to all land that is not part of an irrigation district), and where the 
users manage everything from the source (small dams, wells) to the distribution 
(canals) and which also represent 40% of the watershed’s 61,000 irrigated ha.  
                                                 
1 Another census was realised in 2005 but the results were not published early enough to use in this study.  
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As for groundwater, there are eight aquifers in the watershed: five in Jalisco (Tecolotlan, 
Union de Tula, Tapalpa, Jiquilpan, Autlán) and three in Colima (Valle de Colima, Pueblo 
Juárez and Armeria-Tecoman- Periquillos). The corresponding total water recharge is 439 
million m3 per year for both states, with a total extraction demand of 198 million m3 (of 
which 79% is used for agriculture, 20% for domestic use and 1% for industrial use).   
Independently from the type of water source, the total water demand is 1,379 million m3 
(96% for agriculture, 3% for domestic use and 1% for livestock, demand for industry and 
services being negligible): 1,258 Mm3 for Jalisco (468 for agriculture and 0.2 for domestic use) 
and 818 Mm3 for Colima (875 for agriculture, 37 for domestic water and 0.52 for industry).  
In total, between both superficial and groundwater, the watershed supplies potable water to 
approximately 600,000 persons (both inside the watershed and outside), while irrigating 
61,000 ha (28,000 in Jalisco and 33,000 in Colima) (El Informador, 2004), of which 60% are 
part of irrigation districts and 40% irrigation units. 
Various sources of surface water contamination have been identified, ranging from solid 
waste, untreated wastewater from municipalities and industries, to agrochemicals being 
transported by irrigation flows returns. Three distinct zones appear, with the contamination 
increasing from upstream to downstream: the major part of the high watershed is not very 
contaminated, the medium part, starting Palo Blanco in the municipality of El Grullo, is 
considered contaminated, while further downstream, where the River Armería meets the 
Colima River, it is very contaminated (water index quality2 below 30) (Comisión de Cuenca 
del Río Ayuquila-Armería, 2005). This is because the conurbation of Colima and Villa de 
Álvarez discharges its wastewaters into the Colima River.  
 
The Ayuquila sub-watershed 
Importance in terms of biodiversity 
For the purpose of our case study, we narrow down our focus to the sub-watershed of the 
Ayuquila River, referred to hereafter as ‘the Ayuquila watershed’.  
It is more or less exclusively part of the State of Jalisco, where the hydraulic resources are 
under medium to strong pressure (CNA, 2003). Although the northern part of the state that 
neighbours the States of Nayarit, Zacatecas, Aguas Calientes and Guanajuato faces low 
availability, the southern part in which the Ayuquila flows benefits from abundant water 
                                                 
2
 The water quality index used to classify these areas ranges from 0-100 (the higher the level, the higher the 
quality of the water). 
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resources (as a state located in the middle part of the country, it reflects the national 
disparities quite well).  
Before joining with the Tuxcacuesco River to form the Armería, the Ayuquila River, with a 
length of 150 km, drains a watershed of 3,900 km2 (Martínez et al., 2002a). The various 
tributaries of the Ayuquila are the Ayutla and the San Juan Cacoma Rivers, as well as the 
streams El Coajinque, El Colomo, La Yerbabuena and Manantlán (Martínez, 2003).  
Due to its location in the abrupt transition between two biogeographic provinces (the Neartic 
and the Neotropical), the watershed has a very diverse array of ecosystems with associated 
flora and fauna (Martínez et al., 2000a). In particular, 595 km2 of the watershed are inside the 
Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, with 40 km of the Ayuquila River constituting the 
northern border of the protected area (Martínez et al., 2002a). The Ayuquila River plays a 
critical role for the protection of habitat and species diversity in the Reserve (Henne et al., 
2002). As part of the agreements signed between the UNESCO Man and Biosphere 
Programme, as well as the trilateral agreements related to migratory species in North 
America, Mexico has engaged in protecting the ecological integrity of this international 
reserve, and thus also that of the Ayuquila River (DRBSM and IMECBIO, 2001). 
The Sierra de Manantlán3 Biosphere Reserve (hereafter SMBR) is considered as the most 
important protected land in western Mexico, due to its biodiversity. It counts 2,900 species of 
vascular plants and 110 species of mammals, 336 birds, 85 reptiles and amphibians, 238 
insect families and seven orders of arachnids (SEMARNAP, 2000). Such a variety is the result 
of the protected area’s very important altitude range –from 400 to 2,860 metres above sea 
level- while it is also located at the crossroads between the two major mountain belts ranging 
along the west coast of Mexico (the Sierra Madre Occidental and the Sierra Madre del Sur). 
 Image 1: Aerial view of the SMBR 
 
                                                 
3 Literally, the ‘Mountains of Manantlán’. 
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The Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve was created due to an alliance between 
conservationists on one hand, and groups of local landowners on the other. The first wished 
to preserve the endemic specie they had discovered –that also happens to be one of Mexico’s 
most important traditional symbols: in 1979, Zea Diploperennis, a wild relative of cultivated 
maize, was found in the forests of the Sierra de Manantlán. Having a much stronger 
resistance to maize’s seven most dangerous diseases, it had a potential to breed genetically 
improved cultivated maize (Jardel, 1992). The local communal landowners on the other 
hand, had been fighting for years to protect their natural resources, illegally exploited by 
private forest logging companies linked to local political groups (Graf et al., 2001). This 
conflict had been going on since the beginning of the century, interrupted only by the 
Mexican revolution, and intensified since the 1970s (Jardel et al., 1996). 
In order to protect the habitat of their recent discovery, the researchers from the University 
of Guadalajara (hereafter UdG) set up Las Joyas Research Station, with support from the 
State of Jalisco (Jardel et al., 1996): bought in 1984 by the State Government, it was decreed a 
scientific station in 1985. This monitoring station is set in the heart of the protected area, 
while the Manantlán Institute of Ecology and Conservation of Biodiversity (hereafter 
IMECBIO), a local branch of the UdG created to play an active role in conservation activities 
and also created that same year, was first set in Guadalajara. It was transferred to El Grullo 
in 1987, becoming the first institute of the University to be decentralised: the idea was to 
have the researchers immersed in the region’s issues, inside the transition area of the SMBR. 
This helped define their work agenda according to the demands they were directly 
confronted with in their day-to-day life (for example, they probably would not have initiated 
their work on the Ayuquila River, presented hereafter, had they not been on the spot) 
(Eduardo Santana, personal communication).  
El Grullo was chosen to host the IMECBIO for a combination of reasons: because of its social 
dynamic in terms of trade, because studies on environmental issues had already been 
realised there, and to strengthen the IMECBIO’s identity by clearly distinguishing it from the 
UdG’s Agronomy Institute which was already in Autlán. Then in 1994, the UdG underwent a 
decentralisation wave, and the Centre for the South Coast of the University of Guadalajara 
(CUCSUR, according to its Spanish acronym) was created in Autlán. This process eliminated 
independent institutes, so the IMECBIO then joined the CUCSUR (Eduardo Santana, 
personal communication).   
Due to the conflictive context in which the establishment of the SMBR took place (between 
the logging companies and communal landowners), its realisation was made possible by the 
benefits each party expected from it (Graf et al., 2003).  
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On one hand, for the conservation strategy to work, it was recognised that the people whose 
livelihoods depended on these lands needed to receive some benefits from it –thus excluding 
the options of a strictly protected model, such as a national park or natural reserve. Although 
there are 7,000 dwellers within the actual boundaries of the reserve, its population is 
generally assimilated to the 33,000 people who live in communities with land inside the 
reserve (Jardel et al., 1996). These live mostly off subsistence agriculture –using the slash-
and-burn method to convert forests into cultivated land. So to reduce such pressure on the 
natural resources, regional development had to be included by developing alternative 
livelihood strategies (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). 
On the other hand, these local communities considered the set up of the Biosphere Reserve 
as an opportunity to make contact with the governmental agencies that had always ignored 
them, with the IMECBIO as a potential ally to recover their land rights (Jardel et al., 1996). 
After the IMECBIO provided all the technical information necessary to propose the 
designation of a biosphere reserve and receive support from local to international levels, the 
SMBR was created on March 5th 1987, and one year later integrated the international network 
of biosphere reserves (Jardel et al., 1996). This implied classifying the area’s 140,000 ha 
according to the zoning criteria established by the UNESCO Programme on Man and the 
Biosphere (MAB), located in Paris, France. Such a classification entails identifying one or 
several ‘core areas’, which due to the density or frailty of the species they host, are to be 
dedicated to monitoring and research activities only. Around or contiguous to these is a 
delimited ‘buffer zone’, which allows for more activities –although these should not be 
threatening to the conservation activities in the core area- such as education, training or 
tourism. The outer zone, called ‘transition area’, is not included in the actual territory of the 
protected area, but encompasses a surrounding region that has direct or indirect interactions 
with the biosphere reserve: human settlements and other more intensive activities take place, 
such as agriculture, industry, etc. (UNESCO-MAB, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Basic zoning and activities in a 
biosphere reserve 
Source: UNESCO-MAB, 2002: 17 
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Image 2: Zea Diploperennis 
 
Source:  IMECBIO-UdG 
Image 3: …Emblem of the SMBR  
 
Source: Directorship of the SMBR 
 
The main idea behind the concept of a biosphere reserve –which emerged in 1970- is to go 
beyond the preservation approach that prevailed until then, to include the people living in 
the protected area, enabling both conservation of biological diversity and human 
development (UNESCO-MAB, 2002). The Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve’s poster –
the first in Mexico to include people in addition to biodiversity- perfectly illustrates this 
(image 3).  
The three functions of a biosphere reserve are: conservation (of landscapes, ecosystems, 
species, and genetic variation), development (an economic and human development that is 
socio-culturally and ecologically sustainable) and logistics (to provide support for research, 
monitoring, education and information exchange related to local, national and global issues 
of conservation and development) (UNESCO-MAB, 2002). 
According to its zoning plan (the technical study of which was realised by IMECBIO), the 
Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve is made up of land included in seven municipalities: 
Autlán, Casimiro Castillo, Cautitlán, Tuxcacuesco and Tolimán (in the State of Jalisco), as 
well as Comala and Minatitlán (in the State of Colima) (Rosales and Graf, 1995). So with 90% 
of the SMBR in one state and 10% in another, inter-state collaboration is required for its 
management (SEMARNAP, 2000). 
Around the actual protected area, the ‘transition area’ of the SMBR is made up of 22 
municipalities: Autlán, Casimiro Castillo, Cihuatlán, Cuautitlán, Ejutla, El Grullo, El Limón, 
La Huerta, San Gabriel, Tolimán, Tonaya, Tuxcacuesco, Unión de Tula and Zapotitlán de 
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Vadillo (in Jalisco) and Armería, Colima, Comala, Coquimatlán, Manzanillo, Minatitlán, 
Tecomán and Villa de Álvarez (in Colima). These are municipalities that are contiguous with 
the reserve and in some way have links with it, directly or indirectly, through natural or 
social interactions. In particular, the SMBR and its forests play an important role in the 
regional development, as providers of water resources for many of these municipalities 
(SEMARNAP, 2000). It is estimated that the protective function of the SMBR’s forests is 
important for the production of water supplying a region encompassing 400,000 inhabitants 
(Graf et al., 2001).   
But despite the recognised importance of this protected area for the rich biodiversity it hosts 
as well as its major role in terms of freshwater supply, it is faced with the same issues as 
other biosphere reserves regarding the difficulty to set up benefit-sharing mechanisms in 
favour of local populations (Graf et al., 2003; André de la Porte, 1998).   
In some cases, the strict zoning regulations inside the protected area have been questioned. 
For example, these prevent taking the necessary measures to restore areas that were prone to 
fires or logging. Similarly, they do not recognise the compatibility of traditional low-impact 
activities such as blackberry and mushroom collecting, nor hunting –therefore encouraging 
poaching practices (Jardel et al., 1996). The risk of such rigidity in authorised activities is 
particularly important regarding the core zone, where the “conservation flagship” Zea 
Diploperennis can be found. Indeed it is highly probable that this species’ genetic variety 
depends, precisely, on its interactions with social and cultural processes –in particular the 
traditional hybridisation and weeding in indigenous land-use practices (Gerritsen et al., 
2001). This knowledge could encourage the development of more gradual options in the 
zoning of biosphere reserves. 
Although the creation of the SMBR did not imply expropriations, it did entail important land 
use restrictions4 (Jardel et al., 1996). As 60% of the Biosphere Reserve is communal land 
(while 39% is private and 1% governmental), the delimitation of the three core zones had 
severe impacts on those local communities whose forested lands were, in a way, confiscated. 
Restriction of use is not formerly compensated in any way, and ironically, these communities 
ended up protecting the forest and the water it produces for other people’s use while being 
forbidden its access for their own use. This nurtured resentment, which was aggravated by 
the fact that the federal government did nothing to design a management plan or support the 
reserve through human or financial resources (Graf et al., 2001): “For almost seven years, it 
                                                 
4 In Mexico, contrary to most countries, the Biosphere Reserve is not just a label in addition to the status of 
national park, without any additional restrictive measures. The ‘Mexican modality’ of biosphere reserves fills up 
an institutional gap, due to ineffective governmental involvement, inexistence of local populations’ involvement 
in the protected area’s management or of ecological criteria for such management (Graf et al., 2003). 
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was the classical example of a ‘paper park’ with no active management or formal community 
involvement” (Moran and Lloyd, 2004: 24).  
It was the IMECBIO who filled the institutional gap, by playing the role of manager and 
consulting agency, holding participatory workshops to identify the priorities of the different 
communities and organising environmental education programmes. But it had neither the 
legal authority, nor the required financial or human resources to do so (Jardel et al., 1996). In 
particular, it was faced with the difficulty to implement the planned compensating schemes 
for those landowners with land inside the core zones (essentially due to land tenure 
conflicts), as well as to protect these areas effectively (Graf et al., 2001). The IMECBIO’s 
fundraising –supported by the University of Guadalajara or the World Wildlife Fund- 
nonetheless allowed for the implementation of community development projects and the 
non-implosion of the whole biosphere reserve project (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). 
The situation changed after more than seven years, triggered by major national events. In 
1994, the Chiapas armed conflict, along with the creation of the SEMARNAP, grouping for 
the first time all natural resources as well as protected areas in one sole ministry, created 
favourable conditions that led the SMBR to receive more attention from the central 
government5 (Graf et al., 2001). The Directorship of the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere 
Reserve was created, with funds provided by the World Bank under the Global Environment 
Facility (Graf et al., 2003). 
The first director of the SMBR was the IMECBIO coordinator of community development, 
which enabled him to not only involve local actors of the Biosphere Reserve in the process, 
but also develop projects in partnership with the IMECBIO, focusing on environmental 
education, prevention and control of forest fires and the Ayuquila River watershed 
management6. Interdisciplinary projects with the IMECBIO enabled to set up enhanced agro-
pastoral systems, community forest management, diversification of products, and the 
organisation of cooperatives in marginal communities (Graf et al., 2001). Community 
development projects established include: the rehabilitation of a sawmill working in 
collaboration with a seedling nursery, the exploration of eco-tourism routes and 
infrastructure, local handicraft and marketing of forest by-products (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). 
In addition, organic farming programmes were also set up in certain communities (Jardel et 
al., 1996).  
                                                 
5 On one hand because of the realisation that some very poor communities might be hosting guerrilleros, on the 
other hand because the manager of protected areas inside the SEMARNAT received considerably more power 
than was previously the case. 
6 Research undertaken by the IMECBIO enabled to generate most of the data on which the SMBR’s management 
programme is based (Graf et al., 2001). 
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The SMBR’s most important success is nonetheless the lengthy multi-stakeholder process it 
developed, involving people with conflicting interests, and which led to the ratification of a 
management plan (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). The stakeholders involved are the three levels of 
government, local communities, a local NGO, the University of Guadalajara and the funding 
agencies (Jardel et al., 1996). As a result, illegal logging in the core zones has been 
significantly reduced (Graf et al., 2003).  
Nonetheless the most important problems encountered in the Biosphere Reserve still remain 
the transformation of forest cover to pastures and agricultural plots, erosion, illegal logging, 
excessive harvest of firewood, poaching, overgrazing, and forest fires (Jardel et al., 1996).  
Several factors explain the particular increasing pressure to convert forests into pasture. On 
one hand, the vegetable market suffered a crisis, particularly acute in the first half of the 
1990s (SEMARNAP, 2000). Then, in the context of NAFTA, the maize market is so depressed 
by competing American and Canadian exports that farmers have no incentive to continue 
cultivating their traditional maize land plots; instead, they convert forest cover and maize 
land to pasture land for cattle (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). Those who cannot afford to have 
their own cattle grow pasture to sell (Gerritsen, 2002). Cultivation of illegal drugs also 
developed inside the Biosphere Reserve (SEMARNAP, 2000), and in the village of Paso Real, 
leading to the mountain, it is not uncommon to see heavily armed police patrols go by. 
 
Socio-economic importance of the Ayuquila sub-watershed 
In addition to its importance for the rich biodiversity of the region, the Ayuquila watershed 
is also critical for human uses. Eight municipalities make up the medium part of the 
watershed area (see map below). On one hand, Unión de Tula, Autlán, El Grullo, Ejutla and 
El Limón are part of the intermountain valleys, while Tonaya, Tuxcacuesco, San Gabriel and 
Zapotitlán de Vadillo are part of the Big Valley and Tolimán is in the mountains. 
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Map 12: Municipalities of the lower Ayuquila watershed  
 
      Source: Gerritsen et al., 2005: 113 
Different typologies of these municipalities have been realised –according to socio-
demographic or urbanisation features- but all coincide in that the area is characterised by a 
duality where geographical disparities have generated socio-economic ones.  
This has been intensifying since the pre-Hispanic period, when the municipalities located in 
the upper and relatively flat valley developed an intensive agriculture, while those located 
downstream in the mountainous regions were confined to auto-subsistence activities such as 
seasonal agriculture, extensive cattle-raising and fishing (Graf et al., 1996). This determined 
the very distinct population structuring as well, with high versus low population densities, 
and accordingly, disparate social welfare (Ibid.).  
With more than 60% of their population living in an urban centre, today, Autlán, El Grullo 
and Unión de Tula are ‘predominantly urban municipalities’ (Gerritsen et al., 2005). The first 
two municipalities, with a population of approximately 50,000 and 22,000 respectively, 
concentrate 60% of the total population in the eight municipalities (Lomelí et al., 2003). These 
two municipalities benefited from the construction of the road Guadalajara-Barra de 
Navidad in 1941, as well as the development of irrigation and the installation of a sugarcane 
factory in the Valley of Autlán-El Grullo in the 1970s (Lomelí et al., 2003; Graf et al., 1996). 
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While only a fifth of the active population is employed directly in the primary sector, their 
small urban centres have developed around activities linked to agriculture and livestock 
rearing, while providing services, administrative and commercial functions for the region 
(Gerritsen et al., 2005). Being poles of attraction for labour coming from the mountain areas 
or other states of the country, they are the only ones to have a positive demographic balance. 
All other municipalities reflect the severe emigration phenomenon, generated most probably 
by the crisis in the agricultural sector, incapable of providing sufficient employment 
(Gerritsen et al., 2005). 
Compared to El Grullo, Autlán in addition benefits from being located on the road between 
Guadalajara, the capital of Jalisco State and the coast, which makes it an important 
commercial regional centre, while also hosting the University of Guadalajara’s South Coast 
campus (Moran and Lloyd, 2004). 
These richer municipalities undertake major water withdrawals from the Ayuquila River 
and the aquifer for irrigation, domestic and industrial use.  
For example, according to Martínez (2003), surface water of the watershed provides drinking 
water to 25,000 people in the valley Autlán-El Grullo (essentially from the Manantlán stream 
coming from the SMBR), while groundwater supplies more than 50,000 people. At the same 
time, the watershed also provides water for irrigation to 12,000 ha of the valley (expected to 
rise to 18,000 ha), this time from water stored in the two dams set on the Ayuquila River 
upstream from the valley (Martínez, 2003). 
 
The valley indeed hosts irrigation district 094 that covers the three municipalities of Autlán, 
El Grullo and El Limón, as well as the Ingenio Melchior Ocampo (called ‘IMO’), its sole 
industry, which is a sugar refinery. The IMO is located in the municipality of Autlán, along 
the road between the two towns just before the Ayuquila River, which is the municipal 
border between the two municipalities. It is the biggest regional employer, with 600 
employees, rotating on three eight-hour shifts of 200 people each7.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 This is in addition to the numerous indirect jobs it creates (for example the truck drivers which bring the 
sugarcane to the refinery are directly employed by the two sugarcane associations of the region). 
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Image 4: The IMO sugar refinery 
 
 
The urban centres of Autlán and El Grullo also contaminate the River through the discharge 
of their untreated wastewater and solid waste8 (Martínez, 2003). Until recently, Unión de 
Tula also disposed of its solid waste in an open-air discharge above the River (Gerritsen et 
al., 2005). 
Image 5: Autlán’s wastewater discharge in July 2003 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Autlán has since then finished building its treatment plant, as explained further on in this section. 
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Combined with important water withdrawals which reduce the River flow, these liquid and 
solid waste disposals have negative impacts for the riparian communities inside the 
municipality of El Grullo itself: particularly affected are the communities of El Tempisque, El 
Palo Blanco and El Aguacate, located directly downstream from the wastewater pipelines 
(Graf et al., 1996). While the whole Ayuquila River used to have the reputation of being an 
excellent fishery, the portion located between El Corcovado –the diversion station to irrigate 
the Valley- and El Aguacate has suffered from a reduction in fish species variety and 
abundance (Martínez et al., 2000a).  
Although when the River enters the mountainous area of the SMBR, it has received back half 
of the diverted water for irrigation at the Corcovado (Mercado-Silva, 2001), the water 
withdrawals and point-source contamination in the ‘upstream municipalities’ of Unión de 
Tula, Autlán and El Grullo also affect ‘downstream municipalities’ (Martínez, 2003). The 
Manantlán stream coming down from the SMBR indeed more or less draws the limit 
between the municipalities of El Grullo and Tuxcacuesco. The municipalities located 
downstream from the junction between the two water bodies thus benefit from much 
improved River water quality, at least during the rainy season, when the Manantlán stream 
has an important flow. During the dry season, the water quality used to be very bad when 
the IMO discharged its organic or chemical residues, and the Manantlán stream is not 
important enough to ‘clean’ the Ayuquila (Graf et al., 1996).  
These downstream municipalities, such as Tuxcacuesco and Tolimán, are poorer, mostly 
rural and dependent on work outside of the community (Martínez, 2003). Along with 
Zapotitlán de Vadillo, they are ‘marginal municipalities’, characterised by a relatively low 
urban population –Tuxcacuesco being exclusively rural. In addition, they work for more 
than 60% in the primary sector, mainly as daily workers in the Autlán-El Grullo valley, and 
poverty indexes are much higher than in the two other groups of municipalities (Gerritsen et 
al., 2005). Their population is highly dependent on the River to replace an inexistent potable 
water service (Henne et al., 2002). The River is also a crucial resource for their livelihoods, 
which also consist of subsistence farming, fishing (for auto-consumption and selling) and 
attempts to develop tourism to complement the family income (Martínez, 2003). As the River 
is the ‘beach of the poor’, their recreational activities are also impacted by upstream 
discharges (DRBSM and IMECBIO, 2001).  
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Images 6 and 7: Ayuquila River uses in Tuxcacuesco and Tolimán 
 
 
 
As for El Limón and Tonaya, the two municipalities that do not have a direct access to the 
Ayuquila River, they are classified by Gerritsen et al. (2005) as ‘intermediate municipalities’. 
Due to their hilly geography, they cannot benefit much from the irrigation infrastructures 
developed in the Autlán-El Grullo valley, but have nonetheless developed agricultural 
activities, and count 40% of their population in the primary sector. They are municipalities 
where the emigration rate toward the United States is very high (Gerritsen et al., 2005). 
Tonaya is in particular well known for its important mescal industry, a drink similar to 
tequila although it cannot benefit from the name as it lies outside the boundary of the area in 
which labelling of ‘tequila’ is authorised. 
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Images 8 and 9: Municipalities of El Limón and Tonaya 
 
 
 
The fact the Ayuquila River crystallises many vested interests in the region has led it to 
become one of the main foci of research, along with the SMBR. 
Previous to the establishment of the SMBR’s Directorship, local riparian communities as well 
as the city council of El Grullo asked the IMECBIO to assess the Ayuquila River’s 
contamination. In 1994, the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve took the lead in 
promoting an environmental management of the River, following protests about its 
contamination by many communities located in the reserve itself. In order to “channel the 
dissatisfaction into institutional paths”, it developed a project integrating diagnosis and 
monitoring, as well as local social and political organisation, thereby creating local 
committees in each riparian town. But due to federal and state elections that year, no 
agreement was found at a multi-stakeholder meeting which gathered the city councils, the 
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sugar factory and sugarcane producers, state and federal agencies, the local river defence 
committees and the University of Guadalajara (Graf et al., 1996: 4).   
In 1995, a series of events created a favourable climate for change: the Ministry of 
Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries was created; the opposition party (National 
Action Party) won the state elections as well as the most important local municipalities; and 
the sugar factory was privatised (Graf et al., 1996).  
In this context, that same year IMECBIO started a research project to document the River’s 
pollution sources and their impacts, and undertake the adapted actions for their mitigation. 
From 1996 to 1998, regular monitoring of the River water quality was undertaken in nine 
sampling sites, strategically selected according to polluting sources along a portion of 50 km 
(Martínez et al., 2002a). 
Since then, the monitoring expanded to 15 sites, covering approximately 100 km of the River. 
A traditional physical-chemical monitoring is realised monthly (down from bi-monthly 
during the two first years), while aquatic vertebrates are monitored every two months, and 
fish once per trimester (Aguirre et al., 2005). It is complemented by the use of one of the first 
Biological Integrity Indexes developed for rivers of western Mexico, including ten criteria9.  
Images 10 and 11: IMECBIO Watershed team monitoring session in July 
 
 
Five years after the beginning of the monitoring, in 2000, the research results showed that in 
this portion of the River, the most degraded region of the watershed, various human uses 
accounted for the river’s degradation: “The degradation of the Ayuquila River is a complex 
                                                 
9 Biological indicators –number and variety of fish and aquatic invertebrate species- are very sensitive to organic 
pollution: they enable to follow not only the quality of the water but also that of the habitat, thus identifying 
illegal discharges even when these take place at times other than those of the monitoring (Olguín et al., 2005). 
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problem caused by a variety of human activities that include water storage and diversion, 
channelization, irrigation, point and non-point source pollution, sedimentation and changes 
in land use on the riparian area as well as in the upper watershed” (Martínez et al., 2000a: 
178).  
Among these main causes, three were of particular importance due to their ecological 
impacts on the riparian ecosystem: the urban wastewater discharges from Autlán and El 
Grullo, the industrial discharges from the sugarcane factory Ingenio Melchor Ocampo (IMO), 
as well as the storage and diversion of the River water for irrigation purposes (Martínez et 
al., 2000a; Martínez et al., 2002a). Indeed fertilisers (monitored by the IMECBIO) and 
pesticides (monitored by the CNA) were not considered as main polluters as their levels 
were considered sufficiently low (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication).   
Indeed analysis of water quality showed among other things that dissolved oxygen levels 
were very low –under 5 mg per litre, the level required for fish survival- for 20 km 
downstream from the sugar mill wastewater discharges, and under 2 mg per litre until 
Aguacate, after the El Grullo sewage which is likely to be the reason for limited aquatic biota 
(Martínez, 2003). Although the River was historically rich both in terms of variety and 
quantity of fish, the 30 km of River downstream from El Grullo now host fish of little 
commercial value – although important for the riparian communities that live in the Sierra 
de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve (Martínez et al., 2000a). 
The first cause of River pollution, the discharge of 200 l/s of wastewaters into the River by 
the municipalities of Autlán and El Grullo, was supposed to have been addressed in 2005, 
according to the Law on Ecological Equilibrium.  
In practice, Autlán is the only municipality to have a wastewater treatment plant, built in 
2003. It had trouble with its first year of operation (breaking down on a regular basis), but 
the process has now improved and enables a continuous operation, although it still suffers 
from technical problems10 (Martínez et al., 2005). As for El Grullo, as of the first trimester of 
2006, it is still identifying the best option to treat its wastewaters due to its specific local 
conditions, financially and technically speaking (this process is detailed in the first section of 
Chapter 4).  
 
The second source of pollution –that created by the sugar factory- was finally recognised by 
the CNA after a lengthy process involving local communities, research institutions and the 
                                                 
10 According to the researchers’ monitoring results, it still does not treat the cities’ wastewaters correctly, due to 
problems with the filters (it is a third-level type of treatment plant but only treats primary components, e-g 
sediments, instead of nutriments and coliforms as well) (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
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SMBR. Until then, studies undertaken had used methods that averaged the results of water 
quality, thus minimising the reality of pollution peaks that coincided with the sugarcane 
processing season (Henne et al., 2002). 
Sugarcane factory discharges of raw wastewaters are quite common in Mexico, where 40% of 
all discharges in water bodies are realised by the sugarcane industry (Olguín et al., 2005). In 
the region, the factory was owned by the State until 1995, which complicated matters for 
riparian populations asking the authorities for its wastewater treatment (Graf et al., 1996).  
The factory used to realise two types of discharges into the River. The first type, water used 
to wash the sugarcane that had been burnt to facilitate the cutters’ work11, was realised 
24/24h for the whole harvest period (Aguirre et al., 2005).  
  Image 12: Sugarcane washing process at the IMO 
 
Image 13: Cutters during the harvest 
 
                                                 
11 Until recently, sugarcane harvesting was purely manual, so to help the work of the cutters the sugarcane fields 
were always burnt beforehand. 
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The resulting important organic loads (a concentration of 600 mg/l of biochemical oxygen 
demand) suffocated the oxygen in the water along 30 km downstream (Martínez et al., 
2002a). The magnitude of such discharges was much higher than any other source of organic 
pollution, like domestic or agricultural wastewaters (Henne et al., 2002). Although this 
discharge took place during only six months each year, due to its advanced deterioration, the 
River did not have the capacity to recover, preventing the development of fish and aquatic 
vertebrate (Martínez et al., 2000a). 
The other discharge –chemical residues used for the maintenance and washing of the 
machines- took place twice during the harvest season, and systematically caused massive 
fish kills (Martínez et al., 2002a).  
The chemical discharge stopped in 1997, by replacing the caustic soda with a system of 
highly pressurised water (Martínez et al., 2005). But the organic discharges continued, 
leading 11 municipalities to prioritise the cleaning up of the River in the framework of the 
Sierra de Amula region (Martínez et al., 2002a).  
As explained by Martínez et al., the third main activity impacting the River was the storage 
of rainfall water in the Tacotán and Trigomil dams. This prevents the rainwater from flowing 
into the River, as it would naturally, thus limiting the River’s geomorphologic changes and 
diversity. In addition, at the Corcovado station, water diversion for irrigation reduces the 
River flow downstream by 70% on average, reaching 97% during the irrigation season. 
Consequently, the River is regularly dried up along 2 km, which interrupts the aquatic 
ecosystem (in 2006 the University will start evaluating the impacts of this on fish populations 
that usually migrate). The absence of water also concentrates the pollution discharged in the 
riverbed (Martínez et al., 2000a).  
In 2002, although the issue of minimum environmental flows (which guarantee a minimum 
flow in the River to maintain the ecosystem integrity) was mentioned in the reform to the 
National Water Law, approval of such an orientation and calculations to determine such a 
flow were still pending for the Ayuquila River (Martínez et al., 2002a). Early 2006, nothing 
has changed, the situation being blocked by the postponed publication of the law’s 
Regulation. As commented by this researcher, keen to set such measures up for the Ayuquila 
River: “Election years do not favour agreements”.   
Until 1998, these environmental injustices between the upstream and downstream 
municipalities of the region (Friedrich, 2004), still coincided with their socio-economic 
disparities. That year, on March 28th, an accidental spill of 100 m3 of molasses at the IMO –
the equivalent of 130 tons- provoked an environmental crisis on more than 70 km 
downstream (Martínez et al., 2000b; Martínez et al., 2002a). The CNA did not consider this as 
a priority to address, as it was already busy trying to face complex issues in the adjacent 
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Lerma-Chapala Basin. As a result, the municipality of El Grullo, impacted in its riparian 
areas, confronted the IMO directly. Autlán, in the boundaries of which the sugarcane factory 
is located, was less impacted by the pollution and worried about exerting pressure on one of 
its main tax sources (Graf et al., 1996).  
Following a massive local uprising by downstream communities in both Jalisco and Colima 
States, the local and state authorities were forced to take action and fine the sugarcane 
factory. A low-cost solution was devised to manage the toxic wastewaters with the help of 
the Directorship of the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve and the IMECBIO, leading the 
IMO to adopt a more collaborative approach (Graf et al., 1996). 
The IMO then asked the IMECBIO to devise a programme of actions to restore the Ayuquila 
River by mitigating the impacts of the molasses accident. The document, produced in 2000, 
first offers a diagnosis of the situation: referring to monitoring results of the River prior to 
the accident (from June 1996 to December 1997), it was possible to precisely identify and 
quantify the impacts of the molasses spill. It then presents the detailed actions needed for 
this three-year programme to mitigate the impacts of the molasses accident, as well as the 
factory’s structural discharges in the River and their costs. The three main axes were: 
improvement of aquatic habitat (which includes actions to reduce discharges); improvement 
and protection of the riverbanks (including reforestation programmes); and repopulation of 
native fish species (Martinez et al., 2000b). 
In the end, a working group defined solutions for the management of the sugarcane factory’s 
wastewaters, involving the University of Guadalajara, the Board of the National Water 
Commission’s District 094, the irrigation district’s Water Users Association, the Union of 
Cane Producers and the ejido Las Paredes. 
By 2001, following the suggestions of the programme, the IMO had reduced its discharges in 
the River by 80%. To do so, it first increased its efficiency in water use for processing the 
sugarcane, thus reducing the quantity of water rejected. It also adopted a new recycling 
process, distinct for the three types of water uses it has: to wash the sugarcane, it replaced 
groundwater by canal water for irrigation, less concentrated in salts (Martínez et al., 2002a). 
Filters then enable to lower the sediment loads, and then this water is mixed with irrigation 
water to be directly reused. On the other hand, water used in the process to cool and clean 
the machines and wastewaters (effluents from the manufacture of the sugarcane syrup and 
water containing the products of combustion) first decant – to reduce sediments- in a pond 
before also being used for irrigation (Martínez et al., 2002a).  Unfortunately this unique pond 
should be complemented by others, so albeit the presence of papyrus plants, which are 
 122
typically planted to accelerate the process, the olfactory nuisances give away the wetland’s 
dysfunctions12.  
Important to mention is the fact the population living in the community Las Paredes agreed 
to use these waters to irrigate their fields because a study had previously been undertaken 
by the University to demonstrate the absence of impacts this would have on the soils’ 
properties (Martínez et al., 2005).  
These measures have had a very positive impact on the quality of the River: by mid-2000 and 
even though this was right in the middle of the harvest period, fish were seen in the River 
again. Since mid-2002, the sugarcane factory does not discharge any more wastewater in the 
River (Martínez et al., 2002a). Towards the end of 2003, according to the values of its Index of 
Biological Integrity, the most affected site in the River had recuperated by 47% compared to 
the situation just after the spill (Olguín et al., 2005). 
Consequently, since then, it seems that while the socio-economic duality still prevails 
between upstream and downstream municipalities, the River contamination seems to have 
less of an inter-municipal dimension, revealing that the Manantlán stream is sufficient to 
purify the current contamination (mainly the town of El Grullo’s wastewaters, along with 
extensive agriculture runoffs and a few pig farms). 
The focus is therefore more on an intra-municipal level: the riparian communities of the 
municipalities of Autlán and El Grullo which live directly downstream from the wastewater 
discharges are still affected by the consequent pollution. 
To restore the Ayuquila River, the involvement of all actors who both benefit from and affect 
the River is crucial (Martínez et al., 2000a). Beyond the sugarcane factory’s primary role, 
various other responsibilities need to be met: treating the urban wastewaters, increasing and 
maintaining a base-flow in the River, assessing and controlling the chemical contamination 
from pesticides and fertilisers, among many other actions (Martínez et al., 2000b).  
An innovative plan for such an integrated management of the lower Ayuquila watershed 
was devised, which is presented in the second section of Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 In addition to the prejudice this subjects the sugarcane factory employees living nearby to (low-income 
immigrants from other States of Mexico for the most), the location of the pond –along the road connecting Autlán 
to El Grullo- might also have developed a certain negative preconception against such natural treatment plants. 
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b. The municipality of El Grullo 
Our study is focused on the municipality of El Grullo, located in the intermediate area of the 
Ayuquila watershed. Hereafter we present its most important features in terms of history, 
geography, demography, economy and politics.  
 
Historical evolution 
The first origins of the municipality of El Grullo date back to the 19th century. From a ranch 
in 1839, it later became the Hacienda de Zacate Grullo. In 1900 it entered the category of 
political and judiciary Comisaría as ‘El Grullo’, and was part of the municipality of Autlán 
(INAFED, 2000). Autlán is one of the oldest human settlements in the region, existing since 
1524 –i.e. previous to the Spanish invasion- when it was the tenth canton of Mexico.  
El Grullo wished to become independent in order to manage its own financial resources, so 
the State Congress created the municipality during the Mexican revolution, on December 3rd, 
1912 (Rubio, 2001). Its heraldry was designed in 1987 for the celebration of the municipality’s 
75-year-anniversary (INAFED, 2000).  
Image 14: The current 
municipal heraldry 
 
Source: Municipality of El Grullo 
 
Image 15: Santa María de Guadalupe Church  
 
 
 
On the top of the heraldry, the towers are those of the parochial church Santa María de 
Guadalupe, the town’s most ancient and representative construction. It is located in the 
central garden, a feature shared by all Mexican cities, towns or villages. 
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The legend Salve Feraz Valle is a salutation to the municipality’s fertile soil, while the colours 
blue and gold are those of Jalisco State. In the upper left hand-side, the partition represents 
the musical vocation of the population, including laureate musicians. To the right are the 
products that traditionally sustain the economy, based on agriculture: maize, pumpkin and 
sugarcane. In the lower part, the plant in the water (commonly known as “grullo”) gave the 
municipality its name (Martínez-Réding, 1992).  
Although the explanation of the municipality’s name still causes debate among experts, the 
most agreed upon version is that the inhabitants of the original settlement –the Hacienda 
Zacate Grullo- named the place due to the abundance of a Graminaceae (zacate) of an ash-
grey colour, i.e. the colour of the cranes (Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el 
Desarrollo Municipal, 2000). For some, this was because of the similar colour, for others it 
was because the plant was the cranes’ favourite food (Rubio, 2001). Originally, “grullo” is a 
Spanish word (i.e. not indigenous) with various meanings, such as the male of the female 
crane, a white-greyish horse, etc. (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). It is indeed 
possible that, although today only the great blue heron can be found, cranes were also part of 
the winter migratory birds that visited the valley in the 19th century, when the Hacienda 
Zacate Grullo developed (Santana, 2000).  
The endemic plant, which grows in water and is used as fodder, can still be found in some 
irrigation canals, but it is now much scarcer than in the past, as the valley’s humid areas 
were mostly drained (Santana, 2000). In 1950, a drain was built to dry up the land between El 
Grullo and the Ayuquila River, and develop irrigated agriculture, more productive than the 
traditional rain-fed maize. To build the canals and to have more lands, the valley was 
deforested: before there used to be coamiles in the hills (cultivation of maize in the forest), and 
there were lots of endemic species such as willows (Salix humboldtiana), shootbearing 
astianthus (Astianthus viminalis), cartilagelike jungleplums  (Sideroxylon cartilagineum), plum 
leaf ficus (Ficus pertusa) and eartrees (Enterolobium cyclocarpum): “The Ayuquila River was 
like it is now further downstream, in Tonaya”(Pedro Rubio, personal communication). 
 
Image 16: The Ayuquila River in the past 
Image 17: Ongoing IMECBIO reforestation 
programme with endemic species 
 
Source: Rubio, 2001: 292  
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In 1962, the State Congress approved the municipal capital’s classification as a city 
(Martínez-Réding, 1992). 
 
Geographical data 
The municipality of El Grullo is partly located in the valley of Autlán-El Grullo, the largest 
continuous alluvial valley of the watershed, which covers 160 km2 (Martínez, 2003).  
It is situated at 19°48’06’’ latitude north and 104°12’06’’ latitude west. The semi-dry climate 
allows for clearly defined seasons, although feebly contrasted (the average being 24°C), and 
most of the territory benefits from an annual rainfall pattern of more than 800 mm. With a 
topography varying between 800 and 1,400 m above sea level, the vegetation varies: in the 
north, forests of oaks and pine abound in the mountainous areas, while in the centre and 
southern part, flatter, can be found species more characteristic of warm climate such as 
eartrees (Enterolobium cyclocarpum), DonnellSmith trumpettrees (Tabebuia donell-smithii Rose), 
palmer trumpettrees (Tabebuia impetiginosa), guamachil blackbead (Pithecellobium dulce) and 
plum leaf ficus (Ficus pertusa) (Rubio, 2001). 
Image 18: Cactus with DonnellSmith trumpettrees in the background 
 
 
The municipality is part of the transition area of the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, 
although it has no lands inside it. Its south-western border with the municipality of Autlán is 
delineated by the River Ayuquila, while the other bordering municipalities are: Unión de 
Tula and Ejutla to the north, El Limón to the east and Tuxcacuesco to the south-east. 
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Covering 144 km2, it is one of the smallest of the State of Jalisco (Rubio, 2001) and this is also 
true among the municipalities of the lower Ayuquila watershed. But despite, or perhaps due 
to this, it is also the first most important in terms of population and follows Autlán in terms 
of economic dynamism (Lomeli et al., 2003). 
 
Socio-demographic information 
According to the last published population census –the XIIth General Census on Population 
and Housing in 2000- the total population in the municipality of El Grullo is 22,499. 
Approximately 90% of these (i.e. 20,250 people) live in the homonymous municipal capital, 
which is the only urban human settlement in the municipality (according to national 
classification by the INEGI, the limit between rural and urban is 2,500 inhabitants). This is 
the only municipality in the region where more than 80% of its population is considered as 
urban since the 1930s (Lomeli et al., 2003). 
The rest of the population is scattered in 38 rural communities, of which only 6 have close to 
or more than 100 inhabitants (Ayuquila: 1,214; La Laja: 416; El Aguacate: 261; Las Pilas: 185; 
Palo Blanco; 134; La Puerta de Barro: 95), while many are ranches with just a few people.  
During the 20th century, the municipality underwent an exponential demographic 
progression, growing from a population of 1,724 in 1900 to 6,999 in 1950 to reach almost 
23,000 in 2000 (Rubio, 2001). Nonetheless, during the second half of the century, the 
population growth fluctuated in accordance with the economic situation in the valley: from 
2.5% in 1950 down to 1.3% in the 1960s, it increased back up to 4% in the 70s-80s, followed by 
a strong decrease in the 80s-90s (due to the melon plague in the valley, and the Mexican 
financial-economic crisis more generally speaking) (Lomeli et al., 2003).  
More recently, between 1990 and 2000, it was the municipality that faced the most important 
demographic increase among the 8 municipalities of the lower Ayuquila watershed: 1.1% 
increase in population, 26% increase in the number of households, and a resulting density of 
156.2 hab/km2 (in 2000) –high for the region (Gerritsen et al., 2005). 
This is because unlike other municipalities in the region with which it shares a high level of 
emigration towards the USA (due to the current agricultural crisis), El Grullo also continues 
to attract immigrants in search of employment opportunities. The valley provides important 
seasonal jobs for people coming from mountain areas of the region and other states of 
Mexico, where such employment opportunities are much scarcer (Lomeli et al., 2003). The 
apparent contradiction is due to the fact most men from the valley refuse to be employed as 
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daily workers in the sugarcane fields, because the manual harvesting is very difficult and 
they prefer to search for other opportunities up North.  
This immigration tradition dates back to the initial settlement pattern, as the town grew from 
a ranch to the Hacienda del Zacate Grullo, to become an urban regional centre today.  
Map 13: El Grullo municipality with most important localities and urban centre  
 
Source: IMECBIO 
 
Economic activities 
The economically active population (36.7% of the total population) is distributed as follows: 
24.1 % in the primary sector, 22.3 % in the secondary sector and 52.2% in the tertiary sector 
(1.3% not specified) (Lomeli et al, 2003). But many of the secondary and tertiary activities are 
linked to the agricultural production.  
Historically, in the alluvial valley of Autlán-El Grullo, soils have always been apt for 
agriculture and intensive agriculture has prevailed since pre-hispanic times. From the 19th 
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century through to 1950, the cultivation of maize, beans, cotton, sugarcane, coffee, palm, rice 
and livestock rearing were the most common activities (Ibid.), as well as courgette, chilli, 
papaya, watermelon and tobacco. The rain-fed agricultural products were destined for 
national consumption.  
With the irrigation scheme of the 1950s, the valley underwent what is known as a model of 
agro-industrial development (Toledo, 2000). As highlighted in 1947 by General Marcelino 
García Barragán, Constitutional Governor of the State of Jalisco: “El Grullo, as part of the 
vast colonisation plan for our coasts, was one of the places that received a lot of support from 
my government […] the cultivation of maize, beans, peanuts and sugarcane are sources of 
production and the future looks radiant if the irrigation of this zone with water from the 
Tacotán dam succeeds” (translated from Rubio, 2001: 296). 
New water-thirsty products such as melon (export-bound) and sugarcane replaced the rain-
fed products. Cotton became more important than sugarcane in 1950, followed by tomatoes. 
In 1970, the installation of the Ingenio Melchor Ocampo marked the comeback of sugarcane, 
which dominated the melons as they contracted a plague. In the 1980s sorghum was 
important, as well as tomatoes (Lomeli et al., 2003). Since then, there is essentially sugarcane 
(especially in El Grullo), and to a smaller extent, maize (to be sold on the cob as elote), alfafa, 
chilli, tomato, onion, and courgette. 
 
Image 19: Chilli pickers 
Image 20: Maize, sugarcane and agave fields 
near the village of Aguacate 
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Extensive livestock rearing has developed since the 1950, encouraged by governmental 
subsidies, while fishing activities also take place in the Ayuquila River (Lomeli et al, 2003). 
Although the Green Revolution model used in the valley for tomato and sugarcane 
production (with the use of high productivity varieties, machines and chemical products) 
has contributed to the economic dynamism that makes the valley a focal point for regional 
employment, such a development also generated many drawbacks, the first of which are its 
impacts on public health and the environment (Lomeli et al., 200). As seen previously, it is 
the structural contamination of the River that led to a regional awareness and to taking 
action. As always, point-source pollution (from the sugarcane factory as well as the 
municipal wastewaters) has been targeted as a priority. So as of today, few studies have been 
dedicated to evaluating the degree of pollution of the lands or aquifers, but studies are 
currently planned in the context of the watershed to evaluate the pesticides and chemical 
pollution due to such diffuse pollution in the River. Indeed, during the dry season, although 
the River is dried up on a few km due to the inexistence of ecological flows, when it goes out 
of the valley, the River has gained back most of its flow, mainly supplied by irrigation return 
flows (Martínez, 2003). 
Today, the sugar industry is an important source of direct as well as indirect employment 
through businesses and services principally located in El Grullo (Graf et al., 1996). It is the 
only industry of the valley, and absorbs almost all the sugarcane production: “The IMO is 
almost all the economy, the basis of the economy” (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). 
This means it enables to sustain all the farmers of the valley. 
The agricultural crisis the valley now faces is one of a nation-wide scale: it is more expensive 
to produce certain products in Mexico than to import them (such as maize from the USA or 
beans from Peru). This is linked to the NAFTA, but also to a specific problem of the Mexican 
agriculture. With the Revolution, the latifundias (extensive areas of private land) were 
nationalised, divided, and small plots were distributed to farmers without land. But the 
Mexican agrarian reform was slow to become operational: first mentioned in the 
Constitution in 1917, it was only in 1941 that a presidential decree limited the best lands to a 
maximum area of 150 ha, enabling to distribute the surplus. Today, the results of the reform 
are very mixed: this communal land tenure system, which concerns 75% of farmers in 
Mexico, has given rise to auto-subsistence agriculture with a low technological level, not 
always enabling to provide for the needs of those it originally intended to (Bolay, 1985). 
This is because the parcels are so small (on average 6 ha) that they are not profitable. Also, 
boring deep wells is too expensive, so if the lands are not located near a source of superficial 
water for irrigation, the farmers can only resort to rain-fed agriculture. The fact the property 
is collective does not seem to play much of a role to help: although in some families that does 
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mean that brothers will go and work each others’ fields in rotation, according to El Grullo’s 
chronicler: “In Mexico we are very individualistic, even in the ejidos: what’s mine is mine 
and what’s yours is yours, and if possible, what’s yours is mine as well” (Pedro Rubio, 
personal communication). So today, even though families are much smaller than at the 
beginning of the 20th century (i.e. counting less than ten individuals), they still cannot live 
from their land’s products only: in most households, the majority of those who can also work 
outside (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). 
Alternatives to complete the household income include renting the land (when it is of 
sufficiently good quality) to rich neighbouring landlords –which can result in the farmer 
becoming a daily worker on his own land! Or, if the land is located in a peri-urban area, one 
can discreetly sell it to immigrants looking for a plot to build a house, thus participating in 
what Jean-Claude Bolay identifies as a phenomenon of illegal real-estate speculation (Bolay, 
1985).  
Until recently, the privatisation of ejidal property was officially prohibited (a liberalisation 
attempt in 1980 by President J. Lopez Portillo was massively rejected) (Bolay, 1985). This 
changed in 1992 with the Agrarian Law, enabling either the transmission of the land or 
selling it as private property on the condition of obtaining the agreement of the other ejidal 
landowners (Gerritsen, 2002).  
In El Grullo, historically, the most important hacienda –that of El Zacate-Grullo- was 
constituted during the 19th century by expropriating many indigenous people from their 
lands. This situation lasted until the 1950s (Lomeli et al, 2003). In 1932, 3,420 ha belonging to 
big landowners were expropriated to constitute the ejido of El Grullo (Snoep, 2004). Today 
communal land is still important (42%) even though 58% of the lands are private property 
and in terms of production units, the majority is private (67%) (Lomeli et al, 2003). 
The secondary sector is mostly manufacturing industry. Although the municipality has few 
industries, it produces huarache shoes (traditional leather sandals worn throughout Mexico), 
wooden furniture, ironwork, construction bricks, and maize leaves for exportation (Rubio, 
2001). 
As for the tertiary sector, El Grullo is one of the major commercial centres of the region 
(Gómez et al., 2003): its urban centre is a market for local goods but also a service provider 
for all municipal dwellers, urban or rural, through its health, education and administrative 
offices.  
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According to the urban classification of Arroyo et al. (1986)13, El Grullo is indeed a “minor 
urban centre” along with Autlán and Unión de Tula (Lomeli et al., 2003). Similarly, it could 
also be coined as a “regional urban centre” (Bolay et al., 2004), although to a less extent than 
Autlán. These are centres whose economic dynamism rests mainly on rural production 
(usually destined for exportation), which itself feeds into the urban economy. By creating 
demand for machines, fertilisers, industry at pre-production stages as well as agribusiness of 
post-production stages, this makes the urban centre both a trade centre, in addition to being 
a service provider at the scale of the municipality, for administration, education and health. 
Favourable factors for such an economic dynamism include: climatic conditions, irrigation 
possibilities, but also transport and logistics, low-cost labour and inexistence or non-
enforcement of environmental regulations (resulting in air or water contamination linked to 
intensive use of pesticides or fertilisers). 
As put forward by the municipality’s official chronicler during the ceremony of its 89th 
anniversary: “[The municipality] is small in area, has few villages (all connected), the land is 
fertile and irrigated, the density of the population is satisfactory, its people are hardworking; 
it is located at the crossroads between paved roads, its climate is not extreme, there is 
sufficient water in the river and underground, there are natural resources that we can benefit 
from, and its relative proximity to consumption centres such as Guadalajara, Manzanillo and 
Zapotlán, play in its favour. The municipality is potentially rich; we only need a bit of 
imagination and will to decide to diversify this potential and set up some industries, albeit 
small ones” (Rubio, 2001: 434). 
 
Political-institutional organisation 
Representative of a more general pattern at the national scale, in El Grullo, the National 
Action Party (PAN) was in power only twice: in 1950, when it was the first municipality of 
Jalisco to be governed by the opposition party –the second at national level- and then again 
in 1989. All the other municipal 3-year terms were led by the PRI, a “steamroller” which also 
wins because the PAN fails to propose any alternative programme (Pedro Rubio, personal 
communication). The current municipal authorities, elected for the period 2004-2006, are 
from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (and the next mandate 2007-2009 as well).  
Common electoral campaign themes include: employment, services (such as extending the 
water network and supplying enough to all), education, culture, etc. In particular, they all 
promise water to everyone: as there is a strong demand, they take advantage of the situation 
because they know that “when is comes to water, everyone collaborates” (Luis Manuel 
                                                 
13 According to these authors, only towns of more than 15,000 inhabitants can be considered as urban. 
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Martínez, personal communication). But they always stay at a very general level (nothing as 
specific as building a new tank is ever mentioned): “They all promise the same, to solve all 
the problems…In terms of electoral campaigns, in Mexico we have a very bad habit: we 
promise a lot and do nothing” (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). 
 
 
2. Research strategy 
Methodological principles 
Following Yin (2003), several principles were followed to enhance the quality of research. 
First, for the construct validity (objectiveness), we combined multiple sources of evidence.  
To gather information related to water supply and sanitation in El Grullo, these were: 
administrative documentation from the Municipal Water Board, archival records (maps of 
plots in the town, maps of the municipality), interviews with key informants, as well as a 
mini-survey in 2003 in three riparian villages and another in 2004 with households from 
three villages and four urban neighbourhoods (as embedded units of analysis), and direct 
observation (from which photos were produced).  
Information regarding the participation of El Grullo in regional initiatives was obtained 
through: documentation (administrative documents from both the Ayuquila Watershed 
Commission and the Inter-municipal initiative, as well as newspaper articles), semi-
structured interviews with key informants and participants in the two regional initiatives, as 
well as one opportunity of direct observation during an exceptional meeting of the 
Watershed Commission during my last fieldwork14, also producing photographs.  
Secondly, as far as reliability is concerned (results should be the same if someone else did the 
study), although a case study protocol was not formally designed, the exercise required by 
the NCCR North-South to draft a proposal could be assimilated to such a document, 
highlighting the methodology, work plan, etc. On the other hand, a case study database was 
carefully constituted, listing notes, bibliography and tabular material for the small survey 
done in 2003 and the larger one done in 2004. 
 
                                                 
14 On a normal basis, the meeting dates are generally decided less than a month in advance, so it was difficult to 
make our fieldwork coincide. In addition, previous to this last meeting, we had never been invited to join in. 
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Fieldwork operationalisation 
Based in a Swiss institute in Lausanne, but with a fieldwork in Mexico, our research process 
implied several trips back and forth between the two (for periods ranging from one or two 
weeks to longer ones of several months). Apart from two short trips for specific meetings in 
the region, the fieldwork in itself had three major phases. 
First phase: exploratory fieldwork 
The first phase can be associated to what is generally called an ‘exploratory fieldwork’ and 
lasted three months and a half, from end of May to beginning of September 2003. It was the 
opportunity to personally discover the local issues, and from there refine our PhD proposal 
that had until then mainly been based on secondary sources.  
Several meeting with researchers from the partner institution IMECBIO enabled to finalise 
the proposal, including the choice of the municipality of study, El Grullo. More secondary 
data was then collected and analysed, while semi-structured interviews with a recorder were 
held with key stakeholders in El Grullo (mayor, directors of municipal services of water and 
sanitation as well as solid waste, doctors and nurses from the health centre).  
According to the literature on the research area, it had seemed there was an important 
impact of urban and richer municipalities –like El Grullo- on poorer ones located 
downstream – like Tuxcacuesco and Tolimán. But this was apparently outdated as some 
researchers told us the Manantlán stream was now sufficient to clean the River (as there had 
not been any other spill in addition to the sugarcane factory molasses spill a few years 
before).  
In order to have a clearer idea, we visited different riparian villages along the Ayuquila 
River, located close to the monitoring points of the IMECBIO’s Watershed Unit (i.e. directly 
upstream or downstream from the major water withdrawal points and point-source 
pollution sources). We accompanied the Watershed Unit in their monitoring tour for three 
days in a row, as most of these villages are of difficult access by public transport. In addition 
to Aguacate (in El Grullo municipality) and Zenzontla (in Tuxcacuesco municipality), Paso 
Real and San Pedro Toxín (in Tolimán municipality), this also took us to the junction 
between the Ayuquila River and the Manantlán stream. Limited on-site by the time the 
watershed team spent in each place, we only did a few structured interviews each time. We 
then completed by visiting La Laja, accessible by public transport. 
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Map 14: Villages visited during exploratory fieldwork 
 
The results15 confirmed that the contamination of the Ayuquila River by the urban 
wastewaters discharges in the Autlán-El Grullo valley did not have an important inter-
municipal dimension, as the communities living downstream from the Manantlán stream 
were not impacted.  
This led us to re-focus my our study of such impacts on the riparian villages located inside 
the municipality of El Grullo only, each one in a strategic spot with regards to the 
contamination sources, (useful for comparison purposes): La Laja (located above the 
Corcovado derivation station and the wastewater discharges), Palo Blanco (beneath Autlán’s 
wastewater discharging point) and El Aguacate (beneath El Grullo’s).  
In terms of logistics, the three villages having a very variable accessibility by public 
transport16, we contacted the public health centre in El Grullo (during our exploratory 
interviews, we had learnt that the municipal health centre has a mobile unit responsible for 
all the main villages, which it visits on a weekly basis). The doctor and nurse of the mobile 
unit agreed to take us with them, so we ended up travelling to these villages at the back of 
their green Volkswagen, next to the daily medical supply! This enabled to spend a few more 
hours in each locality than with the Watershed Unit, even though time was still constrained 
by the doctor’s schedule.   
                                                 
15 Due to the very small number of interviews, the results are purely indicative. Nevertheless, their validity is 
reinforced by the fact that in each locality, the interviewees had been living there at least 25 years (if not all their 
life), and had a good knowledge of the state of the River and its impacts on activities like fishing or recreation. 
16 La Laja is situated along the road between Autlán-El Grullo (through the Corcovado bridge), and thus benefits 
from a very regular bus service to and fro between the two towns. Palo Blanco and El Aguacate are on the other 
hand much more ex-centrered, located on the road that goes into the Biosphere Reserve and benefit from a much 
more reduced public transport schedule (one bus comes to the town of El Grullo early in the morning and goes 
back at 2 pm). 
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This time we undertook interviews with at least 10% of households17 (the minimum rate for 
answers to be representative, according to one of our senior partners at the IMECBIO). We 
had designed a short questionnaire, largely inspired by the one used for the exploratory 
interviews, but also in order to be complementary with a Masters student, Carla Friedrich, 
also keen on working on water and related health problems (but concentrating on the poorer 
municipality downstream, Tuxcacuesco). The results are presented in Chapter 4.  
 
Second phase of fieldwork: interviews and questionnaire on water supply and sanitation in El Grullo 
The second phase of fieldwork lasted six weeks (November-December 2004). It was 
essentially dedicated to gaining more information about the water management design in the 
municipality of El Grullo, in particular to identify the actions taken towards an IWRM at 
local level, i.e. in terms of water supply and sanitation. 
To do so, semi-structured interviews were held with key stakeholders of the municipality18 
(most of which had changed due to elections held in the meantime): the director of the 
Municipal Water and Sanitation Board, the responsible of the Manantlán water line, the 
president and the head of operations of the Water Users Association for Irrigation of Autlán-
El Grullo, three canal managers working in the zone of El Grullo and the director of the 
Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve.  
These interviews led to review the main questionnaire (see annex 6), which was then 
translated to Spanish and tested with a Mexican colleague. It was applied to 10% of 
households in three rural communities –Puerta del Barro, La Laja and Aguacate, the two 
latter having already been visited during the exploratory phase- as well as four urban 
neighbourhoods of the municipal capital (Oriente, Cerrito, San Pedro and Del Alamo)19. 
These seven units (see map below) had been selected with the help of key informants, in 
order to cover all different sources of potable water and have an overview of the situation20.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 In order to increase such representativity, we decided to do as many interviews as possible, which is why the 
number does not always correspond to 10 or 10% (see annex 5). 
18 These interviews were immediately transcribed, leading in some cases, to another interview with the same 
person to clarify or complete the information. 
19 Although 10% is perhaps not enough to qualify the results of “representative” as far as statistical use is 
concerned, it is still sufficient to describe a certain reality and the issues at stake. 
20 A more detailed explanation of the choice of the seven units is presented in Chapter 4. 
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Map 15: El Grullo municipality in Jalisco State, with 4 urban and 3 rural areas of study  
 
 
The methodology of household selection was developed together with senior researchers 
from IMECBIO (in particular Peter Gerritsen and Luis Manuel Martínez). In order to cover 
10% of households, the idea was to select one inhabited house out of ten21.  
In order to select the households in each of the seven areas of study, different mapping 
sources were used.  
For the rural communities, the Cadastral registering office had no map at all, so in two of the 
three cases, local actors drew these maps with inhabited houses for me: the municipal 
representative in Puerta del Barro (even though we came across an official map several 
weeks later – see map below) and the health centre auxiliary in Aguacate. In La Laja, we 
drew the map ourselves, as the municipal representative was not very willing to help.  
 
                                                 
21 An exercise that was to prove more challenging than we first thought! 
La Laja
Puerta del 
Barro 
Aguacate 
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Results in the three villages:  
In Puerta del Barro there are 30 inhabited houses, so we did 5 interviews22 (in green on the 
map).   
 Map 16: Interviewed households in the village of Puerta del Barro 
 
In Aguacate, there are 63 inhabited houses, so 6 interviews were held: 
  Map 17: Interviewed households in the village of Aguacate 
 
                                                 
22 Three interviews only seemed too little, so in this case we have a bit more than 10% of households. 
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In La Laja, we identified 74 inhabited houses. But according to the municipal representative, 
there are 30 more, mainly located on the other side of the bridge, so to be sure to get a 10% 
household coverage, we did 12 interviews in total: 
Map 18: Interviewed households in the village of La Laja 
 
For the urban neighbourhoods, the Cadastral office had maps. Once we had selected the four 
neighbourhoods of interest (one in each of the town’s official four zones, and according to 
their varying water sources), we went with such a map to the Cadastral Office.  
Map 19: Four selected urban neighbourhoods for interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2: Sector Obregón 3: Sector Morelos 
 
1: Sector Allende 
4: Sector Rosales 
 
 
Oriente
Cerrito-east
San Pedro 
Del Alamo 
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As there is no traditional neighbourhood classification, we needed to precise which groups 
of plots interested us in particular, so they could give us the corresponding detailed maps. 
When we did obtain the maps with detailed plots, it turned out these were only plots of land 
and not specifically plots with built and inhabited houses. Up to then, data regarding houses 
had only been declared on a voluntary basis, and the registering of the actual inhabited 
houses was supposed to start a few months later by visiting all rural communities, according 
to the office Head23.   
Therefore we worked on the basis of these maps of land plots, and in some cases had to 
substantially revise the maps to adjust the number of interviews and their localisation 
according to the actual inhabited houses, as some neighbourhoods are currently undergoing 
an important process of urbanisation, and still remain only very partially built (especially 
Oriente, and the western part of Del Alamo). 
On the maps below we indicated by a cross the plots of land with no house, and by a number 
each inhabited house, selecting the interviewees each ten houses24. 
 
Results in the four urban neighbourhoods: 
In the neighbourhood of San Pedro, no important revision of map was necessary: there were 
55 built plots (out of 61), so we did 6 interviews: 
  Map 20: Interviewed households in San Pedro neighbourhood 
 
                                                 
23 According to another staff member, insufficient human resources would not allow for such an update. 
24 Or the one after, in case no one was in, or the one before, in case the one after was also empty.  
 140
In the urban neighbourhood of Oriente, an important revision of the map was necessary as it 
is the most recently urbanised neighbourhood: 65 plots are built (out of 226), so we did 6 
interviews as well (a bit less than 10%). 
Map 21: Interviewed households in Oriente neighbourhood 
 
 
In the neighbourhood of Cerrito-East, almost no revision of the map was necessary: 173 plots 
are built out of 178, so we did 17 interviews. 
  Map 22: Interviewed households in Cerrito-East neighbourhood 
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In the neighbourhood of Del Alamo, the most densely populated of my four urban areas, the 
map was mostly reliable (419 built plots out of 480, i.e. 87%), except to the western end 
where many plots are still bare, as the area is currently undergoing urbanisation. We did 44 
interviews:  
  Map 23: Interviewed households in Del Alamo neighbourhood 
 
 
So in total, 23 interviews were held in the rural communities, and 73 in the urban 
neighbourhoods.  
These 96 interviews were analysed with the qualitative analysis software Atlas t.i., which 
facilitated the work of coding (see list of codes as annex 7) and making queries (results are 
presented in chapter 4.1). 
These queries can either be more quantitative –allowing to count, for example, the number of 
interviewees connected to the public water service (or not), those with a positive or negative 
opinion of the service, those preferring to pay a fee or in favour of meters, etc.- or more 
qualitative, enabling to list all the different answers given to explain such decisions, opinions 
or preferences.  
For example, below is the result of a quantitative-oriented query made inside the family of 
interviews corresponding to the Cerrito neighbourhood (17 in total), to see how many 
households are in favour of fees (code “preference fee”): there are 4 such households 
(interview numbers 78, 81, 84 and 85).  
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Example of a “quantitative query” 
 
 
If we select any of the four identified interviewees (here, number 84 for example, which 
corresponds to the 11th interviewee in Cerrito), the specific corresponding interview appears 
in the background of the query tool. The questions and answers are on the left hand-side – 
here we see those for the theme “Connection”- while on the right hand-side of the screen the 
corresponding codes also appear. Each code is preceded by a small bracket identifying to 
which part of the text it is attributed, with colour codes varying from black –when a specific 
chunk of text has several attributed codes- to red or blue for those parts of text which only 
have one code.  
We can then explore a more qualitative dimension by identifying this specific household’s 
explanation for preferring the fee (the sentence in the interview highlighted in grey, 
corresponding to the code “explanation preference fee”).  
A more qualitative-oriented query could also list all the sentences corresponding to such a 
code (or any of the other qualitative answers, such as those explaining why people prefer to 
pay on a monthly or yearly basis, or why they don’t have a connection, why their opinion of 
the public water service is positive or not, etc). This allows to identify which types of 
answers come back more frequently, and, as these queries can be realised for each specific 
area of study, to grasp whether there are any tendencies which vary according to the area, or 
on the contrary, are recurrent.   
In the example above, for instance, the preference for the current payment system based on a 
fee (compared to a meter) is explained by a lack of trust in meters –as they have a reputation 
of accounting air in addition to water. This is one of the explanations most commonly put 
forward. On the other hand, a query focusing on those in favour of meters (such as below) 
enables to identify that recurrently mentioned is the meters’ potential effect on those who 
waste the water, as well as the fact it would enable to guarantee a fairer payment of the 
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water service: those who use more would pay more, those who do not get much water 
would pay less, whereas with the fee everyone pays the same according to housing features, 
and not according to the actual water service, which is very variable as we will see in 
Chapter 4.1. 
 
Example of a “qualitative query” 
 
 
In addition to such rather simple queries, the software also allows to realise more complex 
ones, like identifying how many households respond a certain way to several criteria 
(instead of one only) and which kind of answers they formulate when the questions are of a 
more qualitative nature.  
It is for such queries that it proved necessary to code chunks of text with various codes 
corresponding to the different questions I wanted to combine (i.e. the list of codes in black 
writing).  
To illustrate, below is a query used to see whether any patterns exist in terms of storage 
practices in the different areas of study25. Here, in the neighbourhood of San Pedro, out of the 
6 households interviewed, 5 have both a “wash-house” and an “elevated tank”. As the query 
tool does not allow to combine more than two elements, to see whether such households also 
had either a well or an underground tank, it was then necessary to read through each 
interview separately and scan the list of codes I had entered, to count myself whether they 
were also coded “well” or “tank underground”. In the example below, the third household 
(interview number 100 or San Pedro interview number 4) also has a well, but no 
underground tank.  
                                                 
25 To simplify, this query is purely quantitative-oriented, but qualitative-oriented complex queries are presented 
in Chapter 4.1. 
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Example of a “complex query” 
 
 
During the second phase of fieldwork, we also had the opportunity to visit the sugarcane 
factory, the neuralgic economic centre of the region that buys all the sugarcane produced 
inside the Irrigation District Autlán-El Grullo. Each year, during the 8-month process, 80,000 
tons of sugarcane are refined into 99,000 tons of sugar.  
 
Third phase of fieldwork: interviews with key stakeholders about regional water-related initiatives  
The last phase of fieldwork took place during April 200626. It was used to interview key 
informants about the second type of municipal efforts towards an IWRM: that of 
participating in regional initiatives. We interviewed staff from the Ayuquila Watershed 
Commission (with semi-structured interviews), as well as representatives from five 
municipalities participating in both the Commission and the Inter-municipal initiative (with 
structured interviews –see annex 8). It was also an opportunity to complete missing 
information from the previous fieldworks with other key informants from the municipality 
or the partner research centre. In this case, the interviews, like all the others realised with 
non-household types of interviewees, were not submitted to any specific analysis tool.  
                                                 
26 Apart from a few specified exceptions, this represents the end of the timeframe for the analysis developed 
throughout this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 – DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, we present our results, obtained by confronting our conceptual framework 
(IWRM at municipal level) with our fieldwork in the municipality of El Grullo and the larger 
Ayuquila watershed area. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, municipalities can be involved in IWRM by undertaking two types 
of actions: those at their own level –ensuring potable water and sanitation supply without 
affecting local ecosystems- and those at a bigger scale, by participating in regional set ups 
with broader objectives, to have a stake in decisions that will affect their situation. The 
chapter organisation follows such a distinction: the first section relates to municipal efforts 
and constraints at local level, the second to regional-level initiatives and their difficulties.  
 
1. Implementing IWRM principles at local level 
In this section, we present the provision of potable water and sanitation in the municipality 
of El Grullo. Our analysis is based on interviews held with key stakeholders1 as well as 10% 
of households in four neighbourhoods of the municipal capital and three villages.  
In a first sub-section we present the characteristics of the municipal water and sanitation 
service: governance issues, sources of water, distribution routes and frequency, coverage and 
consequent social practices set up, payment of fees, as well as sanitation characteristics and 
their impacts. In a second sub-section we will present the factors that contribute to explain 
the current situation, and in a third sub-section, the ongoing efforts to enhance it.  
 
a. Characteristics of the municipal water and sanitation service 
In the state of Jalisco, the decentralisation of water, sanitation and wastewater treatment 
services to the municipal level was realised in 19922 (Graf et al., 2006). In the municipality of 
El Grullo, the public water management system is operated by the Municipal Board of Water 
                                                     
1 During the three periods of fieldwork (in 2003, 2004 and 2006), two different municipal teams were in place (the 
change took place in January 2004 for a three-year mandate). To distinguish between the two, hereafter we refer 
to the “current” or “former water board director” (for example).    
2 In other words, just after the Law on National Waters devolved more responsibilities to municipalities and 
States. 
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and Sanitation, decentralised since 1993 from the State water agency SAPAJAL3. The Board 
manages potable water for both the municipal capital and the villages. 
 
Short historical overview 
Before any public water system existed, the inhabitants of El Grullo mostly resorted to 
personal wells4. But the water was not of good enough quality to do the washing so instead 
people went to the Colomo Stream during the rainy season (the Ayuquila River water being 
in a turmoil and the level too high) and to the River during the dry season –as the stream 
was then dried up. Drinking water was provided by a source close to the stream (which is 
still used by street vendors today) (Pedro Rubio, personal communication). 
In 1947 the first pipes were installed in the streets and in 1955 the service began, after the first 
municipal deep well had been drilled. The municipal water board was totally dependent on 
the State water agency in Guadalajara, from which all the planning was realised. 
But very quickly this source of water proved insufficient to supply the growing population, 
which has maintained a positive growth rate since the 1930s, oscillating around 1%5  
according to the economic conjuncture in the valley and the country (Gerritsen et al., 2005). 
As Rubio puts it: “The urbanisation of our population has been similar to that of most cities 
and towns of Mexico: irresponsible and requiring twice as much work [...] Once a few houses 
are built, the owners start to ask for or demand the basic services: water, electricity, 
sanitation, paved streets, etc., which creates serious problems for the authorities and the 
neighbours themselves” (translated from Rubio, 2001: 125). 
 
The system today 
The current system was partially initiated in 1971, when El Grullo’s water board established 
the first inter-municipal collaboration in the region with two contiguous municipalities 
(Autlán and El Limón), to share potable water coming from the Sierra de Manantlán 
Biosphere Reserve (Martínez et al., 2005). The ‘Manantlán system’, as it is called after its 
source (the Manantlán area, literally “the place which cries water”) started operating in 1973. 
                                                     
3 The objective was to get the water systems to be financially self-sufficient, because the State agency had never 
recovered the investments it made (Angel Aguirre, researcher at the IMECBIO-UdG, personal communication). 
4 The aquifer under the municipality is only about six meters deep (but at this depth the water is hard, charged in 
mineral substances; good quality water requires going 40 m deep). 
5 It reached a peak of 4% between 1970 and 1980. 
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As the water could be distributed all along by gravity, it was a cheaper way to get water than 
by drilling wells and having to pump it.  
The Manantlán system covers 32 km, passing through four municipalities. From the two 
sources in Cuautitlán6 where a small dam has been built to supply the main pipe, it goes 
down into the valley. It is first used by communities in the municipality of Autlán 
(Tecopatlán, La Sidrita, El Chante), then by those of El Grullo (Palo Blanco, Tempisque and 
Aguacate), then again by some in Autlán, to finally end up shared between the town of El 
Grullo and that of El Limón7.  
Figure 13: Schematic representation of the Manantlán system 
 
                                                     
6 The Cuautitlán municipality does not use this water, which is why they are not part of the agreement.  
7 Payments for environmental services could potentially be set up between users in the valley and the landowners 
where the source is located (as is already the case with the city of Colima, on the other side of the Biosphere 
Reserve), but this first requires resolution of land tenure conflicts in Cuautitlán municipality (Sergio Graf, 
Director of MABIO Foundation, personal communication). 
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  Image 21: Dam supplying the Manantlán system with pipeline  
 
  Source: El Grullo Water and Sanitation Board 
 
For more than 20 years, El Grullo was the only municipality to financially invest in the 
Manantlán system’s maintenance as a whole; as a result, it received more water than the 
other two (about 50% of the total, when its population represented around 26% of the total 
population). But it also administered the money that each supplied locality contributed for 
such maintenance. According to several of El Grullo’s water board directors, in view of the 
increasing sums this represented8, the other two municipalities “joined in for political 
reasons”: they preferred to directly perceive their own localities’ contributions and pay an 
independent organism for repairs, when necessary (on average, the pipeline breaks down 
twice a month, costing around MXN 5,0009 each time in material and human resources, an 
insignificant sum when shared between the three municipalities compared to Autlán’s 
communities’ contribution of MXN 100,000 for instance...).    
Consequently, in 1997 the three municipalities signed an agreement to have a yearly- 
rotating administration and a more equitable water distribution, to prevent conflicts10. The 
resulting public and independent organism called the ‘Manantlán Inter-municipal System of 
Potable Water’ (SIAPMA, according to its Spanish acronym) is in charge of operating, 
administering, conserving and improving the system.  
                                                     
8 In the municipality of Autlán, the sole contributions of the big village El Chante represented 50% of those of El 
Grullo town. 
9 Costs are indicated in pesos, the Mexican currency (MXN 1 is equivalent to USD 0.10). 
10 According to the actual PRI-led municipal water board, the agreement was reached because at the time Autlán 
and El Grullo were both governed by the same party (the PAN).  
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Today, the Manantlán system –cheap because it works by gravity, but limited in terms of 
quantity of water11- only supplies a small portion of the municipal needs (15-20 l/s for the 
city according to the season, and 4 l/s for the rural communities of Palo Blanco, Tempisque 
and Aguacate).  
 
The rest is provided for by groundwater (five wells supply 118 l/s for the city and 21 l/s for 
the villages): 
Table 2: Quantity of potable water used in El Grullo municipality 
Villages Sources of 
water  
Town of EG 
La Laja, 
Cacalote 
and 
Ayuquila  
Puerta del 
Barro and Las 
Pilas 
Palo Blanco, 
Tempisque and 
Aguacate 
Total 
quantity of 
water 
concessioned 
Wells 118 l/s:  
wells #1,2, 6  
(38, 20,60 l/s) 
15l/s: 
well #5        
 
6 l/s: 
well #3         
 
- 139 l/s 
Manantlán 
system 
15-20 l/s - - 4 l/s 19-24 l/s 
Both 133-138 l/s 15 l/s 6 l/s 4 l/s 158-163 l/s 
 
 
Indeed several deep artesian wells were drilled in the same area12 (see map on the next page): 
the first in 1978 when the Manantlán system broke down for a few weeks, then more in the 
early 1990s when the population growth required an increased water supply.  
This is because the option of building wells resulted cheaper13 than replacing the Manantlán 
system’s pipelines (a project abandoned when the State of Jalisco retracted its financial 
support to face urgent reconstruction needs in Guadalajara instead, following the blowing 
up of sanitation pipes along 7 km).  
                                                     
11 No more concessions from the Manantlán stream will be authorised by the Jalisco State Ecological Commission, 
in order to preserve its flow (the stream plays a major role in purifying the River when it joins it, downstream 
from the major wastewater discharges).   
12 An underground stream called la Manga. 
13 Although its aquifer level has recently dropped by 1 m (Del Castillo, 2003), El Grullo benefits from a privileged 
situation compared to the municipality of Autlán, whose aquifer is 70 m deep, and becoming deeper. This is 
because 4000 ha of its agricultural lands are still irrigated with groundwater, while awaiting the (ongoing) 
extension of the irrigation canals.  
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Map 24: Municipality of El Grullo with potable water sources 
 
Source: Modified from INEGI, 2000 
 
Municipal water distribution routes 
Hereafter, following this classification of groundwater/surface water source, we detail the 
distribution in each of the seven localities of study14.  
As far as groundwater is concerned, the municipal capital is supplied by wells #1, 2 and 6 15. 
                                                     
14 These are schematically represented as no map was available as such (the data for the town was being updated, 
and none existed for the villages). 
15 Two other wells are not used for different reasons: well #4 is out of service as the water quality was not 
satisfactory; well #7, which was built under the mandate of the PAN in 1995-1997, to increase the supply and offer 
a better service, has not been used since by the PRI teams which followed, for political reasons (Angel Aguirre, 
personal communication). 
Legend: 
 
       Municipal border 
 
  Ayuquila River 
 
  Municipal capital 
 
 
 
 Villages 
 
  Wells 
 Manantlán system 
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Figure 14: Schematic representation of the municipal water distribution in the town of El Grullo 
 
 
The main network, which exists since 1997, is supplied directly by the two most important 
wells: well 1 (38 l/s) everyday and well 6 (60 l/s) everyday except Mondays and Fridays. The 
distribution then follows a main line that borders the town to the south. A stopcock enables 
to either supply the neighbourhoods in zone 3 and zone 4 (apart from Cerrito), or those of 
zone 2, further down the network. Because the distribution is realised by gravity, the water 
first goes down the distribution pipes to the lower parts of each neighbourhood. It is only 
when the population there starts using it less that the pipes can fill up backwards again and 
deliver to the lateral tubes towards the houses situated in the streets higher up16.  
Another tank is located at the top of the hill, to distribute water to the Cerrito 
neighbourhood: it is supplied by water pumped from well 2 (20 l/s) everyday and from well 
6 on Mondays and Fridays.  
                                                     
16 In order to operate differently, costly valves would need to be installed (Angel Aguirre, personal 
communication). 
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As for the five villages in the western part of the municipality, they are supplied by two 
distinct wells.  
Well #3 supplies Las Pilas and Puerta del Barro: 6 l/s of water are pumped daily, 6 hours per 
day (3 in the morning, 3 in the afternoon): 
Figure 15: Schematic representation of water distribution in Puerta del Barro 
 
 
 
 
Well #5 provides water (15 l/s) to Ayuquila, Cacalote and La Laja, with an alternated 
schedule: 
Figure 16: Schematic representation of water distribution in La Laja 
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As far as surface water is concerned, the three remaining villages are supplied every other 
day between 6-24 hours (regarding the urban distribution, refer to figure 14). 
Figure 17: Schematic representation of water distribution in Aguacate 
 
 
But the quantity of distributed water has varied along with the governance of the Manantlán 
system.  
Before the 1997 agreement, El Grullo received 53% of the total 64 l/s supplied by the system 
(as it was the municipality who had realised most of it, although each municipality has his 
own version of this). 
With a more important budget and increased contacts between the three municipalities, the 
tri-partite administration was meant to enable a more harmonious management and better 
resulting service of the Manantlán system17. The allocation was to depend on the quantity of 
money contributed by each municipality for the maintenance of the system, and on the 
number of supplied inhabitants. The data regarding the actual litres supplied to each locality 
is very variable, but according to the official SIAPMA document, the system supplies an 
average flow of 64 l/s, distributed as follows: about 14.5 l/s to the municipality of Autlán, 35.5 
l/s to that of El Grullo, and 14 l/s to El Limón (respectively: 22.5%, 56% and 21.5% of the 
total).s According to several of El Grullo’s water board directors, the reality is closer to 50%, 
30% and 20% because in practice, the amount of water agreed upon is rarely respected, as 
allocation procedures (materialised through concessions) favour Autlán, resulting in 
downstream water shortages for the next two municipalities (Tanaka, 2002).  
 
                                                     
17 Among other things, it was to establish studies to update the actual consumption patterns in the various 
localities supplies by the Manantlán system, for a more equitable distribution (in particular by reinforcing the 
control of illegal connections or uses such as giving potable water to livestock). 
Tempisque
Elevated 
tank 
Palo  
Blanco 
Aguacate 
Water from the 
Manantlán system 
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For example, according to the former Director of Municipal Public Services in El Limón in 
charge of the Manantlán Line from 2004-2005, the locality of Aguacate does not receive much 
water during the dry season partially due to an important number of unofficial connections 
between El Chante and El Aguacate (about 20), used to give water to livestock or irrigate 
orchards18. These were usually realised by well-informed persons, as they had to know when 
the service was cut to be able to add their connection (the service is regularly interrupted for 
maintenance reasons, in particular in a section with pipes older than 33 years tend to break 
down with the pressure).  
Further, El Chante’s tank tends to overflow when it is full, when those downstream could 
well do with more water. There have been attempts to install valves but these are 
systematically destroyed. To solve this, the municipalities of El Grullo and El Limón need to 
complain and pressurise that of Autlán, which does not control its inhabitants for electoral 
reasons. 
In El Limón, at the far end of the system, the situation is even worse. According to interviews 
held there with households, the ‘Manantlán water’ is supplied on Sundays only, the rest of 
the week being supplied by water from the municipal well, which is of very poor quality. So 
to wash clothes, some women go to the irrigation canal (El Limón also being part of the 
irrigation district 94). 
To summarize, according to the former municipal president of El Grullo, Armando Nuñez 
Ramos, this represents a lurking conflict between the municipalities involved, ready to 
explode as soon as someone uncovers it19. For him, the problem resides in the fact the line 
was developed in an informal way: more and more communities joined in, tanks were built, 
leading to less and less water available. He also explains this by the tradition in Mexico of 
not interfering in other municipalities’ affairs, so this enables to preserve the status quo. 
According to El Grullo’s water board director, the financial contribution of each municipality 
to the SIAPMA was the following: between 1996 and 2004, each municipality paid a various 
sum (Autlán: MXN 7,000; El Grullo: MXN 6,000; El Limón: MXN 5,000). Then each 
contributed equally (MXN 6,000). Starting 2007, a new agreement will allow each 
municipality to pay according to the quantity of water received, which should enable to 
settle the conflicts.  
For the time being, El Grullo has sufficient water to supply its growing population for 
another 20 years, according to various municipal representatives. Indeed, today, if we take 
                                                     
18 The quantity of water also varies, with much less available towards the end of the dry season. 
19 This was clearly illustrated by the difficulty to obtain any coinciding data between the various municipalities! 
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the official data according to which 40% of the water is lost in leaks20, this leaves enough 
water to adequately supply21 the whole municipality’s population: between 354 l/day/capita 
in town, to 376 l/day/capita throughout the whole municipality22.  
So even if the municipality population were to rise to 100,000 in two decades’ time (a very 
high estimate considering the 1.1% population increase between 1990 and 2000), with the 
same concessions (and no more leaks) it would still be possible to provide 140 l/day/capita 
(the minimum quantity recommended for all household uses by the World Health 
Organisation is 70 l/day/person). 
Table 3: Prospective calculations of water availability in municipality of El Grullo 
 Municipal capital 
(population: 20,250) 
Whole municipality 
(population: 22,500) 
Hypothetical 
municipal 
population of 
100,000 in 20 yrs 
Concessioned water (litres per 
second) (maximum quantity) 
138 l/s 163 l/s 163 l/s 
Concessioned water (litres per 
day) 
11,923,200 l/day 14,083,200 l/day 14,083,200 l/day 
Concessioned water per day per 
capita 
589 l/day/capita 626 l/day/capita 140l/day/capita 
Supplied water after 40% lost in 
leaks 
354 l/day/capita 376 l/day/capita Without leaks 
 
 
Nevertheless this points out that for the future, if the population increase continues, it will be 
necessary to find new sources. Several options have already been studied, including one 
cheaper than the drilling of new wells and undertaken jointly with Autlán (much more in a 
hurry to find new sources as its underground water costs more and more to extract). 
But the plan to obtain concessions from the Trigomil dam above the valley –conditioned by 
the CNA to the building of a potabilisation plant- was rejected, because of the lack of 
financial support from federal and state levels (Armando Nuñez Ramos, former municipal 
president, personal communication).  
 
                                                     
20 This is the average in Mexico but the maximum that was mentioned by former municipal authorities, as they 
tend to put forward a figure of 10% instead, which would mean even more available water per day per capita.   
21 Municipal officials estimate that 250 l/day/capita are adequate to satisfy household needs, although in reality 
much more is used, especially during the three –very warm- last months of the dry season (Tanaka, 2002). 
22 This data does not coincide with other sources, according to which the annual consumption was 64 cubic 
meters per capita in 2000, amounting to a much lower average of 175 l/day/capita (Tanaka, 2002). 
 156
So the objective of the current municipal president is to have independent wells during his 
mandate (currently wells 5 and 6 belong to a private landowner who rents them to the 
municipality)23. This would enable to extract more water at a cheaper price.  
 
Drinking water 
It is important to mention that there is no potabilisation plant, which would be too costly 
(approximately MXN 20 million) for such a small municipality. So the municipal water is 
chlorinated in the wells, under the supervision of the State Water and Sanitation 
Commission and the Ministry of Health, to limit risks of microbial infections and gastro-
intestinal sicknesses and to kill the cholera bacteria24.  
According to the director of the water board, no other treatment is required as the quality is 
good and very low in salts, and the water is drinkable as the pipes (made of PVC) are not 
subject to infiltration risks. So in his opinion, people just don’t drink it because they are not 
used to its taste. In the villages supplied by the Manantlán system, on the other hand, people 
seem to prefer drinking the tap water, sometimes for economic reasons but mostly due to 
personal preferences (“it tastes better”), suggesting this water might be of better quality then 
that from the wells.  
The majority of the population indeed resorts to the very dynamic bottled water industry in 
El Grullo: six local companies are implanted in the vicinity of the town, taking advantage of 
its shallow and relatively good quality aquifer (Tecomates del Valle, La Amistad, El Colomo, 
Grullense, Rancho Alegre, Santa Tere as well as Santorini which is just starting)25. They all 
supply themselves at the same source, La Noria, to the north of the town, and purify the 
water using the much more expensive process of inversed osmosis. 
For a household of five26, the average consumption revolves around 2-4 containers of 20 l per 
week during the ‘cold season’ to a maximum of one per day during the ‘warm season’ (with 
costs ranging between MXN 9-16 per container according to the brand and the locality, and a 
few pesos cheaper in case one goes fetch it directly at the bottled water station).   
                                                     
23 If they manage to find a place where another well could give them 60 l/s, this should be sufficient (Manuel 
Martes Calbán, director of water board, personal communication). 
24 There have been a few isolated cases, which is why monitoring is now realised on a daily basis in El Grullo. But 
in smaller municipalities, the frequency is reduced (Tanaka, 2002). In any case, this technique –the most common 
worldwide to disinfect potable water- practically does not exist anymore in richer countries, to avoid the risk of 
long-term chemically-induced affections due to the chlorination. New technologies are underway to suppress 
both microbial and chemical risks (such as pre-treating the water before its chlorination), with experiences based 
on solar treatment developed as alternatives to expensive technology (Pulgarin and Rincón, 2000).  
25 But not all distributors pass by in the villages. 
26 The most common situation in our interviews, along with those of two (even though the actual number of 
family members can rise up to 18, but many have emigrated). 
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Images 22 and 23: Options to buy 
drinking water (home delivery or 
directly at the shop) 
 
Puerta del Barro constitutes an exception, as it benefits from an original community 
organisation: all households contributed financially to build a well and a purifying station. 
As a result, they now buy this water half to three times less than the bottled waters’ 
commercial price (MXN 4 for the usual 20 l). 
 
Sanitation 
In terms of sanitation, La Laja is the only village of the municipality that does not have a 
public sewage system (each house thus has a latrine). This is partially because of its 
topography –as it is a rocky area, it would be too costly to dig pipes for the sewage- but also 
because it would not be possible to discharge its wastewaters into the Ayuquila River27.  
On the other hand, all other villages’ as well as the capital town’s wastewaters are 
discharged lower down into the River, as no treatment plant exists for the time being (the 
issue is discussed in more detail in the last sub-section of this chapter). 
The town’s sewage runs along a 10 km long open-air canal that follows the road leading to 
several villages; it then joins a secondary irrigation canal before reaching the Ayuquila River 
(Henne et al., 2002). In addition to the foul smells this creates for all villagers commuting to 
town, the discharge, which takes place immediately upstream from the village of Aguacate, 
disrupts the livelihoods and activities of this riparian community (Martínez et al., 2005). 
According to the monitoring of the River quality realised in various sites by the University of 
Guadalajara, Aguacate is indeed the place with the most contamination, as it is situated both 
                                                     
27 The village is located directly upstream from another village in the municipality of Autlán, very popular for 
swimming and which also hosts aquaculture activities. 
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downstream from the two town’s wastewater discharges, as well as upstream from the 
Manantlán Stream (which has a purifying action).  
 
Image 24: River Ayuquila 
flowing near La Laja 
Image 25: Corcovado irrigation 
station 
Image 26: Reforestation of 
River banks near bridge 
   
         
 
 
 
  
Image 27: El Grullo sewage 
discharge in the River 
Source: Angel Aguirre, IMECBIO    
Image 28: Manantlán stream 
joining the River 
Source: Angel Aguirre, IMECBIO 
Image 29: Fishermen in 
Zenzontla 
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This purely intra-municipal dimension of the Ayuquila River contamination by El Grullo’s 
wastewaters was confirmed by the results of my exploratory interviews, showing both an 
important contamination at the level of Aguacate –which prevents many economic or 
recreational activities but does not have health impacts- and the disappearance of this 
problem in the villages of the Tuxcacuesco municipality, downstream from the junction 
between the River and the Manantlán stream.  
So focusing more in-depth on the three riparian villages inside the municipality of El Grullo 
–La Laja, Palo Blanco and Aguacate- I realised another series of interviews there28. 
These showed that the further downstream the village, the more the River is characterised as 
contaminated. This is quite logic due to the location of each village, La Laja being upstream 
from the factory and the wastewater discharges, to the contrary of Palo Blanco and Aguacate. 
The common indicators used in the two villages downstream were the colour (black or 
white) and the bad smell of the River.  
Despite the elderly in each village highlighting that the Ayuquila was much cleaner when 
they were small –some used to not only bathe in it, but also drink it, and most used to eat 
fish and shrimps that then disappeared- it was also was pointed out that this contamination 
had decreased in the past years (here again, in a much more accentuated way the more 
downstream the village). Indicators of this seem to be less strong smells and the fact there are 
now fish again in the River close-by to these villages. 
This can be linked to the various sources of contamination invoked in each case, and which 
have been treated distinctively in the past years. For La Laja, the main source of 
contamination was the garbage dump and wastewaters of the village directly upstream, 
Unión de Tula, which has been at least partially with the closing of the dump. In both Palo 
Blanco and Aguacate, the main source of contamination was clearly the sugarcane factory, so 
the progresses it has made in the past few years are of course felt much more strongly in 
these two villages (although some interviewees also specified that it still discharges its 
wastewaters illegally, at the end of the sugar season or during the night). In Aguacate, the 
two towns’ sewages were also mentioned, with El Grullo’s unchanged situation.  
Finally, although specific tools29 could have been used to estimate the costs entailed by such 
contamination, it was decided not to undertake this, as it did not prove sufficiently relevant:  
                                                     
28 Although the results cannot be taken as statistically representative, they are still indicative of certain tendencies 
in terms of opinions or actions, as in each case, at least three quarters of the interviewees have been living in the 
same village for more than 20 years (on average 30 years in La Laja, 41 years in Palo Blanco and 28.5 years in 
Aguacate), some for up to 60-70 years. 
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• There are very little health problems linked to the River, essentially due to avoidance of 
contact (except in La Laja, for washing, or swimming, where skin itches were mentioned). 
• Economically speaking, there are very little fishermen and only some livestock-rearers 
seem to have modified their practices with regards to giving water to their cows (but they 
give them tap water or water from the wells instead, not entailing major costs either). 
• Those who suffer from reduced opportunities for recreational activities do so essentially 
from a lack of trust in the water quality. Alternative practices (like fishing or swimming 
further downstream, or going to the swimming-pools in town) do not seem very 
common.  
 
Water and sanitation service fees  
In accordance with the Jalisco Water Law of 2000, each municipality disposes of tariff 
autonomy, inside the margins set by the State Congress in the Law of Municipal Income to 
establish a ceiling for yearly price increases (comprised between 10 to 15%) (Tanaka, 2002). 
Indeed in order for the water board’s income to cover the expenses, the fees are adjusted 
according to socio-economic and infrastructure conditions: in particular the 3-4% yearly 
inflation in salaries and combustible prices –electric energy represents 40% of water boards’ 
expenses on average (see annex 9). For example, between 2004/2005, the fee increase was of 
7.86% (see annex 10), while between 2005/2006 it was of 4% (corresponding to an increase of 
MXN 4).  
But this also varies according to the type of water source (as some municipalities are 
supplied only by surface water and thus have no extraction costs), as well as the depth of 
wells when these exist (80 m maximum in El Grullo but reaching 300 m in other 
municipalities).  
Yearly inflation aside, the municipalities send proposals regarding the fees, but the 
Congressmen define them. In the State of Jalisco, water fees do not depend on meters 
(reflecting the exact consumption) but rather on the size of the property (with number of 
bedrooms as indicators of number of persons in the household and therefore of water 
consumption volume).30 
                                                                                                                                                                     
29 The field of environmental economics offers various tools to estimate costs that cannot always be directly 
estimated owing to the absence of a market price (typically the case of negative externalities like in the case of a 
River contamination) (Barde, 1991). 
30 In comparison, in the neighbour state of Colima, pricing depends on the type of residential neighbourhood 
(high, medium or low-income, urban or rural), taking more specifically into account the users’ economic situation 
(Tanaka, 2002). 
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This is the case in the urban centre of El Grullo municipality, while in the villages a unique 
fee prevails for all, which is 10-15% lower than the lowest urban fee –to reflect the average 
lower income as most employment opportunities are in agriculture (see annexes 11 and 12). 
In all cases, a small percentage of the fixed fee is added for infrastructure maintenance and 
20% for the sanitation service. 
There are several types of discounts: those to motivate the users to pay yearly before a 
certain date (15% before the 1st of March, 5% before the 1st of May); and those for certain 
categories of users (50% for persons above 60 years old or retired, provided they pay on a 
yearly basis; 20% for those with a well to compensate for their pumping costs and encourage 
them to take the pressure off the public network31; 97% for those with a well but no 
connection, for the sanitation service).  
To illustrate, the fee varies from MXN 38/month in the villages to a minimum of MXN 43 in 
town when paid on a yearly basis, or a minimum of MXN 52.63 if paid per month (the 
minimum corresponding to a house with one bathroom and at most two bedrooms). 
In the municipal capital as well as some communities (like Puerta del Barro), households pay 
directly at the water board office in town, whereas some villages (like La Laja and Aguacate) 
have a person in charge of collecting the fees and paying the water board. 
According to our interviews in the urban neighbourhoods and villages, households with a 
connection to the public water service tend to pay yearly: 61 % across the seven localities, 
varying from a minimum of 50% in San Pedro, Oriente and Cerrito, to a majority in Del 
Alamo (many who do not know are renting or someone else from the household is in charge 
of paying the bill), Puerta del Barro and Aguacate32. These mention they are motivated by the 
discount, some also add it is more practical: ”That way we don’t have to think about the 
issue afterwards” (household in Del Alamo). Most of the others tend to pay according to 
their means, rather than monthly on a regular basis. As one household in La Laja stated: “It 
depends on the money available: if we can, we pay the whole year, if not, month per month”.  
                                                     
31 It is assumed that if they have a well, they do not use water from the public network as well (but from another 
source, for which they have to pay for as well). But the reduction does not seem to be always applied, as many of 
those interviewed with both a connection and a well complained to have to pay the same fee as those that do not 
have wells. According to one of the former water board directors, the municipality should not have this reduction 
at all, and on the contrary it should prevent the use of such wells, as the owners generally do not respect the 
Water Law, according to which they must have a permit delivered from the CNA authorizing them to extract 
water from the ground (Angel Aguirre, personal communication).  
32 In La Laja this question was not asked to almost half of the households with a connection, so the results are not 
presented here. This is because I used the questionnaire « without connection » (that did not include this 
question), when I should have used the questionnaire “with connection”, even though in these cases the 
connection is located outside in the street and not inside the house itself.   
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This tendency is reflected in the water boards’ particularly important incomes during the 
two first months of the year. 
 
The public water service quality 
Hereafter we often focus the analysis on our seven areas of study –villages or urban 
neighbourhoods, referred to as « localities ». We seize the opportunity to remind that these 
were selected in order to cover the variety of water sources: La Laja (well 5), Puerta del Barro 
(well 3), Aguacate (the Manantlán system); and in town: Cerrito (a specific tank). The other 
three neighbourhoods, supplied by the same wells, either encounter specific problems (Del 
Alamo, Oriente), or not many (San Pedro being taken as a reference neighbourhood with a 
good water service).  
The results, which are more or less representative as based on 10% of households only in 
each case, nonetheless give a first impression of the local reality.  
On average, 80% of interviewed households have been living in the same locality for more 
than 20 years, 65% in the same house for more than 10 years. Nonetheless, these figures do 
not reflect the specificities linked to certain localities, the two extremes being Del Alamo, the 
oldest of the urban neighbourhoods, where more or less 40% have been living in the same 
house from 20-40 years, while in the most recently urbanised neighbourhood –Oriente- more 
than 50% have been in the same house less than 5 years.  
However, as most interviewees are situated in between these two extremes (in all localities at 
least 40% have lived in the same house from 10 to 40 years), stable/feebly mobile habitat 
practices seem to be more common than not. In itself, this guarantees the households’ rather 
good knowledge of their water connections’ characteristics, as well as a certain historical 
perspective of its evolution. 
This is reinforced by the fact a majority of interviewees own the house they live in: 100% in 
the two villages of La Laja and Aguacate, 80% in the third village (Puerta del Barro) as well 
as the urban neighbourhoods Del Alamo and Cerrito, although this figure drops down to 
50%-70% only in the other two urban neighbourhoods (Oriente and San Pedro). The 
ownership of the house is also importance for specific information related to payment of 
water bills (always the responsibility of the landlord). 
 163
Also important to mention is that the majority of the interviewees are women33, as I did my 
interviews during the daytime, and women tend to stay home more with the children or 
because they do not automatically work. This also guarantees a good knowledge of the 
situation, as they tend to be the ones doing most of the household chores requiring water. 
According to the municipal authorities in charge of water and sanitation, 90% of the 
households in the municipality have an in-house connection to the public water network 
(corresponding to 6,217 connections in 2004, including 760 in all the villages).34 According to 
our interviews the rate is a bit lower, with 80% connected on average35. 
Table 4: Degree of connection to the public water service 
 La Laja Puerta 
del 
Barro 
Aguacate San 
Pedro 
Del 
Alamo 
Cerrito Oriente Total % 
Number of 
interviewed 
households 
12 5 6 6 44 17 6 96 100
% 
With 
connection 
9 5 6 6 29 16 6 77 80% 
Without 
connection 
3 - - - 15  1 - 19 20% 
 
The rate often reaches 100%36, except in Cerrito (95%), La Laja (75%) and Del Alamo (66%). 
Among those without a connection, a distinction is to be made between the unique case in 
Cerrito (where the house was undergoing construction) and the two other localities, where 
the reason is of a more structural nature. In La Laja, either households receiving no water at 
all asked to have the service shut down, either it was shut down by the municipal authorities 
because the user was not paying his bills.  
In Del Alamo, which concentrates the majority of households who do not have a connection, 
two schemes prevail. Out of these 15 such households37, six purportedly did not ask for a 
connection: four already had a well and two knew of the weak service quality so they 
preferred not to ask for a connection and dig up a well instead. Example of a couple living in 
                                                     
33 The rare men interviewed were shop-owners, retired or exceptionally coming back home to eat from their day 
of work, but in this case I did not stay unless they insisted. 
34 A bit less are connected to the sewage system (87.8%, varying between 90% in the urban centre and 72.5% in the 
rural communities) according to the Health Diagnosis of 2001 by the Health Secretariat of Jalisco.  
35 Another study realised in 2002 found a rate of connection of 75% (for the town), explaining that this is due to 
settlements on the outskirts not yet covered by the public network (Tanaka, 2002). 
36 This is the case for the four localities where the fewest interviews were held, which perhaps indicates the need 
to consider this figure with precaution. 
37 The last three gave other reasons for not having a connection, or did not precise whether they did not ask for 
one or had it closed down. 
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the neighbourhood for 39 years and in the house for eight years: “We used to live one street 
away, and there was almost no water, so when we moved here, we dug a well and didn’t ask 
for a connection”. Another six households on the other hand asked to have the connection 
closed down because of the bad service (including four who dug one up the well themselves, 
and two who already had one). Example of a couple living in the neighbourhood for 24 years 
(and in the house for 17): “We used to have a connection, but the water was frequently 
missing, so instead we dug a well and cancelled the connection”. Example of a couple living 
in the neighbourhood for 39 years and in the house for ten: “During the dry season there is 
very little potable water, so we dug a well and closed the connection one year after settling 
down”.  
So in general we can explain the relatively low rate of connection to the public water service 
in Del Alamo by the fact the neighbourhood is the most ancient and benefits from a shallow 
aquifer: many plots had wells before the public service was set up in, enabling those who 
wish to resort to an alternative source of water to do so. 
 
It is also interesting to look up with more detail the majority of households with a 
connection, as the binary “connectivity” actually encompasses a variety of situations. 
What can first be said of the public water service is that its schedule (which days the water is 
delivered) is very regular in all localities except in Aguacate (where according to our 
interviews, it is half regular, half irregular).  
Indeed, while in the rural communities, water is mostly distributed once every other day, for 
6-24 hours (except in Puerta del Barro and Las Pilas, which alternate three hours each day), 
in town the distribution is organised in three areas:  
- Those located in the higher areas (Charco de los Adobes, El Cerrito, Posito Santo and 
Mirador del Rosal) get water twice a week (Mondays and Fridays) for 24h; 
- Those located in the eastern area (Oriente segunda seccion and Jardines de Manantlán), 
Wednesdays and Saturdays, 4-5 hours per day; 
- All other (central) neighbourhoods get water three days in a row (Tuesdays, Wednesdays 
and Thursdays) all day, as well as the hours left on Wednesday and Saturday.  
 
 
 
 165
 Map 25: Neighbourhoods in the town of El Grullo 
 
  Source: Municipality of El Grullo (1998-2000) 
 
 Image 30: Aerial view of El Grullo, built against the hill (to the north) 
 
 Source: Municipality of El Grullo map (2000) 
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Although there is sufficient water to supply the whole municipality, the authorities are 
rationing its distribution through an alternate schedule (called tandeos: “one day here, one 
day there”). 
Our interviews mainly confirm the official schedule, while bringing more details. Hereafter 
we refine our analysis regarding the frequency of water distribution. 
Table 5: Variability of public water service (frequency) 
 La 
Laja 
Puerta 
del 
Barro 
Aguacate San 
Pedro 
Del 
Alamo 
Cerrito Oriente Total % 
Households 
with 
connection 
9 5 6 6 29 16 6 77 100% 
Daily - 5 5 4 4 1 - 19 25% 
Non daily, 
including: 
9 - 1 2 21 15 6 54 70% 
- 5 days a 
week 
- - -  2 13 1 - 16 21% 
- 3-5 days a 
week 
9 - - - 5 10 - 24 31% 
- less than 3 
days  
-  - 1 - 1 4 6 12 15% 
- frequency 
not detailed 
- - - - 2  - - 2 3% 
Frequency 
not known 
- - - - 4 - - 4 5% 
 
On average, one connected household out of four has water daily, while almost three 
quarters do not. Nonetheless, among these, a fifth have water five days a week, a third 
between 3-5 days a week and a sixth less frequently still. 
But distinctions are very important among the localities. La Laja, for example, is the only 
village with no daily water at all (but it does get water one day out of two), while Oriente is 
the only urban neighbourhood in that case, and receives water less than three days a week. 
In the other urban neighbourhoods –Del Alamo, Cerrito and San Pedro- between one to two 
thirds of households get water five days a week (San Pedro proportionally much more).  
To be grasped more fully, the water service also needs to be refined according to the number 
of hours during which the water comes, and the pressure at which it flows.  
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Although the number of hours was specified in half the cases only38, this enabled to catch a 
refined glimpse of the variety of the water service. If a sort of continuum were drawn: La 
Laja would be rather low, as almost half the households receive water less than 6 hours; 
Puerta del Barro, Aguacate, Cerrito and Oriente would be average (with a wide distribution 
between 6-24 hrs); San Pedro would be high as comparatively more households often have 
water 24hrs/24.   
In case the pressure was mentioned (also half the interviews on average)39, it was to 
underline a good one, mainly in Del Alamo (“The water goes up [to the tank] with the 
pressure, no need for a pump for the whole house: bathroom, kitchen…)” or a very feeble 
one, like in Aguacate (“[We have water] every day, but little: sometimes it does not go up to 
the tank on the roof”). In San Pedro, many get water daily but with a variable pressure (less 
water two days a week): “[We have water] every day and night except Mondays and Fridays 
where there is little”).  
In La Laja, few with a connection mention the pressure, but those without a connection on 
the higher street explain that it is because of the feeble pressure that they received no water 
(and had the connection closed down): “The water does not reach us, we are too high. The 
water is for the lower part in the morning and the higher part in the afternoon, so there is not 
enough water left for the pressure to come so high. When people are conscious, they close 
their taps, but most are not and then they don’t have water, although they would need it”. 
The past tables illustrate the fact that a rather high rate of connections (80%) does not 
automatically mean a good water service: only 25% of interviewed households have water 
daily40, with close to 50% having water less than five days a week. Moreover, out of the 50% 
of interviewees which detailed the number of hours or the water pressure, less than 8% have 
water 24/24 hours (while 9% have water less than six hours) and the water pressure seems to 
vary a lot according to the area of study, with a slight better in town than in the villages (at 
least as far as La Laja and Aguacate are concerned, as nobody in Puerta del Barro mentioned 
the issue). At least a stable schedule makes it easier for households to organise themselves, 
for instance to plan the weekly washing accordingly.  
 
 
 
                                                     
38 In Del Alamo too few interviewees mentioned the number of hours to be relevant. 
39 In this case, households in Puerta del Barro, Cerrito and Oriente did not mention the water pressure. 
40 This data could be higher as 10% of interviewees either did not know the frequency or they were not asked the 
question. 
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Hereafter we quickly detail the situation in the seven areas of study, starting with the urban 
neighbourhoods: 
San Pedro: this is one of the privileged neighbourhoods (potable water is supplied daily): as 
it is one of the lowest in town, it receives a lot of water due to the distribution by gravity.  
Image 31: Recent housing development in San Pedro neighbourhood 
 
 
Del Alamo: As it is located quite at the end of the water distribution chain, it has trouble 
receiving water. But the groundwater is shallower than elsewhere (5 m approximately) and 
as it is one of the oldest neighbourhoods that developed before the potable water supply 
system, the majority of inhabitants have a well. 
Image 32: Interviewed household in Del Alamo neighbourhood 
 
 
 169
Cerrito: This relatively poor neighbourhood with many irregular settlements is located on 
the hill that dominates the rest of the town. The sewage is installed but they are still making 
connections to the public water distribution system (connected households get water twice a 
week). Access is not always easy as many trails are still not paved (one cement staircase 
leads the way to the chapel Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe).  
Image 33: One of the many dirt trails in the Cerrito-East  
 
 
 
 
Oriente segunda sección: Potable water supply is two to three days a week. Public services 
are currently being supplied (sanitation, electricity) to this neighbourhood undergoing 
urbanization: the landowner did not request the permission to divide his land, build and 
then install the services as is requested by the Law, he sold without having the services. 
Image 34: Ongoing works to supply sanitation services in Oriente 
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In the villages, the situation is just as contrasted, but generally less well-off:  
 
Puerta del Barro: Potable water is distributed seven hours per day, so people stock it in small 
tanks placed on the roof (to have pressure). They resort to the irrigation canal, which crosses 
the village, to water the plants or wash the car.  
Image 35: Roof tank and irrigation canal in  
Puerta del Barro village 
 
 
 
La Laja: This is one of the poorest localities of the municipality, as it is the only one with all 
agricultural lands outside of the irrigation unit of Autlán-El Grullo. As a consequence, 
landowners grow rain-fed maize mainly used for auto-consumption (although maize leaves 
are also sold to make specific dishes or for arts and crafts) and most men are daily workers in 
the valley plantations. 
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Image 36:  Interviewed household and workers sorting corn leaves in La Laja village 
 
 
 
The specificity of the place is the way the water distribution is organised (one day out of 
two) according to the two main and parallel streets: the lower street gets water in the 
morning, the elevated one in the afternoon.  
Figure 18: Water distribution in the village of La Laja 
 
In the morning the main 
stopcock allows water to go 
down to the high street 
only. At 14h, the lower 
street stopcock is closed: all 
the water goes towards the 
high street  
Health 
centre 
Main stopcock
Clandestine connections 
on the high street, from 
houses on the low street
(Road towards Guadalajara) 
From  
well 5 
Low street  
High street 
(Road 
towards 
Autlán)
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This creates two types of tensions: 
o There are many houses located in the lower zone at the beginning of the village that 
have illegal water connexions in the high zone (as they are located between the two 
streets, they have access to the two underground canals), so they have water all day 
long. This prevents those in the back part of the village situated higher up (starting 
from the health centre) from receiving water with sufficient pressure, in addition to 
the fact they say those from the low zone do not take care in moderating the 
quantities they use; 
o Those from the higher zone never paid their water very well, so those from the lower 
zone (which did pay regularly) do not want the water to reach them. 
The problem is explained by the fact that before, most of the population was in the lower 
zone, and recently the village has grown –in particular in the western part, both in the low 
and the high zone (many are illegal settlements in the federal zones along the road or the 
River Ayuquila, but the water board has to provide them with the water service anyway). 
When the water network was designed, such an extension had not been planned (or else they 
would have built a tank in the hill above La Laja, as well as installed pipes with larger 
diameters).  
 
Aguacate: Here as well, due to the fact the village is expanding towards lands that are 
located a bit higher than the rest of the original village (towards the irrigation canal situated 
next to the tank –see Chapter 3), the water pressure is insufficient to supply the houses in 
these new sectors. They thus organise themselves by having wells, or withdrawing water 
from the irrigation canal. 
   Image 37: Main street in Aguacate 
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As a whole, the seven areas of study illustrate the important heterogeneity of the public 
water service. The water board recognised this inequitable water distribution exists because 
the infrastructure hasn’t evolved sufficiently to follow the population growth and the town’s 
physical expansion (be it in pure horizontal terms or to face the expansion of illegal 
settlements located in altitude). 
Overcoming the strong disparities that exist –inside the urban centre itself, due to growing 
and spatially spread-out population, as well as between the urban and rural areas, usually 
less well-off- is one of the local authorities’ priorities. Indeed such a situation generates 
complaints, as with the system of a fixed fee, with equivalent house characteristics, those 
which do not get much water pay the same as those that get water daily. 
 
Storage practices and alternative sources to face water system deficiencies 
To face this very irregular water supply, various storage practices have been set up, ranging 
from roof or underground tanks to washhouses and containers, depending on households’ 
financial means. Indeed, be it in town or in the villages, social practices linked to water 
installations depend on the financial comfort of the household.  
In those of more modest means, the water connexion is realized through a tap, which then 
supplies the washhouse through a pipe. From there, the necessary water for the kitchen, the 
bathroom or the toilets is collected through small containers.  
Then, in houses benefiting from medium-level means, the pipe is instead connected to a tank 
on the roof, which enables to have more pressure in the different rooms it supplies. The cost 
of a tank indeed varies between MXN 1000 (totalling, with installation costs, MXN 5,000, i.e. 
one hundred days of work of a minimum salary of MXN 50) and MXN 10,000-15,000 (for a 
tank of 5,000l, which covers five days for a family of five requiring five times 200 l/day –i.e. 
three hundred days of work). An expensive well requiring electricity also costs around MXN 
5,000.  
In the most modern houses (more or less common according to the neighbourhood), there is 
an underground and generally bigger tank, which supplies, through internal connections, 
the kitchen and other rooms using water.  
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Image 38: Elevated tank (Cerrito)  
 
Image 39: Wash-house in La Laja 
  
 
Image 40: Buckets in Cerrito 
 
 
 
When available, alternative sources of water are also resorted to, such as wells, the Ayuquila 
River or irrigation canals.  
Some patterns seem to prevail in each locality in terms of storage practices or alternative 
sources of water (especially in case of no connection), to face the necessities of everyday life. 
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When we compare households with a connection to the public water service, certain 
specificities emerge41:  
- In La Laja: wash-house and/or sometimes buckets; 
- In Puerta del Barro and San Pedro: elevated tank and wash-house, rarely an 
underground tank; 
- In Aguacate: wash-house and well or elevated tank; 
- In Cerrito: wash-house and sometimes elevated tank; 
- In Del Alamo and Oriente: elevated tank and wash-house, and sometimes well.  
 
Storage practices vary a lot in the two neighbourhoods which count several households 
without a connection: in La Laja, due to the geography, only wash-houses are possible to 
store water brought from the River or the hose lent by a neighbour who has a source. In Del 
Alamo, due to the fact this was an old neighbourhood existing before the water service, and 
the shallowness of the aquifer (on average 6 m) many wells exist. 
Table 6: Storage practices and alternatives to public water service 
Area 
Storage practice 
La Laja Puerta 
del 
Barro 
Aguacate San 
Pedro 
Del 
Alamo 
Cerrito Oriente 
Interviews 12 5 6 6 44 17 6 
Wash-house 10 3 5 6 33 16 4 
AND elevated 
tank 
OR well  
- 3 2 5 27 6 3 
AND elevated 
tank AND well 
- - 2 2 19 - 1 
OR underground 
tank 
- - - 1 3 1 - 
 
 
Basing ourselves on the results of our interviews, the seven areas can be broadly categorised 
in five different types of areas, which vary according to both the altitude and the variety of 
storage practices they resort to. 
                                                     
41 One important characteristic to point out is that in the visited localities, a majority of people live in individual 
houses (and not in apartments), which explains the recurrence of wash-houses, usually set in the courtyard.   
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Figure 19: Variety of water storage practices according to altitude 
 
 
The first difference is between those sites located at a certain altitude (La Laja and Cerrito) 
and the others. La Laja is situated on the hill between the River and the road to Guadalajara, 
while Cerrito is on the hill against which the town of El Grullo is built. Due to this 
geographical constraint, the two are limited in their alternatives to the public water system 
as far as wells are concerned: those in La Laja resort to the River, while those in Cerrito are 
better off as almost all have a connection (including three quarters three to five times a 
week).  
But inside this first category there is also a difference between the two: while La Laja is 
strictly limited to either a wash-house or containers, households in the Cerrito sometimes 
also have an elevated tank (one third of our interviews). This is due to the fact that the water 
supplied to La Laja comes from another village and the resulting pressure seems insufficient 
to be able to store the water in elevated tanks. Cerrito, on the other hand, benefits from a 
tank located specifically above the highest houses.  
The second difference concerns the five other sites located low enough with regards to the 
aquifer to be able to have wells (a water depth of 7 m seems to be the most common depth in 
all five sites, the lowest average being 4 m in San Pedro). Here the distinction is between 
those that have just two types of storage practices (either wash-house and elevated tank or 
wash-house and well) like Puerta del Barro and San Pedro and those that have more, 
Aguacate being between the two.  
Altitude (with 
regards to 
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La Laja Cerrito
Wash-house   
only (or 
containers) 
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Comment from first interviewee in San Pedro: “Underground tanks are only for the rich 
because they cost more. Before the neighbourhood used to be inhabited only by engineers, 
big landowners, so their houses all had underground tanks”. 
More generally, La Laja was one of the poorest of the areas of study, and it seems here that 
their poverty is accentuated by the poor water service quality and limited resort to various 
storage practices. Indeed a wash-house, contrary to an elevated tank, means being limited in 
the installation for a shower or the kitchen, while it is also dependent on the tap water 
service frequency to be filled, contrary to a well. Other poor places such as Cerrito or 
Aguacate at least benefit from the fact they have either an elevated tank for the first or that 
they have the aquifer at less than 10 m for the second, and thus the possibility to have a well 
(although this also incurs electricity costs). 
On the other extreme of the spectrum, the richest houses visited were either in San Pedro, in 
the recently constructed modern compound, or in Del Alamo. In both cases, such houses had 
underground tanks (of 1,000 l) in addition to most other storage practices (from 300-1,100 l 
elevated tanks or wash-houses) –even though these were not always automatically used, like 
in the case of having a washing machine. 
By analysing the well uses in the five localities that count some, we see that there is a big 
difference between those with a connection and a well, and those with a well but no 
connection. Indeed, having a connection makes the wells’ uses more variable, while not 
having one makes the well the only source of water supply, which thus covers all household 
uses (usually the well has a pump to supply tanks for both the kitchen and the bathroom, 
while also supplying the wash-house or washing-machine, although there are fewer number 
of wash houses and elevated tanks when there is no connection, compared to when there is).  
Those with both a connection to the public water service and a well can be broadly 
distinguished between those who frequently resort to the well (which they generally built 
themselves), either because they usually don’t have much water, and: 
1. They use the well all the time for all uses (something more common in Del Alamo), 
leading to situations where sometimes they don’t know the schedule of the public 
water service anymore. As one interviewee noted: “I don’t realize when there isn’t 
[tap water] because I have a pump in the well, to water the plants, the courtyard, the 
street and to fill the elevated tanks for the bathroom and kitchen”; 
2. Or they use the well both regularly for specific uses (generally the garden, wash-
house or to water the street) and for everything when there is no water, because the 
service is not daily, like in San Pedro, or the pressure is very weak, like in Aguacate 
or both combined, like in Oriente; 
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Or (more rarely), they frequently use the well because although they have a rather good 
water service, it is still not sufficient for their needs (in both examples set in the villages of 
Puerta del Barro and Aguacate, the interviewees either grow fruit trees for selling purposes, 
or rear animals).  
Those resorting to the well only on a much more occasional basis and who often have 
relatively a lot of water (either daily, or with good pressure or long hours, and where the 
well was more often already built before they moved in) use it only when the water service 
breaks down. As one household in Del Alamo put it: “We don’t use [the well] anymore 
because now there is more water at the tap, and we don’t have the money to buy the pump. 
We use it only when there is no tap water for weeks”. Indeed, according to the water board 
director, in spite of the fee reduction they are granted many of these well owners have 
stopped using them (representing only 5% of those with a connection), because of the 
incurred electricity bills for pumping. 
In any case, the irony is that these central areas that have wells “just in case” and benefit 
from a particularly shallow aquifer level (3-4 m), are not the ones that suffer most from 
irregular water distribution.  
Indeed, here again, when combining the tables related to water supply, storage practices and 
alternative water service, La Laja is really the worst off: the bad service in the higher street 
cannot be compensated by resorting to a well. Fortunately, they are close to the River and 
located upstream from both the urban wastewater discharges as well as the irrigation return 
flows. In addition one of the village’s benefactors lends his hose to those with no water at all 
at the top end of the high street. On the other side of the spectrum are San Pedro and Del 
Alamo, which combine both a rather good water service and sourcing alternatives. 
Said differently, as distinguished by De Certeau, we can talk of strategies in the case of those 
in Del Alamo which have enough power to decide to not have a connection and use a well 
instead, while those in La Laja resort to tactics, in the absence of much choice – and thus 
power- to cope with the situation they are subjected to (Pedrazzini et al., 2005).  
 
b. How can the current situation of the water and sanitation service be explained? 
“In spite of having sufficient water in the River and underground, providing water to the 
population and the municipality has been, and is still today, a major issue for all the 
administrations that have attempted to do so. With the construction of the potable water 
system Manantlán-El Grullo twenty-one years ago, we thought everything was settled for 
good, but the numerous villages, the natural population increase and fewer water sources, in 
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addition to the problems of a system which works by gravity only, have proven otherwise. 
Deep wells have been drilled, that have not resolved anything” (Rubio, 2001:130). 
In this second sub-section we analyse the reasons for the municipal board’s difficulties to 
ensure an equitable water service while treating the wastewaters (illustrating the theoretical 
difficulties presented in Chapter 2): financial, political, technical, and socio-cultural (all of 
which are closely interlinked).  
 
Money, money, money… and politics 
The decentralisation of the water board from the State agency in 1993 gave the municipality 
total independence in terms of decision-making, planning and operating. Now the board is 
completely autonomous to manage all the income (the collected fees) as well as the expenses 
(electricity, administrative costs, material), whereas before it had to ask the agency in 
Guadalajara for permission to make any investment. 
To this day, El Grullo remains the only municipality of the region to also have, on its own 
initiative, administratively separated the water board from the municipal treasury. Like the 
other municipal services, the board operates on the basis of the fees it collects, in accordance 
with the provision of the Jalisco Water Law for the State and its Municipalities of 2000, which 
recommends reinvestment in the same service (Tanaka, 2002). Such a set-up indeed 
guarantees that the resources (the collected water fees) are actually used to offer a better 
service, instead of being spent in other areas by the municipal treasury. 
This has given the water board even more freedom (even if all decisions are signed by both 
the head of the water board and the municipal president). It also makes the board more 
responsible, more aware of the necessity to spend the money correctly. According to the 
former municipal president, this ‘entrepreneurial policy’ is one he tried to develop in all his 
departments: “They get what they tariff”.    
So the water board’s costs for operation, maintenance and administration are to be covered 
by the water fees paid by the users. Although the municipal authorities do not always 
frankly admit it, this does not seem to be the case.  
Sometimes it is mentioned that the municipality or higher levels of government are also 
solicited: “Of course there are works for which they do not have the economic capacity, we 
also help” (Antonio Mendoza Olivares, current municipal president). But this tends to be 
“for specific and punctual but important works”, like installing the sewage system, for which 
they got a loan from the State Congress and the federal government (Manuel Martes Calbán, 
current water board director).  
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The only official data we managed to obtain regarding the board’s budget seemed to confirm 
the coverage of expenses by income42, even though the former director of the water board 
who provided it also warned against using it as being indicative of any average, because the 
expenses greatly vary according to the public works undertaken each year. 
According to him, the budget is structurally in deficit, which is why they have to subscribe 
fiscal credits to cover their debts. And according to the former municipal president: 
“Nothing seems to indicate this will change promptly”.  
This would be less surprising, given the number of factors that play against their financial 
self-sufficiency.  
First, a very common problem is the need to increase fees43: “To really have 100% sufficient 
resources, we would need to make people pay double, have them pay more to be more 
conscious of what water really costs. We have made publicity so that they don’t waste but 
those that do insult us if we tell them it is not the right thing to do. Also, this would help us 
to better the service and change the old pipes, to better the whole infrastructure” (Manuel 
Martes Calbán, personal communication).  
Indeed fees rarely reflect the real price of water: supplying 1 m3 of water can cost up to MXN 
8-8.5, while water fees are sometimes as low as MXN 3.23 /m3 (Aceves, 2004) or even MXN 
1.6/m3 (Guillén, 1999).  
In El Grullo, due to the shallowness of the aquifer, extraction costs are probably less 
important. Nonetheless, as shown by a study undertaken in 2002 on cost-recovery in El 
Grullo, fees are too low to even start approaching partial cost-recovery. Although the 
information is to be taken with precaution as it is based on State-level sources due to 
“limited disclosure of financial information at municipal level” (Tanaka, 2002: 13), the results 
show that in 2000, revenue collected was MXN 0.96/m3 (e.g. half of the State average), 
enabling to reach a cost recovery of 67% only, and leading to the conclusion that municipal 
water supply is highly dependent on senior government subsidies (Tanaka, 2002).  
                                                     
42 Expenses amounted to MXN 239,000/month, mainly for operation and maintenance, as well as perforation costs 
shared with the CNA (which grants free concessions to municipalities for 25 years). The income was much more 
variable, according to users’ payment of water fees.  
43 Very cheap water is a worldwide reality and it will probably take many more decades before this changes. As 
an example, in France, the ‘model of basin-based water management’, water unavailability in the south-west 
during the past summers seems to be due not only to meteorological conditions, but also excessive withdrawals 
for irrigation. These are encouraged by agricultural subventions allocated to the most intensive productions –
which are also water intensive- like maize. Water agencies have failed to use their power to increase the water 
fees: in total contradiction with the consumer-pays and polluter-pays principles, they are lower in these dry-
prone areas (EUR 0.23/m3), compared to other non-affected basins (EUR 1.14-1.5/m3) (Bronner and Galus, 2005).  
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The problem is that it is the State Congress which sets the price of water44, and that political 
considerations also interfere (for example, if the PAN is in power and wants to increase the 
fee, the PRI opposed the initiative (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). As 
resumed by Tanaka: “Pricing is likely to be based on political priorities rather than costs 
incurred by operation […] The policy reforms [providing legal tools for municipal water 
utilities to collect fees] are expected to have limited influence on water prices. Given that the 
State governments cap the price increase allowed per year, and the political agenda favours 
low prices, the prices of water are destined to remain low. As a result, potable water 
provision in the Mexican case is heavily subsidised” (Tanaka, 2002: 22). This is unlikely to 
change as the conflict that would result from a price increase is avoided and the non-
resolved situation conveniently passed on from one Congressman to the next (Marie et al., 
2005). So to circumvent this perpetuated tradition, municipal boards ask for an increased 
independence of municipalities, such as that existing in the neighbour State of Colima, where 
municipal boards are free to set the prices (Tanaka, 2002). 
Fees discounts could also be revised, either by increasing the fee paid by those without a 
connection but with a well (as 97% of the fee seems very little to pay for the sanitation service 
only), or by changing the conditions of the 50% discount (postponing the age limit or 
combining both retirement status and age limit).  
Finally, also important is the need to update the users’ census, in order to register all 
households and house characteristics to avoid non-payment (or payment of fees lower than 
what should be paid). To a certain extent, this depends on cadastral information, which is 
not always very up-to-date. Indeed in 1993, the transfer of power entailed by the 
decentralisation process to perceive land or property taxes –the main source of local 
finances- was not accompanied by a corresponding transfer of experience and the land 
registration is still being updated (Llop Torné, 2005). In El Grullo, this was exactly the 
situation in November-December 2004, with the cadastral office planning to start such an 
update in January 2005. According to the former water board director though, in 2001 they 
had updated the data regarding public water consumption (to compare house characteristics 
with paid fees, and control illegal connections), but in the villages only. 
To summarize, even though due to contradictory information, it is not very clear whether El 
Grullo’s water board’s budget is in structural deficit or not45, what is clear, on the other hand, 
is that it is too limited to allow for investments in “secondary” domains such as fixing leaks 
(40% of water usually disappears through such obsolete infrastructure) or building a 
treatment plant. Another consequence of the water board’s limited financial resources is its 
                                                     
44 This is the case in Jalisco, but varies according to the States (Pineda, 2004).  
45 The varying points of view could depend on whether the authorities are towards the end of their mandate but 
with past elections (so little pressure), or towards the beginning of it and still wanting to make a good impression.   
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lack of technically qualified staff, which also indirectly contributes to increasing its 
expenses46 (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication).  
Indeed, today, the water board’s first priority is to extend the service, something it already 
has trouble doing in a self-sufficient way.  
 
Technical consequences 
First, insufficient financial resources prevent good operation and maintenance. The non-
renewal of the equipment, frequently in a poor state (old pipes are affected by the chlorine 
used to disinfect the water), creates leaks. As stated by the water authorities: “We need to 
revise and monitor the piping systems, which are very old. We need to correct the 
distribution systems to prevent water loss” (Tanaka, 2002: 31).  
This is worsened by the fact that due to the size of the municipality (insufficient staff, lack of 
qualified personnel and of financial resources), it is not always possible to fix a leakage 
within less than a few days’ time (Tanaka, 2002).  
In addition to such important water losses, the incurred leakages themselves lead to dirt 
infiltration, which affects the water quality.  
According to the former water board director though, these leaks should not represent more 
than 10% of the pumped water, as they rehabilitated the conduction lines47 (the pipes 
between the pumps and the distribution tubes, which are those with the biggest diameter). 
Indeed, according to the former mayor, detecting these leakages was a priority in order to 
repair or replace the distribution pipes accordingly. For him, the leakages would explain 
why they do not have enough water to reach all the neighbourhoods in a satisfactory way, as 
in theory they should be able to. 
But the fact the water board does not dispose of a sufficient budget also contributes to limit 
its power of control over illegal connections (or ‘voluntary leaks’). As mentioned earlier, this 
has been particularly problematic in two villages: La Laja, where certain houses dispose of 
two connections in order to have water all day, and Aguacate, where the water quantity has 
sometimes been significantly reduced due to illegal connections located ‘upstream’ in the 
network: “They say it is because there are clandestine connections, as well as imperfections 
                                                     
46 Although it could not cover all municipalities, the former centralised State operator realised good quality 
studies and planning; today, the municipal water board is dependent on third parties, to whom it must 
subcontract such studies. 
47 The rehabilitation of such lines for well 1 cost them MXN 1,767,000 (Sergio Llamas Gutiérrez, personal 
communication).  
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and lack of attention (the same Manantlán pipeline has now existed for 30 years). In 
addition, sometimes when there is not enough water, they say that it is because in El Chante, 
they use it up to give to their livestock” (Household in Aguacate). 
Then, limited financial means have historically contributed to set up a distribution realised 
by gravity. Today, this complicates the extension of the network to follow the extension of 
settlements, be it the municipal capital or in the rural communities. Indeed, in both cases, the 
most recent neighbourhoods are located on formerly non-constructed lands –e.g. generally 
higher than the municipal water tanks.  
In town, in order to supply the very densely populated neighbourhood of El Cerrito, 
composed mainly of illegal settlements, the problem has been solved by repumping water 
from the main tank to a secondary tank located at the top of the hill.  
As this problem has not yet been solved in the villages of La Laja and Aguacate, the very 
weak resulting pressure for such areas is especially obvious (according to our interviews, the 
most affected households have indeed been living there, on average 10 years less than those 
in the rest of the villages).  
But the gravity distribution creates another problem in the town of El Grullo: it privileges the 
neighbourhoods located at the bottom of the network, towards which all the water flows, to 
the detriment of those located higher up. This is why, in 1997, before handing over the 
municipality to the PRI, the PAN-led team suggested reorganising the water distribution 
through three tanks –instead of one main tank only- in order to each supply a third of the 
town from uphill to downhill, thus with increased pressure, a proposal which was, of course, 
rejected (Angel Aguirre, personal communication).   
In addition insufficient financial means have, up to now, prevented the municipality from 
equipping itself in meters. This entails that the users pay for a service –corresponding at 
most to the extraction, distribution and maintenance costs- but not for the actual quantity of 
water they consume. In addition to being an incentive to waste water, it contributes to create 
a climate of mistrust between neighbours when they pay the same fee for quite a differing 
water service quality. Also, it puts an additional strain on the water board’s budget.  
The former water board director said they would start setting them up meters for those who 
agreed to pay for the installation and the meter (e.g. those who did not trust the current 
system, who thought they were being charged excessively compared to their effective 
consumption), but the former mayor had many doubts about this, due to the costs of the 
operation. He also mentioned this could only be done once everyone receives water 
regularly and with the same pressure.  
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Finally, as it is possible for the board to resort to the funds reserved from water fees to build 
and operate wastewater treatment plants (20% of the fee), these are used to cover other 
expenses, such as electricity bills for water extraction and the maintenance of sanitation 
pipes48. This partially explains why El Grullo still has no treatment plant49. According to the 
former mayor, who was head of the water Board in 1992 (e.g. when the law of 1990 
introducing such a reserve came into practice), they never had sufficient resources for the 
water supply, so they decided to favour it to the detriment of wastewater treatment, in order 
to avoid trouble with the population: “The first priority is to have clean water, then we 
worry about wastewater. So the 20% of the fee that should be kept to build the treatment 
plant is used for the provision of potable water” (Armando Nuñez Ramos, personal 
communication). According to him, this is the same in all municipalities of Jalisco.  
He regrets that the federal government undertook this regulatory approach without offering 
to help these lower governmental levels, and fears it will work against more natural 
solutions such as the one he favoured: “It has taken me 3 years of training [by the inter-
municipal initiative] to know what a constructed wetland is. So, in January 2004, the new 
municipal president is going to say: ‘I only have 1 year left, so I’ll go and see Fox and see if 
he gives me a normal treatment plant” (Armando Nuñez Ramos, personal communication). 
 
Socio-cultural factors 
The fact there are no water meters leads to another problem: between 15-20% of the 
population does not pay its water bills50. Out of these, one third does not pay because they 
have no money, but two thirds because they do not want to (Tanaka, 2002).  
These are generally well-off citizens aware of regulatory evolutions: “We know who they are 
because they have been identified and defend themselves. They do not pay because they 
pretext they do not trust the bill to reflect their effective consumption” (Armando Nuñez 
Ramos, personal communication); “The people that do not pay are educated: they are 
lawyers, they have a bachelor’s degree…We have less overdue payments with the destitute 
than with those which have the means to pay. The poorer do not know the law as well, and 
                                                     
48 This explains why one of the water board’s priorities was to buy more efficient pumps, as was done in 2003. 
49 Another reason which might explain why there is still no wastewater treatment plant might be the fact it is 
perhaps more interesting – in electoral terms - to invest in more visible infrastructures such as roads, etc.  
50 According to the former director of the water board, this level has fallen from 35-40% in 2000, and is due to the 
fact people pay better when there is a good service.   
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are more afraid of sanctions. The legislators are trying to see what can be done to avoid this 
problem”51 (Sergio Llamas Gutiérrez, former director of the water board). 
Indeed, since 2000, the State of Jalisco Water Law prohibits service suspension for non-
payers in the case of domestic water use52: the board is only allowed to reduce the amount of 
water supplied (to 200 l per day) (Tanaka, 2002). The problem is that as they have no meters, 
the municipal team has no way of reducing precisely the quantity of water. Knowing this 
provides an incentive to the free riders to continue ‘business-as-usual’ (some of the richer 
ones have not paid since 2 to 15 years). On the contrary, the poorer try to pay as fast as 
possible, as the discount of 15% represents an important sum for them. 
“Here at the water board we try to pass on the message: ‘If you don’t pay the telephone bill, 
your line is suspended, same thing for the electricity…so it should be the same for the water 
which is much more vital than the phone or electricity’53. But they know we can’t do that 
because of the law, so this is why we have the plan of installing valves to reduce the quantity 
of water they get this year. This will also help us get a better recovery, and make the people 
see we want everyone to fill in their responsibilities, as they ask us to supply a good service 
quality, they have to help us in doing that by meeting up to their responsibilities” (Manuel 
Martes Calbán, personal communication).  
As a means to resolve this free-riding problem, the municipality wishes to install water 
meters, which will have to be paid for by the users themselves (the current situation is 
detailed in the last sub-section). 
 
Vicious circle 
Hereafter we represent the links between these four dimensions, and the vicious circle they 
lead to in our view:  
 
 
 
                                                     
51 Non-payers are rarely sanctioned through fines because some have no means, and it would be difficult to fine 
only a certain category of non-payers (the richer ones).  
52 In any case, such unpopular measures would never be taken for domestic connections, while in the case of 
commercial uses (where this is legal) the board has already cut off non-payers’ water connections. 
53 Quite surprisingly, it is not uncommon that the more vital the service, the less willingness to pay for it. Indeed 
these vital services – such as water distribution- are protected by laws, whereas other less vital ones aren’t (Roche, 
2005).   
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Figure 20: Vicious circle explaining bad quality municipal water service 
 
 
Even though the problem is quite complex, the political setting of prices is one of the core 
issues, as it prevents fees to be sufficiently high to cover the water board’s costs (operation 
and maintenance as well as expansion). The imbalanced resulting budget prevents supplying 
a good quality service to all, as it has specific technical consequences (leaks, difficulty to 
extend the network at the same pace as the settlement extension, absence of meters), most of 
which only reinforce the budget unbalance. In particular, the fact there are no meters, 
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conjugated to a culture of non payment (people are used to being patronised)54 sometimes 
justified by a very low quality… leads to further non payment of fees. 
Moreover, insufficient resources combined with the fact the budget is not separated between 
water and sanitation enables to use the 20% fee destined to the operation of a treatment plant 
to cover other expenses (indeed a treatment plant is rarely as urgent as providing water). 
This contributes to maintain the situation of raw wastewater discharges, and the 
consequences for nearby populations or ecosystems, while increasing the water board’s 
deficit (through its indebtedness towards the CNA). 
According to the current water board, as fees cannot be modified by the municipality the 
other solution is to reduce costs: the current municipal president had the objective of 
reducing extraction costs by resorting to wells owned by the municipality only.  
If this resulted in a better budget balance, it could then contribute to extract more water (and 
thus abandon the alternated schedule), as well as repair the necessary pipes or expand the 
infrastructure to follow the urban expansion, and install meters. Indeed, according to several 
experts in the region, the poor water service is explained by the fact an insufficient amount of 
water is distributed, even though the region is very rich in water.  
 
c. Efforts to increase the water supply and protect the ecosystem 
In this third sub-section we present ongoing efforts undertaken by the municipal board to 
overcome its difficulties in providing a water and sanitation service of quality while 
preserving the ecosystem, e.g. positive local initiatives from an IWRM point of view. 
 
Repairing leaks 
In terms of leaks, important investments were undertaken regarding underground water 
sources during the mandate of the former team (to change the conduction lines of well 1).  
It seems that the current team’s priority is the project of changing the pipes of the Manantlán 
system (replacing 3 km of the asbestos cement pipes with PVC, approximately 1 km 
downstream from the dam): “Currently all three municipalities are participating to finance a 
project to rehabilitate all the pipes that are more than 33 years old, in a section where we 
                                                     
54 The situation of non-payment by users is quite common in developing countries, and is tolerated by the public 
services in charge, by passing the non-paid fees onto citizens’ taxes (Roche, 2005). But in the case of El Grullo, this 
is impossible to do as the water and sanitation board budget is independent from the general municipal treasury.  
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have the most problems: what happens is that due to the topography in the mountain, with 
the pressure, the pipes break down. To repair this we need one or two days, as we have to 
get the machinery over there and one or two days for each municipality without this 
water…. Well, the time the water fills up all the underground tanks before it reaches the end 
part of the system, a week can have gone by” (Antonio Mendoza Olivares, personal 
communication). 
 
Adapting the infrastructure to the habitat expansion  
Another project the water board had for this year55 was to send all groundwater extracted for 
the town through a steel pipe to the main tank. Water from well 1 is particularly concerned, 
which is sent directly to the town without being stocked. Once the missing portion of pipe is 
completed (270 m as of April 2006), this water will be sent to the tank, while that from well 6 
will be sent directly to town in exchange. As it is daily and has a bigger capacity (60 l/s 
compared to 38l/s for well 1), this will avoid having to resort to alternated schedules and 
guarantee the water arrives faster to all.  
In the two villages where water is insufficient, there are also plans to either build a new tank 
(in La Laja) or enlarge the current one (in Aguacate).  
Like all such public works (such as the rehabilitation of streets for example, which is quite a 
common sight in El Grullo), the municipal service in charge can ask the neighbourhood to 
participate financially (the work is conditioned to their paying 20% of the cost)56. In El 
Grullo, this is particularly important for the various services as they are separated from the 
municipal treasury and really need the extra financial resources. 
In La Laja, in order to increase the pressure with which the water is distributed, a tank will 
be built just above from the crossroads. But according to the water board director, the 
situation is blocked by the fact those from the higher zone and the back have not paid, under 
the influence of a policeman living in the neighbourhood. When I suggested that perhaps 
some don’t want to pay until they see the actual water come to their house, he replied that if 
they do not pay they cannot expect to require anything.  
Indeed several arguments were presented when I realised my interviews with households in 
the village:  
                                                     
55 It is important to recall 2006 was an election year at federal but also municipal level, thus the numerous projects 
that are advertised, even though they will perhaps not be achieved in their announced deadline. 
56 At the beginning of the 1980s the government of De La Madrid established such financial participation, 
sometimes replaced by workforce, to reduce the paternalistic tradition maintained until then (Luis Manuel 
Martínez, personal communication). 
 189
- “Until they build the new tank, I will not pay the MXN 380, I want to see the tank 
finished first. I offered to have it built in my property, which is the highest up, below the 
road to Guadalajara, but the ones from the street below are afraid that we will drink it all 
up, so they didn’t agree”. 
- “In my house we paid for the new tank but not all did, as MXN 350 per family can be 
quite expensive for some”. 
 
Even if they inverted the schedule of distribution throughout the day (something we 
suggested as it appeared more logical to start with those from the high street as those from 
the low street would automatically get a bit more pressure due to the difference in level 
between the two), they still need a tank to store the water for the current population. If after 
that it still does not arrive with sufficient pressure, perhaps they will re-pump it for 
distribution (instead of distribute it simply by gravity).  
In Aguacate, the problem is similar: those from the higher zone do not receive enough water 
because the village developed towards the irrigation canal situated next to the tank (see map 
in Chapter 3), as a result of which the new houses are higher than the tank. 
In this case the tank is planned to being extended, although here again it is not clear as to 
when this will materialize: “They came to ask us for cooperación (MXN 200 per house, with 
the municipality completing the other half) to extend the tank, a task already planned for 1st 
October 2005, date which has already gone by…”. 
 
Installing meters 
According to the reform of the Law on National Waters, in Mexico the users are supposed to 
set up a meter in their water source, in order to implement the consumer pays principle. The 
fact very few comply with this reflects a certain lack of will to change their habits and 
participate in bringing up solutions to the problems (Guerrero, 2004). 
In El Grullo, municipal personnel are aware that there is a need for metering as providing 
incentives to avoid wasting water57 (Tanaka, 2002).  
                                                     
57 Meters could also help resolve the conflict regarding the quantity of water received by each locality from the 
Manantlán system, as they would enable to know exactly how much water each community consumes and make 
them pay correspondingly (Angel Aguirre, personal communication).   
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In 2003, the director of El Grullo’s water board mentioned that the year after they wished to 
install meters in the municipal capital for those households that agree to pay for the meter 
and its installation (e.g. those that think they pay more than they receive).  
Indeed, although the former mayor recognized that the fact people do not get water 
everyday makes them a bit more aware of the need to be careful (“People start to think about 
it only once they miss it”), educating the population to avoid such waste was his second 
priority58, not made any easier by the absence of meters.  
The water board directors concur on the importance of such education: “We have the 
quantity of water we need. But unfortunately we have a very bad culture, and don’t know 
how to use this vital resource. Because if we were conscious, we would only use it for human 
uses and we would be fine. Whereas lots of people use it to water their plants and gardens, 
give water to the livestock…” (Manuel Marquez Calbán). This is the case even though the 
law prohibits such uses of the public water: People must have their own wells for such 
purposes, there is control and sanctions” (Sergio Llamas Gutiérrez).  
Along with that of meters, the issue of waste was thus one I raised during my interviews 
with the households, to have their side of the story and see whether they thought they (or 
their neighbours) wasted water, and what types of water uses they considered as waste. 
 
Waste habits 
Three quarters replied that they themselves do not waste, several explaining they use 
another source of water (mainly the well) to water the street or the garden: “No, we take care 
of it. I water my garden with the water from the washing machine. Perhaps if one wastes, 
another doesn’t have any water left” (household in Cerrito). 
Less than one sixth recognises they do waste water, in which case this varies in equal 
proportion between: watering the street (household in Aguacate: “Yes, of course we waste it 
to water the street, but do we have an option? Many cars go by and with the earthen streets, 
this makes lots of dust), the garden (household in San Pedro: “Yes, for the garden, I use 2.5 
hours per day”) or leaving the tap open (household in Cerrito: “Sometimes we go out and 
forget to close the water, then it overflows the washing-house”). 
                                                     
58 The first priority was to supply water to all daily (Armando Nuñez Ramos, personal communication).  
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   Image 41: A common practice: watering the street to keep the dust down 
 
 
The question regarding waste habits seems more easily to answered when asked about the 
neighbours59: the proportion of those who think their neighbours waste water is very close to 
those who don’t (around one third in each case)60, e.g. twice the proportion of those who 
think they waste water themselves.  
Those who consider their neighbours waste water mention this is a relatively frequent 
problem. In La Laja: “The majority do”. In the other two villages, in addition to watering the 
street, certain rural specificities appear: “Many of them give potable water to their livestock” 
(Puerta del Barro); “I know of 3 neighbours who have both a connection and a well, and put 
the water from the system into the well to make the water better, but they will never admit 
that to you […] In addition to the fact those with wells also use water from the system, is the 
fact some people fill up tanks with the same water, to supply their livestock with it” 
(Aguacate).  
In town it is mostly to water the street: “The street is paved, they water it every 2-3 days to 
keep the dust low. In the centre they do it more every day, so they fill the washing-houses 
and leave the tap open” (Del Alamo); for the garden: “Behind they have a hose which is 
always open to water the garden” (Oriente); or by leaving the tap open: “One [neighbour] 
does waste it because she leaves her tap open all day, as she works far away” (Cerrito). San 
Pedro is the only neighbourhood where nobody considers their neighbour wastes the water 
                                                     
59 A colleague had recommended diverting the question, as it enables to capture the interviewee’s previously 
developed typology of his neighbours’ practices, and smoothens the dialogue in case of sensitive issues. 
Nonetheless, I also encountered situations where it was clear that some people felt ill at ease –perhaps as if I was 
asking them to denounce their neighbours- so that might have introduced a bias in their answers. This reflects the 
importance of formulating questions in the most neutral possible way. 
60 The last third were not asked. 
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(which could confirm an inverse correlation between the quantity of water available and the 
care taken not to waste it).  
 
Preference fee versus meter 
According to the water board, the solution to such waste would be to set up meters, but they 
are convinced the population does not want this. According to my interviews, this is far from 
being true. 
Table 7: Preference fee or meter according to locality 
 La Laja Puerta 
del Barro 
Aguacate San Pedro Del 
Alamo 
Cerrito Oriente Total % 
With 
connection 
9 5 6 6 29 16 6 77 100% 
Preference 
fee 
- 2 - - 6 4 1 13 17% 
Preference 
equal 
- 2 - 1 - - - 3 4% 
Preference 
meter 
3 - 4 2 13 5 3  30 39% 
Preference 
qualified  
- - 1 2 3 3 - 9 11.5% 
Does not 
know 
- - 1 - 5 3 - 9 11.5% 
Preference 
not asked 
6 1 - 1 2 1 2 13 17% 
 
 
The meter seems twice as much popular on average (almost 40%, to which must be added 
most of those with a qualified opinion61 -e.g. a good additional 10%- and this is without 
counting those 17% that were not asked their preference), compared to 17% only in favour of 
the fee. The only exception is in Puerta del Barro, where the fee is preferred. 
Those who prefer meters put forward three main reasons:  
- For a majority, this would reduce the waste of water, which is common according to 
them: “Maybe a meter would be better, because one would try not to use so much; now, 
one just wastes it without thinking” (household in Cerrito).  
                                                     
61 Generally in favour of the meter but cautious with regards to the expenses it would entail compared to the fee.  
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- For some, a meter would enable to be charged for the quantity of water one actually uses: 
“A meter would be better because some people use more water, but we all pay the same 
fee” (household in Del Alamo). 
- For others, meters might lead to service improvement: “If there were meters, at least 
perhaps they would try to offer a service. Because now, there is no water, but still one has 
to pay for it, or one has already paid for it for the whole year. The person in charge of 
receiving the money doesn’t solve the problems” (household in Aguacate). 
 
Those with a qualified point of view usually recognise that water is wasted and that meters 
would be better; on the other hand they prefer to maintain a status quo, especially in terms of 
costs: “It would be good to have a meter, because it would make people more conscious 
about the water, on the condition that it be at a reasonable price” (household in Cerrito).  
As for those in favour of keeping the actual fee system, their reasoning mainly revolves 
around two quite different points of view that have in common the desire to avoid paying 
more: 
- Half of them are wary of the meter’s bad reputation, according to which meters make you 
pay even when you do not use the water (a rumour perhaps spread by those with relatives 
living in big cities like Guadalajara, which are currently the only places with meters): “The 
meter is worse because with the pressure from the air, it keeps on counting, this is what they 
say” (household in Del Alamo).  
- A fourth of the fee proponents want to avoid having to pay proportionally to the quantity 
of water they use: “We prefer to pay with the fixed fee because with the meter it would be 
like electricity: the more we use it, the more we have to pay” (household in Puerta del Barro).  
- The remaining fourth did not give any explanation.  
 
So perhaps it is not so much that the households do not want a meter than the fact they do 
not want to (or cannot) pay for it, as well as its installation. Among the few households who 
were asked about their willingness to pay62, some mentioned they would be willing to pay 
partially, but would like to be supported for the costs (MXN 600, i.e. the weekly salary of a 
daily worker in the fields).   
                                                     
62 This question was not asked in a very thorough way as after a few interviews, reactions led us to think perhaps 
people were feeling as if the results would then be used by the municipal water board to force them to pay for the 
meter, according to their positive answers.  
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In addition to this financial constraint, two other conditions need to be fulfilled before water 
meters can be installed: having a good pressure, and clean water. For the time being, the 
water pressure is that obtained by gravity. As for the water quality, neither are there filters 
for the water coming from the Manantlán stream, nor are the storage tanks clean, which 
would risk blocking the meters and preventing them from working correctly63 (Angel 
Aguirre, personal communication). 
 
Public water service quality  
After some interviews regarding this question of fee versus meter, I started asking myself 
whether there seemed to be any direct link between the preferences expressed and the 
quantity of water actually received (or what I hereafter call the “water service quality”). To 
check whether this was indeed the case or a totally wrong intuition, I first needed to 
determine how to describe such a “water service quality”.  
It seemed this could be expressed by the relationship between a household’s opinion of the 
service and the service’s characteristics (frequency, hours and pressure).  
Before anything else, a simple query was made regarding opinions by locality64. In general, 
the opinion of the water service is more positive (61%) than otherwise, especially taking into 
account the fact those with a qualified opinion (14%) mainly answered positively65. 
Nonetheless, the extent of such a position varies greatly between the localities. In Puerta del 
Barro, the only village with water daily, the opinion is 100% positive. In San Pedro, Del 
Alamo and Cerrito, two-thirds are positive, frequently putting forward the historical 
evolution:  
- “Now it is better, before (more than 4 years ago) there was frequently not enough, there 
wasn’t any water on Mondays and Fridays” (San Pedro);  
- ”Since I have been living in this house [1 year], the service has been much better. I used to 
live in the same street and before it used to go missing for weeks, now there is water 
almost all the time” (Del Alamo);  
- “Well yes, because before we didn’t have any, when we arrived here, we had to go to the 
irrigation canal [which passes behind the hill]” (Cerrito). 
 
                                                     
63 This could perhaps be an element of explanation giving reason to those who are suspicious of the meters’ 
technical reliability.  
64 Only those households with a connection to the public water service were asked their opinion about it.   
65 An opinion was considered as qualified when the reply was either: “Yes, but…” or “ I think so” or “No, but…”. 
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The opinion is only 50% positive in the villages of La Laja and Aguacate, highly correlated 
with the service variations between those located higher or lower:  
- Household in La Laja: “There is not enough in the high street, and when the pump breaks 
down, the person in charge gives the preference to those on the lower street: they get 
water from 07-13h (i.e. 6 hours) and supposedly those on the higher street should get it 
for 6 hours from then, until 7 pm. But sometimes it only arrives at 3 or 4 pm and then is 
cut at 7 pm anyway, or even at 5pm and we did not have time to do the washing and fill 
the containers”.  
- Household in Aguacate: “As far as I am concerned, yes, but when I see the situation of 
those living ‘higher’, no”. 
 
Finally, only one sixth of the opinions are positive in Oriente, where the process of water and 
sewage connections is still ongoing: “No, because if there were water more regularly we 
wouldn’t need to plan everything according to when the water comes or not, and with the 
water from the well, the washing is not as well done”. 
 
The query was then refined, by adding the element of service characteristics66 (see table 8):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66 In the software Atlas t.i., that meant making a query by locality, then searching for those with a tap water 
connection and a positive opinion (for example), and then counting which ones among these had water daily, five 
days a week, etc. 
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Table 8: Opinion according to water service frequency, hours or pressure 
Frequency of public water service Opinion Locality67 Number 
of 
house-
holds 
Daily 5 days 
a 
week 
3-5 days 
≥6hrs or 
good 
pressure 
3-5 days 
but no 
details 
on hrs/ 
pressure 
3-5 days 
<6hrs or 
feeble 
pressure 
 Less 
than 
3 
days 
Not 
known 
LL 5 - - 4 - 1 - - 
PB 5 5 - - - - - - 
AG 3 3 - - - - - - 
SP 4 3 1 - - - - - 
AL 19 4 10 - 1 1 - 3 
CE 10 1 - 4 4 - 1 - 
Positive  
 
Total: 47 
OR 1 - - - - - 1 - 
LL - - - - - - - - 
PB - - - - - - - - 
AG - - - - - - - - 
SP 1 1 - - - - - - 
AL 6 - 2 2 1 - - 1 
CE 2 - 1 1 - - - - 
Nuanced  
 
Total: 11 
OR 2 - - - - - 2 - 
LL 3 - - 1 - 2 - - 
PB - - - - - - - - 
AG 3 2 - - - - 1 - 
SP 1 - 1 - - - - - 
AL 4 - 1 - - - 1 2 
CE 3 - - - - - 3 - 
Negative  
 
Total: 17 
OR 3 - - - - - 3 - 
LL 1 - - 1 - - - - 
PB - - - - - - - - 
AG - - - - - - - - 
SP - - - - - - - - 
AL - - - - - - - - 
CE 1 - - - 1 - - - 
Not 
asked 
 
Total: 2 
OR         
 
 
The results enable to establish a sort of threshold to see what a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ water service 
corresponds to. Without counting those who did not specify their frequency sufficiently to be 
relevant (corresponding to the columns “3-5 days but no details on hrs/pressure” and “Not 
known”), we find that: 
                                                     
67 Each locality is coded through its initials (LL: La Laja; PB: Puerta del Barro; AG: Aguacate; SP: San Pedro; AL: 
Del Alamo; CE: Cerrito; OR: Oriente).  
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- Out of the 39 corresponding positive opinions, 35 (e.g. 90%) are from households 
receiving water either daily or 5 days a week or 3-5 days with more than 6 hours or a 
good pressure (inside the greyish area in the top-middle part).  
- Conversely, out of the 15 corresponding negative opinions, 10 (e.g. 67%) receive water 
less than that (either 3-5 days less than 6 hours or a feeble pressure, either less than 3 
days) (inside the greyish area in the lower right hand-side).  
 
When investigating more in detail, several other tendencies stand out: 
- Those with a positive opinion despite a relatively poor water service always mentioned 
either an alternative source of water (River or well) or a storage practice enabling them to 
face the situation: “Yes [I have a wash-house] and containers that I fill for the afternoon 
and the following day. But to wash the clothes I go to the River” (household in La Laja). 
- Similarly, those with a negative opinion in spite of receiving water relatively frequently 
always explain their dissatisfaction by very few hours of service or a weak pressure, or a 
problem linked to storage facilities (a weak pressure prevents from storing water or they 
have no storage facility like a tank or wash-house, or it leaks): “There isn’t sufficient 
pressure for the water to go up to a tank, and this is the case for all living starting the 
street Miguel de la Madrid. So I have two jerricans for the bathroom. From the tap I have 
a hose. Also when there is no water, there is a tap in the street in front of the church 
where there is water” (household in Aguacate with water daily).  
 
Interestingly, most of those with a nuanced opinion are also households with relatively lots 
of water, pointing out either a specific problem such as the fact the system breaks down 
regularly once a year, or that there is not always water, or that it is thanks to their 
organisation (either storage practices, either well) that they are satisfied: “Well, yes, 
organising ourselves we don’t lack water, right?” (household in Del Alamo who stores water 
in the washing house, which is then pumped up to a tank for the bathroom). Two exceptions 
stand out in Oriente, where the interviewees have water less than 3 days a week, one having 
a particularly comprehensive point of view: “It seems little 2 days a week, but this is a 
problem the majority of municipalities have around here, and other neighbourhoods have a 
better service. We organise ourselves with storage facilities”. 
So the satisfaction seems to depend on both the frequency of the water service and the 
storage practices or alternative to other water sources.  
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Paying mechanism preferences according to water service: results 
A more complex query within the same elements enabled to refine these results, showing the 
link between these preferences and the quality of the water service. Such a quality depends 
on the frequency per week, number of hours per day and/or pressure of the tap water, and 
categories were established between a ‘good’ service (either water daily, 5 times a week or 3-
5 times a week for more than 12 hours) and a ‘bad’ one (either water 3-5 times a week less 
than 12 hours, or less than 3 times a week).  
According to such a threshold distinguishing the service quality, we then confronted our 
premise according to which those with a good service would tend to be in favour of the fee, 
while those with a bad one would prefer the meter.  
Table 9: Preference fee or meter according to service quality 
 La 
Laja 
Puerta del 
Barro 
Aguacate San 
Pedro 
Del 
Alamo 
Cerrito Oriente Total % 
WITH 
connection 
9 5 6 6 29 16 6 77  
Preference 
fee 
 
- 2  - - 60 4 1 13:  
- 9 good  
- 2 bad  
- 2 ND68 
100%: 
- 70% 
- 15% 
- 15% 
Preference 
equal 
- 2 - 1 - - - 3:  
- 3 good  
100% 
Preference 
meter 
 
 
3 - 4 2 13 5 3  30: 
- 17 good  
- 7 bad 
- 6 ND 
100%: 
- 57% 
- 23% 
- 20% 
Preference 
nuanced 
- - 1 2 3 3 - 9:  
- 6 good  
- 2 bad 
- 1 ND 
100% 
- 67% 
- 22% 
- 11% 
Does not 
know 
- - 1 - 5 3 - 9: 
- 6 good  
- 1 bad  
- 2 ND 
100% 
- 67% 
- 11% 
- 22% 
Preference 
not asked 
6 1 - 1 2 1 2 13: 
- 6 good  
- 6 bad  
- 1 ND 
100% 
- 46% 
- 46% 
- 8% 
 
 
We were right to a certain extent only. Although those in favour of the fee largely tend to 
have a relatively good water service (70%), the opposite is not automatically true. More than 
half (57%) of those in favour of the meter have a good service quality while less than a 
quarter (23%) have a bad one.  
                                                     
68 ND stands for “Not determined” and encompasses all cases where the frequency was not sufficiently detailed. 
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It is nonetheless important to mention that almost 40% of those with a poor service quality 
prefer the meter, e.g. twice as much as the fee. Further, those with a bad service tend to be 
under-represented, as only a third were asked their preference (the question was particularly 
omitted in La Laja, where the service tends to be rather poor). 
 
   Table 10: Preference fee or meter according to service quality 
Number of households 
(77 with connection) 
Service quality Preference Proportion 
(%) 
Fee: 9 19%  
Equal: 3 6% 
Meter: 17 36% 
Nuanced: 6 13% 
Does not know: 6  13% 
47 Good 
Not asked: 6  13% 
Fee: 2 11% 
Equal: - - 
Meter: 7 39% 
Nuanced: 2 11% 
Does not know: 1 6% 
18 Bad 
Not asked: 6 33% 
Fee: 2 17% 
Equal: -  - 
Meter: 6 50% 
Nuanced: 1 8% 
Does not know: 2  17% 
12 Service not 
determined 
Not asked: 1 8% 
 
A possible explanation could be that the meter has the favour of both those with a poor 
water service, who wish to pay according to their modest water consumption and make 
those that waste change their attitudes, and those which have a good service but are aware of 
the problem of water waste, either for other users or regarding the resource in general.  
This reveals a rather good conscious about the problem of wasting water, contrary to what 
many officials think. Indeed, these tend to highlight a lack of ‘water culture’ (understood as 
resources’ conservation and efficient use), which is now an official programme of the CNA69.  
There is also the need to consider the fact that some with a ‘good service’ (specifically in 
Aguacate) have water only a few hours each day and usually with a very weak pressure, so 
it is quite normal that they should favour the meter as well70.  
                                                     
69 But as highlighted by Walsh (2004), this is often to cover the unsustainable system they have set up, without 
recognising the sustainability of numerous water cultures already existing.   
 200
Further, 67% of those with a qualified opinion have a good service. This is not very 
surprising as the qualified opinions tend to be in favour of the meters, but do not want to 
increase their expenses: we can assume that the meter is not as vital for them as it is for those 
with a poor service, or that they are perhaps less environmentally conscious or financially 
comfortable than those with a good service and in favour of the meter. 
So it seems to us that if the water board really wishes to install water meters, it should not be 
so difficult to do – due to this rather important water consciousness- provided it explores 
alternatives enabling to share the costs of the meters and their installation. 
 
A public-private partnership for municipal wastewater treatment? 
The last type of initiative undertaken by the municipality concerns the well being of both 
downstream communities and the surrounding ecosystem, as it involves stopping the 
discharge of 30 l/s71 of untreated wastewaters into the Ayuquila River.  
Indeed, since 1996 and like other towns and cities of more than 20.000 inhabitants, El Grullo 
is under the obligation to have an operating treatment plant –the deadline was end of 200572 
(SEMARNAT, 1996). As Autlán more or less complied with its obligation73, El Grullo remains 
the major public pollutant in the region of study.  
But the municipality refuses to build a classic treatment plant like the one in Autlán because 
of the corresponding operating costs: it wants to develop a long-lasting solution (Martínez et 
al., 2005).  Indeed, for a town the size of El Grullo, the corresponding yearly operating costs 
would revolve around MXN 1.2 million, e.g. a big part of the municipality’s total annual 
investment budget in municipal services (MXN 2 million)74. As the law does not include any 
financial support to help cover such costs –while State and federal support can be obtained 
to build the plant- the municipality has studied various other options which might have 
expensive construction costs but low maintenance ones.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
70 This would probably not had been the case had we refined our table even more, in order to show the opinions 
according to the specific number of hours or water pressure of those which receive water daily. 
71 This is an average figure, as the volume varies greatly according to the time of the day and the season.  
72 Until then, the General Law for Environmental Protection and Ecology Equilibrium had only targeted large 
cities and those bordering the U.S.A. (Martínez et al., 2000). Urban centres with a population under 20,000 have 
until 2010 to comply (SEMARNAT, 1996). 
73 Although Autlán’s treatment plant has been built since March 2003, it is still not treating the wastewaters 
adequately, as the University of Guadalajara’s regular water quality monitoring shows. In addition to a problem 
with the filters, the fact that wastewater and stormwater are not separated creates an additional burden and 
lowers the treatment effectiveness (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
74 The total budget revolves around MXN 25 million (Manuel Martes Calbán, personal communication). 
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In 2003, El Grullo’s preference was for a constructed wetland. Feasibility studies showed that 
the chosen location site (near Tempisque) was adequate and that building and maintenance 
costs would be much lower than those of a traditional plant. But this option requires 
overcoming a major problem, which is that of finding sufficient land to build the plant in a 
medium-term perspective (15-20 years): up to now, only 1.5 ha is available, so negotiations 
are taking place to be able to complete with the additional 18.5 ha required. Although they 
are concentrating on lands with no agricultural value, they have encountered a strong 
resistance, one strategy being to increase the price to a level the municipality cannot afford 
(MXN 300,000/ha, which would require close to MXN 6 million).  
The former municipal president thought the fideicomiso (the financial set up of the inter-
municipal initiative, presented in the next section) could play an important role in this, by 
financially supporting the municipality75 (Armando Nuñez Ramos, personal 
communication). The option of municipal pre-emption (expropriation) for public utility 
constructions is one that is carefully avoided, due to the unpopularity of the measure76.  
If this land issue were to be solved, a possible solution could then be met as a public-private 
partnership is under negotiation, in accordance with the Jalisco Water Law for the State and 
its Municipalities that enables municipalities to devolve the water and sanitation service to 
the private sector (Tanaka, 2002). This Build-Operate-Transfer agreement would entail the 
building of a constructed wetland and its operation during 20 years by Lemna International, 
an American firm from Minneapolis. This would represent a substantial saving for the 
municipality as building costs represent MXN 50-70 million, while operating the concession 
for 20 years, MXN 1.2 million per year77. The private company plans to recover its 
investment by selling the treated water, either for irrigation or urban uses (municipal 
gardens) according to the quality obtained, thus enabling to free the corresponding amount 
of water for irrigation or public uses.  
Another option would be to use the topography and the drainage canals, and make the 
water decant before it reaches the River: “According to all the information they have, [the 
team of the watershed commission working on this topic] will present us a proposal. Each 
municipality has different conditions: in El Grullo, there is a natural drainage along 5 km, 
before joining another drainage and then reaching the River […]: along this drainage of 4-5 
km, the solids in the wastewater reduce, and the water oxygenates…so after these 4-5 km, 
                                                     
75 Although he was cautious as he knew it is not meant to finance the municipalities’ legal obligations. 
76 The typical counter-example given to illustrate this was that of V. Fox’s government’s awkward manoeuvre in 
2001-2002 to offer a ridiculous compensation to buy lands and build a second airport near Mexico City, a project 
that has been abandoned due to resistance of land-owners.  
77 But the firm can also decide to undertake only the operational aspect, in which case the municipality would 
have to support the building costs. This would be possible only through a CNA loan, or if the State of Jalisco 
agrees to advance the money it allocates the municipality each year.  
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the water is potable! […] We have been counselled to take advantage of this condition to 
have a cheaper and more ecological treatment system, which would not generate so many 
operative costs […]. Some of them counselled us to plant some species of trees, to absorb, 
retain the solids” (Antonio Mendoza Olivares, personal communication). The problem is this 
approach would fill the drainage and make the aquifer level rise, which would have negative 
impacts as it has lots of salts (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication).  
As highlighted by the current water board director, the problem is that in three years’ time 
(e.g. the length of a municipal mandate) it is impossible to start putting in place activities 
related to a wastewater treatment plant, which require a much longer time frame. As 
resumed by the current mayor: “The idea is to have this proposal for the treatment plant 
ready this year, it is one of the priorities, to leave it for the following administration”. 
As the operations of the treatment plant had not started by 2005, El Grullo should be paying 
a fine to the CNA, proportionate to the volume of wastewaters78. Nothing has been paid so 
far, because according to the water board director, they were about to start building the plant 
last year, when the Chiapas was hit by a hurricane (so the State and federal government sent 
the planned resources there instead)79. 
                                                     
78 Like most municipalities in its case, El Grullo is indebted towards the CNA, as it has not paid the fee 
corresponding to its discharges. But even if the CNA sends fines to the municipalities, these do not pay them on 
account of a past system which proved counter-productive: they prefer to invest in their infrastructure directly 
(Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
79 The CNA takes into account the efforts undertaken by the municipalities when it calculates their debt (Juan de 
Dios Martinez, chief of district 94 at the regional agency).  
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2. Engaging in IWRM institutions 
In this second section, we analyse El Grullo’s involvement in regional initiatives established 
to implement IWRM (watershed coordination bodies or municipal associations).  
As highlighted by Álvaro Garnes Díaz, Treasurer of Autlán municipality: “It is part of the 
charge of the municipal president, it is neither compulsory nor voluntary: the municipal 
presidents need to participate in different projects that have an impact at the regional level, 
not only at the scale of their municipality”. 
The information is thus organised around two main regional initiatives in which El Grullo 
participates, and is based mainly on interviews held with key stakeholders participating in 
both: municipal presidents or their representatives from five municipalities (Unión de Tula, 
Autlán, El Grullo, El Limón and Tuxcacuesco, staff from the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed 
Commission or researchers participating as civil society.  
The first sub-section presents the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission, its 
organisational set-up, achievements and the criticisms it is subjected to. The second sub-
section focuses on the inter-municipal initiative, and follows the same structure.  
 
a. The Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission  
Organisational set-up 
History 
In the Ayuquila-Armería watershed, the problem that led to the creation of the Ayuquila-
Armería Watershed Commission1 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Commission’) was not one of 
water scarcity or difficult access, but of contamination (Martínez et al., 2005). As seen in 
Chapter 3, the upper part of the River corresponding to the Ayuquila portion, had been 
structurally contaminated by the Ingenio Melchor Ocampo sugar refinery, as well as raw 
wastewater discharges by the towns of Autlán and El Grullo. This had severely impacted 
human health and biodiversity since the beginning of the 1980s. But it was the specific 
molasses accident on 28th of March 1998 that sparked off an important social mobilisation, 
                                                 
1 Although the Ayuquila-Armería is a watershed, a commission was created (instead of a council) because the 
future structure of a council was already planned at the time: the Centre Pacific Coast Council will be at the level 
of the State of Colima, and integrate the three commissions for the three watersheds it includes. 
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leading to the creation of the Commission2 (Martínez et al., 2002b). Although its creation had 
already been solicited and symbolically announced the previous year, in the framework of 
the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve’s ten-year anniversary (DRBSM and IMECBIO, 
2001), the spill accelerated the course of things. To respond to the citizen uprising which 
grouped riparian communities living downstream –in both Jalisco and Colima States- the 
CNA created the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission on October 15, 1998.  
It is to be a coordination and negotiation platform bringing together stakeholders with one 
common objective: to improve the state of the watershed.  
 
Members and meetings 
The Commission is composed of representatives from the CNA, the States of Jalisco and 
Colima and six water uses3 (agriculture, aquaculture, public and urban, industrial, services, 
livestock-raising). More precisely, its 19 members are made up of two presidents (the 
constitutional governors of both States), a honorary president (the managing director of the 
CNA), a technical secretary (the regional manager of the CNA for the Lerma-Santiago 
Pacífico region4), two governmental representatives (one from the Ministry of Rural 
Development for Colima, and one from the CEAS in Jalisco), the head of the Commission’s 
management board, and 12 user representatives (one for each use in each State) (see annex 
14). The governmental representatives are constant functions, while the users must elect their 
representatives. Decisions are approved by vote (by a majority). 
Also invited to attend the meetings (but without right to vote) are all the governmental 
dependencies, at federal level (CNA, SEMARNAT, SAGARPA, SEDESOL, CONAFOR, 
PROFEPA) and State level (Urban and rural development agencies, Ministry of Public 
Education, Ministry of Health), as well as the municipal presidents or their representatives, 
universities, higher education institutes and NGOs.  
The Commission started operating in 2000, and has since held sessions once every two 
months more or less (according to the progression of the working groups), officially set in 
alternating municipalities in the two states, for integration’s sake5. 
                                                 
2 In that sense we can almost say that the spill was positive, as it triggered a process of consultation and planning 
in the watershed, which might evolve into something more effectively participatory (Luis Manuel Martínez, 
personal communication).  
3 These are identified as the main water uses by the 2002 Law on National Waters. 
4 He will be the president of the future watershed organism.  
5 In practice this is not always the case, among other things because of the costs such sessions would impose to 
small municipalities.  
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The Commission has four annex working groups, which provide support for specific themes, 
each focusing on one of the watershed’s main problems:  
- Lack of water availability, with demand higher than supply in the high part of the 
watershed, and balanced in the lower part (Working Group Water planning); 
- High contamination due to three sources: the wastewater discharges, weak 
management of solid waste, and excessive use of agrochemicals (WG Sanitation); 
- Loss of forest cover due to urbanisation and increase in land use for livestock-raising 
and extensive agriculture, which leads to less rain, erosion and river contamination 
(WG IWRM); 
- Problem of practices, lack of culture with regard to water and forests (WG Culture). 
It seems there is a difference of implication between the two States, both in meetings as well 
as implementation of concrete actions. For example, Colima is much more active in terms of 
promoting water efficiency, as it is located downstream and thus depends on how those in 
Jalisco manage the water (Colima is located downstream from all three watersheds it is part 
of, which explains why the watershed organism will have its headquarters there). This also 
played a role in the establishment of the Commission’s management board.  
 
Financing and operating 
As the Watershed Commission has no juridical personality, it cannot manage finances, nor 
have a staff, nor sign agreements. This is why it created a management board (in October 
2004), to provide technical and administrative support to the Commission, as well as follow-
up on the agreements signed between its members. It was an experimental initiative as it was 
the first such board to be created at national level6, the objective being to generalize this to all 
watershed organisations. 
Appointed by the state governor of Colima and with headquarters in the homonymous state 
capital7, the Commission’s management board is in charge of planning water use at the scale 
of the watershed. As such, it is a major actor in preventing future conflicts between the two 
States (Martínez et al., 2005). Indeed, Colima is anxious about the fact the Autlán-El Grullo 
irrigation district is expanding,8 as well as being technically equipped to use water more 
                                                 
6 This was because the conditions were adequate, as the Commission was working in a very regular way 
(Arnoldo Vogel, personal communication). 
7 This location was decided on common agreement between the two States (for Colima, this watershed is the most 
important, so the stakes are higher than for Jalisco, where it is the second most important watershed) (Arnoldo 
Vogel, personal communication).   
8 Currently only 12,000 ha in the valley are irrigated, while 6,000 more are already planned to be included in the 
municipality of Autlán by extending the irrigation canals.  
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efficiently, because part of the extra water9 Colima gets, provides from the irrigation returns 
into the River. 
To finance its operations, the management board was first to resort to a fiduciary fund 
supplied by the federal and state governments10. Other possible financial sources include the 
CNA regional office and the FIDERCO (Fiduciary Fund for the Development of the Central 
Occidental Region), which finances regional projects in environmental and natural resources’ 
conservation. 
 
Achievements 
Interviewees coincide in that the relationships between the various stakeholders 
participating in the meetings are harmonious, and this is highlighted as being one of the 
greatest achievements of the Commission by the head of its management board. The fact the 
watershed is only shared by two states should indeed be a strength, compared to other 
bigger such institutions, like in the Lerma Chapala watershed (Arnoldo Vogel, personal 
communication).  
Indeed, the Commission has enabled to reinforce the links between Jalisco and Colima, 
enabling each state to see itself as part of a whole: “I think that the principal success of the 
watershed commission is to put us all together, all the participants, all the water users, and 
get us to accept that we are all part of the same watershed, which we can decide to either 
take care of, or destroy” (Álvaro Garnes Díaz, Autlán municipality Treasurer).  
 
Hereafter we briefly present the achievements of each working group. 
Working Group on Water planning 
One of the first working groups to be created (in 2001), it is working on the update of a water 
balance and availability study in surface water financed by the CNA11. The previous study 
showed that the five upstream sub-watersheds in Jalisco are in deficit, while that in Colima is 
still in balance, although tending towards deficit. This is because Colima receives more 
recharge –62% of the total- and is more urban than Jalisco, so it also uses more groundwater 
                                                 
9 In addition to its concessions from the Basilio Badillo dam on the Tuxcacuesco River. 
10 But this option proved too expensive, so now they have a common account (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal 
communication). 
11 Published in 2001 and covering the period 1960-1997. 
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than surface water. Such results led the CNA to decide not to attribute any new water 
concessions (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication).   
The update, which covers the period 1960-2004, will probably not differ much. As the water 
demand has not increased (since no new concessions can be attributed), the results are 
explained by a deficit in rainfall (Arnoldo Vogel, personal communication).  
The working group’s other major product has been the update of the inventory of water 
concessions in irrigation units in four municipalities (two in Jalisco, two in Colima)12. By 
confronting the information from different sources – on one hand, the Public Register of 
Water Rights (REPDA), i.e. the CNA’s official inventory, on the other hand the local uses 
witnessed by the Centres of Support for Rural Development, located in the field- the 
outcomes show that only 60% of actual water concessions have officially been registered 
(both for surface and groundwater).   
This is because when the CNA was created in 1989, nothing was specified with regards to 
whom would be in charge of these small irrigation units, and no staff was available to 
follow-up either. So be it surface or groundwater, many users did not ask for a concession. In 
the case of groundwater, individual wells were bore by the users without the CNA’s help, so 
these are solely responsible of not having asked for permission and being registered, while in 
terms of surface water the responsibility is shared, because in most cases the CNA had built 
the small dams used to store the water (Paula Silva, personal communication).  
The possibility of regularization was in general declined, as many unregistered users feared 
being fined. The consequent status quo might lead the CNA to act as if there is 
corresponding water availability – attributing concessions even though the corresponding 
water is being used- that might, in turn, lead to social conflicts. In order to prevent such 
conflicts, one of the Commission’s objectives is going to be to base its decisions on the actual 
quantities of water used and devise a strategy for a more effective regularisation of non-
registered users (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication).  
The working group’s hopes are that the CNA integrate this updated database into the 
REPDA, but nothing is guaranteed, as it has not been formally recognised13. Indeed they also 
think such an update is important for IWRM, as knowing the total quantity of water being 
used is insufficient: there is also a need to identify the main users and enable them to feel 
recognised as part of the watershed (Paula Silva, personal communication). 
 
                                                 
12 Similar updates are taking place in three other municipalities.  
13 For the current update of the water availability balance for example, it is compulsory, by Law, to use the 
REPDA only, so the deficit observed by the working group will not appear. 
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Working Group on Sanitation  
Also created in 2001, this group focuses on treating the wastewaters, a priority for 
governments at local, state and federal level 14 (Ávalos Verdugo, 2005a). Indeed most 
municipalities crossed by the River Ayuquila-Armería (18 in Jalisco, 6 in Colima) discharge 
their wastewaters into it and increasingly feel the pressure to comply with the law 
prohibiting such practices.  
Studies show that to treat all wastewater still lacking treatment in the watershed (e.g. 1,508 
l/s out of a total of 1,853 l/s of wastewater produced by both urban and rural areas, e.g. towns 
and villages), there is an investment need of MXN 114 million for those in Jalisco and MXN 
319.6 million for Colima.  
A study was undertaken to identify which kind of treatment plant each municipality should 
set up (Martínez et al., 2005). In 2005, representatives of the working group visited the main 
towns –including El Grullo- and discharging points in the watershed. They decided to keep 
only nine monitoring sites out of the 15 initial (in the State of Jalisco: the Corcovado, El 
Aguacate, the Tuxcacuesco River before its confluence with the Ayuquila and the Ayuquila 
after the confluence) (Ávalos Verdugo, 2005b).  
For example in El Grullo it should be a constructed wetland with mechanic airing, to avoid 
requiring too much surface (14 ha will be necessary for 800 l/s of wastewaters): “It is like a 
consulting agency, giving us recommendations with regards to the project for the 
wastewater treatment” (Manuel Martes Calbán, current director water board of El Grullo).  
As a result, the Governor of the State of Colima has invested in a wastewater treatment plant 
to treat the wastewaters from the conurbation Colima-Villa de Álvarez, until now discharged 
in the Armería (Ibáñez Lopez, 2005). 
In addition, a project to monitor the quality of the River for heavy metals and agrochemicals 
was to be realised in 2006. 
 
Working group on Integrated Management of the watershed 
It emerged in 2002, because of observed land use dynamics (loss of forest cover due to the 
extension of the agropastoral frontier and of urbanisation, or activities leading to the 
Tuxcacuesco River’s sedimentation). These result not only in loss of biodiversity and 
                                                 
14 Only 27% of wastewaters in the watershed are treated.  
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deterioration of the ecosystems but also in creating an unbalance in the local hydrological 
cycle, leading to less rain (Comisión de Cuenca del Río Ayuquila-Armería, 2005). 
Emphasizing that the watershed could not be reduced to water resources only, the working 
group explores dimensions ignored by the two previous ones: how to increase the water 
recharge (by promoting efficiency and avoiding deforestation), to obtain more water for 
irrigation in order for farmers to agree to leave more water in the River for the natural 
systems; and a broader understanding of the processes leading to the River contamination, in 
particular agrochemicals that had been ignored until then. Its topic being integration –
between water, forests, soil, biodiversity- it is the working group which keeps all the others 
focused and linked (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication).  
Coordinated by the two representatives of the SEMARNAT in Colima and Jalisco since 
200215, it is composed of various representatives of state dependencies as well as universities, 
the Commission’s management board and the inter-municipal initiative, through the 
Biosphere Reserve Directorship and the MABIO Foundation16.  
In April 2006, having finished drafting the terms of reference of a plan for the integrated 
management of the watershed, the working group was going to submit it to the various 
actors of the watershed to check whether it adequately reflects their points of view17 (Tania 
Román Guzmán, personal communication).  
The plan’s three phases consist of: first, the description of the actual state of the natural 
resources, socio-demography and economic activities of the territory. From this database, 
areas under pressure that require protection as well as environmental conflicts will then be 
identified with specific analytical maps (such as the water demand per sector, quality of 
water and sources of contamination, conflicts of use, basic services’ coverage in households, 
etc.). Finally, in a third step, priority areas will be defined, as well as proposals to solve the 
issues they are confronted with.  
This was realised among other things through contacts with the National Institute of Ecology 
in Mexico City (and in particular Helena Cotler, the person in charge of the integrated 
management of watersheds), entailing visits on both sides and counselling with regards to 
the management plan18. So with respect to integrated water resources management, the 
                                                 
15 The idea is to have a representative from each state for each entity, when possible.  
16 In addition to the Ministry of Environment and the University of Guadalajara, these latter three conform the 
planning group that defined the programme’s terms of reference.  
17 Similar workshops were already held in 2004-2005 to identify the main problems, their causes and solutions. 
18 Although at the beginning of the process, the other working groups were doubtful on the integrated 
management working group’s capacity, and thus asked for such federal support, their participation at the 4th 
World Water Forum in March 2006 enabled them to realise they were on the right track and gain trust from the 
other working groups (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication). 
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process was far from being a top-down one, diffused at national level by the CNA – on the 
contrary, the CNA has always been quite resistant to topics other than water resources. For 
this working group, the definition of IWRM is thus not specifically that promoted by the 
Global Water Partnership19, although it does express the same spirit in different words: “It is 
being aware of the interactions occurring through the management of the territory, of the 
interactions between water, vegetation, soil, and human beings inside the limits of a certain 
territory” (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication). According to the head of the 
Commission’s management board, the tri-partite definition of the Global Water Partnership 
“is nothing different than harmonizing the objectives of all in favour of one unique: enable 
the watershed to continue providing environmental goods and services […] and it is this 
plan that will give us the orientation for that, the integration, articulation, union that we 
need to coincide all together”.  
But from a management plan, that for the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed switched to being a 
strategic plan, e.g. describing the situation, the actions lines and priority locations, without 
defining implementation procedures as well:  “This is what we want, that is stays at this level 
of generality, as an orientation. Why? Because we saw that the watershed is not an 
operational scale, at least the watershed taken in its whole territory. The proof was given to 
us by the work realised by the Inter-municipal initiative, which managed to do a quantity of 
things with a level of detail that would have been very costly to implement at the scale of the 
watershed. So we said: ‘No, we do our macro plan, and implement it through the 
municipalities, the inter-municipal initiatives, regions of the watershed, according to their 
situation of the moment’” (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication).  
This is thus justified by the higher degree and more detailed knowledge of inter-municipal 
platforms with respect to the problems: “You plan and define priorities at the level of the 
watershed commission, but you act and make them operational at the level of municipalities 
or micro-watersheds. At the level of municipality associations –one municipality alone 
cannot do anything- we see it as very feasible and it has to be reinforced, because that is 
where the possibility to solve the problems is, as that is where they hurt first and foremost. 
They must thus be included in the process of elaboration of the management plan” (Tania 
Román Guzmán, personal communication). 
The working group is now identifying priorities for investment –which studies need to be 
undertaken to complement what already exists- to guarantee continuity in the financial 
support it receives (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
                                                 
19 The GWP does not work with the CNA, but with the IMTA (the Mexican Institute of Water Technology, a State-
owned organisation coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources); in fact Mexico is not 
one of the GWP’s member countries because of the resistance of other countries in the region (Alan Hall, Global 
Water Partnership, personal communication). 
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Working Group on Water and forest culture  
The last working group to be created (in 2003) is in charge of information diffusion about the 
watershed (through various media), while also being the focal contact in the commission.   
As part of promoting water culture, they are encouraging the implementation of the user-
pays principle. The objective is to motivate people to use new irrigation techniques, such as 
drip irrigation, supported by the program Alliance for the countryside (financed by the 
federal and state governments) (Ibáñez Lopez, 2005). Indeed, most irrigation systems in 
irrigation units are inefficient, because canals, either earthen or made out of sand, tend to 
lose a lot of water. They are trying to cement these canals or diffuse pressurized irrigation. 
 
Challenges 
The difficulties faced by the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission coincide with those 
of other watershed commissions or councils throughout the country.  
 
Absence of coordination between different sectors using water 
Although water management responsibilities are shared between municipalities or water 
users’ associations in the case of irrigation districts, the CNA does not encourage any wide 
discussions between the different sectors, as it prefers to manage everything directly on a 
one-to-one basis. So despite the set up of the Commission to provide a platform for 
discussions, management is still very much sector-based20: “And what’s more: the CNA does 
not want that to change. For example, allocation of concessions are not discussed widely, the 
CNA is the only one to decide” (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication).  
Another example illustrating the lack of willingness to discuss issues openly was the fact it 
was not the CNA which called for an extraordinary session of the Commission, when in 
March 2006, the sugarcane factory was found guilty of having discharged its wastewaters 
into the River during one whole day, on the contrary: “The CNA came to sample the water 
five days later…by then the contamination had disappeared of course. …We have to fight 
the CNA so that they fight those who contaminate!” (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal 
communication). 
                                                 
20 Contrary to the cases seen in Chapter 2, where several institutions are in charge – leading to conflicts regarding limits 
of responsibility- one institution does not guarantee any more an integrated water resources management, as it can lead 
to even more sector-by-sector management by preventing negotiations.  
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The event was bound to happen21, as the agreement with the ejido Las Paredes had been 
terminated without the factory setting up any alternative system22. The very important load 
in organic material the discharge led to caused oxygen depletion and the death of fish on 10 
km (see annex 15). The IMECBIO researchers happened to be monitoring the River, and 
confronted the factory, which called for an extraordinary session of the Commission. The 
researchers hoped it would force the IMO to react and take its responsibility to avoid such 
further events in the future, by finally building its treatment plant (something it has been 
delaying since 1998, when they had helped set up a provisional agreement with the ejido Las 
Paredes). According to Tania Román Guzmán, coordinator of the IWRM working group, this 
event represents the Commission’s “ordeal by fire”: the Commission’s institutions need to be 
stricter. The problem being that the sugarcane factory, owned by ZUCARMEX, one of the 
main sugar producers in Mexico, is very strong both economically and politically.  
 
Images 42 and 43: Extraordinary session of the  
Commission in April 2006 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 It represents the “chronicle of an announced discharge”, as described ironically by Sergio Graf, Director of 
MABIO Foundation.  
22 The ejido did not want to receive the factory’s wastewaters for irrigation purposes anymore, as it was replacing 
its canals by tubes, in the framework of the ongoing modernisation programme in the valley. 
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Lack of inclusion of resources other than water 
Like watershed councils on a bigger scale, Commissions like the one for the Ayuquila-
Armería have the objective of providing a more integrated management of natural resources 
in the area they cover. But focused on water planning, the Commission was not endowed 
with such a vision (Martínez et al., 2002; Graf et al., 2003). At the start, its only preoccupation 
was supplying water for irrigation in the two states, the important elements being the dams 
and the irrigation districts: “This is why is was useful that the working group on IWRM was 
created, even though it has only drafted the terms of reference of the management plan up 
till now, due to insufficient financial resources to do anything else” (Luis Manuel Martínez, 
personal communication). 
Another element illustrating the fact resources other than water are not much taken into 
account is that ecological uses of water have not yet been identified among the most 
important uses, thus requiring a user representative. This will nevertheless come into effect 
once the regulation of the law is published, and it is the president of the inter-municipal 
initiative who will occupy that function (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
It is in this context that researchers from the IMECBIO are working on setting up minimum 
environmental flows, by realizing a historical analysis of the River flows23, to restore its 
natural flow. Indeed, at the time of the building of the dams, the concept of environmental 
flows did not exist (according to some, they have not been necessary due to the recharge of 
the River by irrigation return flows, nonetheless these are bound to decrease with the 
expansion of the irrigation district in Autlán). Nevertheless the CNA is planning to keep 5-
10% for biodiversity needs, based on a study undertaken by the IMTA24, but this is 
dependent on regulation’s publication. 
So meanwhile, the abrupt variations in the water flow due to dams and derivation systems 
for irrigation provoke the opposite result than natural variations would: during the dry 
season there is more water (water being released from the dams to irrigate) than during the 
rainy season (when water is on the contrary stored in the dams).  
For example, in the case of the Autlán-El Grullo valley, during the dry season (from 
November to May), i.e. when the crops need to be irrigated, water is released from the 
Tacotán and Trigomil dams, and “canalised” through the Ayuquila River. When it reaches 
the El Corcovado diversion station with a flow of 10m3/s, it is diverted through two main 
canals, one towards Autlán, the other towards El Grullo and El Limón. This reduces the river 
flow volume by 97% on average, resulting in a dried up riverbed along a portion of 3 to 5 
                                                 
23 By comparing the flow for each season before and after the building of the Tacotán and Trigomil dams. 
24 According to Dr. Martínez, the regional expert, this figure is not based on any preliminary scientific study. 
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km. Then with irrigation return flows and sewage waters from Autlán and El Grullo, the 
riverbed fills back up, reaching five m3/s at Palo Blanco and eight m3/s at Aguacate. On the 
contrary, during the rainy season –from June to October- there is no irrigation and no use of 
water by the sugarcane factory, but the flow is not very important either before the Autlán 
sewage discharge, because of water storage in the Trigomil Dam (to prepare the future 
irrigation season) (Martínez, 2003).   
These totally artificial processes affect the River’s biodiversity, a typical example being the 
shrimps that regularly die due to the drying up of the River during the dry season, when 
they migrate. This happens both in the Ayuquila and the Armería Rivers. 
 
  Image 44: Dried up River after Corcovado in Jalisco 
 
 
 
Image 45: Bridge over the Armería River in Colima 
 
  Source: Tania Roman Guzmán, SEMARNAT-Colima 
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In order to calculate the minimum environmental flows that would be required to avoid such 
problems, the IMECBIO team is also working with a Mexican Long Term Ecological 
Network initiated by the UNAM, to determine the water needs of different ecosystems 
(River, forests...). Indeed, as highlighted by Niasse et al (2004), it is frequently the 
informational gaps linked to ecosystem water needs that lead to bypassing the 
environmental dimension in the holistic approach of IWRM. 
 
Low degree of participation in watershed management 
Like all other watershed councils or commissions in Mexico, the Ayuquila-Armería 
Watershed Commission is criticised for the feeble participation of the multiple social actors 
present on the corresponding territory. 
This is due, on the one hand, to a very restrictive admission. Only the six identified water 
users have a right to vote, while fishermen are ignored25. Similarly, “water producers”, as 
Martínez et al. (2005) call the landowners situated in the upper part of the watershed, are not 
considered either in the management process (this is officially justified by the fact only water 
users are considered).  
Further, civil society participation is very low as well, as neither universities, nor 
municipalities, public nor private organisations have a right to vote (although they have a 
right to talk):  
“I have concentrated on the inter-municipal initiative, because in the Commission I know 
that I can’t obtain more concessions, I know I have no right to vote, there are lots of 
reasons…so I can’t stop working on important things for the municipality to just go and 
listen. […] There is a good participation but not many outcomes. […] There are good 
intentions, but there is a lot of conformity, nothing much can be done, […] there is not much 
room for change” (Jaime Almaráz Garibay, municipal president of Tuxcacuesco).   
“As a municipality, one can go, but you seldom have a right to speak. You just attend, you 
listen because you aren’t part of it like them. They just invite you because you are a 
municipality part of the watershed. And well, when you ask for it, yes, they give you the 
right to speak, but more than anything you go to be aware of what is going on in the 
Commission” (Ernesto Guerrero García, general secretary of Unión de Tula municipality).  
Three other reasons explain why participation of users or municipalities (or both) is feeble.  
                                                 
25 According to the head of the Commission’s management board, they are barely starting to ask to be included, 
but they are frequently organised in fishing groups, which should help to elect a representative.  
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The first is a lack of communication. Municipalities located in the upper part of the 
watershed (in the Sierra de Quila and Sierra de Tapalpa) are not even aware of the 
Commission’s existence. Its meetings have been attended only by the representatives of two 
municipalities, Autlán and El Grullo, which are both regional leaders (respectively for the 
region of the South and the region Sierra de Amula), so they have more financial resources 
for that and in addition have been sensitised to the importance of the Commission through 
the inter-municipal initiative.  
The second factor has to do with logistics: the fact the watershed involves two states makes it 
more complicated in terms of administration. This is true both to elect user representatives –
the users fail to organise themselves for this purpose, so these are usually designed by the 
CNA26- or to attend the Commission’s meetings. These take place alternatively either in 
Colima (in the cities of Colima or Comala) or Jalisco (in Autlán or El Grullo), which entails 
important travelling costs for those users who do not have the budget for it –e.g. all, apart 
from the Water Users’ Association: “All municipalities of the watershed are invited, and 
have a right to attend. But when the meetings are held in Colima, the distance is what 
explains that many municipalities don’t go (they don’t even send anyone), in addition to the 
many engagements we already have” (Ernesto Guerrero García, general secretary of Unión 
de Tula municipality).  
Indeed, time-wise, municipal presidents also rarely have the freedom to participate to all the 
meetings they are invited to: they attend the Commission’s meeting when these take place in 
their municipality, otherwise they give priority to those where they can negotiate financial 
resources for their municipality27. Another option being to send the deputy: “There has been 
a slowing down in the municipal participation: when they are first elected they have to go, to 
get to know the Commission better, and to get known as well, but then when they really start 
to implement their municipal programmes, they don’t have enough time to go and send the 
deputy representative instead”. For example, in this Commission, Autlán’s municipal 
president is the representative of urban use for the municipalities of the State of Jalisco, but it 
is essentially El Grullo’s water board director who has participated in the meetings 
(replacing his municipal president, the deputy for such uses).  
Finally, a third factor is the fact that up to now, the users who have participated have not 
seen any effective benefit resulting from their attendance28: like in other such commissions or 
                                                 
26 In the particular case of the urban users, it is very complex to get the 20 municipal presidents from the State of 
Jalisco to meet to elect a representative (it is already difficult with the ten participating in the inter-municipal 
initiative!) (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
27 In some cases meetings dealing with natural resources can also bring them financial resources.  
28 And unless this changes, they will continue to consider such meetings as a waste of time (Luis Manuel 
Martínez, personal communication). 
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councils, the participatory component of the meetings is more a question of formal 
consultation than of real decision-making (Martínez et al., 2002b).   
Indeed, during the watershed council meetings, no discussion takes place around what the 
priorities of the watershed are, although officially, each working group presents their project 
and corresponding budget, and the Commission presents these projects and asks the 
different institutions for corresponding resources. In practice, decisions related to 
investments are usually made prior to the meetings, by the actual decision-makers –the 
abundant representatives coming from the CNA, central agencies or State authorities (Luis 
Manuel Martínez, personal communication). These decisions are simply announced during 
the meeting, and in any case, these institutions have the power to influence the vote with 
respect to investment decisions. By disregarding so openly the very principle of participation 
the Commission is supposed to encourage, the CNA reveals the little importance it gives to 
such institutions, considered little more than its appendixes. The watershed’s future 
management plan should enable to counter this, by canalising financial resources where the 
watershed’s actual priority needs are (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
The situation is of course even worse for those without right to vote, like the municipalities:  
The working groups should communicate more with the municipalities, because the 
municipality knows the water issue very well: “Although we have received invitations, the 
truth is we have had little motivation to go: ‘Ah… an invitation from the watershed. I go, I 
listen, and the truth is that they talk about themes I don’t even know about and that have no 
implication for my municipality. The only theme for me that is a problem is that of 
wastewater treatment and they haven’t given much follow-up, so this doesn’t interest me 
much […] They need to involve the municipalities more, motivate them…show us that our 
problem is being solved” (Ernesto Guerrero García, general secretary of Unión de Tula 
municipality).  
This situation is supposed to change with the innovations brought by the reform to the 
Water Law in 2004. It is expected to reinforce user participation (reaching a minimum of 50% 
of attendees) and lower that of governmental representatives, from the three levels (to a 
maximum of 35% of participants). More municipal participation is expected as the 
municipalities are going to have both right to speak and vote (in watershed commission and 
councils), while they are also going to be part of the future watershed organisms, through the 
consultative council. These watershed councils are going to be a way to suppress some of the 
sub-directories of the CNA, centralized in Mexico, as they will be established on a regional 
basis, enabling better and faster results than the ones we have now (Arnoldo Vogel, personal 
communication). Further, non-governmental actors will be given the right to participate and 
vote (it is through this category that the inter-municipal initiative hopes to be able to 
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participate onwards, as for the time being it had obtained a right to speak and vote, as 
representative of ecological uses under the scheme in place prior to the reform).  
 
Absence of real independence of watershed councils from the CNA 
As clearly illustrated by the way decisions are taken during the meetings, the Commission is 
a medium for discussions where agreements of good faith are signed, but which has no real 
decision power as such. The fact it has no say in the way water is allocated is the utmost 
proof of this: “Due to the hierarchy, those which are the representatives of the States, the 
CNA, the CEAS, can have more decision-making power, they say: ‘I can obtain this or 
that’”(Manuel Martes Calbán, director of El Grullo water board).  
Another deficiency of the Commission is the fact that it drastically lacks in human, material 
and financial resources.  
“The Commission…needs to undertake more studies. […] I know they lack financial 
resources, so that complicates things a little. We have visited watersheds in the USA where 
the management is totally different and in Canada as well. They exploit the watershed for 
tourism, agriculture, to supply domestic water in cities, and they have a lot of money, so this 
helps to have a very good management” (Jaime Almaráz Garibay, Municipal president of 
Tuxcacuesco).29 
They have many problems to finance their operations, as the budget they have to negotiate 
each year enables to cover the salaries of the management board employees, its operational 
costs and the studies they have contracted, but it barely leaves anything else to operate. 
There is a lot of competition for the financial resources attributed by the various 
dependencies that participate in the Commission, so they need to promote the watershed’s 
problems. 
Since 2004, the yearly budget reached MXN 1 million: the CNA transfers MXN 500,000, 
matched by the two states’ MXN 250,000 each. But the money arrives late (in April 2006 it 
had still not arrived for the coming year from the CNA, which mainly invests in the Lerma-
Chapala watershed) and is insufficient. 
                                                 
29 Every three years, as part of the ’initiation’ of the newly elected municipal presidents, the Inter-municipal 
Initiative finances trips to visit inter-municipal activities in both Canadian and American watersheds, to observe 
the different options in place related to local watershed management, which include mechanisms for solid waste 
recycling, water treatment at different scales, institutional linkages, citizen participation and protected areas 
(Graf et al., 2006).  
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They hope that with the future change in the structure of the CNA, once the watershed 
organism exists (in Guadalajara), there will be no need to go ask the CNA’s offices in Mexico 
City. It should be easier to obtain more, and thus contract other persons to undertake the 
studies (Arnoldo Vogel, personal communication).  
 
b. The Inter-municipal Initiative for the Integrated Management of the Ayuquila River 
Basin 
Organisational set-up 
History 
In 2001, the weak capacity demonstrated by the Commission to respond to municipal 
priorities (in particular the restoration of the River quality) led to the creation of another 
regional governance mechanism for environmental management30 (Graf et. al., 2006).  
Acknowledging the importance of including municipal governments and developing inter-
municipal networks in the framework of watershed management – in particular between 
municipalities sharing the same ecological and socio-economic issues (Martínez et al., 2005; 
Martínez et al., 2002b)- the Inter-municipal Initiative for the Integrated Management of the 
Ayuquila River Basin (hereafter the Inter-municipal Initiative) was created on 25 July, 200131. 
Such an institutional platform for discussion and decision-making resulted from a workshop 
held at the IMECBIO to support regional development, and was jointly developed with the 
Directorate of the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve. It results from a ten-year process 
of trust building among the stakeholders in the region (Martínez et al., 2005; DRBSM and 
IMECBIO, 2001). El Grullo played an active role in its informal consolidation, as it was there 
that the programme on solid waste separation was initiated and that the researchers from the 
University lived. It has since maintained this position of regional leader (along with Autlán), 
stimulating other smaller municipalities to join in.  
The idea of the inter-municipal collaboration is to explore how to incorporate various 
elements for an integrated management on a portion of the watershed (Graf et al., 1996). 
Coordinated actions are to increase their efficiency, by enabling more results with less 
investment for each municipality. The objective is to incorporate sustainability criteria in 
                                                 
30 The Commission’s priority was the distribution of irrigation water between the states of Jalisco and Colima, and 
did not address the river pollution, which was the local population’s priority (Graf et al., 2006).  
31 It was originally called the “Local initiative for an integrated management of the lower Ayuquila watershed”, as 
these municipalities are all located in the medium part of the Ayuquila-Armería watershed, which corresponds to 
the lower part of the Ayuquila watershed. 
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local governmental planning: emphasis is placed on sound environmental planning in order 
to improve the life standards in the basin, while increasing the productive capacity of the 
natural resources in order help municipalities in their task and develop a more participative 
management of natural resources (DRBSM and IMECBIO, 2001; Graf et. al., 2003). 
Its six specific objectives are to:  
- Improve the living conditions of the local population, through an adequate 
environmental management that increases the productive capacity of the natural 
resources in the Ayuquila watershed; 
- Promote the conservation, restoration, and sustainable use of water, soils, forests and 
biodiversity in the Ayuquila watershed; 
- Strengthen the institutional capacities of the municipal governments and of the local 
citizen organisations and academic institutions for an integrated management of the 
Ayuquila watershed; 
- Support the coordinated participation of the three levels of government and local 
actors for an integrated management of the Ayuquila watershed; 
- Stimulate processes of environmental education that enable the adequate public 
participation in the management of the Ayuquila watershed; 
- Manage the links with governmental and non-governmental instances of local, 
national and international level, for economic and other types of support for the 
projects of integrated management of the Ayuquila watershed (IIGICRA, 2003).  
 
Members and meetings 
Originally grouping eight municipalities (Unión de Tula, Autlán, El Grullo, El Limón, 
Tonaya, Tuxcacuesco, Tolimán and Zapotitlán de Vadillo), the Inter-municipal initiative 
currently convenes two more (Ejutla and San Gabriel), all part of the Ayuquila watershed, i.e. 
in the State of Jalisco (see map 25). Also participating are representatives from the federal 
government, such as the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve and the Jalisco State Rural 
Development Secretariat, academic institutions like the IMECBIO, and a local NGO, the 
Manantlán Foundation for the Biodiversity of Western Mexico (Graf et al., 2006). These 14 
members whom compose the technical committee have a right to speak and vote, and hold 
meetings every month approximately32. They are in charge of defining the Initiative’s long-
term strategy, deciding on priority actions and evaluating their implementation.  
                                                 
32 The President of the initiative is supposed to change every six months, but it lasts on average a year to follow-
up the activities. 
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The fact the representatives from the University of Guadalajara, the Sierra de Manantlán 
Biosphere Reserve and the MABIO Foundation participate in the Commission’s meetings as 
well as in those of the Inter-municipal Initiative, might explain why small municipalities part 
of the Initiative do not feel the necessity to go to the Commission’s meetings (in addition to 
their financial restrictions or their lack of motivation to go). These three major actors indeed 
tend to act in the benefit of the municipalities during these meetings, while also giving them 
feedback of the Commission’s meetings during the Initiative’s meetings: 
“The Commission played an important role, helped us embark on many problems that we 
needed to solve, but the most direct way to do it is through those from MABIO, the SMBR 
and the UdG, who participate in the Commission, they are our spokesmen (and have vote), 
because they know our issues, and they give us follow-up, they have helped us to inform the 
Commission of what is going on in our municipalities. If they didn’t participate, there 
wouldn’t be any benefit for the municipalities. As they are both part of the Commission and 
the Initiative, they know us well, and then we are informed of what is going on in the 
Commission” (Ernesto Guerrero García, General Secretary of Unión de Tula). 
Map 25: The 10 municipalities part of the Inter-Municipal Initiative cover the medium part  
of the Ayuquila-Armería watershed 
 
 
Ayuquila-Armería 
watershed 
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In addition to these 14 members, any other organisation can participate in the meetings, 
although without right to vote. This is the case of the head of the Ayuquila-Armería 
Watershed Commission’s management board (the Initiative has been formally accepted as 
part of the Commission).  
Among the various national and international collaborators the Inter-municipal Initiative 
counts are the Universities of Wisconsin (USA) and Guelph (Canada), as well as the Credit 
Valley Watershed Authority from Ontario.  
 
Financing and operating 
Financially speaking, working on a regional basis through an inter-municipal agreement has 
two advantages: on one hand, it enables to capture more support and financial resources, on 
the other it enables to realise much more, with reduced costs for each municipality33 (Luis 
Manuel Martínez, personal communication). 
So to finance the very specific priorities identified by the participating municipalities, a trust 
fund was set up one year after its creation, with the support of the federal and state 
governments and the municipalities, which contribute an equal amount each (25% of what 
they receive back) (IIGICRA, 2004). It has increased each year, starting off with MXN 1 
million (USD 100,000) in 2003 to reach MXN 4 million (USD 400,000) in 2006 (Graf et al., 
2006). 
Each municipality receives the same amount back for its specific uses in its municipality, but 
part of the money is spent on collective expenses. For example, in 2005, each municipality 
put in MXN 20,000 and received MXN 80,000 back to reinforce its infrastructures, while 
MXN 700,000 were spent on the Geographical Information System, environmental education, 
anti-fire brigades, for all ten municipalities. 
In addition, if one specific municipality is impacting all the others, it is also possible to 
concentrate resources to help it resolve the issue: “They will try and resolve the problems of 
the involved municipalities in an upstream-downstream way, starting with Unión de Tula’s 
problem with solid waste and wastewaters, then Autlán’s, and so on. Of course, in practice it 
might not be possible to follow exactly the order of the municipalities from upstream to 
downstream, because of political problems impeding an upstream municipality to undertake 
                                                 
33 For example, in 2006 all municipalities belonging to the Initiative have contributed to contract two anti-fire 
brigades, which go where is needed in the ten municipalities (something the municipalities alone could probably 
not finance, especially the small ones). 
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what it wants (such as buying land for the constructed wetland in El Grullo)” (Armando 
Nuñez Ramos, former municipal president of El Grullo).  
Preference has been given to those polluting more and impacting those downstream: “Here 
MXN 12-15 millions more are necessary to finish the constructed wetlands and we don’t 
have the money. This was discussed in the meetings of the Inter-municipal Initiative and the 
Commission, but Autlán was helped first even though Unión de Tula is more upstream, 
because Autlán is bigger and pollutes more (Ernesto Guerrero García, General Secretary of 
Unión de Tula municipality).  
 
Achievements 
According to the interviewed municipal presidents or their representatives, the Inter-
municipal Initiative is very successful, and has generated very important results for the 
region. It provokes enthusiasm, illustrated by a high rate of participation among them. 
The results range from improvements in the Ayuquila River quality, the implementation of 
municipal solid waste separation and recycling programmes, greater citizen awareness and 
implication through environmental education programmes, as well as information made 
available regarding environmental and socio-economic links (Graf et al., 2006).  
“As the name shows, it was an initiative of the people, but supported by the institutions, 
especially, in the first phases, by the SMBR and the UdG. And although it has suffered a 
series of…let’s say, attacks…the results are really impressive, for those who lived and knew 
the problems, there are huge changes! Personally, I am very lucky because I have seen the 
River when it was clean, when it got contaminated and now that it is clean again” (Daniel 
Ramírez Sánchez, municipal president of El Limón). Previously, the River was indeed 
comparable to a ‘wastewater canal’ (Martínez et al., 2005). 
“It is an interesting success…it is a group of municipalities preoccupied by the health of the 
Ayuquila River. And they have managed to realise quite interesting things, because if the 
State Congress is supporting us financially –and increasingly- this means that there are 
results, doesn’t it?” (Antonio Mendoza Olivares, municipal president of El Grullo). 
The first priority themes were the Ayuquila River quality, and solid waste management. In 
March 2003 a workshop was held during which the 8 municipal presidents agreed that the 
issue of solid waste management was the most urgent to be dealt with, and it came out of the 
studies used for this workshop that in all the municipalities, on average 50% of the solid 
waste is organic, e.g. can be used by the municipalities for compost, whereas 24% is 
recyclable (9% cardboard, 8% plastic, 6% glass and 1% steel). 
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  Image 46: Workshop on solid waste  
  management in 2003 
 
  Source: IMECBIO 
This topic was chosen because it was one where there were already some advances that 
could be shown (the separation programme in El Grullo started in 1994), to encourage more 
participation from other municipalities (and avoid making the same mistakes34).  
“This year [2003] the municipalities will spend MXN 65,000 to rehabilitate their centres to 
store separated solid waste (except for Autlán whose centre is already modernized, with a 
cement ground). They need to do this to show something concrete to the municipal 
counsellors, so that they see that the fund is worth the effort” (Armando Nuñez Ramos, 
former municipal president of El Grullo). 
“We perceive [the financial support] more [than that of the Commission] because 
municipalities receive direct financial support. Probably the Commission manages more 
money, of course, also because the States are there, but as a municipality you receive more, 
even if it is little, it represents more, because the Commission doesn’t give you financial 
resources. For instance they have received money to build their separation centre for solid 
waste and prepare a truck for the collection, and consulting to restore a site. This does not 
interest the Commission as much, as they are more interested by water and wastewaters” 
(Ernesto Guerrero García, General Secretary of Unión de Tula municipality).  
A certain asymmetry has emerged, regarding the municipalities’ implications in the two 
themes:  “For El Grullo and Autlán, the River is a recreational area, whereas more 
downstream the communities are much more dependent on the River, for them it is an area 
vital for their survival. So the value of the River is not the same: upstream they are more 
active with regards to the solid waste, while downstream they are more active with respect 
to the River contamination35” (Sergio Graf, personal communication).  
                                                 
34 For example, in El Grullo, the fact of giving out little presents to encourage household separation of solid waste 
will not be replicated in the other municipalities due to the abuses this led to.   
35 Even though the production of solid waste is of the same type, with similar consumption trends such as soft 
drinks, which produce a lot of plastic bottles (Sergio Graf, personal communication). 
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With regards to environmental education, some highlight changes of attitude in terms of 
awareness, of collaboration  
Six strategic actions have been identified at a workshop: spatial planning, public 
participation, strengthening the institutional capacity of local government, solid waste 
management, restoration of the headwaters of the Ayuquila watershed and environmental 
conservation in the upper part of the basin (Graf et al., 2006). Now that the initiative has 
been reinforced, the theme of water has started to be incorporated as well36.   
Among the activities planned for 2005 were:  
- Database on land use changes and capacity-building for each municipality; 
- Public awareness through the development of a web page for the initiative, the 
creation of a citizen council (a technical group that will be part of the municipalities 
without changing with electoral changes) and the programme of environmental 
education based on various media (visits to schools, radio emissions, songs, theatre, 
regional art contest, etc.);  
- Better institutional capacity in the municipalities through their regulatory and 
legislative frameworks (design of environmental programs for each municipality, 
enhance the regulations (ecological regulations, to have the same context for all), 
workshop on strategic environmental planning, workshop on new legislative 
framework for water and watershed;  
- Reduction of water contamination and further river health activities and restoration 
of the Ayuquila riverbed (diagnosis on the municipal water and sanitation system in 
the municipalities which mostly contaminate e.g. Autlán, El Grullo and Tonaya) and 
supervise the payment of taxes by the sugarcane factory.  
- Correct management of the solid waste (improve the waste collection centres in 
Autlán and El Grullo, provide basic equipment for those in Tonaya and Toliman, and 
build such centres in Tuxcacuesco, El Limón, Zapotitlán de Vadillo and Unión de 
Tula). 
- Prevent forest fires and promote the Programme on Payment for environmental 
services as an incentive to protect the forests.  
- Integrate new municipalities in the initiative and the trust fund: those of Ejutla and 
San Gabriel (IIGICRA, 2005) 
The link between the Inter-municipal Initiative and the Watershed Commission is quite 
positive as well:  “Now it is very good because there is starting to be a link between a higher 
territorial scale, and a more operational and functional one, and we need to reinforce this 
                                                 
36 For example, in 2006 a study was led to assess the coverage of water and sanitation service in the watershed, 
and efforts made to have municipalities consider water as a human right, to guarantee its supply in small 
communities (Graf et al, 206). 
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relation. How? By getting the 14 institutions from the two States and part of the Commission 
to support the Inter-municipal Initiative, answering its questions, looking for financial 
resources or ideas and by communicating information. At the beginning the two were 
without any interaction, now they have both seen that it is possible to work together “(Tania 
Román Guzmán, personal communication). 
“There is mutual support, we share information, capacity building workshops. I feel the 
Initiative is part of the team. They already have numerous successes and for us this is very 
positive, as the more they take care of the water upstream, the more water we have here 
downstream. So we see it as something necessary, important, that we must support” 
(Arnoldo Vogel, head of the Commission’s management board). 
Illustrative of such concrete beneficial processes it helped implement, in 2005 the Initiative 
won a prize at national level37 that distinguished five finalists out of 440 environmental 
projects, which should help bring more money in addition to more recognition: “An 
interesting aspect of the Inter-municipal Initiative is that they are starting to be known 
throughout the country: in July 2005 municipal presidents from Yucatán State came to visit, 
and then they went to visit in exchange, and in February of this year people from Sinaloa 
State came to our last meeting to see how it works. The initiative has helped make our 
experience be known. And the prize will help to diffuse this” (Álvaro Garnes Díaz, Treasurer 
of Autlán municipality). 
 
Challenges  
Despite all these very positive results, the Inter-municipal Initiative is faced with several 
challenges: 
First, it must increase visibility to capture more resources. Indeed, the main weakness of the 
Initiative is that it remains highly dependent on political alliances for financial support (in 
particular at State level).  
Then, it needs to ensure continuity despite the very short three-year term municipal 
mandates, and the political changes these often lead to38.  
“The people who are behind this initiative (those from the IMECBIO) work very hard, but 
unfortunately each three years the municipal presidents go away. On the contrary, the 
former stay, give continuity to the project on a long term, so they lose a lot of time to come 
                                                 
37 The Mexican National Award for Local Government and Management (financed by the Centre for Economic 
Research and Education, along with the Ford Foundation) (Graf et al, 2006).   
38 Such changes often lead to abandoning all the projects undertaken by the past team in place (Graf et al, 2006).  
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back, raise awareness, convince again of the necessity to be part of it” (Antonio Mendoza 
Olivares, municipal president of El Grullo).  
To do so it is important to institutionalise the Initiative, so it tries to gain citizens’ 
acknowledgment of its concrete outcomes for their everyday life (as is the case with the 
programmes for solid waste separation and recycling or forest fire prevention), in order to be 
seen as a positive electoral issue by all candidates, whatever the political party. 
“[That the next municipal presidents follow in the Initiative]… this is the most difficult part. 
The better it is known, the more difficult it will be to stop it. So these days, we have to work 
to make it well known. So that if a new municipal president arrives saying: ‘I’m not 
interested’ – ‘Oh no?’ Well, the population is going to tell you differently’” (Armando Nuñez 
Ramos, personal communication).  
“With the solid waste programme in which we are already working on […] I think that with 
this, the President that will be elected [in July] will have to go on, because the population is 
already asking why we aren’t already doing this, so if they realise that this initiative will 
bring them a lot of benefits, they are going to oblige the new President, whoever he is, to 
continue” (Ernesto Guerrero García, General Secretary of Unión de Tula). 
They are careful not to interfere in the political agendas of the parties, and work with them 
only once they have won the elections (Luis Manuel Martínez, personal communication): 
“After the elections, there are meetings with the new presidents to inform them of what the 
initiative is doing, already giving them follow up. And here important is the fact the people 
working in the UdG, SMBR and MABIO don’t leave, they stay, they involve the Presidents so 
that they continue.  This is what happened to us, and they managed to capture our attention 
to continue the programme. […] In the beginning the first meetings you don’t know 
anything about it, it is a totally new issue, you don’t know what it is there for, but as they 
don’t leave you alone, they keep on inviting you, on informing you, it captures your 
attention, they keep on inviting you until you understand the ideas and suggestions, and 
then you go on, because they are truly great!” (Ernesto Guerrero García, General Secretary of 
Unión de Tula).  
Usually they try and leave the politics out of the Initiative:  
- “Here the political parties stop existing” (Daniel Ramírez Sánchez, municipal 
president of El Limón). 
- “It is something that has been working very well: there are three political parties in 
the 10 municipalities (PAN, PRI and PRD) but independently from the political 
parties, there is a good connection, a good disposition towards the others: the colours 
of the parties stays aside. […] Because in the end, we all live here, now we [the PAN] 
are here, and they [the PRI and PRD] are there, but sooner or later it will be the 
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opposite, so the relationships are going to have to go on” (Álvaro Garnes Díaz, 
Treasurer of Autlán).  
- “This is the most important: they are like one great family, uniting different parties 
through peaceful meetings and they have managed to sign agreements” (Antonio 
Mendoza Olivares, municipal president of El Grullo).  
- “It is something very interesting. Currently there are 3 political parties participating, 
through the municipal presidents involved in the Initiative, but there is a lot of 
respect, we don’t embark on political themes, there are no political interests, instead 
there is a strong support and friendship that has enabled us to coordinate with each 
other with regards to these themes and others” (Ernesto Guerrero García, General 
Secretary of Unión de Tula). 
The candidates are conscious that the environmental theme must be included more (Luis 
Manuel Martínez, personal communication). It seems they have already started to realise this 
challenge: in 2003, in spite of the change of party in five municipalities, the new mayors 
decided to pursue the implication of their predecessors in the Initiative (Graf et al., 2006): 
“It got stronger with the past administrations, and none of the current MPs hesitated about 
incorporating it, all wanted to, we all entered with a lot of enthusiasm, to give it continuity. 
And I am sure that the presidents that are going to start next year will also want to give 
continuity to this programme…Because unfortunately, in Mexico, we do not have such a 
culture: if the PRI wins, it manages its programme, then if the PAN wins, it changes it 100%. 
This is a very serious issue. On the contrary, this programme of the Inter-municipal Initiative 
has been something that has been given continuity. In the initiative, there have been 
presidents of the three most important political parties, and all three have been president of 
the initiative. And now the current candidates, those that don’t involve themselves in this 
programme, will not be supported by the population” (Daniel Ramírez Sánchez, municipal 
president of El Limón). 
But frequently it was also mentioned that a few municipalities are not very implicated: 
“Some are really not very interested in the initiative: 50% are very involved, 30% more or less 
and 20% very little” (Jaime Almaráz Garibay, municipal president of Tuxcacuesco). 
Another path currently under exploration is that aiming to increase municipal capacity 
building for environmental management, through the employment of “specialist civil 
servants without affiliation to political administrations” (Graf et al., 2006: 306). This would 
enable these to “remain in post through several successive political administrations, which 
would give continuity to public policies for environmental and natural resources 
management in each municipality” (Graf et al., 2006: 311). 
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3.  Summary of chapter  
In the first section of this chapter, we saw that municipal efforts towards an IWRM at local 
level are especially constrained by the lack of independence of municipal water boards to fix 
the water fees. This problem is at the core of the vicious circle then generated: an unbalanced 
budget prevents ensuring good maintenance and extension of the infrastructure, thus a good 
quality service. Combined with the system of payment by fee, this can result in even less cost 
recovery for the water board budget, while delaying the treatment of wastewaters which 
continue to impact downstream riparian communities and aquatic biodiversity.  
Efforts are nonetheless being undertaken at different levels to face this, either by fixing leaks, 
co-financing new tanks with communities, or setting up a public-private partnership to cover 
the operation costs of a natural treatment plant. We think the municipality’s separation of 
services from the municipal treasury plays a crucial role in encouraging the development of 
such a demand management approach (fixing leaks, metering, recycling of wastewaters) 
along with a more traditional supply-oriented one, because it seeks to suppress all un-
necessary costs more actively than if it needn’t finance its operations through its fees. 
Therefore such an administrative scheme can be seen as a stepping-stone on the path 
towards an IWRM from a local point of view, even though more decentralisation is required 
to entail substantial progress.  
In the second section, we focused on the realisations and difficulties faced by two regional 
initiatives El Grullo is part of, designed to implement an integrated water or natural 
resources management on two different scales inside the Ayuquila-Armería watershed. 
If the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission seems quite criticised for the lack of 
interest it imparts municipalities (as well as other users or the civil society), there is hope this 
might change once the reform of the National Water Law of 2004 –which recognises them as 
stakeholders- is made effective. The reform should also allow for a better inclusion of natural 
resources other than water, encouraging for instance the set up of minimum environmental 
flows in the River. Indeed, although in this respect the Commission has made progress due 
to the influence of its working group specifically dedicated to IWRM, it is still limited in the 
work it can actually carry out due to its limited financial resources. Most important, for the 
Commission to evolve towards an effective integrated management requires that it enable 
for a ‘real planning’ to take place, i.e. that decisions related to priority investments in the 
watershed be discussed between all its members, instead of being defined beforehand by the 
investing institutions as is the case today.  
As for the Inter-municipal Initiative, smaller scale and more flexible than the Commission, it 
has managed to implement more activities with effective results (a cleaner River, the 
promotion of a greater environmental awareness, the diffusion of solid waste separation and 
 230
recycling programmes among others). Closer to the municipalities’ preoccupations, it seems 
to have now gathered sufficient momentum to secure its existence in the long run, even 
though this remains one of its main challenges, due to important political turnover every 
three years in the municipalities.  
Confirming its success, it is beginning to be nationally known. Also very interesting is the 
fact the Commission, acknowledging the difficulty to implement IWRM at the scale of the 
watershed itself, has the project of replicating the Initiative’s experience so as to have four 
such municipal associations covering the watershed39, as more operational levels of 
implementation.   
Finally, we can say that both initiatives, although to different extents –both geographically 
and in-depth-wise- have enabled to set up efforts entailing an evolution from what Calvo-
Mendieta (2005) calls a ‘passive and forced upon solidarity (due to geographical proximity)’ 
to an ‘active solidarity and an organisational proximity’, allowing to better overcome interest 
conflicts with regards to water uses, and thus playing a positive role in terms of IWRM.  
                                                 
39 There would be two in the higher part (regional municipal committees have already been set up to protect the 
forests Sierra de Tapalpa and Sierra de Quila), one in the medium part (the Inter-municipal Initiative) and one 
downstream, in Colima (see map 25). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Main findings 
In this concluding chapter, we first wish to answer the questions that guided our work.  As a 
reminder, the general objective of this research was to analyse the concept of integrated 
water resources management (IWRM), in order to identify the necessary local conditions for 
its practical implementation. The guiding research questions were the following: 
Research question 1: In what respect is an IWRM innovative compared to traditional water 
management? 
Research question 2: How is the potable water management system designed in the 
municipality of El Grullo, Mexico? 
Research question 3: What are the local and necessary conditions to implement an IWRM? 
 
We first questioned the innovative components of IWRM, compared to traditional water 
management. In Chapter 1, we presented an overview of the various theoretical approaches 
to IWRM, designed to overcome the problems of water management that have led to the 
global water crisis we are faced with today, by being more inclusive of various water uses –
human or not. The concept’s evolution reflects that of the relationship between humankind 
and natural resources during the past century, and currently embodies the values of our 
post-industrial society: integration, participation/negotiation, awareness of limited resources 
and management.  
Despite the growing worldwide promotion of the concept, it still encounters major 
applicability problems: resistance to integration and cooperation between institutions 
maintains status quo and preserves sector-by-sector management; moreover, the 
environment is often the weak link of IWRM due to insufficient scientific knowledge 
regarding its needs in terms of water, and because of a lack of political commitment to 
undertake the necessary reforms. Indeed, the most important obstacle to implementing 
IWRM is perhaps the fact it entails making trade-offs between water for human uses or for 
the environment, hard choices which are far from the ideal conferred by its most well-known 
definition today, promoted by the Global Water Partnership. 
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Our second research question led us to investigate the public water management in the 
municipality of El Grullo.  
After having broadly presented the region of study and the municipality in Chapter 3.1, in 
Chapter 4.1, we presented this system, operated by the municipal water board, in charge of 
supplying water and sanitation to the capital town as well as the villages. In spite of being a 
municipality rich in water resources, the public water service is of very unequal quality, 
leading most households to resort to a variety of water storage practices, as well as 
alternative sources of water –like wells- whenever possible. Combined with a payment 
system of fixed water fees, the disparities between neighbourhoods in terms of frequency, 
hours and water pressure contribute to create an unfair system. As far as sanitation is 
concerned, the water board’s financial constraints and the lack of political priority attributed 
to the issue of wastewater have up to now upheld the building of a treatment plant, despite 
increasing legal pressure. Consequently, those riparian communities living downstream 
from the municipal capital’s wastewater discharge continue to be subjected to opportunity 
costs, in terms of fishing or recreational activities.         
 
Our third research question focused on defining the local and necessary conditions required 
to be able to implement an IWRM in the municipality of El Grullo.  
As highlighted in Chapter 4.1, to better implement IWRM at a local level, i.e. through its 
provision of water and sanitation services, the municipality needs to acquire more 
independence to be able to determine its water fees –with water pricing based on costs and 
not on political considerations anymore, as is the case in State Congress. But the municipal 
board’s cost-recovery will also be enhanced by pursuing the demand-oriented water 
management it has initiated: fixing leaks, metering water to entail better payment while 
encouraging a culture of payment, and eventually using recycled wastewater for municipal 
gardens.  
Chapter 4.2 illustrated what changes must be brought to the regional initiatives El Grullo is 
actively involved in, at both watershed and sub-watershed scale, to allow for an effective 
integrated water or natural resources management. First, the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed 
Commission, which during its first eight years of existence has stimulated a rather weak 
participation of users, municipalities or NGOs, must start considering these as stakeholders 
as such, instead of submitting them to a process of formal consultation only. Combined with 
insufficient financial resources and its feeble –yet growing- interest in natural resources other 
than water, it is not surprising that the Commission has not obtained many effective results 
for the time being. It is expected that the reform to the National Water Law of 2004 will 
enable to counter these obstacles to an IWRM.  
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Created in reaction as a more responsive and smaller scale set-up, the Inter-municipal 
Initiative for the Integrated Management of the Ayuquila River Basin has for its part been 
much more successful. Based on a ten-year old process of trust building in the region, it has 
generated concrete results: the River Ayuquila has regained the quality it had previous to the 
installation of the sugarcane factory in the valley (confirmed by the reappearance of a bigger 
fish population), fire brigades have been set up to fight against the yearly hazards that 
threaten the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, and each municipality is developing its 
own solid waste separation programme in the framework of regional environmental 
education activities. Illustrating the extent of its effectiveness is the fact that the Ayuquila-
Armería Watershed Commission is now exploring the possibility of replicating the 
experience in order to cover the whole watershed with such platforms, judged more 
operational to implement an IWRM. This should allow combining the advantages of both 
scales: designing a regional vision through a strategic management plan for the watershed, 
and implementing it through more flexible units. The Inter-municipal Initiative is 
nonetheless still confronted to the necessity of increasing its visibility in order to attract more 
financial resources, and of institutionalising its activities so as to guarantee their long-term 
implementation.   
The difficulties encountered by the municipality to undertake efforts towards an IWRM, at 
both local and regional level, highlight the important centralisation that still prevails in 
Mexico, despite the various decentralisation attempts to change this. Indeed, be it the potable 
water-pricing policies –prerogative of the State of Jalisco- or the lack of effective decision-
making power of participants in the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission, these 
difficulties reflect those encountered more generally throughout the country (presented in 
Chapter 2). They very clearly illustrate the resistance to change and develop more power-
sharing inside governmental institutions at state and federal level, endowed with a 
historically vertical structure, and stress the importance of reinforcing the decentralisation 
efforts initiated twenty years ago. They also highlight the centrality of politics in the reality 
of water management in Mexico, something that those promoting IWRM wish to ignore, 
preferring an unrealistic approach based on technical solutions with little political 
interference, as they already did in the 1940s1 (Mollard and Vargas, 2005b). Water has on the 
contrary become (in certain states), a political tool for state governors to acquire national 
calibre2, with water basin organisations in particular crystallizing the tensions between state 
governors or these and the water administration (Mollard and Vargas, 2004b).  
                                                 
1 It is precisely by refusing to recognise the historical reality of IWRM efforts in the country and assess the past 
errors, that the promoters of IWRM are most likely bound to repeat these (Mollard et al., 2005a). 
2 This was the case of V. Fox, former governor of the State of Guanajuato, which is part of the Lerma-Chapala 
basin. 
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The non-re-election rule for state governors also has a role to play, as it does not encourage 
any sort of long-term responsibility (Marie et al., 2005). This would be necessary for 
decisions such as an increase in water prices to be taken. Equally important to emphasise is 
the particularity of Mexican municipalities’ very short and non-renewable mandates of three 
years, which represents another obstacle to their efforts towards an IWRM at both local and 
regional level. Indeed this prevents the realisation of many activities requiring long term 
efforts, such as potable water and sanitation supply, wastewater treatment or solid waste 
management, because at best one or two years of the new team are dedicated to such works –
the rest being used for political campaigns. Further, in case of alternative political 
orientations, all previous programmes are generally abandoned to set up fresh new ones, 
and all administrative employees are changed, a drastic and very counter-productive Latin 
American specificity.  
 
Limits of the exercise 
This concluding chapter is also the opportunity to explicit certain choices made in terms of 
topic delineation or to recall the difficulties we did not manage to overcome.   
Using the lens of a municipality to approach IWRM can seem surprising, as the officially 
recognised scale of implementation is that of the watershed. Nonetheless, for practical 
reasons, it seemed more realistic to take this small-scale approach rather than undertake the 
study of the whole watershed. Personal preferences for a micro-level analysis –enabling for 
example to interview households, which would not have been possible otherwise- were also 
determinant in this decision.    
The choice of such an entry also restricted the analysis of IWRM strictly speaking, as it meant 
leaving aside one of the most important water users in the region, i.e. agriculture (some 
elements are nonetheless provided throughout Chapter 4.2).  
Finally, due to a lack of time, not all entries of the municipal theoretical framework were 
explored: as part of a municipality’s approach towards IWRM at a local scale, we 
concentrated on water and sanitation services, leaving aside the issue of storm-water and 
wastewater de-coupling. Albeit not included in this framework, we also chose not to 
specifically explore the issue of land use planning, a municipal tool that also has important 
impacts on water resources, and this for the same reason of time restriction.  
It is also important to highlight that obtaining information in Mexico is not always easy, and 
generally more time-consuming than originally planned: very often « the available 
information is contradictory, vague or inexistent, leading to rumours both absurd and 
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counter-productive » (translated from: Marie et al., 2005: 245), which complicates the task of 
the researcher trying to establish useful –and usable- information. 
Finally, even though throughout this thesis we recognise the major role played by politics in 
Mexican water management, it was not our purpose to investigate this aspect in much detail. 
Many articles and books exist, however, for those who wish to look this aspect up (in 
particular, we suggest the reading of López et al., 2004; Mollard and Vargas, 2004a and 
2004b). 
 
New questions 
It also seems interesting to list a few new research questions that emerged following this 
study, which might constitute potential tracks for future research:  
Specifically regarding the municipality of El Grullo:  
• Which potable water pricing structure would enable the municipal water board to reach 
full cost-recovery while guaranteeing basic needs throughout the municipal 
communities, and how could this be set up and effectively implemented? 
• How could a system of cost-sharing be devised in order to allow for the installation of 
meters for all households in the municipality?  
More generally speaking:  
• To which extent can the coordination of several inter-municipal platforms inside one 
watershed allow for a better implementation of IWRM?  
 
Reflections for ongoing debate 
Hereafter we wish to open up in generality and contribute elements to certain debates 
concerning IWRM.  
Triggering elements 
First, it seems important to highlight that in the region of study, the crucial factor that 
triggered the two initiatives aiming at a more sustainable natural resources management –be 
it the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission or the Inter-municipal Initiative- was the 
exceptional involvement of a group of researchers from the University of Guadalajara, who 
teamed up with a federal dependency (the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve). Initially, 
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they responded to a social demand expressed by the riparian communities affected by the 
Ayuquila River contamination, and have since managed to give real continuity to this 
bottom-up process and generate concrete positive changes for the area. Such ties, enabling to 
combine scientific knowledge with regulatory power to respond to local demands, should be 
encouraged whenever possible. Also important to mention is the role of international 
academic links and exchanges between the IMECBIO of the University of Guadalajara and 
other universities with more experience in ecological restoration (the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison) or watershed management (that of Guelph).  
 
Scale of implementation of IWRM 
Then, the results of this thesis feed into the debate that questions the watershed as the best 
unit to implement IWRM. This is a rather young theme, as experiences of watershed-based 
IWRM are sometimes only barely starting: as highlighted by Tortajada (2005), it is only once 
the results of the current Latin American wave of IWRM and its implementation through 
watersheds are available and comprehensively analysed, that it will be possible to compare 
these with results of “alternative institutional arrangements”, and draw conclusions “as to 
which should be the preferred option and under what conditions” (Tortajada, 2005: 314). 
Choosing the watershed as a management unit requires integrating other scales of 
management, where other institutions manage agriculture, environment, etc., and thus the 
integration might depend on the degree of decision-making power and financial resources of 
the river basin institutions (Tortajada, 2005). A “major failure” of many developing countries 
seems to have been to consider the establishment of river basin organizations as a trendy 
“end by itself, and not the means to an end, the end being a more efficient, decentralized, 
participative process where needs and requirements of the several stakeholders (including 
the environment) are identified, analysed objectively, and then rational decisions are made 
within a social-economic-environment framework” (Tortajada, 2005: 315). Such institutions 
are thus created and expected to work, without any support or resources.  
Watershed organizations indeed “perfectly reflect the traditional powers and will of 
openness”, as the watershed is the place where institutional innovation determines the type 
of regulation and of participation that will be set up (Mollard and Vargas, 2005b: 18).  
As highlighted by Barraqué (1994), local consensuses such as those of the waterings in the 
Netherlands or the Tennessee Valley Authority –the founding examples of an IWRM- 
highlight to which extent integrated water resources management is a socio-political 
problem that can lead to more bottom-up public decision processes. For the time being, this 
has not yet materialised, as we saw through our case of the Ayuquila-Armería Watershed 
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Commission, but it is possible that the reforms brought to the Mexican legislative framework 
work in favour of less top-down decision-making.  
It is increasingly recognised that IWRM should be planned at the level of a watershed, but 
can only be implemented at a smaller scale. Illustrative of the current importance of this 
theme was the interest, expressed during the 4th World Water Forum in Mexico City in 
March 2006 (which stressed the importance of local authorities in managing water), in the 
experience of multi-level implementation as is being explored in the Ayuquila-Armería 
watershed (Tania Román Guzmán, personal communication). Similar initiatives of municipal 
associations or local government consortiums have developed in several countries of the 
region, such as Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican Republic. They also 
demonstrate that they are more successful than individual municipalities in ensuring 
technical capacity development and financial viability for water supply and sanitation, 
environmental protection or watershed management (Brannstrom, 2004; Jouravlev, 2003). 
 
National specificities to approach IWRM 
Also being questioned is the possibility of implementing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. As 
commented by C. Tortajada, the transfer of the French model of integrated river basin 
management to Latin America is, for example, limited in Mexico by the highly centralized 
water management, and the fact it might not be possible to replicate the basis of the French 
system’s relative success, i.e. its financing by taxation. More tailored-specific implementation 
procedures are required, such as, for example, smaller scale initiatives capable of 
circumventing the still highly centralised water management system in Mexico.   
Jonch-Clausen insists that while essential elements in IWRM need to be identified to help 
stakeholders undertake reforms in water resources management towards more integrated 
approaches, sufficient flexibility must be left to each country to find its path according to its 
national context: “Water as a resource and its development and management is specific to 
the geographical, historical, cultural and economic context of any country. Hence IWRM 
processes will differ from country to country, and there is no ‘one size fits all’. To assure 
political interest and public support, the initial focus should be on crucial, urgent issues. (...) 
For the poorest countries of the world the national IWRM planning processes may well focus 
strongly on how to attain the UN Millennium Development Goals (…). For the richer 
countries of the world, progress towards IWRM may be pursued by focusing on 
environmental maintenance and restoration” (Jonch-Clausen, 2004: 9).  
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Applicability problems of IWRM 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, despite its growing presence on the international 
water agenda, the concept of IWRM remains extremely criticised. Presented as ‘the’ solution 
to the world’s water management problems, its actual implementation still remains to be 
seen.   
Along with the concept of sustainable development, despite a global acceptance, it faces 
numerous shortcomings, among which: inadequate institutional and legal frameworks, 
centralized decision-making, absence of political will to make the change, lack of qualified 
staff and financial resources, in addition to the complexity of the task due to the important 
number of sectors related to the water sector, and feeble effects of decentralisation 
(Tortajada, 2005). 
The implementation of these approaches requires such important radical changes that to 
facilitate these, resisted by many for fear of losing their advantages, it is recommended to 
experiment IWRM on small scales, through incremental steps, by staying pragmatic and 
context-specific (Chéret, 2004). “The need for an integrated water resources management 
framework will require major policy reforms and a far higher level of policy coordination 
than is found in most countries. […] Creating these levels of synergy is far from easy, and 
perhaps the most pragmatic approach is to develop them incrementally, with each step 
having a clear purpose and demonstrable benefits” (UN-WWAP, 2001: 34). 
Further, IWRM risks not being considered as a serious and reliable doctrine, unless it accepts 
to critically balance out its past experiences, such as the Mexican experience highlights 
(Mollard et al., 2005a). 
According to many authors (Gyawali et al., 2006; Mollard and Vargas, 2005a), by avoiding to 
recognise the ideological feature of this concept, its promoters are trying to make it sound 
simpler than it really is. In reality, the use and interpretation of such a concept are highly 
influenced by political relations: “IWRM professionals have to decide whom and what they 
want to serve” (Mostert, submitted: 1). As previously highlighted, the difficult task of 
making trade-offs also needs to be made clearer (Falkenmark, 2003). 
In both cases, there is a need to take and give time: “The advocacy phase for the idea has 
been carried out according to the Johannesburg decision, but very few people, particularly in 
terms of stakeholders on the ground, know what this is all about and this remains the case 
even in the richest countries in the world" (Chéret, 2004: 8).  In addition, each person must 
take his responsibility to play his part in this process: “All actors, at all levels, must look at 
the water-related aspects of their activities" (Chéret, 2004: 10). 
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Brüschweiler clearly resumes the challenges faced by those which promote the diffusion of 
IWRM:  “How can such an ideal concept be realized, when so many changes are required 
that it is difficult to know where to start? Without a doubt, IWRM represents a highly 
challenging and complex approach. In fact, this is why it so well suits the nature of water. 
IWRM is not a product, but a process that offers a flexible framework with several points of 
entry, like a puzzle in which each move represents a further step on the way to sustainable 
integrated management” (Brüschweiler, 2003: 5). The future will tell us whether the 
promoters of an IWRM succeed in this quest, and through which modalities. 
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Annex 1: A relatively recent explosive institutional “mushrooming” around water issues 
 
Unlike the secretariats that exist for the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, water management is not 
the unique focus issue of any one institution belonging to the United Nations agencies. On 
the contrary, due to its cross cutting feature, not less than 62 UN institutions deal with water 
(such as those in charge of the programmes on education, agriculture, security, etc…) (Crié, 
1992). Many have developed specific programmes and units dedicated to water.  
For example, the International Hydrological Programme (IHP) is UNESCO’s 
intergovernmental scientific programme in water resources (www.unesco.org/water/ihp). 
Based in Paris, France, it was first initiated as the International Hydrological Decade (1965-
1974) to become the IHP in 1975. It is a long-term programme organised along 6-year 
periods. IHP-VI, covering 2002-2007 and dedicated to “Water interactions: systems at risk 
and social challenges”, reflects the growing importance of the social science component, only 
recently incorporated to more traditionally technical approaches.   
Then in 1978, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) created the Global 
Environmental Monitoring System for Water Programme (GEMS/Water) 
(www.gemswater.org). Its mandate is to collect data and information on inland water 
quality (both surface and groundwater) for environmental assessments at regional and 
global levels. Country-by-country data banks are accessible in GEMS/Water’s Annual 
Reports, while data at regional level is presented in the GEO Yearbooks. Since March 2005, 
all this information is also accessible through an online searchable database called Gemstat 
(www.gemstat.org), result of the “Great water quality data drive”, a global call in 2004 for 
water quality monitoring and data.  
But the transversal dimension of water across the UN institutions is particularly reflected by 
more recent set ups, such as the World Water Assessment Program (WWAP) 
(www.unesco.org/water/wwap), whose secretariat is housed in the UNESCO Division of 
Water Sciences in Paris. Established in 2000, it is a joint effort by 24 UN agencies to develop 
tools –essentially key indicators- and skills to improve global water supply and quality. It 
promotes an integrated approach to management, with river basins and watersheds as the 
natural hydrological unit, and policies designed to take account of full-cost pricing and 
stakeholder needs and expectations. Its priorities are to assess the state of the world’s 
freshwater resources and ecosystems worldwide and evaluate progress made since Rio 
towards achieving specific targets, identifying gaps and assisting countries in improving 
their own water management policies and practices, through local capacity development. 
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Results of this ongoing assessment process are presented every three years in the World 
Water Development Reports, while information to decision-makers and other stakeholders is 
also provided through the world water portal developed with other partners 
(www.unesco.org/water).   
Since 2003, UN-Water (www.unwater.org) has been set up as the official UN inter-agency 
mechanism for follow-up of the water-related decisions taken at the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development and the Millennium Development Goals. In addition to 
providing support at global, regional and country level in this respect, it is responsible for 
organising the UN World Water Day and the UN Decade on Water 2005-2015.  
Alongside these UN programmes and mechanisms, many new organisations fully dedicated 
to water have developed. Although some already existed in the first half of the 20th century, 
many were created during a very short time span in the 90s, illustrating the growing 
importance water has taken recently. Each one each of these institutions, with its specific 
approach, now plays a major role in the international arena.  
The International Association of Hydrological Sciences (IAHS) (www.cig.ensmp.fr/~iahs) 
is the oldest and foremost international nongovernmental organisation that deals with 
hydrology and water resources. In 1922 it was part of the larger International Union of 
Geodesy and Geophysics, of which it distinguished itself increasingly as of 1948, to take its 
present name only in 1971. It is made up of 8 International Commissions (on surface water, 
groundwater, continental erosion, water quality, water resources systems, remote-sensing, 
coupled land-atmosphere system, tracers and formerly snow and ice). Working in close 
collaboration with UNESCO since the International Hydrological Decade launched in 1965, 
as well as the World Meteorological Organization, the three organisations award the 
International Hydrology Prize annually since 1981.  
Established in 1950, the International Council on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) 
(www.icid.org) is a scientific, technical and voluntary not-for-profit nongovernmental 
international organisation based in New Delhi, India. It is dedicated to enhancing 
worldwide food supply and fibre for all, through research, development and capacity 
building in the fields of water and land management and increased productivity of irrigated 
and drained lands.   
The International Water Resources Association (IWRA) (www.iwra.siu.edu) was created in 
1972. A non-profit organisation, it promotes a more sustainable management of water 
resources through networking, mainly in the forms of dialogue, education and research. 
Based at the Southern Illinois University, it publishes the Water International Journal, sponsors 
regional conferences and convenes the World Water Congress each three years.  
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Almost twenty years later, in 1990, the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council 
(WSSCC) (www.wsscc.org) took over international coordination of the various agencies 
since the end of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Existing 
since 1988 (as the ESA Collaborative Council), this international NGO aims at accelerating 
the achievement of sustainable water, sanitation and waste management services to all, 
through collaboration between developing countries and donor agencies. The World Health 
Organisation in Geneva, Switzerland, hosts its secretariat. One of its most notorious actions 
has been the WASH campaign, to raise awareness and bring about the necessary changes in 
structure and behaviours in the fields of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene.  
In 1991, the International Office for Water (www.oieau.fr) was founded. This non-profit 
making association based in Paris, is a network of 149 partner organisations from all over the 
world and all sectors, involved in water resources management and protection. It provides 
professional training as well as information and documentation for capacity building for a 
better water management. Among its numerous activities, it presents databanks and 
international networks, such as the Aqualingua project, a free multilingual and online 
dictionary of technical terms and expressions financed by the European Community with the 
aim of breaking down linguistic barriers between the member countries (available at 
http://scripts.oieau.fr/aqualingua).  
The International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO) was created in 1994 (www.inbo-
news.org). Its technical secretariat is the International Office for Water. With currently 125 
member organisations in 42 countries, the INBO works to “support the creation and 
development of basin organizations throughout the world”. Its four guiding principles are: 
“For major basins, organization of integrated water resources management and 
environmental management, aiming at optimal satisfaction of all legitimate requirements; 
participation of local government and all user categories when determining water policy, 
mainly through river basin committees; Formulation of basin master plans with medium and 
long-term objectives and their implementation under five-year priority action programs; 
Implementation of targeting funding systems based on the ‘user-polluter-pays’ principle, so 
that ‘water pays for water’” (French Water Stakeholders, 2000). Aquadoc-Inter, a network of 
national information centres on water, is the result of cooperation between INBO member 
organisations to establish an international portal on water management in river basins 
(www.aquadocinter.org).  
Two new non-governmental organisations have brought the international debate on IWRM 
further: the Global Water Partnership and the World Water Council. Although both were 
founded in 1996 with similar objectives, the first is a facilitator of IWRM projects (tools for 
IWRM at catchment or local level), while the second promotes itself as a 'think-tank' on 
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IWRM issues (global and policy issues) and works to both develop a global water inventory, 
while identifying water-related problems and proposing solutions (Calder, 2005).  
In 1996, the World Water Council (WWC) (www.worldwatercouncil.org) was established in 
Marseille, France, as a “common umbrella to unite the disparate, fragmented, and ineffectual 
efforts on global water management” by “water specialists, the academic community and 
international organizations”. Since then, in order to raise awareness in the political spheres 
as well as across society, this international water policy think-tank financed by the World 
Bank and where the water industry is very present, organises the World Water Forums 
jointly with a host country each three years (Comision Nacional del Agua and World Water 
Council, 2004). Further, as the INBO’s Aquadoc-Inter does not provide information on water 
uses, another database was set up by the World Water Council and the French Ministry of 
Ecology and Sustainable Development in April 2005, as the Water Monitoring Alliance 
website (www.watermonitoringalliance.net). 
In 1996, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) (www.gwpforum.org) was set up by the 
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the Swedish International 
Development Agency to provide coordinated assistance to developing countries 
specifically on integrated management of water resources. It facilitates the exchange of 
information and experiences relative to IWRM. This new holistic and participative approach 
to water management was identified as a necessity after the Dublin and Rio Conferences. 
Working closely with the INBO to promote basin organisations, the partnership integrates all 
types of institutions involved in water management, from public to private and from 
governmental to multilateral development agencies. As way of promotion and 
implementation, it has developed a Toolbox for IWRM (see Chapter 2).  
Since 1997, the Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) (www.siwi.org), a policy 
think-tank, “links water experts to decision-makers so that progressive policies and 
scientifically sound, water-cycle solutions to water-related problems can be elaborated. […] 
SIWI stresses that water is a key to socio-economic development and quality of life, and that 
through integrated water resources management (IWRM), barriers which hinder increased 
food production, pollution prevention and poverty reduction can be overcome”. 
Each year in August, SIWI administers the Stockholm Water Symposium (or World Water 
Week), the main annual global platform for dialogue, whose objective is to develop 
“practical solutions and strategies that will help to alleviate the world water crisis” (SIWI, 
2005). From 2003-2007, the framework theme is “Drainage Basin Security: Prospects for 
Trade Offs and Benefit Sharing in a Globalised World”. Sub-themes range from “Balancing 
production, trade and water use” (2003),  “Regional Approaches for Food and Urban 
Security” (2004), to “Hard and Soft Solutions in Regional Development” (2005). In 2005, 
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several seminars referred to IWRM: “Scenario building as approach for IWRM”, “IWRM- Do 
we practice it in the North?”, “Harnessing Uncertainty: Taking Complexity and 
Vulnerability Seriously in IWRM”, “Benefit Sharing from Integrated Land and Water Use in 
River Basins”. 
Also in 1997, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research launched the 
Environment-Water Task Force (ec.europa.eu/research/tf-wat1.html), which also includes 
the Development and the Environment branches, and identifies 10 priority action lines.  
In 1999, the International Water Association (IWA) (www.iwahq.org.uk) was the result of 
the merger between the International Association of Water Quality and the International 
Water Supply Association. It is an international professional membership association 
“committed to furthering sustainable and holistic resource management and service 
provision, built on the concept of the complete water cycle”. Its members range from 
individuals to countries or regions. Founder member of the World Water Council, it is 
involved in the Global Water Partnership and the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative 
Council. Founder of the International Water Associations Liaison Committee, bonding the 
principal international water associations, it also has an important publishing branch (which 
includes Water 21). IWA organises the annual IWA World Water Congress, as well as leading 
edge and regional conferences.  
Supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research with funding 
from the World Bank and 30 other donors, the International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI) (www.iwmi.cgiar.org) is a non-profit scientific research organisation with 
headquarters based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. In 2000, it evolved from the International 
Irrigation Management Institute, created in 1983 by the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka. It works with partners in Africa and Asia to help them develop tools and methods to 
eradicate poverty through a more effective management of their water and land resources. 
Its four main activities –water productivity and poverty mapping, analysing high potential 
interventions and assessing impacts - are organised around its four new research themes 
(Basin water management; Land, water and livelihoods; Agriculture, water and cities; Water 
management and environment). 
At the World Bank, the Water Resources Management Group exists since 2000. It has 
members from the main stakeholder groups (water supply and sanitation, hydropower, 
irrigation and environment). 
The International Water History Association (IWHA) (www.iwha.net) was founded in 2001 
as “a forum for the widest possible debate”, aimed at fostering research on the links 
between water and humankind. 
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The International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC) (www.irc.nl) was established as the 
International Reference Centre for Community Water Supply in 1968 by an agreement 
between the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Dutch Government, to become the 
hub of a network of some 32 National WHO Collaborating Institutions in both developed 
and developing countries. Its aim is to provide knowledge and information to enable the 
poor to meet their water and sanitation needs in a sustainable, efficient and affordable 
manner. It is based in Delft, Netherlands. 
Since 2003, the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education (UNESCO-IHE) (www.unesco-
ihe.org) was created. The mandate given by UNESCO to IHE (the International Institute for 
Infrastructural, Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering in Delft University, Netherlands) 
is to “strengthen and mobilise the global educational and knowledge base for integrated 
water resources management and meet the water related capacity building needs of the 
developing and countries in transition”. 
The CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research), an alliance of 
countries, international and regional organisations and private foundations set up the 
Challenge Program on Water and Food (www.waterforfood.org) in 2003, to take up the 
water productivity challenge: growing more food with less water. Its main and interrelated 
research themes are: Crop water productivity improvement; Water and people in 
catchments; Aquatic ecosystems and fisheries; Integrated basin water management systems; 
Global and national food and water systems. 
The Third World Centre for Water Management (www.thirdworldcentre.org), based in 
Mexico, aims at generating and synthesising new knowledge, applying existing 
knowledge and disseminating information. It works extensively with the numerous 
networks it belongs to around the world.  
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Annex 2: Anecdotes from fieldwork  
The following anecdotes result from impressions gathered all along the fieldwork, which 
oscillated between pure enchantment and “feeling at home”, to strong urges at times to… go 
back home! 
While my study focused on the municipality of El Grullo, I was based in the neighbouring 
municipality of Autlán. Its eponymous capital is a small urban centre of 40,000 inhabitants 
that hosts the University of Guadalajara’s Centre for the South Coast. Autlán is located 
approximately 200 km to the south of Guadalajara –Mexico’s second biggest city- in the State 
of Jalisco. This is a state from which originate many of the symbols traditionally associated to 
Mexican folklore: mariachi musicians, tequila, jaripeo (a form of rodeo), charro (the typical 
representation of the Mexican man, whose costume varies from a more countryside to a 
more festive version) and palenque (gambles on cockfights).  
In Autlán, for example, cowboys are a common sight. Some work in the rodeo-shows, which 
enable them to earn quite a lot more money than working in the fields. I went to see a 
performance once, in a small-scale local bullring, and it was a sort of digest of the many 
festive qualities which make life in Mexico so lively: an orchestra was playing typical –and 
loud- music in the background, families and groups of youngsters formed the audience, and 
in the end, everybody danced on the platforms of the small stadium, between buckets of 
empty beer bottles!  
 
Along with such informal events that take place on a regular basis, other festivities, common 
throughout the country, punctuate each season, giving the impression there is always an 
opportunity to celebrate: the Carnival (in February in Autlán), official dates like 
Independence Day (15 September) or the Day of the Revolution (20 November), as well as 
the numerous traditional Christian celebrations all year long, along with more specific events 
like the day of the Virgin of Guadalupe, the most famous saint in Mexico (12 December). 
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Day-to-day life is very lively, for several reasons.  
The climate, for one, is generally very nice (except in April-May, when it tends to get 
unbearably hot!). Whatever the season, it is sunny everyday –even during the rainy season, 
when it rains mostly in the afternoons. So it is common for some of the inhabitants to gather 
in the central plaza in the evenings to have a chat with a corn on the cob or an ice cream –
each Mexican town, as little as it may be, always has its central plaza with a well-attended 
garden and a bandstand. Unfortunately, the romantic custom (single girls walking one way 
around the plaza, single boys the other) has now been modernised, replaced by the latter 
driving by in four-wheel drives with the loudest possible music to attract attention! 
Another characteristic is the colourfulness, embedded in the culture, be it to celebrate specific 
events –like the Day of the Dead (see picture below, in a bank) or other festivities- or 
reflected in the traditional clothing and architecture 
 
 
The simple journey by bus between Autlán and El Grullo is also thrilling. Landscapes give a 
complete change of scene, ranging from the huge cactus bordering agave fields, to views of 
bougainvillaea and Jacarandas in the sun, set against the Sierra de Manantlán mountains in 
the background. But seasonal differences are very marked, with the lush vegetation of the 
surrounding hillsides undergoing complete transformation during the dry season.  
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The food is also amazing –unfortunately the one served in ‘Mexican restaurants’ in Europe 
tends to concentrate on a few landmark dishes and leaves out the more traditional recipes. 
My big favourites turned out to be the appetizers (cucumber with lemon and chilli, or tacos 
with tomatoes, coriander and lemon), but also Jalisco specialities like the posole soup, nopales 
and all the home-cooked dishes of Juliana and Gisela from across the university campus! 
Going to the market every Saturday was a real treat in terms of fresh fruit smells in addition 
to the bubbly atmosphere of noisy sellers. 
Mexico is not a bad place to work alone in, because it’s difficult to feel lonely very long: you 
just need to go out and talk with people on the street (shopkeepers, shoe-shiners, you name 
it). One aspect that always made me regret coming back to Europe was the contrast in terms 
of informal daily relationships. Mexicans talk very easily, even when they don’t know each 
other: if someone in the bus sneezes, people usually say “salud”; when you get off, the driver 
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says “que le vaya bien” or “adios”. Each time I came back to Switzerland I experienced a sort of 
cultural shock, disappointed to be once again surrounded by people wary of ‘the other’. 
The kindness and hospitality of the Mexicans is also a rather constant trait, although this 
might be more specific to rural areas, as is often the case. On a regular basis, during my 
interviews with households, interviewees gave me a fruit or offered to share some tortillas –
or whatever they were having for breakfast or dinner. 
Finally, my last –but not least- thrill was the discovery of the traditional dancing: I had the 
opportunity to see various performances of the local ballet group (which has existed for 30 
years and won several prizes at national level), showcasing dances from many States of 
Mexico. Each time, I was swooped away by incredible scenes and performances, the variety 
of rhythm and costumes illustrating the country’s very rich cultural diversity.  
 
 
Some funny things happened too.  
Due to the fact I was far from being totally fluent in Spanish when I started out, I did have 
some problems getting myself understood at first. One day I went to buy basil to put in my 
spaghetti, and explained I was going to use it to put in my “pasta”…not knowing this also 
has the more common significance of toothpaste. When I left the shop with my pot of basil, I 
overheard the owner telling his wife that I was going to use it to brush my teeth…They 
cracked up, and I cracked up too, imagining them imagining me! 
Another time, during an interview with two elderly people in the urban neighbourhood of 
Del Alamo, in El Grullo, the man started telling me jokes about the old times: he used to 
work for the train company and would travel quite a bit. Once, as a present, he bought his 
wife some nice shoes: apparently he has been drunk during the purchase, because when she 
opened the present, there were two shoes of a different colour, and for the same foot! It was 
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very touching to see this old man who cares tenderly for his wife (now losing her memory), 
so pleased with this hilarious recollection.  
In December 2004, I witnessed the setting up of the first-ever Christmas decorations in 
Autlán’s central plaza –a luxurious testimony of the general increased well-being in the 
municipality. There was both an artificial Christ child’s crib, as well as a live one, with sheep 
and ducks. One of the ducks managed to get loose and the municipal employees started 
chasing him, with no luck, as he flew away in circles to always come back to his mate. The 
scene went on forever, and I left without knowing the outcome. 
 
 
Although I was extremely fortunate to experience all this, there were times when things were 
not as rosy.  
For one thing, I had to get used to the noise. Mexicans love loud music, loud advertisement, 
loud conversations, and Autlán, the biggest town in the region, is renowned for this. 
Fortunately, the Sierra de Manantlán Biosphere Reserve, a very peaceful and quiet place 
close-by, once provided a perfect escape for a weekend! 
Then, I had lots of trouble with the treatment of pet animals, especially dogs, generally free 
to roam around and usually very badly treated.  
But the worst of it all was the poverty. The region has been severely impacted by the 
agricultural crisis following the North American Free Trade Agreement, explaining why 
frequently at least one family member emigrated to work in the United States. Family 
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support is often the only resort for the elderly or handicapped, whose pensions –when they 
exist- are rarely sufficient. Some of the interviews had sad moments, when people talked 
about how their lack of means prevented them from going to school, or from buying medical 
treatments for their children.  
Moreover, the valley attracts immigrants seeking employment, originating from other 
Mexican States such as Oaxaca or Guerrero, where the economic situation is even worse. On 
the road between Autlán and El Grullo, one is generally struck by a small village, in the 
middle of which shacks with aluminium roofs house seasonal workers during the sugarcane 
harvest; young children in rags play in the mud in front of this small local favela. These 
workers are indigenous people, and are often despised by the locals coming from Jalisco 
(generally descendents of intermarriages with the Spanish).  
But difficult and enthusiastic moments taken together, to sum up, the whole experience was 
very enriching, enabling me to discover a small part of a country I had a lot of preconceived 
ideas about, and which will now stay forever as my second home: “Aqui tienes tu casa” (“your 
house is here”) as they say. 
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Annex 3: List of various definitions related to ‘IWRM’ (Biswas, 2005) 
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Annex 4: Countries classified as having made “good progress” in first GWP survey 
 
Region/Country  IWRM status and prospects (from survey in 2003) 
Eastern Africa 
Uganda Excellent framework for IWRM Plans and achievement of MDGs related to water 
Northern Africa 
Egypt Water sector reform ongoing. IWRM Plan prepared. Stakeholder involvement in the IWRM 
Plan development and participation of the stakeholders in modifying and updating the 
IWRM. Participates in Nile Basin Initiative. 2005 Target of IWRM Plan likely to be met. 
Southern Africa 
South Africa Water sector reform is advanced. There is a comprehensive water policy and updated 
legislation in place. Some implementation has started. Existing processes and outputs can 
merely be repackaged for meeting targets by 2005.  
Zimbabwe Water sector reform progress is advanced. There is a comprehensive water policy and 
updated legislation in place. Some implementation has started. Existing processes and 
outputs can merely be repackaged for meeting targets by 2005. Limited financial support 
may be required. Support required for implementation of water act.  
West Africa 
Burkina Faso IWRM action plan already adopted by the Government. The main challenge and task for the 
country remains implementing PAGIRE [IWRM action plan] with the support of partners. 
Ghana IWRM action plan already adopted by the Government. The main task for the country 
remains implementing IWRM action plan with the support of development partners. 
Central Asia and Caucasus 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is the country best prepared in the region to realise an IWRM Plan.  
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Governance system of Kyrgyz Republic is developing rapidly. Most elements in place for an 
IWRM Plan. Potential for impact is great. 
Asia 
China Although there has been no definite IWRM National Plan until now, China has been 
applying an IWRM approach and methodology in all the fields of water resources 
management while receiving experiences and lessons. Water resources issues rank high on 
the governmental agenda. An institutional and legal framework for IWRM has been 
established, and focused efforts are being made to achieve IWRM approach. The near future 
is a critical period for China to translate the principles of IWRM, in light of the new Water 
Law, into specific measures and instruments and overcome the identified challenges. 
Pacific 
FrenchPolynesia EU regulations apply to French Territory. Therefore has to meet EU deadlines and criteria. 
New Caledonia EU regulations apply to French Territory. Therefore has to meet EU deadlines and criteria. 
Central America 
Costa Rica The process is underway and will culminate with an IWRM Plan needing financing. 
Both the political leadership and the Costa Rican society at large show a growing awareness 
about the urgent need to define and move towards IWRM.   
Nicaragua A Water Resources National Management Plan that needs to be updated. Besides, a national 
commitment to implement the plan is required. Nicaragua has some instruments and basic 
organization for IWRM but still lacks some of the legal, technical and financial resources to 
implement it. Capacity building must be pursued at the national level and integrated 
management needs to be further promoted among decision makers and at the basin level.  
South America 
Brazil The National Water Agency of Brazil – ANA- was established in 2000. The establishment of 
ANA was mandated by the National Water Resources Policy, which along with the National 
Water Resources Management System was legally created in 1997. (…) Brazil is a federation 
and almost all of its states have their own water legislation and legal mechanisms. (…) ANA 
is establishing the IWRM’s principal mechanisms that were forecast in Brazilian law: basin 
committees and basin water agencies in federal basins. The Paraiba’s Basin Committee 
started to charge water use. States are in different levels, but mostly financial support is 
needed for programs like: water use rationalization, sewage and water quality.  
Source: GWP, 2004a 
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Annex 5: Calculating interviews to be held in the three riparian villages  
 
 Total 
population 
(census 
2000)* 
Households 
(census  
2000)* 
10% of 
households 
(rounded 
off) 
Number 
of 
interviews 
realised 
Coverage 
in terms of 
households 
Municipality 
of El Grullo 
22.499 5145    
El Grullo 
town 
19984 4536    
La Laja 416 88 9 9 10% 
Palo Blanco 134 38 4 10 26% 
El Aguacate 261 71 7 10 14% 
* INEGI, XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000 
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Annex 6: Interview guide with households (November-December 2004) 
 
Place of interview: 
Type of habitat: 
Date of interview: 
Interview number (House number):  
GENERAL INFORMATION 
M / F 
Name (but confidentiality guaranteed in results): 
Age: 
Place of birth: 
Number of years living in this locality: 
Number of years living in this house/apartment: 
Number of persons in the family: 
Number of persons living in the house: 
Number of persons living abroad: 
Is this your house/apartment or do you rent it?  
Do you have a connection to the public service of water inside your house/apartment?  
Professional occupation of household head: Agriculture/Commercial/Livestock-rearer/Other (specify) 
INFORMATION RELATED TO DOMESTIC USE 
1.1 WITH CONNECTION TO WATER SUPPLY PUBLIC SERVICES 
When do you have water from the tap (which days, how many hours per day)? 
How do you face the fact you do not have water from the tap all the time? For example, do you have a tank? If 
you do, is it an elevated or underground tank? 
If house, do you have a washing-house in your property? What do you use it for? 
If house, do you have a well in your property? For which activities do you use it? 
Did you build the well yourself? 
Do you know how deep the water is here? 
Do your neighbours also have wells for the same purpose? 
How much do you pay for your connection per year, and where?  
When do you usually pay for your connection, and why? 
If you have a well, do you have a discount of 20%? Do you know why? 
Do you know what a meter is? Do you prefer to pay a fixed fee or would you prefer to have a meter? 
1.2 WITHOUT CONNECTION TO WATER SUPPLY PUBLIC SERVICES 
Why don’t you have a connection to the public service of water inside your house? 
What are the problems that this creates?  
In particular, has this created health problems in your family? 
How do you face the problem of not having water? 
Do your neighbours have the same problems and react the same as you do? 
If house: do you have a well in your property? For which activities do you use it?  
Did you build it yourself? 
Do you know how deep the water is here? 
Did you have to pay anything for it? If so, to whom? 
What about your neighbours, do they also have a well for the same reason? 
Although you do not have tap water, do you have to pay something to the Municipal water and sanitation Board? 
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Why and how much? 
2. DRINKING WATER 
Where does your drinking water come from? 
If you buy it: How many garrafones (capacity= 1 gallon or 20l) do you buy per week? 
And how much to do you pay per garrafon? 
3. SAVING/WASTING HABITS 
In your use of water for domestic use, do you think you waste water? 
What about your neighbours? 
4. OPINION ABOUT THE WATER SYSTEM 
Are you satisfied with this water system? 
If there are any problems: according to you, what are the causes of these problems? 
What would be required to reduce the problem? 
INFORMATION RELATED TO PROFESSIONAL USE 
1. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY  
What is your commercial activity? 
How much do you earn per day, week or year? 
Is this your only source of income? If you have others, how much do you earn in total? 
Do you have a connection to the public service for commercial use of water? 
If you do not have water all the time, what are the problems that this creates and how do you face them? 
How much do you pay for your connection per year, and where? 
When do you pay it and why?  
In your use of water for commercial use, do you think you save or waste water?  
What about your neighbours, do they all have the same attitude? 
Are you satisfied with this water system for your commercial use? 
Does it allow you to make the maximum economic benefits? 
If there are any problems: According to you, what are the causes of these problems? 
What would be required to reduce the problem?  
2. IRRIGATION ACTIVITY 
LANDOWNER OR DAILY WORKER WITH PARCELS 
Are you a member of the Water Users’ Association? 
Where is/are your parcel(s) located? 
How big is/are your parcel(s)? 
What types of crops are there in your fields? 
Why did you decide to cultivate such a crop? 
How much does/do your parcel(s) let you earn per day, week or year? 
Is this your only source of income? If you have others, how much do you earn in total? 
What technology do you use to irrigate? 
If canal irrigation: would you like to become a beneficiary of the tube technology, and why/why not?  
If tube irrigation: why did you decide to become a beneficiary of the tube technology? 
If groundwater irrigation: Why do you irrigate with groundwater? 
Do you use drip-irrigation? If not, why not? 
How much water does your concession allow you to have? 
Are there any problems related to receiving the right quantity of water? 
If there are, how do you react to solve them? 
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Do your neighbours have the same problems and react the same as you? 
How much do you pay for this concession, to whom and when? 
If groundwater irrigation: Why do you irrigate with groundwater? 
In your use of water for irrigation, do you think you save or waste water?  
What about your neighbours, do they all have the same attitude? 
Are you satisfied with this water system for your agricultural use? 
Does it allow you to make the maximum economic benefits? 
If there are any problems: According to you, what are the causes of these problems? 
What would be required to reduce the problem?  
DAILY WORKER WITHOUT PARCELS 
Where is/are the parcel(s) you work in located? 
How big is/are the parcel(s)? 
What type of soil is it/are they? 
What types of crops are there in the fields? 
Do you know why the landowner decided to plant this crop? 
How much does your work in other people’s parcels let you earn per day, week or year? 
Is this your only source of income? If you have others, how much do you earn in total? 
What technology is used to irrigate? 
If it is tube irrigation, do you know why the landowner wanted to be a beneficiary? 
If it isn’t tube irrigation: do you know whether the landlord would like to be a beneficiary? 
According to you, what are the advantages or drawbacks of this new system? 
If groundwater irrigation: is there drip-irrigation?  
If canal, tube or groundwater technology: Are there any problems related to receiving the right quantity of water? 
If there are, how does the landowner react to solve them? 
Do the neighbours have the same problems and react the same? 
Do you think that in the use of water for irrigation, the water is wasted?  
Are you satisfied with this water system for agricultural use? 
If there are any problems: According to you, what are the causes of these problems? 
What would be required to reduce the problem?  
3. LIVESTOCK-REARING ACTIVITY 
How much livestock do you own? 
How much does your livestock enable you to earn per day, week or year? 
Is this your only source of income? If you have others, how much do you earn in total? 
What is the source of water for livestock? 
Do you have a concession for this water? 
If yes: How much water does this concession allow you to have? 
Are there any problems related to receiving the right quantity of water? 
How do you face these problems? 
Do your neighbours have the same problems and react the same as you? 
How much do you pay for this concession and to whom? 
In your use of water for livestock drinking purposes, do you think waste the water?  
What about your neighbours, do they all have the same attitude? 
Are you satisfied with this water system for your use for livestock? 
Does it allow you to make the maximum economic benefits? 
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If there are any problems: According to you, what are the causes of these problems? 
What would be required to reduce the problem?  
INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
1. GENERAL ENVIRONMENT 
According to you, does the current water management create any problems for the environment? 
In particular, what do you think of the water taken from the River for the irrigation canals? 
What about the contamination of the river by El Grullo’s wastewaters?  
2. SANITATION SYSTEM 
Do you have a connection to the sewage system? 
If yes, do you know where your wastewaters go after going out of the house? 
If not, what type of sanitation system do you have? 
Do you know that part of the water fee you pay is to treat these wastewaters? 
ANY OTHER THEME, PROBLEM, ASPECT RELATED TO THIS DISCUSSION YOU WISH TO DISCUSS 
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Annex 7: List of codes used in Atlas t.i. to analyse household interviews 
 
Number of years living in locality: <5<10<20 years 
Number of years living in house: <5<10<20 years 
Number of family members  
Number of family members living in house 
House: owned/rented 
Professional occupation 
Water connection: yes/no 
With connection: Without connection:  
Schedule of water service: 
- Daily/non daily 
- Regular/irregular 
- <6<12 hours per day 
- Weak pressure/strong pressure 
Explanation no connection  
Storage practices: tank elevated/tank 
underground/wash-house 
Coping practices 
Pays: yearly/monthly (explanation why + fee)  
Pay preference: fee or meter or equal (+ 
explanation why) 
 
Alternative sources: well (well built self, well uses, well water depth) 
Drinking water:  
- Source (bottled water, tap water, privately built tank, purified well, several) (+ explanation) 
- Quantity 
- Price 
Waste water self/no waste self explanation 
Waste water neighbours/no waste neighbours explanation 
Opinion municipal water system: positive, negative, equal, nuanced (+ explanation why) 
River Ayuquila contaminated: yes/no and characteristics 
Connection sewage: yes/no 
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Annex 8: Interview guide with municipal presidents (April 2006) 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Interviewee:  
Date:      
Place: 
1. IWRM 
Have you already heard the expression “IWRM”, if so where? 
What does it mean for you? 
Do you think that the definition promoted by the GWP (remind) is something that can be implemented at the 
scale of the watershed? 
How do you see the role of a municipality in such an IWRM? 
What can a municipality bring to IWRM? 
Inversely, what would IWRM bring to your municipality? 
Municipal level 
In your municipality, what is the situation in terms of supplying water to all? 
What are the main problems in water supply in your municipality? How can these be overcome? 
If mayor of Autlán or El Limón: the Manantlán system (SIAPMA) 
What were the conflicts that existed between the 3 municipalities before the signature of the agreement to create 
the SIAPMA in 1996? 
As El Grullo was the only one investing financially in the maintenance of the system, what were the advantages 
for the other two municipalities to join in the agreement in 1996? 
Today, what is the situation? 
2. Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission 
Members  
How would you define this institution? 
How would you describe the role of El Grullo in this institution? 
Does your municipality participate? 
If yes, who goes? 
As representative of which water use? 
What is the period for which they are elected for this function? 
What motivated your municipality to join? 
So far, have the expected advantages materialised? If not, why not? 
Do you feel well represented by those who go? Why/why not? 
Meetings 
Are meetings between water users organised with the representative before each meeting of the Commission to 
discuss common priorities? 
Are meetings held afterwards to inform of the outcomes? 
How are decisions taken about priorities of investment? 
Do you feel that each representative has the same decision-making power as the others? 
Achievements 
As belonging to a water user group, what have been the main objectives of your group inside the Commission? 
What have been the outcomes? 
What are the Commission’s biggest successes? 
What main advantages has the Commission brought your municipality? 
Has it contributed to making it more active to solve environmental problems? Which ones? 
Has it contributed to create more awareness of interrelationships between municipalities in terms of water? How? 
Has it contributed to preventing conflicts in the region by developing dialogue? 
In your opinion, has it contributed to creating a regional solidarity between municipalities with more means and 
those with less? 
Problems 
What are the main problems of the Commission? How do you think these could be overcome? 
Sectoral water management 
Has the Commission enabled more communication between different water users? 
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What are the remaining problems that you see? How could these be overcome? 
Problems of priority of economy over social and environmental problems 
Has the Commission enabled to bring higher on the agenda the social and environmental problems in the 
watershed?  
What are the remaining problems that you see? How could these be overcome? 
What is the situation in terms of participation in the Commission? 
What are the remaining problems that you see? How could these be overcome? 
3. Inter-municipal initiative 
How would you define this institution? 
How would you describe the role of El Grullo in this institution? 
Members 
Are you the person attending from your municipality?  
What motivated your municipality to join? 
What are the advantages you expected for your municipality? Have these materialised? 
Are there alliances between municipal presidents in the Initiative? According to what? 
Does the political party play a role in these alliances? 
Meetings 
How are decisions taken about priorities of investment? 
Do you feel that each municipality has the same decision-making power as others? 
Achievements  
What are the Initiative’s biggest successes? 
What major advantages has the Inter-municipal initiative brought your municipality? 
Has it contributed to making it more active to solve environmental problems? Which ones? 
Has it contributed to create more awareness of interrelationships between municipalities in terms of water? How? 
Has it contributed to preventing conflicts in the region by developing dialogue? 
In your opinion, has it contributed to creating a regional solidarity between municipalities with more means and 
those with less? 
Problems 
What are the main problems of the Inter-municipal initiative? How could they be overcome? 
4. Inter-institutional links 
In your opinion, do the two regional initiatives influence one another? How? 
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Annex 9: Electricity costs represent 40% of water board’s expenses 
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Annex 10: Inflation rate 
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Annex 11: Municipal water fees for urban residents 
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Annex 12: Municipal water fees for rural residents 
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Annex 13: Directory of Ayuquila-Armería Watershed Commission 
 
 
Source: Gazette of the Ayquila-Armería Commission, No. 4, June 2005 
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Annex 14: Local newspaper announcing the discharge and investigation of April 2006 
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Professional experience  
 
2002-2007 Research assistant at the Laboratory of Urban Sociology, Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology Lausanne (LaSUR-EPFL) 
- Co-responsible for information management: reorganised internal 
information and promoted the team’s research in campus events 
- Participated in organising, writing up and editing annual reports  
- Attended and partially organised workshops in the Caribbean region 
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Development, Geneva 
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- Donator of Sheldrick Foundation in Kenya, UNICEF’s « Desert Flower » operation and 
Médecins Sans Frontières 
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